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Preface
This edited volume contains a selection of papers that are an outgrowth of
the SING11-GTM2015 ”European Conference on Game Theory” with additional
contributed papers. These papers present an outlook of the current development
of theory of games and its applications to various domains, such as management,
economics and environment.
SING11- GTM2015 ”European Conference on Game theory”, a three day con-
ference, was held in St. Petersburg, Russia in July 08-10, 2015. The conference was
organized by Saint-Petersburg State University (SPbSU) in collaboration with The
International Society of Dynamic Games (Russian Chapter). More than 180 partici-
pants from 35 countries had an opportunity to hear state-of-the-art presentations on
a wide range of game-theoretic models, both theory and management applications.
Plenary lectures covered different areas of games and management applications.
They had been delivered by Professor Hans Peters (University of Maastricht), Pro-
fessor David Schmeidler (Tel Aviv University), Professor Georges Zaccour (HEC
Montreal), Professor Alexander Vasin (Lomonosov Moscow State University).
The importance of strategic behavior in the human and social world is increas-
ingly recognized in theory and practice. As a result, game theory has emerged as a
fundamental instrument in pure and applied research. The discipline of game theory
studies decision making in an interactive environment. It draws on mathematics,
statistics, operations research, engineering, biology, economics, political science and
other subjects. In canonical form, a game takes place when an individual pursues
an objective(s) in a situation in which other individuals concurrently pursue other
(possibly conflicting, possibly overlapping) objectives and in the same time the ob-
jectives cannot be reached by individual actions of one decision maker. The problem
is then to determine each individual’s optimal decision, how these decisions interact
to produce equilibrium, and the properties of such outcomes. The foundations of
game theory were laid more than seventy years ago by von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1944).
Theoretical research and applications in games are proceeding apace, in areas
ranging from aircraft and missile control to inventory management, market devel-
opment, natural resources extraction, competition policy, negotiation techniques,
macroeconomic and environmental planning, capital accumulation and investment.
In all these areas, game theory is perhaps the most sophisticated and fertile
paradigm applied mathematics can offer to study and analyze decision making un-
der real world conditions. The papers presented at ”European Meeting on Game
Theory” certainly reflect both the maturity and the vitality of modern day game
theory and management science in general, and of dynamic games, in particular.
The maturity can be seen from the sophistication of the theorems, proofs, meth-
ods and numerical algorithms contained in the most of the papers. The vitality
is manifested by the range of new ideas, new applications, the growing number of
young researchers and the expanding world wide coverage of research centers and
institutes from whence the contributions originated.
6SING11- GTM2015 offered an interactive program on wide range of latest de-
velopments in game theory and management. It includes recent advances in topics
with high future potential and exiting developments in classical fields.
We thank Anna Tur for displaying extreme patience typesetting the manuscript.
Editors, Leon A. Petrosyan and Nikolay A. Zenkevich
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Abstract It is widely accepted that the decentralization process exerts neg-
ative influence on the supply chain economic performance relatively to the
case of an integrated supply chain in terms of total supply chain profit. In
other words, a decentralized supply chain is less efficient than a central-
ized one, as in a decentralized supply chain each separate member tends
to maximize his own benefits and pursue his private objectives, even if it
harms the system wide performance. Coordination, in turn, helps to miti-
gate these negative effects of a decentralized decision-making. Nevertheless,
coordination may be hard to achieve if some of the supply chain members
are competing with each other, which leads to a new line of research on such
systems, referred to as supply networks. Supply chain contract can be an
effective coordination mechanism to motivate supply network members to
be a part of entire system, in order to improve individual and system wide
performance. There are different types of contracts, such as revenue-sharing,
quantity-discount and other. The objective of the paper is methodology im-
provement of contract selection in cooperative supply networks for achieving
better supply network economic performance. The research was focused on a
two-level standard newsvendor model, which was adapted in order to reflect
the situation of competing retailers. The methodology of coordination con-
tracts decision-making was developed by devising a mechanism for contract
selection for the case of multi-echelon supply network with two competing
retailers enabling coordination at a system-wide level. The proposed model
is a novel approach in applying coordination theory at systems with inside
competition.
Keywords: Supply Chain Management, Supply Chain Coordination, Coor-
dinating Contract, Supply Network, Bargaining Power in Contract Decision-
Making
1. Introduction
In modern economy the most important features determining market competitive-
ness include product quality, company’s flexibility, costs optimization, logistic ac-
curacy, high service level and responsiveness to the ever-changing consumer needs.
Companies which are not able to adapt in time to changing market environment
should expect serious troubles in their long-term competitiveness. In this regard,
⋆ This work is supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, projects
No.16-01-00805A and 14-07-00899A and Saint-Petersburg State University, project
No.9.38.245.2014
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the concept of supply chain management is becoming more and more important
over the years, as it is seen as a strategic factor to balance customer orientation and
profitable growth (Procenko, 2006).
According to (Fedotov, 2010), the research in the field of supply chain man-
agement is currently at the stage of its conceptual development, characterized by
predominance of papers devoted to practical business needs. Main directions of the
studies include (Fedotov, 2010):
– Strategic aspects of supply chain management;
– Detailed examination of specific functions;
– Engineering and IT support of supply chain management;
– Contract relationships in supply chains.
Current article is focused on the last of the listed lines of research, namely, con-
tract relationships. Studies in this particular field emerged from the notion of supply
chain coordination, introduced by Williamson (1986) as a part of a broader science
of supply chain management. Managerial implication here lies in the necessity to
improve supply chain economic performance.
In the ideal situation, all the processes throughout the supply chain would be
managed by a single company, as, stated by Anupindi and Bassok (1999) , a single
decision-maker optimizes the network performance with the union of information
and resources available. Such a supply chain is usually referred to as an integrated
or a centralized one. Hence, supply chain economic performance is at risk as soon as
there are multiple decision-makers, who may have different private information and
their own incentives, which are at odds with the supply chain as a whole. Unfor-
tunately, current trends, such as globalization, application of outsourcing activities
and spread of information technologies worldwide lead to further fragmentation and
decentralization of supply chain operations.
This decentralization process exerts negative influence on the supply chain eco-
nomic performance relatively to the case of an integrated supply chain in terms
of total supply chain profit. In other words, a decentralized supply chain is less
efficient than a centralized one, as in a decentralized supply chain each separate
member tends to maximize his own benefits and pursue his private objectives, even
if it harms the system wide performance. Coordination, in turn, helps to mitigate
these negative effects of a decentralized decision-making.
Despite of wide literature devoted to both theoretical and practical analysis of
contract coordination mechanisms in a supply chain, as well as their modeling and
application, there is a gap in literature in what relates to researches devoted to
coordination mechanisms in a different setting of supply chain - supply network -
and to modeling the application of those mechanisms on real life cases and examples.
Supply network is understood here as a set of three or more organizations directly
involved in the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, finances and
information from a source to a consumer, provided that two or more of them are
direct competitors. In other words, supply network is a set of distinct supply chains
connected into a system with existing competition between its members.
Therefore, supply network coordination can be defined as identifying interde-
pendent activities between supply network members and devising mechanisms to
manage those interdependencies for improving the supply network economic perfor-
mance in the best interests of participating members Arishinder, 2011.
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Thus, a supply network, as a set of supply chains, is coordinated by a set of sup-
ply chain contracts. Here, a supply chain contract stands for a set of rules, rights and
obligations regulating relationships between supply chain or network members. Typ-
ically, a supply chain contract should capture the three types of flows encountered
between the companies, i.e. material, information, and financial flows Hohn, 2010.
Moreover, contracts are considered to be one of the most powerful mechanisms to
achieve coordination, as they address directly the nature of relationships evolving
within the supply system.
The goal of the present research is methodology improvement of contract selec-
tion in cooperative supply networks for achieving higher supply network economic
performance, where economic performance stands for total supply network profit.
The research was focused on a two-level one-period newsvendor model, which was
adapted to reflect the situation of competing retailers and applied as a basis to
describe the decision-making process in a given supply network. Then, the estab-
lished framework was used to model the supply network economic performance in
market dynamics under the implementation of different supply chain coordinating
contracts.
2. Cooperation, Coordination and Collaboration
Following Mentzer et al. (2001), Supply Chain Management can be defined as a sys-
temic, strategic coordination of the traditional business functions and the tactics
across these business functions within a particular company and across businesses
within the supply chain, for the purposes of improving the long-term performance
of the individual companies and the supply chain as a whole. Therefore, as noted by
Simatupang et al. (2002), the main concern of supply chain management is how to
coordinate independent companies to work together as a whole to pursue the com-
mon goal of improving individual and overall supply chain economic performance
in changing market conditions. This has been a major issue of early economic the-
ory that differentiated between the firm and its hierarchies and price mechanisms
as forms of coordination (Williamson, 1986). Following Coase (1937), if separate
companies coordinate, it is referred as combination or integration.
In the context of industrial engineering research and in particular SCM research,
the related terms cooperation, coordination, and collaboration are often used inter-
changeably without clearly distinguishing them from each other (Hammer, 2006).
At the same moment, some authors Arishinder, 2011 assume that integration, col-
laboration and cooperation are just the elements of coordination. For the purposes
of the current paper, terms cooperation, coordination and collaboration are as-
sumed to be different levels of supply chain integration. Therefore, it is necessary
to introduce clear distinction between the related terms.
Cooperation is defined as acting or working together for a shared purpose (Cam-
bridge Dictionaries Online), working or acting together toward a common end or
purpose, acquiescing willingly and being compliant (American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language), or as the act of working with someone toward a common
goal (Heinle’s Newbury House Dictionary). In the context of supply chain manage-
ment, Quiett (2002) referred to cooperation as little more than toleration of each
other. While this view might be a bit drastic, the other definitions imply that co-
operation emphasizes mainly the alignment towards a common goal and a shared
purpose. Hammer (2006) highlights that the notion of working together in the con-
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text of cooperation does not suggest a close operational working relationship, but
rather a positive attitude towards each other. Therefore, for the purposes of the
current paper cooperation is understood as an existing willingness to work together
towards a shared goal or purpose and openness towards negotiations.
Coordination, in turn, refers to a more direct, active cooperation. It is defined
as the activity of organizing separate things so that they work together (Cambridge
Dictionaries Online), the act of making arrangements for a purpose, the harmony
of various elements (American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language), and
harmonious adjustment or interaction (Heinle’s Newbury House Dictionary). Fol-
lowing Moharana et al. (2012), compared to cooperation, coordination indicates an
interactive, joint decision making process, where separate entities influence each
other’s’ decisions more directly. Besides horizontal coordination, i.e. coordination
within a supply chain tier, and vertical coordination, i.e. coordination across sup-
ply chain tiers, for example between supplier and customer, coordination can also
be distinguished from mechanism of coordination. According to Williamson (1991),
the fundamental mechanisms are markets and hierarchies. Market structures refer
mainly to incentive-driven coordination between separate, legally independent com-
panies whereas hierarchical structures indicate either a high unilateral dependency
or those companies are not legally independent or equity is shared. Hence, coordi-
nation is defined as a set of incentives and direct actions making companies work
together towards a common goal, as well as joint decision-making.
Collaboration, therefore, can be defined as working together or with someone
else for a special purpose (Cambridge Dictionaries Online), or simply as working
with someone (American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language) or work-
ing together (Heinle’s Newbury House Dictionary). Following Stank et al. (1999),
whereas coordination is a joint, interactive process that results in joint decisions
and activities, collaboration depends on the ability to trust each other, and to
appreciate one another’s knowledge and emphasizes the building of meaningful re-
lationships. By that, it also indicates a higher degree of joint implementation and
can be thought of as a teamwork effort. Then, collaboration can be defined as a
superstructure evolving between separate entities in form of shared vision, culture,
mission, etc. that facilitates the processes of working together towards a common
goal.
3. Supply Chain Integration
According to Anupindi and Bassok, 1999, supply chain management deals with the
management of material, information, and financial flows in a network consisting of
vendors, manufacturers, distributors, and customers. Exchange of flows can be re-
garded as a routine transaction, occurring between any pair of suppliers and buyers
in the system. Ideally, the quantity and pricing decisions in the supply chain would
be made by a single decision maker who has all information at hand Hohn, 2010.
Such a situation is generally referred to as a fully integrated, or centralized, supply
chain. Respectively, a supply chain is called decentralized if the network consists of
multiple decision-makers having different information and incentives.
Following Anupindi and Bassok, 1999, a single decision-maker optimizes the net-
work with the union of information that otherwise various decision-makers have.
Hence, supply chain performance is at risk as soon as there are multiple decision-
makers in the network who may have different private information and incentives.
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For instance, as it was highlighted by Corbett et al. (2004), decision-makers are
often reluctant to share private information regarding cost and demand, which may
lead to suboptimal supply chain decisions and economic performance.
This was first described in literature by Spengler (1950) as a problem of double
marginalization. It can be shown that when operating independently, supplier and
buyer will produce less than a vertically integrated monopolist, because they receive
less than the total contribution margin at any given quantity. This clearly is a
case, where locally optimal decisions of supplier and buyer do not optimize the
global supply chain problem, or, in other words, the decentralized supply chain is
inefficient, since the total expected profit of the decentralized supply chain is lower
than the total expected profit of the fully integrated supply chain Hohn, 2010. Thus,
the centralized, fully integrated system can be taken as a benchmark situation, while
integration itself can be viewed as a tool for a decentralized supply chain to achieve
or approach the economic performance of a centralized chain in terms of total profit.
For the research purposes cooperation, coordination and collaboration are as-
sumed to be stages of supply chain integration process. Notable, that in SCM re-
search, integration usually enhances two elements: interaction and collaboration.
Both elements were introduced as separate philosophies and combined as integra-
tion. Following Hammer (2006), the interaction philosophy emphasizes exchange
of information, while the collaboration philosophy highlights strategic alignment
through a shared vision, collective goals, and joint rewards, along with an informal
structure of managing relationships. Mentzer and Kahn (1996) stated that integra-
tion, therefore, is viewed as comprising interaction and collaboration activities.
Thus, dividing supply chain integration into distinct levels means recognition
of specific stages in inter-firm relationships development, ranging from decentral-
ized decision-making with poor interactions and no shared vision, goals or rewards
to fully centralized decision-making with a single decision-maker having all avail-
able information and one unified goal and vision. It is necessary to note that, for
the research purposes, moving along these stages towards increased supply chain
integration is assumed to improve overall supply chain performance. Hence, the
hierarchy of supply chain integration levels can be presented as follows (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1: Levels of supply chain integration
In the suggested framework, it is expected that all firms when establishing re-
lationships in the supply chain start with decentralized decision-making. Follow-
ing Jarillo (1998), cooperation is a little step further from decentralized decision-
making, when the participants of the supply chain adapt their behaviors to that of
other partners and create informal links between companies. Therefore, cooperation
is an acknowledgement of the common goal and willingness to pursue supply chain
profit maximization function instead of individual profit maximization functions by
members of the supply chain.
While cooperation refers to creating informal links, coordination and collab-
oration are both aimed at devising formal mechanisms to manage supply chain
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interdependencies (Arishinder, 2011). In terms of coordinating intensity, collabora-
tion can be seen as more intensive than coordination because most of the time it
subsumes all characteristics of coordination as well. Therefore, in a hierarchy of dif-
ferent levels of integration, collaboration would be positioned above coordination.
In his research Hammer (2006) agrees that, in the context of SCM, coordination
aims at achieving global optimization within a defined supply chain network. Mean-
while collaboration aims to exploit hidden potential and consequently expand the
optimization potential, i.e. shifting the efficient performance frontier upwards.
This view is also supported by Shaw (2000), who has differentiated between
three types of coordination in terms of level of involvement, in ascending order:
simple information exchange, formulated information sharing, and modeled collab-
oration. Simple information exchange is quite straightforward as it refers to informa-
tion exchange without additional interpretation or rules. In formulated information
sharing, such policies as restocking policies are shared together with operational
information. In modeled collaboration, operational models are also shared, together
with capabilities, factory load, inventories, and orders (Shaw, 2000). The impor-
tance of information exchange was confirmed by Swaminathen et al. (2003), who
highlighted that information sharing is of central importance for coordination, as it
allows for coordinated forecasts and forecasts based on richer information. Extend-
ing this idea, Sahin and Robinson (2002) have stated that a lack of coordination
occurs when decision makers have incomplete information or incentives, which are
not compatible with system-wide objectives.
This understanding can be directly linked to the three levels of collaboration
that Quiett (2002) has identified, which are data exchange, cooperative collabora-
tion and cognitive collaboration. These views, however, indicate a more extensive
information sharing scheme on the highest level instead of a close, teamwork-like
working relationship (Hammer, 2006).
As opposed to that, in a Deloitte study (Koudal, 2003) conducted in 2003, col-
laboration has been characterized by internal and external teamwork in the context
of manufacturing companies, i.e. with customers and suppliers. As differentiating
factors, strong cross-functional teams, stronger commitments to these teams, de-
sign for quality, and design for manufacturability techniques have been identified.
Necessary elements were cited to be joint-working with suppliers and customers on
production planning, inventory management, replenishment, forecasting, and de-
mand planning.
An understanding in line with this interpretation of collaboration is provided
by Liedtka (1996), who has defined collaboration as a process of decision mak-
ing among interdependent parties, which involves joint ownership of decisions and
collective responsibility for outcomes. Liedtka (1996) has emphasized the cross-
functional teamwork aspect of collaboration with a clear focus on processes instead
of functions. Because processes rarely stop at company boundaries, this includes
external organizations as well. Therefore, the term partnership is also used to in-
clude external collaboration. Success factors identified in Liedtka’s study (1996) are
quite independent from legal forms of partnerships. The components of successful
partnering comprise a partnering mindset, a partnering skillset, and a supporting
organizational architecture.
Barratth (2004) has identified yet another, however closely related, set of ele-
ments that define collaboration. These are cross-functional activities, process align-
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ment, joint decision making, and supply chain metrics. The elements that support
a collaborative culture are trust, mutuality, information exchange, openness, and
communication, which, in turn, is necessary for successful collaboration. It is impor-
tant to note, that a rather close proximity to team working exists. As Christopher
(2005) remarked, the closer the relationship between buyer and supplier the more
likely it is that the expertise of both parties can be applied to mutual benefit.
Consequently, higher levels of internal and external collaboration are expected to
improve performances in the areas of collaboration (Stank, 2001).
Therefore, summarizing different approaches presented in literature, cooperation
is referred to as willingness to participate in supply chain performance improvement,
coordination encompasses joint decision-making, process alignment, information ex-
change and other active steps for supply chain performance improvement, while
collaboration is a superstructure in form of creating a unite supply chain culture,
mindset and architecture. Thus, in order to proceed to the next stage a given supply
chain should fully embrace characteristics of the previous step(s). For example, in
order to start working on activities to achieve coordination, a given supply chain
should be already cooperative and embrace the characteristics of this stage.
Spekman et al., 1998 have drawn a similar conclusion. In their view, cooperation
refers to rudimentary information exchange with little interaction and is seen as a
necessary but not sufficient condition for managing business relationships. The next
level would then be coordination. Just-in-time (JIT) and electronic data interchange
(EDI) linkages can reflect such coordinated relationships. Again, though companies
cooperate and coordinate, they still might not behave as true partners. According
to (Spekman et al., 1998) in order to achieve collaboration, a level of trust and
commitment beyond the one found in cooperation and coordination is required.
Thus, supply chain partners may cooperate and coordinate, but still not collaborate.
4. Supply Network
Up to this point, the paper was focused on the relationships in a traditional supply
chain, no matter what level of complexity was assumed. Notably, while increasing
supply chain complexity, Mentzer et al. (2001) were only talking about the number
of tiers a supply chain might have. Nevertheless, apart from the number of tiers,
supply chain complexity may be increased further by the number of firms at a given
tier as shown in Figure 2. According to Mentzer et al. (2001), Figures 2a and 2b are
both representations of a direct supply chain, although it is clear that the supply
chain 2b is more complex in both functional and managerial terms.
While direct supply chain in the Figure 2b consists of a supplier, an organization
and three distinct customers, it can be argued that this is just a unite representation
of three distinct supply chains. Nevertheless, following Mentzer et al. (2001), supply
chain members are defined by their involvement in the upstream and downstream
flows of products, services, finances and (or) information from an initial source to
a consumer. Thus, supply chain in the Figure 2b is defined as a single supply chain
if it serves one unique flow of products, services, finances and information from
the ultimate supplier to the ultimate customer. Notably, the term unique flow here
refers to the non-competitive nature of inter-firm relationships within the supply
chain.
Absence of rivalry is of vital importance when it comes to supply chain man-
agement as it reassures that all the members of the given supply chain would have
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Fig. 2: Levels of direct supply chain complexity
incentives for mutual performance improvement, which, in terms of SCM, means
working together to achieve coordination. A traditional example of such a supply
chain is automotive industry, with one car assembler and multiple dealers, which
are not owned by the manufacturer, but do not compete with each other as they
either cover different segments and (or) regions (Fig. 3a).
At the same time, if companies within one supply chain tier compete with each
other, it may be assumed that they are all serving different flows of products,
services, finances and information and, therefore, are members of different sup-
ply chains. However, in a situation when all these flows go alongside the supply
chain from one unite source to the same end consumer, despite the fact of existing
competition, it can be argued that this system is close to supply chain in terms of
management and optimization. In the case of automotive industry that would mean
that one car assembler sells its cars through multiple dealers, who are competing
with each other in the open market using both price and quantity (Fig. 3b).
Fig. 3: Supply chain and supply network
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The concept of supply chain assumes Mentzer et al. (2001), that all supply chain
members are interconnected one after another, comprising a single line of relation-
ships. Introducing competition inside one of the supply chain tiers means that these
relationships no longer form a direct line, but rather a system of interconnected
companies.
Therefore, for the research purposes, such system would be called supply network
and defined as a set of three or more organizations directly involved in the upstream
and downstream flows of products, services, finances and (or) information from a
source to a consumer provided that two or more of them are direct competitors.
In other words, supply network is a set of distinct supply chains connected into a
system with existing competition at one or more of its tiers. Consequently, the main
concern of supply network management is coordination of independent companies
in order to improve the economic performance of the individual companies and the
supply network as a whole.
Bryant, 1980 appears to be the first published paper to address the supply net-
work setting, including into a supply chain a competitive oligopoly model with
stochastic demands, which arise from a finite customer population. Another such
model is Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1997), addressing a market with a contin-
uum of identical retailers offering a completely homogenous product. Most directly
related to the current research are papers of Birge et al. (1998) Carr et al. (1999)
and van Mieghem and Dada (1999), who consider the special case of the supply
network model with two competing retailers.
5. Cooperative Supply Network
Birge et al. (1998) have shown that pricing and capacity decisions, those directly
influencing economic performance, are affected greatly by the actual parameters that
the decision makers can control as well as whether decision makers are optimizing
system-wide or individual channel profits. This raises a question of integration in a
supply network as opposed to that of its individual channels, e.g. separate supply
chains.
As supply network is a system comprised of individual supply chains united by
an integrated flow of products, services, finances and information, it can be claimed
that supply network as a phenomenon shares some characteristics with a supply
chain, level of integration being one of those.
Therefore, in terms of integration supply network follows the same steps as
supply chain (Fig. 1), from being completely decentralized to fully integrated. Nev-
ertheless, due to competition between its members, full integration here refers to
achieving the same economic performance as if it was managed under a single
decision-maker. Thus, in terms of supply network, cooperation is referred to as
willingness to participate in supply network performance improvement, when its
members understand that they can achieve better results and they are ready to
invest in that. Coordination embraces any activities aimed at supply network per-
formance improvement, while collaboration is a superstructure in form of creating a
unite culture, mindset and architecture. Similarly to a supply chain, in order to pro-
ceed to the next stage, a given supply network should fully embrace characteristics
of the previous step(s).
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Hence, the process of coordination can be only initiated in a cooperative supply
network, meaning that all its members are open towards negotiations and ready to
invest in system-wide performance improvement.
6. Coordinating Contracts
Although contracts have been studied in law, economics, and marketing disciplines,
their study in SCM takes a rather different approach. Following Tsay, 1999, what
distinguishes SCM contract analysis may be its focus on operational details, re-
quiring more explicit modeling of material flows and complicating factors such as
uncertainty in the supply or demand of products, forecasting and the possibility of
revising those forecasts, constrained production capacity, and penalties for overtime
and expediting.
By viewing a supply chain as nexus-of-contracts (Wang and Sarkis, 2013), mean-
ing a group of rational agents interacting with each other according to pre-specified
set of rules, an improved supply chain management is achieved by designing ap-
propriate contracts coordinating the agents’ decisions. Typically, a supply chain
contract should capture the three types of flows encountered between the members
of supply chain, i.e. material, information, and financial flows Hohn, 2010. Never-
theless, to date there is no commonly accepted classification of the rules, parameters
and dimensions fixed in those supply chain contracts.
One of the first classifications of supply chain contracts was suggested by Anupin-
di and Bassok (1999) and consisted of eight parameters: horizon length, pricing, pe-
riodicity of ordering, quantity commitment, flexibility, delivery commitment, quality
and information sharing. In contrast, Tsay, 1999 classified supply chain contracts by
eight contract clauses, including specification of decision rights, pricing, minimum
purchase commitments, quantity flexibility, buy-back or returns policies, allocation
rules, lead time, and quality.
Those two classifications were synthesized and developed further by Hohn, 2010.
Integrated framework comprised eleven dimensions: specifications of decision rights,
pricing, minimum purchase commitments, quantity-flexibility, buy-back or return
policies, allocation rules, lead time, quality, horizon length, periodicity of ordering
and information sharing.
Notably, supply chain contracts are not always required to be legal. Several
papers in the literature consider contracts among independent agents that are di-
visions of the same company and a higher level manager can verify the execution
of lateral promises (Lee and Whang 1999, Zhang 2006). Nevertheless, the process
of contract design should explicitly point out the verifying ability of the enforcing
agent. Two approaches to verification are presented in literature: direct and indi-
rect. In direct verification, the conditions regarding the fulfillment of contract terms
can be observed. In indirect verification, studied by Hezarkhani and Kubiak, 2010,
the conditions may be only inferred. For example, in case of direct verification a re-
tailer can observe and count the number of products received from a supplier, while
indirect verifications require self-enforcing, e.g. manufacturer can verify that if the
market selling price is greater than the total production cost and salvage value, the
retailer would satisfy market demand as much as it can.
If the contract parameters are well defined, contract enforces coordination in the
supply chain. First studies devoted to supply chain contracts and their coordination
capabilities appeared in the scientific literature in 1980s. However, only in 1990s the
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systemic integrated research of this mechanism emerged, which summarized frag-
mented findings of previous papers and build on that. The earliest overviews focused
on coordinating contracts included papers of Wang and Sarkis, 2013, Tsay, 1999,
Cachon, 2003 and Lariviere, 2001.
Among the recent papers in this field it is necessary to mention an extensive
overview of different types of contracts by Cachon, 2003 and his joint study with
Lariviere (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005) on the interchangeability of contracts of dif-
ferent types. Most recent research includes subsequent comprehensive reviews of the
topic by Hohn, 2010, Govindan and Popiuc, 2011 and Arishinder, 2011.
6.1. Coordinating Contract Definition
Following Tsay, 1999, from the point of view of supply chain coordination, a contract
can be defined as a coordination mechanism that provides incentives to all of its
members so that the decentralized supply chain behaves nearly or exactly the same
as the integrated one.
This definition emphasizes the capability of supply chain contracts to integrate
a supply chain in terms of centralizing decision making in a way and turning supply
chain processes into optimal for the whole channel. However, not every coordinating
contract can be actually implemented, which happens due to acceptability rules.
6.2. Acceptability Rules
The notion of acceptability rules implied in supply chain contracts was described by
Hezarkhani and Kubiak, 2010. According to their research, two approaches towards
formulating the acceptability conditions exist in literature. The first approach sup-
poses that, in order to be acceptable, the contract should lead to the each member’s
utility being above a certain acceptable level. This level can take the form of reser-
vation profit, opportunity costs, outside options or status quo utilities, i.e. an agent
should not be in worse situation with a new contract than it was with the existing
one.
This approach was followed by Gan et al., 2004, who defined coordinating con-
tract as a contract which the agents of a supply chain agree upon, while the optimiz-
ing decisions of the agents under the contract should satisfy each agent’s reservation
payoff (minimum acceptable utilities) constraint and lead to Pareto-optimal deci-
sions and Pareto-optimal sharing rule. This definition formulates the acceptability
condition according to the first approach stated earlier, as satisfaction of minimum
acceptable utilities. Nevertheless, it has a sufficient drawback as it does not indicate
how one contract should be preferred over the others in case of multiple contracts
with Pareto-optimal sharing rules which satisfy the agent’s minimum acceptable
utilities.
The second approach implies that the contract should not only guarantee some
minimum acceptable level of utility to all the members, but also allocate extra
benefits from the contract to its members in some fair manner. The notion of fairness
here provides that the profit is allocated among members proportionally to their
investments, i.e. share of costs (Hezarkhani and Kubiak, 2010).
This approach was adopted by Cachon, 2003, who stated that there are three
conditions that a supply chain contract should meet in order to be coordinating:
1. With a coordinating contract, the set of supply chain optimum decisions should
be a pure Nash equilibrium;
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2. Coordinating contract should divide the supply chain profits arbitrarily among
agents;
3. Coordinating contract should be worth adopting.
The first condition implies that no member should have an incentive to de-
viate from the set of optimal actions. Ideally, the described equilibrium should
be unique, with cooperation being the most profitable alternative for all members.
Gan et al., 2004. Finally, the third condition articulates that coordinating contracts
with highest efficiency may not be the best option for the supply chain, as some-
times non-coordinating contracts with high efficiency ratio can be preferred by the
supply chain members.
Despite the different interpretations of the acceptability condition of a coor-
dinating contract by Cachon, 2003 and Gan et al., 2004, the fundamental notion
in both definitions is similar. That is, with the coordinating contract, agents’ op-
timum decisions must be the same as the supply chain’s optimum decisions, and
the contract should divide the resultant payoffs among the supply chain members
so that all agents are satisfied and, as the result, they would accept the contract
(Hezarkhani and Kubiak, 2010).
Therefore, two variations of the concept of coordinating contract were formulated
by Hezarkhani and Kubiak, 2010:
* Weak Coordination: If a contract could achieve the equivalence of agents’ opti-
mal decisions (pure Nash equilibrium) and the supply chain’s optimal solution,
and at the same time it satisfies the minimum acceptable utilities for all agents,
then the contract is weakly coordinating.
* Strong Coordination: If a contract could achieve the equivalence of agents’ opti-
mal individual decisions (pure Nash equilibrium) and the supply chain’s optimal
solution, and at the same time it could divide the total supply chain payoff in
any manner among the agents, then the contract is strongly coordinating.
The relationship between the two definitions is that if a weakly coordinating
contract is also flexible, then it is strongly coordinating as well.
7. Coordination in Supply Network
A typical model that is used for analyzing supply chain coordination with contracts
is a newsvendor model - a standard one-period one-product one-echelon (i.e. con-
sisting of two firms, a supplier and a buyer) setting for modeling order quantity
decisions under stochastic demand, presented in Figure 4 below.
In this framework the supplier (manufacturer) produces one type of product at
a constant cost c and sells it to the buyer (dealer) at a wholesale price w(Q) per
unit. In turn, the buyer resells this product to the market at a retail price r. In the
newsvendor model, the action to coordinate the supply chain is the buyer’s order
quantity Q, as, while facing stochastic demand, the buyer must determine an order
quantity Q before the start of the selling season. Cachon, 2003 emphasizes that a
contract is said to coordinate the supply chain if the set of supply chain optimal
actions is Nash equilibrium, i.e. no firm has a profitable unilateral deviation from
the set of supply chain optimal actions.
This model is a building block for a large stream of the research modeling and
scientific literature on supply chain contracts. According to Khouja, 1999, the tra-
ditional newsvendor setting lies in the basis of the majority of other more complex
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Fig. 4: Basic one-period one-product supply chain model (Hohn, 2010)
models developed for more complicated configurations of parameters. Thus, the de-
scribed newsvendor model will be used for current research purposes as a basis for
supply network model, presented in Figure 5 and discussed further.
This is a one-period one-product topology with one upstream firm that supplies
two downstream firms. In this framework manufacturer produces one type of prod-
uct at a constant cost c and sells it to the dealers at wholesale prices w1 and w2 per
unit of good. In turn, dealers resell this product to the open market at a retail prices
p1 and p2 accordingly. Product is homogeneous and neither of the dealers has any
technical advancements, i.e. they have the same marginal costs. Thus, they compete
with each other in the open market with demand function defined as D(p1, p2). Full
summary of parameters used in the model is described below.
Table 1: Parameters for Supply Network Model
C: production cost
w1(Q1): wholesale payment of the 1st dealer
w2(Q2): wholesale payment of the 2d dealer
Q1: 1st dealer’s order
Q2: 2d dealer’s order
p1: 1st dealer’s retail price
p2: 2d dealer’s retail price
D(p1, p2): Market demand
q1: 1st dealer’s sales
q2: 2d dealer’s sales
→ : Financial flows
→ : Material flows
: Information flows
For the purposes of the current research, it is assumed that the dealers compete
under the rules of Bertrand competition model, which examines interdependencies
between rivals’ decisions in terms of pricing. According to this model, there are two
firms, selling homogeneous goods with the same marginal costs, which have to take
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Fig. 5: Supply network model
simultaneous decisions on setting a retail price based on their assumptions on the
expected price of their rival. Then the market determines the quantities bought
from each firm dependent on the prices they have previously set.
Thus, assuming that dealers compete on prices, the quantity Qi ordered by a
dealer i from manufacturer can be described by the demand function qi(p1, p2) (1).
Qi(p1, p2) = θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi), i = 1, 2, i 6= j (1)
Qi stands for the order quantity of a dealer i at a given period of time under the
conditions of price competition with dealer j, with pi being retail price of dealer i.
θ represents the potential size of the market, where ki is market share of the dealer
i, provided that k1 + k2 = 1. δi and γ are parameters of the demand function.
In the stated model (1) it is assumed that there are two types of customers
forming the market: switching customers and marginal customers. Switching cus-
tomers will always buy the good at a cheapest possible price. Marginal customers
will only buy the good if its price is lower than a certain minimum price. Therefore,
parameter γ describes the behavior of switching customers and stands for demand
leakage, while parameter δi characterizes marginal customers, who can be attracted
by lowering the price. Total demand can be defined as follows (2).
D(p1, p2) =
2∑
i=1
qi = θ −
2∑
i=1
δipi (2)
Following the assumptions of Bertrand competition model, both dealers have
the same marginal costs c, nevertheless manufacturer’s operating expenses to fulfill
their orders are different and equal to s1 and s2 per unit of good accordingly.
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Relationships between the members of a supply network can be formalized by
a two-tier hierarchical game leader – competing followers, where manufacturer sets
contract parameters, while dealers compete on prices in the next round after the
choice is made. Taking into consideration assumptions and specifications of the de-
veloped supply network model, this would be a non-zero sum game under conditions
of perfect information.
In order to formalize the discussion, let us introduce a game:
Γ =< N, {Xi}i∈N , {πi}i∈N > (3)
where N = {S,B1, B2} is a set of players, with S being a supplier (manufacturer)
and Bi being buyer i (dealer), Xi is a set of strategies available for a player i, πi is
a payoff function of a player i defined by the profit function of a given company. To
make it clearer, let us define the manufacture’s payoff as πm.
Each of the discussed contract types is formalized into a separate game, where
the goal of the first-tier player is to choose a dependent contract parameter according
to the definition of the coordinating contract and, therefore, define the transfer
payment. Meanwhile, the chosen parameter is a function of the dealers’ retail prices,
e.g. a function of followers’ strategies.
The set of manufacturer’s strategies (player S) in a game number k, where k is
correspondent to a specific contract type, will look as follows:
Xk1 = {T k = (T k1 (p1, p2), T k2 (p1, p2))}, k = 1, 2, 3, 4 (4)
where T ki (p1, p2) ∈ C2(p1, p2) is a function of dealer’s i transfer payment (player Bi)
in a contract k, which is a double continuously differentiable function on p1,p2. Each
dealer has his own transfer payment function. Notably, manufacturer determines the
formulas for these functions, while dealers, in their turn, use given functions to solve
the competition problem on the second stage of the game. Therefore, manufacturer’s
strategy is a choice of vector comprised of transfer payment functions for a distinct
contract type. These functions are chosen according to the rule determined by a
definition of a coordinating contract. The vector T k, in turn, stands for the chosen
contract.
The dealer i strategy (for each contract type k, e.g. in any given game) is a
choice of the retail price pi under the rules of Bertrand competition model. The
order quantities Qi(p1, p2) are uniquely defined by the demand function (5):
X2 = {p1}p1≥0, X3 = {p2}p2≥0. (5)
Let us consider the set of deales’ payoffs, which are equivalent to their profit
functions. πi(p1, p2) is a function of dealer i profit and equals to (6, 7):
π1(p1, p2, T
k
1 ) = Q1(p1, p2)(p1 − c)− T k1 (p1, p2), (6)
π2(p1, p2, T
k
2 ) = Q2(p1, p2)(p2 − c)− T k2 (p1, p2) (7)
forQ2(p1, p2) being defined by (1), Qipi being dealer i profit, cQi being total dealer’s
expenses on purchase, storage and sales of Qi units of good and Ti being a transfer
payment from dealer i to manufacturer according to the terms of contract T k(p1, p2).
The manufacturer’s profit function is a sum of two local profit functions in simple
supply chains manufacturer - dealer(8):
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πm(p1, p2, T
k
1 , T
k
2 ) = πm1 + πm2. (8)
The local profit functions equal to (9) and (10) accordingly, where siQi(p1, p2)
are operational costs to fulfill the order of a dealer i.
πm1(p1, p2, T
k
1 ) = T
k
1 (p1, p2)− s1Q1(p1, p2), (9)
πm2(p1, p2, T
k
2 ) = T
k
2 (p1, p2)− s2Q2(p1, p2). (10)
The total supply network profit can be concurrently divided into two streams:
P (p1, p2) = P1(p1, p2) + P2(p1, p2), where P1 and P2 are local supply chain profit
functions resulting from interaction between manufacturer and an associated dealer.
P (p1, p2) = Q1(p1, p2)(p1 − c− s1) +Q2(p1, p2)(p2 − c− s2), (11)
P1(p1, p2) = π1(p1, p2) + πm1(p1, p2) = Q1(p1, p2)(p1 − c− s1), (12)
P2(p1, p2) = π2(p1, p2) + πm2(p1, p2) = Q2(p1, p2)(p2 − c− s2). (13)
Let us assume the direct manufacturer’s payoff function equals to the total sup-
ply network profit function P . Then, the main goal of the manufacturer is coordina-
tion of supply network as a whole or coordination of the two affiliated supply chains
separately, if supply network coordination is impossible. Therefore, the main con-
cern of the manufacturer is choice of such contract parameters that the maximum
supply network profit is achieved. For the research purposes, that sort of contract
is called coordinating.
Thus, contract T k(p1, p2) is called strongly coordinating if it meets the conditions
(14): 
argmax
p1
P (p1, p2) = argmax
p1
π1(p1, p2),
argmax
p2
P (p1, p2) = argmax
p2
π2(p1, p2).
(14)
Following the conditions for coordinating contract, an optimal solution of the
dealer’s market competition problem optimal prices p∗1, p
∗
2, should also be an op-
timal solution for the supply network coordination problem, as in this point the
maximum of the supply network profit function (11) should be attained. This is
achieved through manufacturer’s choice of the dependent parameter of the contract
and, respectively, the transfer payment function, compliant with (14). Therefore,
we have defined the rule for manufacturer’s strategy choice by introducing the op-
timality principle, which is supply network profit maximization.
Notably, in some situations with specific contract types the optimal solution
to supply network coordination problem cannot be found analytically. For this
cases the optimization criteria is lowered, allowing maximization of the profit func-
tion separately for each supply chain constituting the network. Therefore, contract
T k(p1, p2) is assumed to be weakly coordinating if it meets the conditions (15).
argmax
p1
P1(p1, p2) = argmax
p1
π1(p1, p2),
argmax
p2
P2(p1, p2) = argmax
p2
π2(p1, p2).
(15)
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By introducing conditions (14) and (15), we introduce the rule for manufac-
turer’s optimal strategy choice, which states that manufacturer will always choose
such contract parameters that guarantee supply network profit maximization. In
other words, while dealers pursue to maximize their individual profits, manufac-
turer integrates the supply network in order to maximize the profit of the whole
system. Thus, supply network is fully coordinated if it meets the conditions (16)
and the problem of the game is to find corresponding strategies of all the players,
so that these conditions are met.
argmax
p1
P (p1, p2) = argmax
p1
π1(p1, p2),
argmax
p2
P (p1, p2) = argmax
p2
π2(p1, p2),
max
p1
π1(p1, p2, T
∗
1 ),
max
p2
π2(p1, p2, T
∗
2 ).
(16)
Consequently, supply network is weakly coordinated if it only meets lowered
optimization criteria (17).
argmax
p1
P1(p1, p2) = argmax
p1
π1(p1, p2),
argmax
p2
P2(p1, p2) = argmax
p2
π2(p1, p2),
max
p1
π1(p1, p2, T
∗
1 ),
max
p2
π2(p1, p2, T
∗
2 ).
(17)
8. Contract Decision-Making
Based on the choice of the contract parameters, there are several types of coordi-
nating contracts recognized in literature that can be applied in a newsvendor set-
ting. These are revenue-sharing, buy-back, price-discount, quantity-flexibility, sales-
rebate, two-part tariff and quantity discount contracts. Studies of Cachon, 2003,
Hohn, 2010, and Arishinder, 2011 synthesize the main findings and give summariz-
ing reviews on the existing supply chain contract topologies. Behzad et al. (2010), in
turn, provides a detailed overview of coordinating contract in literature and presents
the state of art research in this field. According to his study, two broad classes of
coordination contracts can be identified in literature: quantity dependent contracts
and price dependent contracts.
As the supply network model, presented in the previous section, is based on the
model of Bertrand price competition, the scope of this paper is restricted to the
price dependent contracts, including wholesale, buy-back, price-discount, revenue-
sharing, sales-rebate, quantity-discount and two-part tariff contracts.
Namely, four contracts chosen for the modeling and analysis are wholesale,
revenue-sharing, quantity-discount and two-part tariff contracts, which are described
later in this chapter. Each contract has dependent and independent variables, which
determine how the profit is distributed between manufacturer and dealers. The de-
cision on the independent variables is taken as a result of negotiations between the
agents (manufacturer and dealer), strictly after the retail prices were set by the
dealer and the dependent contract variables were chosen by the manufacturer. In a
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general case, dealer i has to pay a transfer payment T k (18) to the manufacturer,
where k refers to the specific contract type.
T ki (p), i = {1, 2} (18)
where p = (p1, p2) is a price vector.
8.1. Wholesale Contract
Under a wholesale contract a dealer buys goods in quantity Qi from the manu-
facturer at a wholesale price per unit wi and then resells them at a retail price p.
Therefore, the transfer payment looks as follows (19):
T 1i (p) = wi(p)qi(p), i = {1, 2}. (19)
This type of contract only has one dependent variable, chosen by manufacturer,
and no independent variables to be negotiated later. Wholesale contract is the
least flexible type of contract among all chosen for the analysis, as the supply
chain profit is distributed uniquely between manufacturer and dealer. Consequently,
manufacturer’s (20) and dealers’ (21) profit functions can be formalized as follows:
πmi(p, T
1
i ) = Qi(p)(wi(p)− si), (20)
πi(p, T
1
i ) = Qi(p)(pi − c− wi(p)). (21)
This type of contract is the most commonly observed in practice, as it is the
simplest to set out and to administer, so it is usually assumed as a basic model for
supply chain contract studies with all other types of contracts being derived from
it.
8.2. Revenue-Sharing Contract
Under a revenue-sharing contract a dealer buys goods in quantity Qi from the man-
ufacturer at a wholesale price per unit wi plus pays a percentage of his revenue.
Notably, the supply chain revenue is assumed to include salvage revenue as well. In
the end of the selling season dealer receives φ share of the revenue, while manufac-
turer receives the remaining part (1− φ). Both parameters are specified before the
order quantity Qi is decided by the dealer. The transfer payment with this type of
contract is equal to (22).
T 2i (p) = (1− φi)Qi(p)pi + wi(p)Qi(p). (22)
Therefore, manufacturer’s (23) and dealers’ (24) profit functions look as follows:
πmi(p, T
2
i ) = Qi(p)((1 − φi)pi + wi(p)− si), (23)
πi(p, T
2
i ) = Qi(p)(φipi − c− wi(p)). (24)
Notably, profits of the separate supply chains and supply network as a whole
will be the same for all the studied contracts (11), (12), (13), as the finite function
is not dependent on the specific contract parameters due to the fact that transfer
payment T is shortcut in the process of mathematical computations.
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Revenue-sharing contract is one of the most widely applied in practice, as it
has clear interpretation and explicit formulas for φ and w, which enforce the co-
ordination in one-echelon supply chains under the rules of Cournot competition
model. Moreover, this type of contract allows flexible allocation of profit between
manufacturer and dealer, which is highly valued.
8.3. Quantity-Discount Contract
Under a quantity-discount contract a dealer buys goods in quantity Qi from the
manufacturer paying the wholesale price per unit wi(Q), which decreases with the
increase of Qi. In other words, this means that the discount is dependent on the
quantity ordered. In general case transfer payment for this type of contract can
be presented as T (Q) = w(Q)Q. Nevertheless, in case of two competing dealers
quantity-discount contract becomes more complex, where transfer payment may be
expressed by the following correlations (25).
T 3i (p) =
wi(p)Qi(p)− 12viQ2i (p), if Qi(p) ≤ Qi(p) =
wi(p)− si
vi
,
T (Qi(p)) + si(Qi(p)−Qi(p)), otherwise,
(25)
where si are manufacturer’s operating costs to produce and deliver a unit of good
for dealer i, wi(p) is a wholesale price per unit for dealer i, vi represents a discount
(independent parameter) obtained by dealer i, compliant with the following criteria
(Cachon and Kok, 2010): vi ∈ [0, v¯) v¯ = min(
2δ1
δ0
,
2δ2
δ0
), where
δ0 = δ1δ2 + γ(δ1 + δ2). (26)
Notably, that this contract allows flexible allocation of profit between manufac-
turer and dealer and is included in the multitude (19) with ?i = 0. Profit functions
of manufacturer (27) and dealers (28) in each case are as follows:
{
πi(p, T
3
i ) = Qi(p)(pi − c)− wi(p)Qi(p) + 12viQ2i (p), if Qi(p) ≤ Qi(p),
πmi(p, T
3
i ) = wi(p)Qi(p)− 12viQ2i (p)− siQi(p),
(27)
{
πi(p, T
3
i ) = Qi(p)(pi − c)− T (Qi(p))− si(Qi(p)−Qi(p)), if Qi(p) > Qi(p),
πsi(p, T
3
i ) = T (Qi(p))− siQi(p).
(28)
8.4. Two-Part Tariff Contract
Two-part tariff is actually a particular case of the wholesale price contract. Manu-
facturer sells the produced goods in quantity Qi to the dealer at a wholesale price
wi and charges and additional fee equal to Fi. While the wholesale price is chosen
by manufacturer, the parameter F is independent (negotiated) and should be paid
at the end of the selling season disregarding the actual dealer’s profit. Thus, transfer
payment may be formalized as follows:
T 4i (p) = Fi + wi(p)Qi(p). (29)
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Therefore, profit functions of manufacturer (30) and dealers (31) can be pre-
sented as follows:
πmi(T
4
i ) = Qi(p)(wi(p)− si) + Fi, (30)
πi(p, T
4
i ) = Qi(p)(pi − c− wi(p))− Fi. (31)
9. Optimization Results for Quantitative Modeling
Let us formulate the general rule for solving the game in terms of finding the
appropriate players’ strategies. As manufacturer is a leading player, he would have to
analyze the current situation, taking into consideration competition between dealers
and their next move, and based on this knowledge take a decision on dependent
contract parameters to choose. The resulting parameters should ensure strong or
weak coordination of the supply network, provided retail prices and order quantities
chosen by the dealers.
9.1. Optimal parameters for the wholesale contract
After the manufacturer’s first move, on the second stage of the game each dealer
would maximize his profit function, using the first-order conditions, provided that
the profit function is strictly concave:
∂πi
∂pi
= 0.
Therefore, manufacturer has to choose contract parameters in such a way, that
condition (32) is fulfilled (if weaker criterion of optimality is chosen):
∂Pi
∂pi
=
∂πi
∂pi
. (32)
If this condition is fulfilled in the point pi = p
∗
i (e.g. optimal dealer’s price under
competition) the supply chain profit would also hit its maximum, as manufacturer’s
and dealer’s profit functions would match due to specific choice of contract param-
eters. If both functions are strictly concave on the price of the dealer i, there is no
need to check the second-order conditions to demonstrate that point of extremum
is a maximum.
Therefore, let us illustrate that both profit functions are strictly concave on the
price pi:
πi(p) = Qi(p)(pi − c− wi(p)) = (θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi))(pi − c− wi(p)),
∂πi
∂pi
= (θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi))(1 − ∂wi
∂pi
)− (δi + γ)(pi − c− wi),
∂2πi
∂p2i
= −2(δi + γ)(1 − ∂wi
∂pi
)− ∂
2wi
∂p2i
(θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi)) < 0.
If these conditions are met on the function wi(p), the dealers’ profit functions
are strictly concave on pi. Correspondingly:
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Pi = Qi(p)(pi − c− si),
∂2Pi
∂p2i
= −2(δi + γ) < 0.
The conditions for expressing contract parameter wi from (32) for each of the
supply chains can be formalized as follows:
θki−δipi+γ(pj−pi)−(δi+γ)(pi−c−wi) = θki−δipi+γ(pj−pi)−(δi+γ)(pi−c−si),
wi = si.
This leads to a conclusion, that the wholesale contract does not coordinate a
supply chain due to the fact that the first-order condition is fulfilled only when
the wholesale price is equal to the manufacturer’s operational costs, meaning that
manufacturer would get a zero profit. Taking into consideration, that this is the
simplest type of coordinating contracts, the first criterion of optimality was used.
In other words, the chosen contract parameters for each dealer should maximize the
total supply network profit function P independently on p1 and p2:
∂πi
∂pi
=
∂P
∂pi
, (33)
θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi)− (δi + γ)(pi − c− wi) =
= θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi)− (δi + γ)(pi − c− si) + γ(pj − c− sj),
(δi + γ)(wi − si) = γ(pj − c− sj),
wi(p) = si +
γ
δi + γ
(pj − c− sj). (34)
Now the optimal wholesale price is higher than manufacturer’s operational costs,
providing the positive profit for the manufacturer and ensuring coordination in a
supply network. Moreover, in this case wi does not depend on the price pi, which
means that
∂wi
∂pi
= 0,
∂2wi
∂p2i
= 0,
∂2πi
∂p2i
= −2(δi + γ) < 0.
Notably, total supply network profit function P is also strictly concave on pi:
∂2P
∂p2i
= −2(δi + γ) < 0.
In order to solve the problem of competition, knowing the manufacturer’s choice
on wi(p), let us insert wi(p) into the dealer’s i profit function (21):
πi = (θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi))(pi − c− si − γ
δi + γ
(pj − c− sj)).
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While choosing the optimal retail price p∗i , the dealer i would maximize his profit
function, thus, applying the first-order condition:
∂πi
∂pi
= 0 (35)
⇒ ∂π
∂pi
= θki + (δi + γ)(c+ si − 2pi) + (2pj − c− sj) = 0.
As there are two dealers in the model, their reaction functions (describing the
reaction of a dealer on the price set by his competitor), can be derived from the
first-order conditions (35) and formalized as follows:
p1 =
1
2
(
θk1
δ1 + γ
+ c+ s1 +
γ
δ1 + γ
(2p2 − c− s2)),
p2 =
1
2
(
θk2
δ2 + γ
+ c+ s2 +
γ
δ2 + γ
(2p1 − c− s1)).
(36)
Then, the optimal competitive prices are derived by expressing p1 in terms of
p2:
p1 =
1
2
(
θk1
δ1 + γ
+ c+ s1+
+
γ
δ1 + γ
((
θk2
δ2 + γ
+ c+ s2 +
γ
δ2 + γ
(2p1 − c− s1)− c− s2)),
p1 =
1
2
(
θk1
δ1 + γ
+ c+ s1 +
γ
(δ1 + γ)(δ2 + γ)
(θk2 + γ(2p1 − c− s1)).
If we denote δ0 as δ1δ2 + γ(δ1 + δ2), then:
p1
(
1− γ
2
(δ1 + γ)(δ2 + γ)
)
=
1
2
(
θk1
δ1 + γ
+ c+ s1 +
γ
(δ1 + γ)(δ2 + γ)
(θk2 − γ(c+ s1))
)
,
p1 =
(δ1 + γ)(δ2 + γ)
2δ0
)
(
θk1
δ1 + γ
+ c+ s1 +
γ
(δ1 + γ)(δ2 + γ)
(θk2 − γ(c+ s1))
)
,

p∗1 =
θ(γ + k1δ2)
2δ0
+
1
2
(c+ s1),
p∗2 =
θ(γ + k2δ1)
2δ0
+
1
2
(c+ s2).
(37)
After expressing optimal retail prices (37) in context of market competition, we
can consequently determine the optimal order quantities Q∗i = Qi(p
∗
1, p
∗
2).
After all the players choose their strategies, we can evaluate the expected values
of manufacturer’s, dealers’, supply chains and total supply network profit functions
based on (8), (11), (20), (21).
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9.2. Optimal parameters for the revenue-sharing contract
This contract has a more complicated structure, than the one discussed above. Thus,
if the first-order conditions (33) are used to find optimal parameters (e.g. strong
criterion of optimality), there will be no explicit solution to the game. Therefore,
weak criterion of optimality is applied. Parameter φ defines specific shares in which
revenue is divided between manufacturer and dealer in the supply chain i (Cachon
and Lariviere, 2005):
πi = φPi.
In order to find contract parameters, let us assume that the correlation between
the parameters is valid for the model with two dealers, meaning that each dealer
receives a share of total supply network profit correspondent to his profit generated
in a supply chain:
πi = φiPi. (38)
Consequently:
∂πi
∂pi
= φi
∂Pi
∂pi
.
Possibility of coordination is predetermined by the contract type and the first-
order condition results from (38). Hence, while choosing optimal retail price under
competition, a dealer, as well, maximizes his local supply chain profit. Let us illus-
trate that under the revenue-sharing contract dealers’ profit functions are strictly
concave on the price pi:
πi(p) = Qi(p)(φipi − c− wi(p)) = (θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi))(φipi − c− wi),
∂πi
∂pi
= (θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi))(φi − ∂wi
∂pi
)− (δi + γ)(φipi − c− wi),
∂2πi
∂p2i
= −2(δi + γ)(φi − ∂wi
∂pi
)− ∂
2wi
∂p2i
(θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi)) < 0.
Let us express wi(φi) out of (38), when the coordination in supply chains is
attained (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005):
Qi(p)(φipi − c− wi) = φiQi(p)(pi − c− si),
Qi(p)(c+ wi) = φiQi(p)(c+ si),
wi = φi(si + c)− c. (39)
This formula allows us to find relevant wi, which maximizes profit in the local
supply network and, therefore, ensures coordination, dependent on the φi, resulting
from negotiations between parties. Nevertheless, wi is not dependent on prices.
Thus, dealers’ profit functions are strictly concave:
∂2πi
∂p2i
= −2φi(δi + γ) < 0.
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In order to solve the problem of competition, knowing contract conditions, let us
insert wi into the dealer’s i profit function (24):
πi = Qi(p)(φipi − c− wi) = (θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi))(φipi − c− φi(si + c) + c).
Consequently, first-order conditions are expressed as follows:
∂πi
∂pi
= −(δi + γ)(φipi − φi(si + c)) + φi(θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi)) = 0.
Then, the reaction functions can be formalized as:
−2φipi(δi + γ) + φi((δi + γ)(si + c) + θki + γpj) = 0,
p1 =
1
2
(s1 + c+
θk1 + γp2
δ1 + γ
),
p2 =
1
2
(s2 + c+
θk2 + γp1
δ2 + γ
).
(40)
Finally, let us express optimal retail prices:
p1 =
1
2
(s1 + c+
θk1 +
γ
2
(s2 + c+
θk2 + γp1
δ2 + γ
)
δ1 + γ
),
(2p1 − s1 − c)(δ1 + γ) = θk1 +
γ
2
(s2 + c) +
γ(θk2 + γp1)
2(δ2 + γ)
,
p1(4δ0 + 3γ
2) = 2(s1 + c)(δ0 + γ
2) + 2θk1(δ2 + γ) + γ(s2 + c)(δ2 + γ) + γθk2,
p∗1 =
2(s1 + c)(δ0 + γ
2) + γθ + θk1(2δ2 + γ) + γ(s2 + c)(δ2 + γ)
4δ0 + 3γ2
,
p∗2 =
2(s2 + c)(δ0 + γ
2) + γθ + θk2(2δ1 + γ) + γ(s1 + c)(δ1 + γ)
4δ0 + 3γ2
.
(41)
With the expression of optimal retail prices (41), we can find out optimal order
quantities and the expected values of all the profit functions.
9.3. Optimal parameters for the quantity-discount contract
In this case formula for transfer payment calculation is divided into two parts,
dependent on the order quantity, which should be reflected in the analysis. For the
research purposes, weak criterion of optimality is used.
Let us consider the first situation:
T 3i (p) = wi(p)Qi(p)−
1
2
viQ
2
i (p), Qi(p) ≤ Qi(p) =
wi(p)− si
vi
. (42)
Assume that Qi(p) ≤ Qi(p). In this case, let us define dealer’s profit function
and show that it is strictly concave on pi, then evaluate the dependent parameter
wi, wherein the coordination in local supply chains is attained.
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πi(p) = Qi(pi − c− wi(p) +
1
2
viQi),
∂πi
∂pi
= (δi + γ)(c+ wi(p)− pi) +Qi(p)(1− ∂wi
∂pi
− vi(δi + γ)),
∂2πi
∂p2i
= (δi + γ)(2
∂wi
∂pi
− 2− vi(δi + γ))−Qi ∂
2wi
∂p2i
< 0.
If wi(p) is chosen according to the conditions above, dealers’ profit functions are
strictly concave.
Let us state the first-order conditions:
∂πi
∂pi
=
∂Pi
∂pi
,
(δi + γ)(c+ wi − pi) +Qi(1 − vi(δi + γ)) = −(δi + γ)(pi − c− si) +Qi,
wi(p) = viQi(p) + si, (43)
which is equivalent to Qi =
wi − si
vi
, meaning that in this case coordination
is achieved only on the threshold value of the interval for Qi. Let us show the
fulfillment of conditions for wi(p), which ensure that dealers’ profit functions are
strictly concave:
∂wi
∂pi
= −vi(δi + γ),
∂2wi
∂p2i
= 0,
∂2πi
∂p2i
= −(δi + γ)(2 + vi(δi + γ)) < 0.
In order to solve the problem of competition and find optimal retail prices, under
condition that transfer payment equals to (42), let us instead of wi(p) insert into
the dealer’s i profit function (27) its value according to (43):
πi = Qi(pi − c− viQi − si +
1
2
viQi) = Qi(pi − c− si −
1
2
viQi),
∂πi
∂pi
= −(δi + γ)(pi − c− si −
1
2
viQi) +Qi(1 +
1
2
vi(δi + γ)) = 0.
Then, the reaction functions can be formalized as:
p1 =
(c+ s1)(δ1 + γ) + (θk1 + γp2)(1 + v1(δ1 + γ))
(2 + v1(δ1 + γ))(δ1 + γ)
,
p2 =
(c+ s2)(δ2 + γ) + (θk2 + γp1)(1 + v2(δ2 + γ))
(2 + v2(δ2 + γ))(δ2 + γ)
.
(44)
Finally, let us express optimal retail prices:
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p1 =
(c+ s1)(δ1 + γ)
(2 + v1(δ1 + γ))(δ1 + γ)
+
+
(θk1 + γ(
(c+ s2)(δ2 + γ) + (θk2 + γp1)(1 + v2(δ2 + γ))
(2 + v2(δ2 + γ))(δ2 + γ)
))(1 + v1(δ1 + γ))
(2 + v1(δ1 + γ))(δ1 + γ)
,
p1(δ0 + γ
2)(2 + v1(δ1 + γ))(2 + v2(δ2 + γ)) = (c+ s1)(δ0 + γ
2)(2 + v2(δ2 + γ))+
+(1 + v1(δ1 + γ))(2 + v2(δ2 + γ))(δ2 + γ)θk1 + γ(c+ s2)(δ2 + γ)(1 + v1(δ1 + γ))+
+γ(1 + v1(δ1 + γ))(1 + v2(δ2 + γ))(θk2 + γp1),
p1((δ0 + γ
2)(2 + v1(δ1 + γ))(2 + v2(δ2 + γ))− γ2(1 + v1(δ1 + γ))(1 + v2(δ2 + γ))) =
= (c+ s1)(δ0 + γ
2)(2 + v2(δ2 + γ)) + (1 + v1(δ1 + γ))(2 + v2(δ2 + γ))(δ2 + γ)θk1+
+γ(1 + v1(δ1 + γ))(1 + v2(δ2 + γ))θk2 + γ(c+ s2)(δ2 + γ)(1 + v1(δ1 + γ)).
Let us denote δi + γ as αi , then optimal prices equal to:
p∗1 =
γ(1+v1α1){α2(c+s2)+(1+v2α2)θk2}+α2(2+v2α2){α1(c+s1)+θk1(1+v1α1)}
δ0(4+2v2α2+2v1α1+v1v2α1α2)+γ2(3+v2α2+v1α1)
,
p∗2 =
γ(1+v2α2){α1(c+s1)+(1+v1α1)θk1}+α1(2+v1α1){α2(c+s2)+θk2(1+v2α2)}
δ0(4+2v2α2+2v1α1+v1v2α1α2)+γ2(3+v2α2+v1α1)
.
(45)
It can be clearly seen that in this case optimal retail prices are dependent on
contract parameter ?i, which stands for a discount defined during the negotiation
period. All other parameters, such as optimal prices, wholesale price, order quanti-
ties and profits, are determined according to the chosen discount.
Now let us consider the second situation when Qi(p) > Qi(p). In this case
dealers’ profit functions can be formalized according to (28):
πi = Qi(pi − c− si)−
wi − si
vi
(
si
2
+ (wi − si)
(
wi
vi
− 1
2
))
=
= Pi −
wi − si
vi
(
si
2
+ (wi − si)
(
wi
vi
− 1
2
))
⇒ ∂πi
∂pi
=
∂Pi
∂pi
.
Therefore, coordination is achieved no matter what contract parameters are
chosen. In this sense manufacturer focuses on those parameters, which yield higher
supply chain profit, and makes his choice based on the analysis of these two cases.
∂πi
∂pi
= −(δi + γ)(pi − c− si) + θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi) = 0.
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The reaction functions: 
p1 =
c+ s1
2
+
θk1 + γp2
2(δ1 + γ)
,
p2 =
c+ s2
2
+
θk2 + γp1
2(δ2 + γ)
.
(46)
Now let us express optimal prices:
p1 =
c+ s1
2
+
θk1 + γ
(
c+ s2
2
+
θk2 + γp1
2(δ2 + γ)
)
2(δ1 + γ)
,
4p1(δ0 + γ
2) = 2(c+ s1)(δ0 + γ
2) + 2θk1(δ2 + γ) + γ(δ2 + γ)(c+ s2) + γθk2 + γ
2p1,
p∗1 =
2(c+ s1)(δ0 + γ
2) + (δ2 + γ)(2θk1 + γ(c+ s2)) + γθk2
4δ0 + 3γ2
,
p∗2 =
2(c+ s2)(δ0 + γ
2) + (δ1 + γ)(2θk2 + γ(c+ s1)) + γθk1
4δ0 + 3γ2
.
(47)
The comparison of formulas (47) and (45) leads to a conclusion that in the first
case the optimal retail price would be always higher, which means that, according to
the law of demand, in the second case lower prices enforce higher order quantity. This
proves that in the second case dealers’ order quantities would meet the requirement
Qi > Qi.
In order to determine optimal strategy for the manufacturer, it is necessary
to compare supply chain profit Qi(pi − si − c) under both (47) and (45) for each
separate case. It is also possible to insert in profit function Qi(pi− si− c) equations
dependent on vi (47) and, under first-order conditions, find through market values
and players’ costs expressions for optimal discounts v1, v2 for the first situation.
9.4. Optimal parameters for the two-part tariff contract
In this case strong criterion of optimality gives the same result as for the wholesale
contract:
πi(p) = Qi(p)(pi − c− wi)− Fi,
∂πi
∂pi
= θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi)− (δi + γ)(pi − c− wi),
∂P
∂pi
=
∂πi
∂pi
,
θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi)− (δi + γ)(pi − c− wi) =
= θki − δipi + γ(pj − pi)− (δi + γ)(pi − c− si) + γ(pj − c− sj),
wi = si +
γ
δi + γ
(pj − c− sj). (48)
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Expression for the contract parameter is similar to the case of the wholesale
contract, with the only difference in controlling parameter Fi, which is an inde-
pendent contract parameter allowing to redistribute supply chain profit between
manufacturer and dealer, while under the wholesale contract maximum profit can
be distributed in an exclusive and predefined way.
Therefore, due to similarity in formulas for these two contracts, optimal retail
prices are equivalent to (37).
10. Bargaining Power in Contract Decision-Making
According to Kannan (2011), the final choice on the type of contract to be im-
plemented is based on supply network profit allocation between the participating
members. This leads to the notion of the bargaining power and the ways it can
be distributed among the supply network members, as, following Choi and Tri-
antis (2012), when two parties enter into a contract, their relative bargaining power
affects the terms of their deal.
Although bargaining power is often cited as a critical determinant of contractual
terms, neither the meaning of power nor the path of its influence is very clear (Choi
and Triantis, 2012). The slipperiness of the term is due, at least partly, to the
fact that bargaining power frequently boils down to a tautology: one party had
bargaining power when the resulting agreement is more favorable to that party
than its counterpart.
To understand what a bargaining power is, consider price is a function of the
manufacturer’s and dealer’s respective perceptions of the two reservation prices
(each party’s own and that of her counterpart). The perceived bounds for the bar-
gaining range, and the price ultimately chosen within this range, are determined by
a mix of factors that might be exogenous or endogenous to the negotiations. Choi
and Triantis (2012) divide these factors into five distinct categories:
– Demand and supply conditions
– Market concentration
– Private information
– Patience and risk aversion
– Negotiating skills and strategy
The first category of exogenous factors consists of the demand and supply con-
ditions in the relevant market. When there is a significant increase in the demand
for the product or reduction in the supply, the market price will tend to increase
and manufacturer is often said to have increased bargaining power.
Second category of exogenous factors is market concentration. A monopolist’s
market power is often referred to as its bargaining power. A dealer’s no-agreement
alternative is limited by the fact that there are no other manufacturers available
in the market and his reservation price is correspondingly higher than if he could
purchase the same good from a competitor. Typically, market concentration on the
seller side increases price and concentration on the buyer side decreases it.
A third category of exogenous factors contains informational advantages that
one party may enjoy by knowing more about the other party, the market or by
concealing information about itself. A party with private information can be thought
of as having a type of monopoly originating from having private access to valuable
information.
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Fourth category is containing company’s characteristics, such as patience and
risk aversion, that may determine where the agreed price will fall within a given
bargaining range. Bold parties, for example, may do better than timid players, and
the patient negotiator typically enjoys higher returns than the impatient opponent.
Patience may be, in turn, a function of other factors, such as the solvency and
liquidity constraints, or the ability to diversify risks of an unfavorable bargaining
outcome.
In the fifth category, there are various negotiating tactics that can change the
actual or perceived reservation price of either party, so as to induce a favorable
shift in the bargaining range. For example, a party might take steps to worsen (or
appear to worsen) the opponent’s outside opportunities, through credible threats or
otherwise. Strategic negotiators also exploit the cognitive biases and errors of their
opponents, particularly the tendency of some individuals to escalate commitment
and be overconfident in their abilities.
In any given contract transaction, one or more of these factors might be in ac-
tion. Which ones are present usually determines the exact path by which unequal
bargaining power affects given contract design. This means that a factor or a com-
bination of certain factors gives one party the opportunity to influence the contract
terms in his own favor. In other words, having more bargaining power refers to the
ability of one party to influence the choice of contract parameters in such a way,
that this party receives more benefits from the contract.
For the purposes of the current research, it is assumed that the party, which
enjoys more bargaining power in negotiations, uses it to receive additional benefits
from the contract in terms of winning a bigger share of total supply network profit.
This means, that during the negotiation period, contract parameters will be chosen
in favor of the most powerful party, nevertheless, being accepted as an optimal
solution by all the supply chain members.
11. Contract selection modelling in Supply networks
Based on the results of the theoretical studies, presented in Chapter 9, special soft-
ware for the improved contract selection methodology was developed. It computes
optimal parameters for all four types of contracts, studied in current paper, so that
these contracts coordinate a given supply network and return the highest possible
profits, according to their type. Moreover, this software tool also allows graphical
representation of supply network profit function dynamics, while changing certain
parameters for manufacturer, dealers and the market.
Software tool was developed in Visual Studio 2012 using C# programming lan-
guage. Graph construction was carried out in ZedGraph frame. Its functionality is
presented in the Figure 6 below.
It is necessary to give some comments on revenue-sharing contract parame-
ters approximation, as well as optimal discounts computation. Analytically, for the
revenue-sharing contract, the problem was solved in terms of weak coordination, as
if the criterion (49) for strong coordination is followed, then equation for wi would
take the following form (50):
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Fig. 6: Software functionality
∂πi
∂pi
= φi
∂P
∂pi
, (49)
wi = φi(si + c)− c+
(δ1 + γ)(s1 − w1)
2p1(δ1 + γ)− γp2. (50)
Equation (50), in turn, led to problem insolvability due to the last additive
component. Therefore, the proposed algorithm of approximation chase is based on
the method of drawing near this last component, initially assuming that it equals
to 0 and then gradually increasing its value in different combinations. Since profit
function is concaved, the chase goes on until supply network profit keeps growing.
As soon as the next iteration gives value for a profit function, which is smaller than
the one given at a previous step, search cycle is stopped. Hence, approximation for
wi in terms of strong coordination would look as follows (51).{
w1 = φ1(s1 + c)− c+ e1,
w2 = φ2(s2 + c)− c+ e2,
(51)
where e1, e2 are the algorithmically found approximations. Testing showed that
these approximations return higher values for supply network profit function than
previously used weak coordination parameters.
As for optimal discounts computation, the problem solution has resulted in two
different options of pricing and quantity decisions, namely, when dealer i orders
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quantity Qi ≤ Qi and when dealer i orders quantity Qi > Qi . These two sets
of decision options result in four separate cases. Software makes computations of
optimal discounts for each case and then returns the one, which maximizes supply
network total profit.
Initially, the program requires to input certain parameters, including market
parameters: θ potential market size, δ1, δ2 and γ demand function parameters,
k1, k2 first and second dealer’s market shares accordingly; and cost parameters:
c dealers’ marginal costs, s1, s2 manufacturer’s operating expenses to fulfill the
orders of an associated dealer. For certain contracts it is also necessary to insert
additional initial parameters, such as shares of revenue for revenue-sharing contract
and discounts for quantity-discount contract.
Developed software will be first applied for modelling numerical examples to
show the mechanics and draw some conclusions, which then will be tested on real-
life cases. Both modeling examples and cases were selected to cover the notion of
different bargaining power distribution between the supply chain members, which
was discussed in previous Chapter. Consequently, first example assumes the situa-
tion of strong manufacturer and is later illustrated with Audi Russia (Volkswagen
group) case study, second example assumes the situation of strong dealers and is
supported by ProtechDry Portugal (Impetus group) case study and the last exam-
ple assumes negotiation between equally powerful parties, which is illustrated with
Heineken (Local wholesaler) case study.
11.1. Coordinating Contract with Strong Manufacturer
Let’s consider the situation of initially strong manufacturer, who can insist on con-
tract parameters in his own favor. In this case manufacturer tries to gain a relatively
bigger share of profit from the supply network, while dealers would accept these un-
favorable conditions, as they have limited bargaining options.
Table 2 below summarizes market conditions and contract parameters that
would correspond to a described situation.
Table 2: Initial data set for the case of strong manufacturer
θ γ δ1 δ2 k1 k2 c s1 s2 φ1 φ2 v1 v2 F1 F2
200 0.5 1 1 0.45 0.55 10 35 40 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.15 160 170
The potential market size equals to 200 conditional units, which is more or
less equally divided between dealers, as first dealer has 45% market share, while
second covers the remaining 55%. Given γ, ranging from 0.1 to 0.9, reflects market
elasticity, while γ+ δi shows price demand elasticity of a given dealer. Therefore, it
is assumed that initially market is characterized by medium elasticity.
From mathematical point of view, manufacturer’s power would directly affect
given contract parameters, such as φ1 and φ2, which are relatively low in order to
reflect lower dealer’s profits. Similarly, dealer’s discounts v1 and v2, which can range
from 0 to 1, will be quite small as well.
Given the initial data set, Table 3 below gives an overview for the resulting
prices and order quantities, while Table 3 aims to summarize the modeling results
in terms of listing the profits achieved by all the participants of a supply network
under different contract rules.
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Table 3: Optimal prices and quantities for the case of strong manufacturer
p∗1 q
∗
1 w
∗
1 p
∗
2 q
∗
2 w
∗
2
Wholesale contract 70 24 44.17 77.5 29 48.33
Revenue-Sharing 65,2 29 4.7 72,7 34 5.4
Quantity-discount 66,4 28 37,8 75 31 44,65
Two-part tariff 70 24 44.17 77.5 29 48.33
Table 4: Profit function values summary for the case of strong manufacturer
π∗1 π
∗
2 π
∗
s1 π
∗
s2 π
∗
s P
∗
1 P
∗
2 P
∗
Wholesale contract 380 555.8 220 241.6 461,7 600 797.5 1397,5
Revenue-Sharing 141,1 218,3 445,3 554,7 1000 586,5 773 1359,5
Quantity-discount 560 703,9 39,3 72 111,3 599,2 776 1375,2
Two-part tariff 220 385,8 380 411,7 791,7 600 797.5 1397,5
As for the Table 4 and further in this Chapter, π∗1 , π
∗
2 - are optimal profits for
the first and the second dealers accordingly; π∗m1, π
∗
m2 - are optimal profits of the
manufacturer in the distinct supply chains with each dealer; πm is total optimal
manufacturer profit; P ∗1 , P
∗
2 - are separate supply chains optimal profits; P
∗ - is
optimal total supply network profit under a specific contract type.
It can be clearly derived from the obtained results that quantity-discount and
wholesale contracts would not be chosen in a situation, when manufacturer is a
strong party, as both these contacts provide him with less than average profits.
Revenue-sharing and two-part tariff contracts are more suitable for manufacturer,
knowing that he can claim a bigger part of the total profit.
To understand how these contracts will be able to coordinate supply network
relationships under changing market conditions, developed software is enabled with
Graphical analytical toolkit. Notable, that graphs show only three types of con-
tracts wholesale, revenue-sharing and quantity-discount, as two-part tariff contract
behaves perfectly identical to wholesale contract with Y-shift equal to the value
F . The resulting graphs showing the behavior of the profit function for the case
of strong manufacturer are presented in the Appendix 1, while main findings are
summarized below.
If marginal costs c increase from 7 to 15 monetary units (see Appendix 1, Fig. 31
- 33), supply network’s total profit, as well as manufacturer’s and dealers’ profits,
tend to decrease. Notably, the safest contracts for manufacturer in this case are
wholesale and quantity-discount, as manufacturer’s profit function is less sensitive
to negative effects under their conditions.
At the same time, with the increase in manufacturer’s operating expenses for the
order fulfillment from 30 to 40 monetary units (see Appendix 1, Fig. 34 - 36), total
profit of supply network is decreasing. Profit of the second dealer is growing pro-
portionally to decrease in first dealer’s profits. As for manufacturer, all the studied
contracts share little sensitivity to negative effects. Therefore, as quantity-discount
and wholesale contracts return the smallest profits, revenue-sharing and two-part
tariff are most suitable in this case.
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The influence of market parameters is defined by γ, ranging from 0.1 to 0.9,
parameter that is connected to switching customers’ behavior and reflects market
elasticity, and δi, ranging from 0.3 to 2, parameter that is connected to marginal
customers’ behavior and reflects price sensitivity. Thus, γ + δi shows price demand
elasticity for the dealer i.
With γ increase (see Appendix 1, Fig. 37 - 39), elasticity of the market increases
accordingly, which leads to further weakening of both dealers. In such market con-
ditions, wholesale or two-part tariff contracts would be the most suitable option for
the manufacturer, as under these contracts profit function stays within a specified
frame, having a corridor with maximum and minimum borders, instead of constantly
falling down, like it happens under all other contracts. Moreover, wholesale contract
in a situation of increasing market elasticity considerably drives up manufacturer’s
own profits. Thus, in case of strong manufacturer and increasing market elasticity
γ, two-part tariff contract is the most suitable option.
On the other hand, while price sensitivity for first dealer’s products δ1 is increas-
ing (see Appendix 1, Fig. 40 - 42), total profit of supply network is decreasing, as
well as profit of the first dealer itself. A steep increase in price sensitivity results in
a heavy decrease in the manufacturer’s profit under both wholesale and quantity-
discount contracts. In this sense, revenue-sharing contract gives the best safety to
manufacturer, as it has low sensitivity to changes in both δi and in γ.
Other parameters from the set of external environment features that might in-
fluence the profit function are dealers’ market shares k1 and k2. In other words, a
way the market is divided between the two players. In order to track changes in the
profit function values, market share of the first dealer is increased from 0.3 to 0.8,
while market share of the second dealer decrease accordingly from 0.7 to 0.2 (see
Appendix 1, Fig. 43 – 45). This parameter reflects market concentration in a way
it is possible to do so for an oligopolistic market.
As it was expected, with the increase of a market share the profit of an associated
dealer is increasing as well, while its competitor is losing his profit. Another obvious
conclusion is that the more severe is competition the smaller is total supply network
profit, as both dealers have strong incentives to lower prices following the rules of
Bertrand competition. In other words, it can be stated that supply network profit
increases proportionally with the increase in market concentration.
As for the manufacturer, in a situation of low market concentration and, there-
fore, equal and relatively weak dealers, most optimal decision would be to operate
under two-part tariff contract, as it returns the highest profit. At the same time,
in a situation of high market concentration, with one dealer being sufficiently more
powerful then another, but still less powerful then manufacturer, revenue-sharing
would be more favorable.
From the conducted research it can be concluded that for the case of a strong
manufacturer, when he has sufficient bargaining power to pursue contract decisions
in its own favor, two-part tariff contract is the most optimal contract choice, as
it behaves identically to the wholesale contract, nevertheless, allowing profit real-
location in favor of a powerful manufacturer. Revenue-sharing contract has fewer
advantages, but generates much stable revenue streams under volatile market con-
ditions and, therefore, can be considered as an optimal choice for some specific
markets.
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11.2. Coordinating Contract with Equal Power Participants
In turn, let’s consider the situation when manufacturer and dealers initially have
almost equal bargaining power and, consequently, none of the supply network par-
ticipants can claim a bigger share of profit. Therefore, given contract parameters,
such as revenue shares φ1 and φ2, as well as dealers’ discounts v1 and v2 and tariff
rates F1 and F2 would be considerably fairer.
Table 5 below summarizes market conditions and contract parameters that
would correspond to a given situation. It is assumed that potential market con-
ditions stay similar to the ones described in a previous example.
Table 5: Initial data set for the case of equal power distribution
θ γ δ1 δ2 k1 k2 c s1 s2 φ1 φ2 v1 v2 F1 F2
200 0.5 1 1 0.45 0.55 15 35 40 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.45 100 110
Given the initial data set, Table 6 gives an overview for the resulting prices
and order quantities, while Table 7 summarizes the results in terms of listing the
profits achieved by all the participants of a supply network under different contracts
applied.
Table 6: Optimal prices and quantities for the case of equal power distribution
p∗1 q
∗
1 w
∗
1 p
∗
2 q
∗
2 w
∗
2
Wholesale contract 72,5 21 43,3 80 26 47,5
Revenue-Sharing 68,2 26 11,2 75,7 31 12,9
Quantity-discount 72,9 21 43,4 81,7 24 50,8
Two-part tariff 72,5 21 43,3 80 26 47,5
Table 7: Profit function values summary for the case of equal power distribution
π∗1 π
∗
2 π
∗
s1 π
∗
s2 π
∗
s Π
∗
1 Π
∗
2 Π
∗
Wholesale contract 297,5 455 175 195 370 472,5 650 1122,5
Revenue-Sharing 236,9 321,4 236,9 321,4 601,9 473,8 642,9 1116,7
Quantity-discount 392,9 511,2 88,2 129,6 217,8 481,2 640,7 1121,9
Two-part tariff 197,5 345 275 305 580 472,5 650 1122,5
It can be derived from the obtained results that quantity-discount contract un-
evenly distributes total supply network profit between the participants in favor of
dealers. Wholesale contract seems to have this drawback as well, although it is con-
siderably less overbalanced. Such uneven profit allocation might be compensated
with the wise application of two-part tariff contract by choosing appropriate tariff
rates. Revenue-sharing contract, in turn, divides profit in a perfectly balanced way,
according to predefined negotiated shares. Examination on how these contracts will
coordinate supply network relationships under changes in different parameters can
be found in the Appendix 2.
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Considering changes in marginal costs c from 10 to 20 (see Appendix 2, Fig. 46
- 48) and in operating expenses si from 30 to 40 (see Appendix 2, Fig. 49 - 51),
the results are similar to the case of strong manufacturer. In a situation of equal
power participants, from the dealer’s perspective, revenue-sharing contract is the
one least sensitive for cost increase, while manufacturer might favor wholesale and
quantity-discount as being safer.
Notably, with changes in γ from 0.1 to 0.9 (see Appendix 2, Fig. 52 - 54) some
mixed results are observed. On the one hand, supply network profit is the most sta-
ble towards changes in the market conditions under quantity-discount and wholesale
contracts, while under revenue-sharing contract there a slight decrease in profit is
evidenced. On the other hand, under the wholesale contract profit dynamics for
manufacturer and dealers tend to be completely the opposite manufacturer’s profit
is drastically increasing with increase in market elasticity, while dealers’ profits suf-
fer significant decrease at the very same moment. This situation seems to be com-
pletely inacceptable in a case of equally distributed bargaining power. Therefore,
revenue-sharing contract is more reasonable here, as the behavior of manufacturer’s
and dealers’ profit functions follows the same patterns.
All studied types of contracts reacted similarly to changes in δ1 from 0.3 to 2 (see
Appendix 2, Fig. 55 - 57). When price sensitivity is increasing, total profit of supply
network is decreasing, as well as first dealer’s and manufacturer’s profit, which is
identical to the results obtained for the case of strong manufacturer earlier. In
this situation, revenue-sharing contract gives the best safety to manufacturer, while
second dealer would give credit to the wholesale contract.
Expectedly, the observed dynamics for changes in dealers’ market shares ki, with
market share of the first dealer growing from 0.3 to 0.8, while market share of the
second dealer is decreasing from 0.7 to 0.2 (see Appendix 2, Fig. 58 - 60), are similar
to the case of a strong manufacturer. The more severe is competition, the smaller
is total supply network profit, as both dealers have strong incentives to lower their
retail prices (following the rules of Bertrand competition), disregarding what type
of contract is applied. In other words, supply network profit increases proportionally
with the increase in market concentration. For the dealers, revenue-sharing contract
is the most stable in terms of profit allocation, while for manufacturer, in a situation
of equal and relatively weak dealers, most optimal decision would be to operate
under two-part tariff contract, and in a situation of one dealer being sufficiently
more powerful then another, revenue-sharing would be more favorable.
From the studied example, it can be concluded that for the case of equally
distributed bargaining power, optimal contract choice would be revenue-sharing, as
it allocates the supply network profit exactly according to the negotiated shares.
In addition to that, revenue-sharing contract is less sensitive to changes in market
conditions and preserves the same tendencies for both dealers’ and manufacturer’s
profit functions, which is important. Two-part tariff might also be used, if tariff
rate is tuned to the supply network needs, but it suffers more sensitivity to costs
escalation and unfavorable market environment.
11.3. Coordinating Contract with Strong Dealers
The last numerical example considers the situation, when dealers initially have more
bargaining power then the manufacturer and, therefore, impose their decisions on
the supply network in terms of business arrangements. Dealers’ bargaining power
would again influence given set of contract parameters, such as revenue shares φ1
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and φ2, dealers’ discounts v1 and v2 and tariff rates F1 and F2. Table 3.5 below
summarizes market conditions and contract parameters that would correspond to
the situation. It is assumed that potential market conditions stay similar to the
previous examples.
Table 8: Initial data set for the case of strong dealers
θ γ δ1 δ2 k1 k2 c s1 s2 φ1 φ2 v1 v2 F1 F2
200 0.5 1 1 0.45 0.55 17 35 40 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.85 30 40
Given the initial data set, Table 9 below gives an overview for the resulting prices
and order quantities, while Table 10 summarizes the modeling results in terms of
listing the profits achieved by all the participants of a supply network under different
contract types applied.
Table 9: Optimal prices and quantities for the case of strong dealers
p∗1 q
∗
1 w
∗
1 p
∗
2 q
∗
2 w
∗
2
Wholesale contract 73,5 20 43 81 25 47,2
Revenue-Sharing 69.5 25 25.7 77,5 29 35.7
Quantity-discount 72.9 21 43.4 81,7 24 50.8
Two-part tariff 73,5 20 43 81 25 47,2
Table 10: Profit function values summary for the case of strong dealers
π∗1 π
∗
2 π
∗
s1 π
∗
s2 π
∗
s Π
∗
1 Π
∗
2 Π
∗
Wholesale contract 270 420,8 160 179,2 339,2 430 600 1030
Revenue-Sharing 349,1 533,6 87,3 59,3 146,6 436,4 592,8 1029,2
Quantity-discount 304,1 415,8 50,4 72,7 123 419,3 569,3 988,5
Two-part tariff 240 380,8 190 409,2 580 430 600 1030
Behavior of the profit functions of a supply network, manufacturer and dealers
is summarized in the Appendix 3. In a situation of changing marginal costs c from
12 to 25 (see Appendix 3, Fig. 61 - 63) and manufacturer’s operating expenses si
from 30 to 40 (see Appendix 3, Fig. 64 - 66), the behavior of profit functions is
similar to the cases discussed before. In general, it can be concluded that all types
of contracts have little sensitivity for costs escalation, with revenue-sharing contract
being the most stable option in terms of revenue streams.
As for the influence of market parameters, profit function behavior under the
changes in price sensitivity δi, ranging from 0.3 to 2, (see Appendix 3, Fig. 70 –
72) also has insignificant differences from the cases discussed earlier. Nevertheless,
changes in market elasticity, ranging from 0.1 to 0.9, (see Appendix 3, Fig. 67 - 69)
bring some new interesting insights.
With increase in market elasticity γ, both revenue-sharing and quantity-discount
contracts react less intensively than wholesale and two-part tariff contracts, which
would probably be an attractive option for powerful dealers. In addition to that,
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revenue-sharing contract can even provide some growth in total supply network
profit due to a slight increase in manufacturer’s profit. Nevertheless, quantity-
discount is less sensitive to changes in market conditions. Therefore, if dealer runs a
risk of losing a part of his market share, optimal choice would be apply a quantity-
discount contract, while if he is expecting some growth, application of a revenue-
sharing contract would enforce a steeper profit growth.
As it was expected, the observed dynamics for changes in the dealers’ market
shares ki, from 0.3 to 0.8 for the first dealer and from 0.7 to 0.2 for the second
dealer, (see Appendix 3, Fig. 73 - 75), are similar to the previous cases. The more
severe is competition, the smaller is total supply network profit, as both dealers have
strong incentives to lower their prices (following the rules of Bertrand competition),
no matter what type of contract is chosen. In other words, supply network profit
increases proportionally with the increase in market concentration. For the dealers,
revenue-sharing contract is the most stable option in terms of profit allocation,
while for the manufacturer, in a situation of equal and relatively weak dealers,
most optimal decision would be to operate under two-part tariff contract, and in
a situation of one dealer being sufficiently more powerful then another, revenue-
sharing contract would be preferred.
From the current example, it can be concluded that in any case, quantity-
discount contract tends to allocate profit in favor of dealers, no matter what costs
and discounts are chosen. Moreover, this type of contract has some characteristics,
which might be of use in a situation of strong dealers. Thus, this contract would
be an optimal choice in this case. Wholesale contract, in turn, allocates too much
profit to the manufacturer, which is very doubtful to be accepted by the dealers en-
joying higher bargaining power. At the same time, revenue-sharing contract allows
dealers to receive an exact share of total supply network revenue according to the
negotiations. However, it this contract type is very sensitive to changes in external
market conditions and, therefore, is applicable only for some specific situations.
11.4. Audi Group Case Study
This is a case study based on the data of the year 2010, which was obtained from
the interview with a CEO of one of the Audi dealership centers in Saint-Petersburg,
Sergey P. Ticholiz, on 16.04.2012. In addition to that, public company reports, as
well as open-source data were used in order to obtain some data for the model-
ing purposes. Detailed information can be found in the research paper ”Supply
Chain Coordination with revenue-sharing contract: Audi dealers case” (M. Korol-
eva, 2012).
This is a case of a strong international manufacturer selling its goods through
small, compared to manufacturer size, local dealers, who have to compete for the
same local market with each other. In 2010, Audi’s importing department, in terms
of their own branded dealership network, included 46 points of sales in 35 cities
across Russia, of which 9 were in Moscow and 3 in Saint-Petersburg.
Volkswagen Group Rus usually encloses 5-year long-term revenue-sharing con-
tracts with its associated dealers. According to the contract terms, an official dealer
of Audi, based on his own demand estimations, buys a specific amount of branded
Audi cars Qi from the importing company at a price wi per car and then resells
these cars to the market at a price pi per unit. The difference between w and p
is called dealer’s percentage and, therefore pi = φiwi. Moreover, if a dealer sells
44 Anastasia Bashinskaya, Mariia Koroleva, Nikolay Zenkevich
more than a certain amount of cars, he receives a bonus from the manufacturing
company, which might be interpreted as having a quantity-based discount.
To evaluate the potential market size, Audi sales statistics of the year 2010 was
used. Due to lacking information, it is impossible to estimate, how many cars exactly
were ordered by dealers in 2010. Therefore, it is assumed that the number of sold
cars equals to the number of ordered cars and salvage value therefore equals to zero.
Thus, combined dealers’ order quantity Q for the region of Saint-Petersburg in 2010
was equal to 1430 car units.
Concerning the actual retail prices, there is a lot of volatility in the car market
due to a number of possible car grades, which can range from simple to luxurious. To
overcome this problem, retail price p was assumed to be equal to the mathematical
average between the lowest and the highest prices of a specific model.
Based on these data, potential market size θ for Audi cars in 2010 in Saint-
Petersburg can be estimated as equal to 2 834 885 795 Rub. For the purposes of the
current study, it is assumed that all dealers have equal market shares, as, according
to the interview (Sergey Ticholiz, 2012), their competition is quite intense. An
additional analysis, presenting different possible levels of market concentration will
be presented later in this section.
Concerning market elasticity γ, as car buyers are very likely to switch between
dealers in case of lower prices, γ is assumed to be equal to 0,7 in order to reflect the
situation. At the same time, price sensitivity δ tends to be medium and equals to 1,
as Audi cars fall into a category of luxury goods with less price-sensitive customer
audience.
Following Sergey Ticholiz (2012), dealer’s marginal costs c can be approximately
estimated as being equal to 70 000 000 Rub, while operating expenses of Audi Russia
(si) in 2010 were 474 000 000 euros (from Audi Group Annual Financial Statement).
Euro exchange rate for 31.12.10 was equal to 40.3 Rub / Euro. Therefore, costs of
Audi Russia to fulfill all the associated dealers’ orders in 2010 were equal to 19 102
200 000 Rub, while the costs si to fulfil the order of one dealer in Saint-Petersburg
can be estimated as 181 925 700 Rub.
As it was mentioned earlier, in terms of bargaining power, this is the case of
having a strong manufacturer at one side and a number of small, competing dealers
on the other side, which is reflected in contract parameters. According to Sergey Ti-
choliz (2012), in 2010 the distribution of profit between manufacturer and dealer was
90% manufacturer’s share and 10% dealer’s share (φ). At the same time, quantity
based discount available (v) was 5% at maximum. As for F1, F2, after modelling
the wholesale contract, their initial values were set equal to 150 000 Rub, as to
redistribute the profit according to the situation of extremely strong manufacturer.
Table 11 below summarizes market conditions and contract parameters that
would correspond to the described situation, with M standing for million Rubles.
Table 11: Initial data set for Audi case
θ γ δ1 δ2 k1 k2 c s1 s2 φ1 φ2 v1 v2 F1 F2
2834M 0.7 1 1 0.5 0.5 70M 181M 181M 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.15M 0.15M
Main results for the profit allocation are summarized in Table 12. The results
are presented in million Rubles.
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Table 12: Profit function values summary for Audi case
π∗1 π
∗
2 π
∗
s1 π
∗
s2 π
∗
s Π
∗
1 Π
∗
2 Π
∗
Wholesale contract 199420 199420 139594 139594 279188 339015 339015 678030
Revenue-Sharing 31692 31692 285232 285232 570349 316924 316924 633722
Quantity-discount 310062 310062 12678 12678 25276 322700 322700 645401
Two-part tariff 494200 49420 289594 289594 579188 339015 339015 678030
As it can be clearly seen from the Table 12, Audi Russia has chosen revenue-
sharing contract to be the one coordinating their supply network, as initially it
returns the company, as a manufacturer, the highest profit in absolute terms. Nev-
ertheless, wholesale and two-part tariff contract results show that there still ex-
ists room for supply network optimization in terms of increasing system-wide total
profit. Moreover, with the application of a two-part-tariff contract, this profit can
be reallocated according to the power distribution with the usage of corresponding
tariff rate, which would result in higher total supply network profits, as well as
higher profits for both dealers and Audi Group.
Let’s now see how these contracts will be able to coordinate Audi’s supply net-
work relationships under changing market conditions. In case of changes in dealer’s
marginal costs c, in a range from 40M to 100M Rub., profit functions would look
as follows (Fig. 7 – 9):
Fig. 7: Audi supply network profit function under volatility of marginal costs
The behavior of profit functions for Audi’s supply network is similar to that of
a numerical example for strong manufacturer and brings the same conclusions: the
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Fig. 8: Audi dealers’ profit function under volatility of marginal costs
Fig. 9: Audi profit function under volatility of marginal costs
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safest contracts for Audi would be wholesale and quantity-discount, as company’s
profit function is less sensitive to the dealer’s costs escalation.
Consequently, the behavior of profit function in case of changes in Audi’s oper-
ating expenses to fulfill the orders of their dealers, from 160M to 200M Rub, would
be similar to that of a studied example as well (see Appendix 4, Fig. 77 - 79). With
the increase in Audi Russia operating expenses for order fulfillment, total profit
of the whole supply network is decreasing. Moreover, profit of the second dealer is
growing proportionally to the decrease in first dealer’s profits. All of the studied
contracts share little sensitivity to negative effects of the changes in cost structure,
thus, revenue-sharing and two-part tariff are the most suitable contracts for Audi
Group in this case.
As for the influence of different market parameters, including market elasticity γ,
ranging from 0.1 to 0.9, and price sensitivity δi, ranging from 0.3 to 2, the behavior
of Audi supply network profit functions can be found in the Appendix 4 (Fig. 80 -
84). In general, main results are similar to those, attained for the numerical example.
Notably, γ was initially quite high in the Audi case, reflecting the situation
of equally small dealers weakened by their intense competition. In a situation of
growing market elasticity γ, wholesale or two-part tariff contracts would be the most
suitable options for Audi Russia, as they save company’s profits from constantly
falling down, keeping the profit function within the corridor, as opposed to other
contract types. Nevertheless, increase in price sensitivity δ leads to a heavy decrease
of Audi’s profit under wholesale and quantity-discount contracts. In this sense,
revenue-sharing contract gives the best safety in a volatile market situation, as it
has low sensitivity to changes in both δi and in γ.
Now the assumption of initially equal market shares k1 and k2 is to be tested.
Market share of the first dealer would be increased from 0.3 to 0.8, while market
share of the second would decrease from 0.7 to 0.2 accordingly. Consequently, the
behavior of profit function would look as follows (Fig. 10 - 12):
As it was expected, with the increase of his market share, profit of an associated
dealer is increasing as well, while its competitor’s profit is falling proportionally.
Another evident conclusion is that the more severe is the competition, the smaller
is total Audi supply network profit, as under the rules of Bertrand competition both
dealers have strong incentives to lower their prices in order to attract consumers. For
Audi, in a situation of facing equally weak dealers, the most optimal decision would
be to operate under two-part tariff contract, as it returns the highest profit. If con-
centration on the market would be eventually increasing, revenue-sharing contract
becomes more favorable for the Audi Group.
All in all, this case study goes in line with the results attained in a numerical
example earlier in this Chapter. According to the data available, for Audi Russia
Group, the most optimal contract choice is two-part tariff contract, as it provides
enough safety towards volatile market conditions, while optimizing the supply net-
work economic performance in terms of returning the highest possible total profit,
in addition allowing profit reallocation in favor of manufacturer. Revenue-sharing
contract, which is currently used by company, is suitable for specific market condi-
tions, such as growing price sensitivity of customers, which might be the case during
the economic crisis or due to political environment.
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Fig. 10: Audi supply network profit function under changes in market concentration
Fig. 11: Audi dealers’ profit function under changes in market concentration
Coordinating Contracts in Cooperative Supply Networks 49
Fig. 12: Audi profit function under changes in market concentration
11.5. Heineken Case Study
Heineken case study is based on the data of the year 2015, which was obtained from
the confidential interview with a middle manager responsible for procurement and
logistics of the medium chain pub in Saint-Petersburg on 21.08.2015. In addition to
that, company’s contract offers and warehouse documentation were used in order
to attain the necessary data.
This is a case of equal power parties, with a beer wholesaler selling products
to separate pubs in the center of Saint-Petersburg. Concerning the dealers’ side,
restaurant and foodservice market in Saint-Petersburg is extremely competitive,
with huge chain players dominating the market at one side and medium-to-small
local companies altogether comprising the majority of the market (more than 50%
market share) at another. According to Rosstat, the number of cafes, restaurants,
and other food outlets in Russia currently stands at about 88,000 and almost 88
percent of outlets are independent non-chain cafes and restaurants.
As for the supplier side, big alcohol manufacturers, such as Heineken Group,
have specific distribution requirements, which are more or less similar worldwide.
In order to have direct relationships with Heineken Group any buying company
should purchase and realize certain volumes of their product on a monthly or a
weekly basis. If company cannot satisfy a minimum qualification level, it has to
purchase Heineken products through wholesalers, who accumulate orders from nu-
merous smaller companies. Being able to cumulate the required purchase volume,
these wholesalers make purchases directly from the Heineken Group and redistribute
down the supply system.
Therefore, in terms of bargaining power distribution, this is a case of a medium
wholesale company reselling branded beer to two medium pubs, which reflects the
situation of equal power participants.
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Consequently, the two pubs chosen for analysis are situated next to each other
in one street in the Saint-Petersburg city center. Both are buying certain amount
of beer Qi from the wholesaler at a price wi per liter of product and then resell it
in their point of sales at a price pi per liter. It is assumed that they are serving
the same sort of beer ”Heineken” in exactly the same way, so that it is completely
indistinguishable to consumers. Moreover, it is assumed that consumers make their
buying decision based on the retail price, disregarding pubs’ location (as they are
situated next to each other), reputation, interior design, etc. Nevertheless, the con-
sumers are characterized by a certain degree of loyalty to one of the pubs, as this
is an important notion for the foodservice industry.
From the interview with a company manager (2015), a small-to-medium pub in
the city center is able to sell up to 1000 liters of one specific well-known brand of
beer per week. Therefore, as beer is an FMCG product, it is assumed that all beer
ordered from the wholesaler is realized during the same week. Thus, total potential
demand for Heineken sort of beer in that specific place of the city is equal to 2000
liters per week. Placing more efforts in promotion, first pub enjoys a slightly bigger
market share k1 = 0.6, compared to the rival’s k2 = 0.4. Therefore, order quantities
are Q1 = 1200, Q2 = 800 liters of Heineken per week.
The retail price p of a Heineken beer is 180 Rub per 0,33 liters, which makes it
540 per liter in retail. This subsumes the potential market value θ to be equal to 1
080 000 Rub per week. At the same time bar’s marginal costs c equal approximately
150 000 Rub. per week, while wholesaler costs to fulfill the order are 190 Rub. per
liter of Heineken. Then, s1 = 228 000 Rub. and s2 = 152 000 Rub. per week.
Concerning market elasticity γ, consumers are not very likely to switch between
small pubs in case of price decrease, as there is a significant percentage of loyal
customers in the target audience. Therefore, γ is assumed to be equal to 0.3, re-
flecting considerably low market elasticity. On the other hand, price sensitivity δ
tends to be medium, as the target audience seems to be not very price-sensitive to
out-of-home FMCG products, and therefore equals to 1.
In terms of bargaining power, equal power distribution is reflected in contract
parameters in a following manner. Thus, the distribution of profit between the
wholesaler and the pubs is assumed to be 50% share of the wholesaler and 50%
pub’s share (φ). Similarly, quantity based discount (v) is 50% for the first pub and
40% for the second one. As for F1, F2, after modelling the wholesale contract, their
initial values were set as 900 and 1000 Rub. accordingly, as to reallocate profit more
evenly.
Table 13 below summarizes market conditions and contract parameters that
would correspond to the described situation, with T standing for thousand rubles.
Table 13: Initial data set for Heineken case
θ γ δ1 δ2 k1 k2 c s1 s2 φ1 φ2 v1 v2 F1 F2
1080T 0.3 1 1 0.6 0.5 150T 228T 152T 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 900 1000
Main results are summarized in Table 14, in thousand rubles.
As it can be clearly seen from the Table 14, supply network in terms of total
profit will be optimized under the wholesale or two-part tariff contract. While the
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Table 14: Profit function values summary for Heineken case
π∗1 π
∗
2 π
∗
s1 π
∗
s2 π
∗
s Π
∗
1 Π
∗
2 Π
∗
Wholesale contract 11789 4466 2439 2012 4452 14229 6497 20708
Revenue-Sharing 6956 3270 6956 3270 10227 13913 6541 20454
Quantity-discount 11180 5620 2412 1155 3567 13833 6776 20609
Two-part tariff 10889 3466 3339 3012 6352 14229 6497 20708
wholesale contract better suits the interests of the stronger pub, wholesaler would fa-
vor revenue-sharing contract. At the same time, relatively weaker pub would choose
quantity-discount contracts. Most probably, this indicates that final decision on the
contract type will be made based on specific market conditions or negotiation power,
as the cases of completely even bargaining power distribution are extremely rare.
Nevertheless, from the results of modeling on a numerical example, it was con-
ducted that quantity-discount and wholesale contracts unevenly distribute total
supply network profit. Namely, these contracts allocate a bigger share of profit to
the dealers. Therefore, the most balanced contract is two-part tariff, in case the tar-
iff rates are chosen appropriately. In turn, revenue-sharing contract as well divides
total supply network profit in a balanced way, according to predefined negotiated
shares.
Let’s examine how these contracts will be able to coordinate supply network
relationships in foodservice industry under changing market conditions. The behav-
ior of profit function in case of changes in pubs’ marginal costs c from 100 to 200
thousand Rub. would look as follows (Fig. 13 - 15):
Fig. 13: Heineken supply network profit function under volatility of marginal costs
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Fig. 14: Bar profit function under volatility of marginal costs
Fig. 15: Beer wholesaler profit function under volatility of marginal costs
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The behavior of profit function in case of changes in the wholesaler’s operating
expenses to fulfill the orders of the pub with a higher market share, growing from
200 to 250 thousand Rubles, would be as follows (Fig. 85 - 87):
Fig. 16: Heineken supply network profit function under volatility of operating expenses
In line with the results obtained from a numerical example, from the pub’s
perspective, revenue-sharing contract shows the smallest sensitivity for costs esca-
lation, while beer wholesaler would favor wholesale and quantity-discount contracts
as providing more safety.
Graphs, showing the reaction of the profit function on changes in market elas-
ticity and consumer price sensitivity δ can be found in the Appendix 5 (Fig. 88 –
90). Supply network profit proved to be the most stable in terms of profit towards
changes in the market conditions under quantity-discount and wholesale contracts.
Nevertheless, under the wholesale and two-part tariff contracts, profit dynamics for
the beer wholesaler and pubs proved to be completely the opposite. Such a situation
seems to be inacceptable in case of equally distributed bargaining power. Therefore,
revenue-sharing contract is more reasonable, as the wholesaler’s and pubs’ profit
functions follow the same tendencies.
The last set parameters that might influence the profit function is market con-
centration, reflected by pubs’ market shares k1 and k2. Assume, that the market
share of the first pub is increasing from 0.3 to 0.8, while market share of the sec-
ond dealer is decreasing accordingly from 0.7 to 0.2. Thus, the behavior of profit
function in case of changes in the market shares would be as follows (Fig. 19 - 21):
The observed dynamics again prove that the more severe is competition, the
lower is total supply network profit, no matter what type of contract is applied.
In other words, supply network profit increases proportionally with the increase in
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Fig. 17: Bar profit function under volatility of operating expenses
Fig. 18: Beer wholesaler profit function under volatility of operating expenses
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Fig. 19: Heineken supply network profit function under changes in market concentration
Fig. 20: Bar profit function under changes in market concentration
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Fig. 21: Beer wholesaler profit function under changes in market concentration
market concentration. For the bars, revenue-sharing contract is the most stable in
terms of profit allocation and revenue streams, while for the beer wholesaler optimal
choice depends on the market concentration. Thus, in a situation of equally small
and relatively weak bars, the optimal decision for the beer wholesaler would be to
operate under a two-part tariff contract, however, in a situation when one bar has a
sufficiently bigger market share, for the wholesaler revenue-sharing contract is more
favorable.
As for the case of a Heineken beer wholesaler reselling products to different pubs
of Saint-Petersburg, optimal choice is a revenue-sharing contract, as it allocates the
supply network profit exactly according to the negotiated shares. In addition to that,
revenue-sharing contract is less sensitive to volatile market conditions and preserves
the same tendencies for both bars and the wholesaler, which should be taken into
account assuming that parties have equal bargaining power. Bars should also favor
revenue-sharing contract, as it provides them with the most stable revenue streams,
ensuring a considerate protection in case of costs escalation.
11.6. ProtechDry Case Study
This is a case study based on the data of the year 2015, which was obtained from
the interview with a senior manager of ProtechDry company on 11.03.2015 for Inte-
grated Marketing Communications course in Nova SBE, Portugal. As an additional
source of information, ProtechDry and Impetus Group reports and financial state-
ments for the years 2014-2015 were studied. Detailed information can be found in the
research paper ”ProtechDry Integrated Marketing Communications” (M. Koloreva,
N. Kowalczyk, T. S. Baena, F. M. de Mello, M. B. Moura Costa, 2015).
ProtechDry is a Portuguese brand that belongs to Impetus Group, specializing in
the production of Cut and Sew and seamless products. ProtechDry is an innovative
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solution, developed in 2010 by the Impetus R and D department and launched in the
Portuguese market as a separate entity. ProtechDry is ultra-absorbent, washable and
anti-odor underwear that was specially designed for people with light incontinence
and is supposed to replace the need of using pads.
As ProtechDry is legally separated from their parent company, they had to de-
velop their own distribution network, not connected to the one used by Impetus
Group. As a strategic decision, for the past few years, ProtechDry was sold along-
side other incontinence products through grocery retail channels. Grocery retail in
Portugal is heavily dominated by domestic players, with few international com-
panies operating in the market. The two largest chain retailers are Sonae Modelo
Continente and Jeronimo Martins, which together captured a substantial 36% share
of the overall value sales in grocery retail in Portugal during 2014.
This is one of the perfect examples of unequal bargaining power distribution,
when a small unknown brand faces huge retail chains, which completely dominate
the market and therefore are able to set their own rules.
According to the ProtechDry manager (2015), big retail chains buy small quanti-
ties Qi of ProtechDry underwear for placing it on shelves at a price wi per package.
Then retailers resell the product in the stores at a price pi per package. As the
brand is new to the market, retailers do not buy any sufficient quantities for stor-
age, therefore, it is assumed that they sell everything they buy and salvage value
equals to zero.
According to the company report, in 2014 ProtechDry has sold 12 000 packages
of underwear, which is taken as combined retailers order quantity Q. Concerning
the actual retail prices, there is an even price of 24.99 euros per package, which is
set by the company and does not vary over different stores and retail chains. 23%
of the price is due to Value Added Tax, the retailer margin is about 7 euros and the
distribution costs account for 3.5 euros per unit (c = 3.5∗Q). The costs of materials
and production compose 4 euros per unit of product (s = 4 ∗Q). The contribution
margin of is around 5.9 euros.
For the purposes of the current study, potential market size θ equals in units to
order quantityQ and, therefore, is estimated to be around 299 880 euros. Concerning
market elasticity γ, consumers in Portugal are extremely likely to switch between
retailers in case of lower prices offered by any competitor. Thus, γ is assumed to be
equal to 0,8 to reflect this situation. At the same time, price sensitivity δ tends to
be medium, as compared to its competitors ProtechDry is in a category of luxury
goods, characterized by less price-sensitive consumer audience. Moreover, as this is
a niche product serving very specific need of people with light urinary incontinence,
which ensures that target customers are even less price sensitive, because the number
of available solutions is very limited. Therefore, price sensitivity is set to be δ = 0,5.
This is the case of supply network relationships between strong retail chains at
one side and a small local brand on the other side, which is reflected in contract
parameters. According to the data, received from the interview with the company
manager (2015), the profit distribution between ProtechDry and retail chains in
2014 was as follows: 25% share of profit was allocated to ProtechDry and the re-
maining 75% was retailers’ share (φ). At the same time, quantity based discount
(v) is assumed to be 90%, as all the retail chains in Portugal apply heavy discount
policies. As for tariff rates F1, F2, after modeling the wholesale contract, their initial
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values were set as 100 euros, although it seems to be very unlikely that a strong
retail chain would pay any tariff to a small company.
As it was already stated above, the competition in grocery retail is very intense,
which is reinforced by the fact that market is more or less equally shared between five
to six retail giants. In this sense, it is assumed that dealers have equal market shares
k1 and k2, while an additional analysis with different levels of market concentration
will be presented later in this paragraph.
Table 14 below summarizes market conditions, and contract parameters that
would correspond to the described situation, with t standing for thousand euros.
Table 15: Initial data set for ProtechDry case
θ γ δ1 δ2 k1 k2 c s1 s2 φ1 φ2 v1 v2 F1 F2
300t 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 21t 24t 24t 0.75 0.75 0.9 0.9 100 100
Main results of possible profit allocations are summarized in Table 16, in thou-
sand euros.
Table 16: Profit function values summary for ProtechDry case
π∗1 π
∗
2 π
∗
s1 π
∗
s2 π
∗
s Π
∗
1 Π
∗
2 Π
∗
Wholesale contract 3138 3138 5021 5021 10043 8160 8160 16320
Revenue-Sharing 4967 4967 1655 1655 3311 6622 6622 13245
Quantity-discount 5861 5861 2142 2142 4284 8004 8004 16008
Two-part tariff 3038 3038 5121 5121 10243 8160 8160 16320
As it can be derived from the Table 16, ProtechDry’s supply network would be
optimized under the wholesale or two-part tariff contracts, in terms of total profit.
Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that those types of contracts allocate far too big
share of profit in favor of a manufacturer, which is a small weak brand in this
case. Retail giants, such as Continente and Jeronimo Martins, being able to dictate
their own terms, would never accept such conditions. Therefore, most probably, a
quantity-discount contract will be chosen for supply network optimization, as it
shows much better results than revenue-sharing contract.
The behavior of the profit functions of the supply network, ProtechDry and
the retail chains in case of changing retailers’ marginal costs c and manufacturer’s
operating expenses si is presented in the Appendix 6 (Fig. 91 - 96). All types of
studied contracts show little sensitivity for costs escalation, while an interesting
observation is that due to the low consumers’ price-sensitivity δ and high market
elasticity γ, showing that many customers can be attracted by price reduction, profit
decreases less intensively in a situation of increasing costs.
As for the influence of changes in price sensitivity δi, within the range from 0.3
to 2, the behavior of profit function would look as follows (Fig. 22–24):
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Fig. 22: ProtechDry supply network profit function under changes in price sensitivity
Fig. 23: ProtechDry dealers’ profit function under changes in price sensitivity
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Fig. 24: ProtechDry profit function under changes in price sensitivity
ProtechDry, retail chains’ and supply network aggregated profit functions in a
situation of changing market elasticity γ, ranging from 0.1 to 0.9, would look as
follows (Fig. 25–27):
Fig. 25: ProtechDry supply network profit function under changes in market elasticity
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Fig. 26: ProtechDry dealers’ profit function under changes in market elasticity
Fig. 27: ProtechDry profit function under changes in market elasticity
Conclusions that can be derived from the Figures 25 - 27, follow the ones made
earlier in this paragraph. With increase in market elasticity γ, revenue-sharing and
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quantity-discount contracts react less intensively than wholesale and two-part tar-
iff contracts, which would attract cautious retailers. At the same time, quantity-
discount contract provides some growth in total supply network profit due to slight
increase in ProtechDry’s profit. Thus, if a retailer runs a risk of losing a part of
its market share, optimal choice would be application of a quantity-discount con-
tract, while if a retailer is expecting some growth, revenue-sharing contract would
enforce a steeper profit growth. For ProtechDry quantity-discount contract would
serve better in highly elastic market.
Considering the possible changes in retailers’ market shares k1 and k2, from 0.3
to 0.8 for the first retail chain and from 0.7 to 0.2 for the second accordingly, the
behavior of profit function would look as follows (Fig. 28 - 30):
Fig. 28: ProtechDry supply network profit function under changes in market concentration
Following all the other studied cases and examples, with an increase in a market
share, profit of the associated retailer is increasing as well, while its competitor’s
profit is decreasing. Moreover, the more severe is the competition the smaller is
total ProtechDry supply network profit. In any case, quantity-discount contract
tends to allocate supply network profit in favor of dealers, no matter what costs
and discounts were chosen during the negotiation process. This type of contract has
some characteristics, which might be useful in a situation of powerful retail chains,
especially when they are operating in a highly competitive market, like Portuguese.
Thus, quantity-discount contract would be an optimal choice for powerful retail
chains in case of ProtechDry. Wholesale contract allocates too much profit to man-
ufacturer, which is very doubtful to be accepted. At the same time, as opposed to
the numerical example, revenue-sharing contract has shown the worst performance
in a situation of strong retailers in terms of both total supply network profit and
stability towards changing market conditions.
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Fig. 29: ProtechDry dealers’ profit function under changes in market concentration
Fig. 30: ProtechDry profit function under changes in market concentration
64 Anastasia Bashinskaya, Mariia Koroleva, Nikolay Zenkevich
Most probably, ProtechDry would not have a possibility to affect the choice of
the contract type due to extremely low bargaining power. However, despite the fact
of returning the lowest profits for the company in absolute terms, quantity-discount
contract shows good performance in highly elastic market, providing ProtechDry
with opportunities for faster growth.
12. Conclusion
This is the final section, which aims to give an overview of the conducted research
and formulate the main conclusions. Hence, discussion concerns in turn main results
of the study, limitations to those results and managerial implications.
The objective of the article was methodology improvement of contract selec-
tion in cooperative supply networks for achieving higher supply network economic
performance, where economic performance stands for total supply network profit.
Supply network management is a new line of research within a broader field of sup-
ply chain management. Therefore, as a starting point of contract decision-making
methodology improvement, the conceptual understanding of supply network phe-
nomena was extended. In general, supply network can be described as a system
comprised of individual supply chains, united by an integrated flow of products,
services, finances and (or) information, provided that at least two of its members
are direct competitors. As a result of defining supply network conceptual framework,
the standard newsvendor setting was improved and adapted in order to reflect the
situation of competing retailers (dealers).
Nevertheless, in light of adding a new factor of competition, the problem of
supply network optimization through coordination could be solved only partially,
as the existing methodologies only allow achieving coordination of distinct supply
chain pairs (manufacturer-dealer) separately. This suggests that there exists some
space for methodology improvement.
The stated objective was successfully achieved by the application of a new supply
network setting to the supply chain cooperative game, which was solved regarding
the new initial input in the form of competing retailers. Thus, the methodology
of contract selection in a supply chain or a set of supply chains was widened by
devising a mechanism that allows not only coordination of distinct simple supply
chains but also coordination at a system-wide level in the context of competing
retailers (dealers). In addition to that, the improved methodology embraces the
notion of bargaining power and enables building different scenarios based on the
estimation of the negotiation power disposed by the supply network members.
Based on the game-theoretical and mathematical modeling, resulting in the im-
proved methodology, a quantitative software tool was developed aimed at facilitation
of methodology application. With the help of this tool, the improved methodology
was tested on the real-life cases, matching three main alternatives of bargaining
power allocation: strong manufacturer, strong retailers (dealers) and equal power
participants. All three cases showed potential for supply network economic perfor-
mance improvement, in terms of increasing total profit of the system itself, as well
as individual profits of each supply network member, which can be achieved through
methodology application as a means for coordinating contract selection.
The main results of the study can be summarized as follows:
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1. The standard newsvendor model was improved and adapted in order to reflect
the situation of competing retailers (dealers), referring to the supply network
concept;
2. The methodology of coordination contracts decision-making was improved by
devising a mechanism for contract selection for the case of multi-echelon supply
network with two competing dealers enabling coordination at a system-wide
level;
3. Economic performance improvement potential of developed contract decision-
making methodology was empirically proved by testing it on the real-life cases
of Audi Russia, Heineken Saint-Petersburg and ProtechDry Portugal;
4. For each case a set of recommendations on contract selection for optimizing
system-wide performance was formulated, giving attention to the bargaining
power and, therefore, decision priority of all members.
Nevertheless, these findings have some important limitations that are not to
be neglected, as they are primarily related to the applicability of the developed
methodology in different circumstances.
First of all comes the group of the limitations originating from the newsven-
dor setting, a supply chain model widely used for studying coordinating contracts.
Supply network model developed in the present master thesis was designed as an
improved and widened newsvendor model, assuming that retailers compete with
each other. Therefore, application of the studied model is limited to one product
and one period. This means that if a company sells a range of different products
down the supply chain, the improved methodology of contact selection would be
able to find optimal solutions for each product separately as if those were sepa-
rate supply networks with no possibility of interconnections, combinations, cross
discounts, mutual contracts, etc. The same is true for the time horizon.
In addition to that, another limitation originating from the newsvendor setting
is assumption of perfect information throughout the supply network. Hence, it is
not clear, whether the model can be successfully applied in case of incomplete
information or in case of the opportunistic behavior, when participants are trying
to use their access to private information as a way to receive an advantage.
Moreover, the developed model does not cover the situation of products from
competing companies (manufacturers) being distributed through the same retailers.
Influence of these products should be studied more thoroughly in order to derive any
conclusions on the possible effects concerning the methodology of contract decision-
making.
Second set of limitations is related to the rules of market competition applied in
the model. For the purposes of the current study it was assumed that retailers set
their prices following the rules of Bertrand competition, which limits model appli-
cation to the markets to a greater extent satisfying these conditions. As a direction
for future research, studied methodology can be improved further by application of
Cournot competition rules. In addition to that, directly linked to Bertrand compe-
tition rules used in the model, come limitations of specific contract types. As due
to these rules, the methodology considers only coordinating contracts belonging to
a group of price-dependent contracts. Therefore, it would be interesting to study
also those contracts related to quantity-dependent group.
However, present research paper derives important theoretical and practical im-
plications.
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From the theoretical perspective, this paper develops the research related to the
supply network conceptual framework, originated from Bryant (1980) and then de-
veloped by Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1997). Most directly related to the current
research are papers of Birge et al. (1998) Carr et al. (1999) and van Mieghem and
Dada (1999), who consider the special case of the supply network model with two
competing retailers.
Research originality of the paper is granted by an applied procedure that fills
in the research gap in papers devoted to development of specific contract selection
mechanisms, which are applicable in real life situations. The particular novelty of
the research lies in in the improved methodology of contract selection, which is able
to achieve a system-wide coordination under the conditions of competing retailers
(dealers). Thus, the paper widens the field of supply chain coordination, however,
upscaling it to coordination of supply systems, as a broader scope of relationships
between companies.
Theoretical implications of the research therefore include extended concept of
supply network phenomena and an improved methodology of contract decision-
making for a specific case of competing retailers, which was tested and proved to be
applicable to the real-life situations. The studied methodology opens a broad area
for future research, as it might be improved further in a range of different courses,
such as including additional coordinating contracts, applying different competition
rules, extending the time horizon or product range, etc.
In the array of managerial implications the most important result is an improved
methodology of contract selection and a quantitative software tool, that enable
companies to choose a specific contract type in order to maximize supply network
economic performance as well as to distribute total profit in a specific desired way.
The improved methodology by the means of a software tool was tested on real-life
cases and proved to give corresponding results, as well as demonstrated a significant
economic performance improvement potential.
Resulting from the case study analysis, which was encompassed by bargaining
power distribution between the supply network members, it was noted that the more
power is concentrated in the hands of one supply network member and the more
he is able, in terms of negotiating abilities, financial resources and personal involve-
ment, to integrate the entire system in pursuing his own goals, the more efficient this
supply network becomes from the perspective of total profit. This observation un-
derlines the idea of importance of coordination mechanisms application as a means
to improve supply chain efficiency and sustain company’s competitiveness in the
modern market economy.
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Appendix
1. First Appendix
The behavior of profit function in case of changes in marginal costs c from 7 to 15
would look as follows (Figures 31–33):
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Fig. 31: Supply network profit function under volatility of marginal costs
Fig. 32: Dealers’ profit function under volatility of marginal costs
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Fig. 33: Manufacturer profit function under volatility of marginal costs
The behavior of profit function in case of changes in manufacturer’s operating
expenses to fulfill the orders of, say, dealer 1, s1 from 30 to 40 per unit of good
would be as follows (Figures 34–36):
Fig. 34: Supply network profit function under volatility of operating expenses
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Fig. 35: Dealers’ profit function under volatility of operating expenses
Fig. 36: Manufacturer profit function under volatility of operating expenses
The behavior of profit function in case of changes in market elasticity γ from
0.1 to 0.9 would look as follows (Figures 37–39):
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Fig. 37: Supply network profit function under changes in market elasticity
Fig. 38: Dealers’ profit function under changes in market elasticity
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Fig. 39: Manufacturer profit function under changes in market elasticity
The behavior of profit function in case of changes in price sensitivity for dealer
1 products k1 from 0.3 to 2 would look as follows (Figures 40–42):
Fig. 40: Supply network profit function under changes in price sensitivity
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Fig. 41: Dealers’ profit function under changes in price sensitivity
Fig. 42: Manufacturer profit function under changes in price sensitivity
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The behavior of profit function in case of changes in dealers’ market shares would
be as follows (Figures 43–45):
Fig. 43: Supply network profit function under changes in market concentration
Fig. 44: Dealers’ profit function under changes in market concentration
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Fig. 45: Manufacturer profit function under changes in market concentration
2. Second Appendix
The behavior of profit function in case of changes in marginal costs c from 10 to 20
would look as follows (Figures 46–48):
Fig. 46: Supply network profit function under volatility of marginal costs
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Fig. 47: Dealers’ profit function under volatility of marginal costs
Fig. 48: Manufacturer profit function under volatility of marginal costs
76 Anastasia Bashinskaya, Mariia Koroleva, Nikolay Zenkevich
The behavior of profit function in case of changes in operating expenses to fulfill
the orders of dealer 1 (s1) from 30 to 40 per unit of good would be as follows
(Figures 49–51):
Fig. 49: Supply network profit function under volatility of operating expenses
Fig. 50: Dealers’ profit function under volatility of operating expenses
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Fig. 51: Manufacturer profit function under volatility of operating expenses
The behavior of profit function in case of changes in market elasticity γ from
0.1 to 0.9 would look as follows (Figures 52–54):
Fig. 52: Supply network profit function under changes in market elasticity
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Fig. 53: Dealers’ profit function under changes in market elasticity
Fig. 54: Manufacturer profit function under changes in market elasticity
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The behavior of profit function in case of changes in price sensitivity for dealer
1 δ1 from 0.3 to 2 would look as follows (Figures 55–57):
Fig. 55: Supply network profit function under changes in price sensitivity
Fig. 56: Dealers’ profit function under changes in market elasticity
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Fig. 57: Manufacturer profit function under changes in market elasticity
The behavior of profit function in case of changes in dealers’ market shares would
be as follows (Figures 58–60):
Fig. 58: Supply network profit function under changes in market concentration
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Fig. 59: Dealers’ profit function under changes in market concentration
Fig. 60: Manufacturer profit function under changes in market concentration
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3. Third Appendix
The behavior of profit function in case of changes in marginal costs c from 12 to 25
would look as follows (Figures 61–63):
Fig. 61: Supply network profit function under volatility of marginal costs
Fig. 62: Dealers’ profit function under volatility of marginal costs
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Fig. 63: Manufacturer profit function under volatility of marginal costs
The behavior of profit function in case of changes in manufacturer’s operating
expenses to fulfill the orders of, say, dealer 1, s1 from 30 to 40 per unit of good
would be as follows (Figures 64–66):
Fig. 64: Supply network profit function under volatility of operating expenses
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Fig. 65: Dealers’ profit function under volatility of operating expenses
Fig. 66: Manufacturer profit function under volatility of operating expenses
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The behavior of profit function in case of changes in market elasticity γ from
0.1 to 0.9 would look as follows (Figures 67–69):
Fig. 67: Supply network profit function under changes in market elasticity
Fig. 68: Dealers’ profit function under changes in market elasticity
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Fig. 69: Manufacturer profit function under changes in market elasticity
The behavior of profit function in case of changes in price sensitivity for dealer
1 products δ1 from 0.3 to 2 would look as follows (Figures 70–72):
Fig. 70: Supply network profit function under changes in price sensitivity
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Fig. 71: Dealers’ profit function under changes in price sensitivity
Fig. 72: Manufacturer profit function under changes in price sensitivity
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Considering changes in dealers’ market shares k1 and k2 from 0.3 to 0.8 and from
0.7 to 0.2 accordingly, the behavior of profit function would be as follows (Figures
73–75):
Fig. 73: Supply network profit function under changes in market concentration
Fig. 74: Dealers’ profit function under changes in market concentration
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Fig. 75: Manufacturer profit function under changes in market concentration
4. Fourth Appendix
Fig. 76: Audi supply network profit function under volatility of operating expenses
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Fig. 77: Audi dealers’ profit function under volatility of operating expenses
Fig. 78: Audi profit function under volatility of operating expenses
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Fig. 79: Audi supply network profit function under changes in market elasticity
Fig. 80: Audi dealers’ profit function under changes in market elasticity
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Fig. 81: Audi profit function under changes in market elasticity
Fig. 82: Audi supply network profit function under changes in price sensitivity
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Fig. 83: Audi dealers’ profit function under changes in price sensitivity
Fig. 84: Audi profit function under changes in price sensitivity
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5. Fifth Appendix
Fig. 85: Heineken supply network profit function under changes in market elasticity
Fig. 86: Bar profit function under changes in market elasticity
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Fig. 87: Beer wholesaler profit function under changes in market elasticity
Fig. 88: Heineken supply network profit function under changes in price sensitivity
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Fig. 89: Bar profit function under changes in price sensitivity
Fig. 90: Beer wholesaler profit function under changes in price sensitivity
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6. Sixth Appendix
Fig. 91: ProtechDry supply network profit function under volatility of marginal costs
Fig. 92: ProtechDry dealers’ profit function under volatility of marginal costs
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Fig. 93: ProtechDry profit function under volatility of marginal costs
Fig. 94: ProtechDry supply network profit function under volatility of operating expenses
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Fig. 95: ProtechDry dealers’ profit function under volatility of operating expenses
Fig. 96: ProtechDry profit function under volatility of operating expenses
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Abstract The paper describes the development of financial markets and
changes in the nature of economic growth using the theory of cooperative
games. These issues have developed since the early 1950s under the influ-
ence of theoretical problems based on the game theory itself and interacting
with real problems outside of the game theory (mostly from economics). It
turned out that various applications and contexts correspond to numerous
possible solutions of standard tasks, e.g. Nash (S, d) bargaining problem.
Some of the significant solutions are responded to questions arising in the
context of social welfare economic theory, respectively issues are related to
the redistribution of wealth between different groups in population and the
rationale of such reallocation. We show that under conditions of sufficiently
effective financial markets the question of the relationship between efficiency
and equality, which is typical of the theory of social welfare, may be replaced
by the question of making full utilization of investment opportunities asso-
ciated with the acquisition, preservation and application of human capital.
We define “sufficient efficiency of financial markets” as ability to fully utilize
investment opportunities related – to put it simply – to human development,
regardless of its initial assets or income position. This is related to the fact
that instead of different ways of reasoning for solution (S, d) of the prob-
lem we can take advantage of technical solution (based on the equality of
marginal returns of investment opportunities, or rather based on sum pay-
ments maximization), e.g. the solution used in problem of optimal allocation
of water (water allocation problem) (Brink, et al., 2011). The question of
compensation payments in relation to solutions based on technical optimum
has important interpretation. Sufficiently efficient functioning of financial
markets (in the above mentioned sense) assumes also good functioning of
such financial market instruments, e.g. human capital contracts associated
with the use of transferred prices and mediated utilization of transferred
prices. In case of full utilization of those tools, compensation would not be
necessary. Above mentioned topics are part of wider research focused on
changes in the nature of economic growth. This research is based on the
hypothesis that the existing possibilities of economic growth have become
exhausted and that it is necessary to transition towards the economy based
on the dominant role of productive services, i.e. services which have imme-
diate effect on the acquisition, preservation and utilization of human capital
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(e.g. education, health care etc.)(Friedman, 1957). The development of fi-
nancial markets in the above direction is prerequisite to economic growth.
Keywords: Nash bargaining problem, investment opportunities, human
capital; financial markets; cooperative games; investment opportunities
1. Introduction
In our contribution, we are pointing out an interesting and from the practical point
of view important area of interpretation of solving cooperative games (especially
the Nash (S, d) problem) (Nash, 1950), namely from the perspective of relation
between the level of reality (practical application), a definition of assumptions (in
the language of micro-economy), a drawing up of a concept (by defining assumptions
based on the cooperative game theory) and a setting of a corresponding axiomatic
system. The application of the cooperative game theory apparatus for financial
markets, specifically for the analysis of supply and demand of investment funding
and investment opportunities is original and innovative. As part of the defined
objective, we identify a general cause of a certain type of problems that arise in
financial markets (we call it a “snag” in financial markets) and we point out a
practical purpose of this phenomenon. The achieved results are well applicable at
searching an answer to the question of what causes some of the phenomena that we
are currently encountering in financial markets. At present, they are being applied
in the financial markets research which is being carried out by the University of
Finance and Administration based in Prague.
We will take the following steps:
1. We will point out the microeconomic and practical dimension of the problem
and apply a numerical model to it.
2. We will identify the “snag” phenomenon.
3. We will describe it by means of the cooperative game theory and point out some
interesting and from the practical point of view important characteristics of this
phenomenon.
4. We will discuss our results with respect to some methodological issues of the
cooperative game theory (relation between a theoretical solution and its prac-
tical purpose) and with respect to possible interpretations of various solutions
of the Nash (S, d) problem and with respect to what we encounter in financial
markets in the Czech Republic.
5. Lastly, we will outline a possibility of substantial expansion of the area of appli-
cation of the processes which we deal with in our contribution. Since the single
steps that we make require their permanent relation to a practical context, or
more precisely identification of practical relevance of the rolling results, we will
put emphasis on comprehensibility and a clear picture for a wide circle of ex-
perts, as it results from, inter alia, our experience of cooperation with specialists
in financial markets.
2. Introduction to the problem – Microeconomic view of financial
markets
We consider a simple model of the financial market which includes two entities, each
of them having investment opportunities and investment funding. Combination of
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a particular amount of investment funding and a particular investment opportunity
results in a particular yield. We consider the current income that the business en-
tities have at disposal to be investment funding. The future income that they will
receive by combining investment opportunities and investment funding is considered
to be their yield. We assume that both business entities will maximise their future
yield and therefore they will utilise investment opportunities in the order of their
rate of return, i.e. the function of the marginal rate of return on investment oppor-
tunities is a function non-increasing in its whole domain. Functions of the marginal
rate of return on investment opportunities of both entities are continuous, when
the minimum of one of the functions is smaller than the maximum of the second
function and the maximum of the first function is greater than the minimum of the
second function, see Fig. 1:
Fig. 1: Supply and demand of investment funds and investment opportunities
Here: x1, x2−x1 are the quantities of investment funding that business entities
1 and 2 have available, y is the future yield in marginal quantities, f(x), g(x), or
g(x2 − x) non-deceasing continuous functions of the marginal yield on investment
opportunities; g(x) is modified for a better graphical illustration of the situation in
question.
E1(xE , yE) is the point in which f(x) = g(x) = f(x2 − x) = g(x2 − x); in
this point all the investment opportunities of both entities are used depending on
the rate of return. The hatched area shows a size of the maximum possible Pareto
improvement as a result of the financial market effect if one of the entities gives
up his less profitable investment opportunities and provides funding to the second
entity.
The total yield of the first (analogically the second) business entity is as follows:
x1∫
0
f (x) d (x) =
x2∫
x1
f (x2 − x) d(x),
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resp.
x1∫
0
g (x) d (x) =
x2∫
x1
g (x2 − x) d(x).
In the event that the cost of investment funding is determined by equality of
marginal yields, i.e. by the fact that f(x) = g(x), investment opportunities of both
entities will be utilised depending on the rate of return on them. The compensation
of the entity that provided his investment funding to implement an investment
opportunity of the other entity will equal to yE(xE − x1).
Such process is satisfactory for the microeconomic approach. It has reached the
Pareto equilibrium; both entities improved their positions compared to the previous
ones; the origin and volume of interest have been clarified (as a compensation for
use of investment funding of the other entity to implement their own investment
opportunities). This solution seems to be problem-free.
y (1) =
x1∫
0
f (x) d (x) is the function of the payoff of the entity 1,
y(2) =
x2∫
1
g (x2 − x) d (x) is the function of the payoff of the entity 2.
Distribution of the yields in Figure 1 can be mathematically described as follows:
Fig. 2: Limit of achievable payoffs of both entities
where:
x1∫
0
f (x) d (x) ,
x2∫
x1
g (x2 − x) d(x) are maximum payoffs of business entities,
x1∫
0
f (x) d (x) +
x2∫
x1
g (x2 − x) d(x) is a function delimiting a set of permissible
payoffs,
max{
x1∫
0
f (x) d (x) +
x2∫
x1
g (x2 − x) d(x)} is the maximum total of business enti-
ties’ payoffs.
The points inside the area of delimitation by the curve of the sum of the pay-
offs can be interpreted as points corresponding to business entities’ payoffs in the
situation when they did not use all of their investment funding.
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As long as the financial market is in operation (investment funding of one busi-
ness entity can be used for implementing investment opportunities of the other
business entity), both entities can increase their payoffs if the cost of investment
funding – marked with the letter y – is in the interval between f(x1) = y1 and
g(x1) = y2, i.e. if it is true that g(x1) < yi < f(x1). At the cost of investment op-
portunities equal to yE , all the investment opportunities prioritised by their return
on them will be used.
2.1. Microeconomic model testing
Before we applied the apparatus of the cooperative game theory to the microeco-
nomic issues of relation between supply and demand of investment funding and
investment opportunities, we had created a simple numerical model to test various
situations. To understand the achieved results better and to illustrate how financial
markets work from the viewpoint considered by us, we will point out some findings
from the numerical model testing.
y′ = 2(5− x), y = 10x− x2,
x1 = 2, y
′
1 = 6, y1 = 16,
x2 = 5, y
′
2 = 0, y1 = 25,
y1 = 2.6 + 2.4.
Fig. 3: Quadratic production function simulating a decrease of the marginal yield on in-
vestment opportunities
First part of the Figure 4 on the left side shows supply and demand of invest-
ment funding and investment opportunities of two entities in case of a quadratic
production function of both entities, when one of its possible situations is presented
in Figure 3. In first part of the right side of Figure 4. you can see the Pareto im-
provement in the graph, where axes 1y and 2y show yields of individual entities.
Notice the typical “heart” shape which appears in most models and implies that
the maximum yield of individual entities is usually not in the point of full utiliza-
tion of investment opportunities. Because of significance of the above-mentioned,
we present one more Figure (5,6) which shows the area of Pareto improvements in
detail:
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Fig. 4: Supply and demand of investment funding and investment opportunities of two
entities in case of a quadratic production function
Fig. 5: Detail of Pareto improvement areas of financial market stakeholders
Fig. 6: Example of another marginal yield functions (quadratic function of decreasing
marginal yields)
The concept we have used to illustrate the relation of supply and demand of
investment funding and investment opportunities can have other interpretations as
well. One of them is the water problem, for details see e.g. (Beal, 2013), (Brink,
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2011), (Houba, 2013). From the practical point of view, we have two very different
tasks, however, in terms of description by an abstract concept, the problems are
almost identical. We will comment on this topic at the end of our contribution.
To monitor multiple possible interpretations during the presentation (and moreover
without knowledge of what the presentation will bring) would make comprehensi-
bility of our steps significantly harder.
3. Problem of the yield distribution in the language of cooperative
games, Nash (S, d) problem
As we approach the area of game theory, we will call business entities players. If
in the point (y(1)E , y(2)E) both players achieved the maximum payoff at the costs
of investment funding being in the bounded interval 〈y1, y2〉 Fig. 1. If in that point
both players achieved the maximum payoff at the costs of investment funding being
in the bounded interval, assumption of the individual rationality would suffice to
regard the point (y(1)E , y(2)E) as an intuitively acceptable solution of the respective
cooperative task. However, this need not to be true, see Figure 7:
Fig. 7: Players’ payoffs at changing costs of investment funding
The figure on the left side shows an increase of the first player’s and second
player’s payoff at the cost of investment funding yi. The next figure shows the
change which would occur if the cost of investment funding changed from yi to yE .
As seen in Figure 7, at the cost of investment funding yE (i.e. at the cost which
we consider equilibrium from the microeconomic point of view), the payoff of the
first player will decrease as a result of the decline in the cost of investment funding
(interest, compensation) more (see the hatched area 45◦ in the figure on the left
side) than it increases as a result of the fact that more investment opportunities
will be utilised (see the thickly hatched area 135◦ in the figure on the left side).
This is a very significant moment. It turns out that the individual rationality
assumption need not suffice to find an unequivocal solution. Therefore, it is useful
to convert the problem encountered by us to the form of the Nash (S, d) bargaining
problem.
Now, let us look at the following Figure 8.
It corresponds to Figure 3-7; however, it shows the compensation area. We re-
gard compensation as the part of the yield which the person who owns utilisable
investment opportunities will transfer to the person who lent investment funding
(i.e. in our case interest paid by the debtor to the creditor as well as the cost of
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Fig. 8: Compensation area
investment funding). The size of compensation naturally depends on the interest
rate, i.e. on the cost of investment funding.
The particular task can be also viewed as the Nash (S, d) bargaining problem. In
the following figure we will illustrate the problem which occurs at compensations.
For this purpose, we will look at the compensation area in more detail. Figure 9 is
an enlarged section of Figure 8.
Fig. 9: Compensation area as the Nash (S, d) problem
S is a set of payoff distribution possibilities in the situation when max y(1)
and max y(2) are smaller than y(1)E and y(1)E . S
′ is a set of payoff distribution
possibilities in the situation when max y(1) and max y(2) are greater than y(1)E and
y(1)E . Pareto improvement functions are in Graph 5. The solid-line curve represents
the situation when max y(1) and max y(2) are smaller than y(1)E and y(1)E; the
broken-line curve the situation when max y(1) and max y(2) are greater than y(1)E
and y(1)E . In the first situation (provided that the cost of investment funding is
constant and use is made of all the investment opportunities the yield of which is
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greater than this cost), the solution of the cooperative task in question is univocally
determined by the individual rationality assumption.
In the second example, the individual rationality assumption does not suffice. A
“snag” (term introduced by us) occurs at utilisation of investment opportu-
nities. It is possible to apply a number of potential approaches to a solution of the
cooperative game in question. Let us view the particular problem (the cooperative
task in question) in more detail.
Each of the players may claim his maximum payoff: max y(1), or as the case may
be max y(2). The bargaining will then take place in the bounded interval between
y1max and y2max (which is the cost of investment funding at which one or the other
of the players will achieve the maximum payoff), see Figure 10.
Fig. 10: Possiblity for bargaining
The same can be illustrated in Figure 11.
Fig. 11: Area of Pareto improvement
Only the points on thick solid lines in both pictures correspond to the require-
ments (axioms) of achievability and collective rationality.
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Each cost of investment funding which the players opt for or more precisely
agree on corresponds to a particular distribution of yields between them. However,
only if the cost equals to yE , use will be made of all the investment opportunities
prioritised by their rate of return.
It means that if the players opt for any solution of the cooperative game which
results in a different cost of investment funding than yE, they have a chance to act
in such a way that they will improve their position compared to this solution of the
cooperative game, see Figure 10.
If they opt for the solution that results in the cost yi, then the hatched 45
◦ area
of Pareto improvements is offered. We can show this hatched 45◦ area in the Figure
11 as well.
If we want to meet the requirement of collective rationality, i.e. to exploit all the
Pareto improvements, to use the language of microeconomy, then in the situation
when the (S, d) solution of the Nash bargaining problem does not result in the cost
when the sum of the payoffs is maximised, another sequential improvement is always
possible at a different cost of investment funding. In the limit situation, sequential
solutions constructed this way and derived from any type of the cooperative solution
of the Nash bargaining problem will reach the line of the maximum sum. All the
investment opportunities, regardless to which of the entities (players) they belong,
are utilised depending on their rate of return. Nevertheless, the distribution of
players’ payoffs need not (and usually will not) correspond to the point of the
maximum sum in the primary task, see Figure 12.
Fig. 12: Sequential bargaining process
4. Results and Discussion
The task that we are dealing with has a number of interpretations. With regard to
what we know especially two of them come into focus:
- Financial markets, i.e. supply and demand of investment funding and invest-
ment opportunities.
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- Water problem – supply of water and a possibility of its use in order to realise
a yield in a various way.
Generally, this task can be understood as an application of a production factor
in different ways if we have two owners who have different possibilities of applying
the respective production factor in order to achieve some yield.
We assume that each of the owners of the resource is in question and he uses
his own opportunities to use this resource according to the rate of return on the
opportunities that he owns. The question is whether or under what conditions op-
portunities prioritised by their rate of return are utilised regardless of who is the
owner of such opportunities for application of the production factor (and who is the
owner of the production factor). From this point of view, let us repeat our initial
assumption – business entities (players) use their investment funding to implement
investment opportunities prioritised by their rate of return. Let us proceed from
this assumption to an analysis of assumptions under which investment opportu-
nities prioritised by their rate of return are implemented regardless which of the
business entities (players) owns them. And it turns out that it is a very difficult
topic.
4.1. Recapitulation of the findings and a discussion about the
theoretical and methodological aspect of the topic in question
If the cost of the production factor may change in the sense that it is paid (as
a compensation) by the person who uses the resource for his own opportunities,
at costs at various stages of bargaining and rolling agreements (realised acts of
exchange), then all the investment opportunities prioritised by their rate of return
are used (regardless to whom they belong); the solution has a sequential character.
The requirement of a single cost for all resource units and simultaneous utilisa-
tion of all the opportunities of resource use prioritised by the rate of return (i.e. if we
want both requirements to be applied simultaneously) is met by the only solution
at which the sum of yields is maximised right in the first step. Any other solution
conflicts with a simultaneous meeting of both requirements. If we do not insist on
the requirement of a single cost, there exist an endless number of different sequential
solutions at which the sum of yields is maximised by gradual compensations.
On the basis of a given task, a great number of currently known solutions can
be interpreted – dictator’s, egalitarian, Kalai-Smorodinski’s, Raiffa’s solution, etc.
At a certain shape of the function delimiting yields in the point of the maximum
sum (unless the function is smooth), some of the solutions merge into one (those of
Nash (1950), Kalai-Smorodinski (1977, 1975), Raiffa (1953)).
As the first step for evaluating the presented result theoretically, it is possible
to compare the currently known solutions of the Nash (S, d) bargaining problem
with the possibility of interpreting them from the perspective of their relevance
(information values) for the problem of the “snag” in financial markets:
- Which of the known solutions have a real interpretation?
- For which do we lack an interpretation?
- Are there any of the solutions of the Nash (S, d) bargaining problem which,
for principal reasons, cannot have any interpretation in a given area and why?
One of the extremely interesting applications is a survey of the financial market
development which can be mentioned based on the above-mentioned facts. It is as
follows:
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– Imperfections of the financial market can be understood as impossibility of
using all the resources (investment funding) according to their rate of return.
– One reason may be that problems can not be solved on the basis of maximiza-
tion the amount and at the same time, only acceptable solutions are those which
set a single cost.
– These solutions can be described empirically, notionally, conceptually and
presumably axiomatically as well. It means that each imperfection agrees with a
certain type of a cooperative game solution which can be expressed at a various
level of abstraction.
The cooperative game theory then gives a highly effective instrument for de-
scribing financial markets and their development:
– Identification of standard situations.
– Identification of standard transitions between different stages and ways of the
financial market development.
– Definition of ways of improving financial markets (or, on the contrary, their
degeneration), etc.
It would be interesting to see whether there are other tasks which would similarly
induces a wide spectrum of problems associated with a search and comparison of
various cooperative games in terms of relation among reality, concept, model and
different levels of abstraction, or transition up to its axiomatic expression. At this
moment, we consider the area that we have touched upon particularly interesting
from the above-mentioned point of view.
From theoretical, methodological and philosophical perspectives, these are in-
teresting issues of relation of our real world on one hand and possible worlds on the
other hand that are partly a result of our abstractions and partly corresponding to
possible changes of our real world.
4.2. Outline of one of the possible applications of achieved results
to examine current problems in financial markets in the Czech
Republic
One of the conclusions arising from the attained findings can be briefly formulated
as follows: If entities in the market of supply and demand of investment funding
and investment opportunities are in an asymmetric position, when the stronger
position belongs to the entity offering investment funding, this stronger entity will
offer investment funding for differentiated costs in such a way to increase his yield
as much as possible to the detriment of the other entity. After he uses investment
opportunities of the other entity at the cost which is the most advantageous for
the entity offering investment opportunities, (only then) he will offer his additional
investment opportunities at a lower cost. This process can repeat.
Now, let us look at one of the topical or rather acute problems of the Czech
financial market (to discuss the question of whether it shows the financial market
“snag” problem by us revealed and analysed, or not). We will show that the concept
of analysing the snag in financial markets can be used at analysing real situations
which occur at present. Real situations always comprise multiple, various influences.
A good model facilitates their precise identification. Let us try to do so in the context
of the following situations that occurred in the Czech financial market.
Continuation in interventions of the Czech National Bank as the most visible
part of its monetary policy under the current macroeconomic conditions results in
accomplishing new “records” in some key monetary indicators. In recent days, the
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volume of ready money in circulation has exceeded CZK 500,000 million and we
may discuss or rather speculate about reasons for its permanent growth without
regard to the real economic growth.
On 13 November 2015, the total value of all banknotes and coins which are cur-
rently in circulation (“money in circulation”) exceeded the amount of CZK 500,000
million for the very first time. This amount represents more than 2,000 million ban-
knotes and coins in circulation. In the long term, the most numerous representations
among Czech money have been had by the one-thousand-koruna banknote and the
one-koruna coin, as shown in the statistics of the Czech National Bank.
A new record was also shown in CNB deposits of domestic commercial banks
which recently for the very first time exceeded CZK one trillion, i.e. one million
million. The fact that this amount is twice as big as the total value of all the
banknotes and coins which are currently in circulation is related to the effect of the
money multiplier, or more precisely to multiplication of deposits.
In the past, a long-term massive surplus of liquidity in domestic banks was
invested in Czech state bonds that account for a majority of the securities in their
portfolio structure. A high demand for Czech state bonds resulted in a slump of
their yield, across maturities. In shorter maturities (up to two years), yields of Czech
state bonds gradually moved to red figures and recent state bond auctions show that
a negative yield appears in longer maturities (three to five years) as well. However,
lower yields of Czech state bonds, also when compared with German bonds that
are generally considered the lowest-risk state bonds, do not mean that the Czech
Republic is a more solvent debtor than Germany, but they reflect the fact that
almost all foreign investors expect the Czech koruna appreciation after the CNB’s
interventions end.
The fact that the time of foreign currency interventions is quickly drawing to
an end and at the same time some members of the Bank Board admit aloud that
interventions may continue even after the originally announced half of the year 2016
gives the impression of the Bank Board of the Czech National Bank not having any
exit strategy from the intervention regime drawn up, let alone possible exit scenar-
ios. At the high quality of work of Czech National Bank’ analysts, it is strange that
the possibility of a jump appreciation of the Czech koruna after the end of inter-
ventions is considered highly unlikely, opposed to a majority of economic experts.
The development of the Czech economy in relation to its main business partners has
been showing a convergent character in the long term and an artificial prevention of
fluency of this convergence (through foreign currency interventions) only increases
the future pressure on koruna appreciation. The situation when at comparable work
productivity and costs of living the labour force receives a wage of third or fourth
the amount (when compared to developed European countries) is not sustainable
in the long run. And jumps and shocks of all kind rank among the factors that are
not beneficial to any normally functioning economy. Without comparing the Czech
Republic and the Swiss Confederation, the jump appreciation of the Swiss franc
after the end of interventions that we witnessed is at least food for thought (not
only for our central bankers). A permanent inflow of euros from the EU funds which
will be higher than the outflow still for few years results in additional demand for
Czech koruna and a pressure on its appreciation. Moreover, the sale of Czech state
bonds with a negative yield at primary auctions (organised by the Czech National
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Bank) indicates that all the “big players” in financial markets already expect the
appreciation of koruna.
The current structure of the CNB’ liabilities in [million Kcˇ]
1. Bank notes and coins in circulation 495 873 -829
2. Liabilities to the IMF 49 655 918
3. Liabilities abroad 21 792 -1 641
3.1 Loans from foreign banks 6 335 -3 000
3.2 Other liabilities abroad 15 457 1 359
4. Liabilities to domestic banks 955 876 1 625
4.1 Loans received 395 300 81 100
4.2 Minimum reserve requirement 81 959 3 117
4.3 Other liabilities to banks 478 617 -82 592
5. Liabilities to the state and other public in-
stitutions
1 913 107
6. Other liabilities 12 174 147
7. Reserves 282 0
8. Registered capital and reserve funds 15 561 0
9. Revaluation differences 11 670 0
10. Profit or loss for the previous period 0 0
11. Profit or loss for the accounting period 5 475 10 875
LIABILITIES IN TOTAL 1 570 271 11 202
The current structure of the CNB’ liabilities is illustrated in the table.
Now, let us view the topic in question from the perspective of two players of
a cooperative game, when one of the players are commercial banks and the other
player the other financial market stakeholders, including the Czech National Bank.
It is rather simplified, especially with regard to the fact that:
– Commercial banks compete with each other.
– The other stakeholders in the financial market represent a substantially het-
erogeneous mix (starting from the already-mentioned Czech National Bank through
the state bond market up to companies who are granted loans by commercial banks
and last but not least households as the financial market stakeholders at whom
consumer loans and mortgage loans in particular target).
With awareness of the reservations we have mentioned, it is however evident
that the following behaviour prevails in commercial banks (that, as it turns out, act
in a certain agreement):
– They first select such entities whom they can grant loans at a very high interest
rate.
– They differentiate among them depending on how big the loans are, how
high the related risk is, what the transaction costs are and how transparent the
information about these stakeholders is.
– Subsequently, they invest a huge amount through deposits in the central
bank at very low interest; (however, in the context of this particular investing as
a cost of sacrificed opportunity in relation to the other investment possibilities)
they strengthen their asymmetric or privileged position against the other owners of
investment opportunities.
To what extent this phenomenon is related to our analysed phenomenon of the
“snag” in financial markets is a subject of another analysis. It is necessary to take
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into consideration various aspects that we mentioned in connection with a reduction
of the task to two players of the cooperative game. A certain connection undoubtedly
exists here and the instruments of the financial market “snag” analysis discussed by
us (as well as those that we will acquire by further examination directing the dis-
cussion towards theoretical and methodological aspects of the respective problem)
may produce immensely interesting findings.
5. Conclusions
Since the early 1950s the cooperative game theory has been developing under the
influence of theoretical problems arising both in the field of the game theory it-
self and in interaction with real problems outside the game theory (mostly in the
economic field). It turned out that different applications or contexts correspond to
different potential solutions of standard tasks, e.g. Nash (S, d) bargaining problem.
Also, a number of different axiomatic systems describing the (S, d) problem have
been established. Some of the solutions responded to the issues arising in the then
important economic theory of social welfare, or the issue related to redistribution of
wealth among various groups of population and justification of such redistribution.
To do so, some of the arbitrary solutions of the Nash (S, d) bargaining problem were
mostly applied.
In our contribution, we have presented an interesting and significant area of
interpretation of different solutions of the Nash (S, d) bargaining problem in con-
nection with some other issues of the cooperative game theory and the instruments
employed by this theory (e.g. in relation to the water problem solution) at analysing
supply and demand of investment funding and investment opportunities. And this
both at the general level and in specific conditions of the Czech Republic, where
we interpreted this task as a cooperative game of two players in which one of the
players is commercial banks and the other player is the other financial market stake-
holders, including the Czech National Bank. The interpretation and the subsequent
discussion about the theoretical and methodological aspect of the topic in ques-
tion have produced many interesting findings concerning the relation among the
level of reality (practical application), a definition of assumptions (in the language
of microeconomy), a drawing up of a concept (by defining assumptions based on
the cooperative game theory) and a setting of a corresponding axiomatic system.
Equally, the application to the issues of the Czech financial market and the related
discussion about achieved results shows that it is a useful and promising topic.
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Abstract The primary goal of this research paper is to provide new in-
sights in the research area of supply chain collaboration. The research aims
to deliver novel evidence if supply chain collaboration has a positive effect
on improvement of firm performance and what mediates and moderates such
effects in the case of the contextual cross-border inter-firm (EU15-Russia)
research design based on a survey questionnaire (quantitative). The empir-
ical results showed that in a cross-border inter-firm context, as in the case
of EU15-Russia, supply chain collaboration has a direct positive impact on
improvement of operational performance and achieving collaborative advan-
tages. Furthermore, these collaborative advantages have a bifurcated effect
on the relationship between supply chain collaboration and improvement of
firm performance. Conclusively, in market situations and environments with
impediments in the form of collaborative barriers and cross-border business
barriers the positive effects of supply chain collaboration are amplified and
strengthened due to unfavorable environmental dissimilarities in the market
which makes it more difficult and harder to obtain them.
Keywords: Supply chain collaboration, collaboration barriers, firm perfor-
mance, operational performance, collaborative advantage, cross-border busi-
ness barriers, mediation, interaction moderation.
1. Introduction
International trade and efficient supply chain management and operations are a
valid and essential method towards firm growth, increase of sales and firm perfor-
mance, and to reach higher levels of internationalization for many companies in
today’s globalized world. Disruptions of the status quo, changes in technology, and
globalization of products and services have resulted in an increase of dynamic mar-
kets and uncertain environments. Nowadays, customers are better informed, have
greater access to a wider choice of products, and have access to new products emerg-
ing at a faster pace. These developments and alterations in the current situation
have significant consequences and implications on the network and design of supply
chains and business operations in general, and its influence on the value chain of
supplier-buyer dyads (Wuyts and Geyskens, 2005). The everlasting fierce competi-
tion in global markets, the introduction of products with shorter product life cycles
(PLCs), and the heightened demands of customers have forced firms to invest in re-
sources and to pay more attention to stronger mutually beneficial relationships and
supply chains. (Deloitte, 2012). Facing and dealing with uncertain developments
and dynamic environments, firms are striving to achieve greater collaboration in
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supply chains to leverage the resources and knowledge of their suppliers and buy-
ers (Fawcett and Magnan, 2004; Lejeune and Yakova, 2005). Therefore, in today’s
global market, firms no longer compete as independent entities but rather as in-
tegrative parts of collaborative networks, grouping entities for allowing them to
seize opportunities and possibilities to which a single entity could not achieve alone
(Msanjila and Afsarmanesh, 2010).
To meet the requisites and the demands of the current markets and customers,
firms try to develop value-added processes that deliver innovative, high-quality, low-
cost products on time, with short cycle times and greater responsiveness than ever
before. In order to do so, firms are transitioning from transactional supplier relation-
ships to more transparent and collaborative relationships designed and constructed
to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes (Deloitte, 2012).
Hence, firms began to perceive that it is not enough to improve efficiencies within
their organization alone. Firms are looking outside their internal organizations for
opportunities to collaborate with supply chain members to ensure that the supply
chain is efficient and responsive to dynamic market’s needs. The future belongs to
integration and collaboration of supply chains. As business increasingly relies on
other firms, especially in industrial and consumer products industries, the need to
effectively manage external relationships is of considerable importance. The abil-
ity to achieve effective collaboration becomes a strategic imperative in the era of
information and globalization.
The debates in contemporary supply chain management (SCM) literature cen-
ters around supply chain collaboration (SCC) (Siew et al., 2012; Cao and Zhang,
2011; Christopher, 2011; de Leeuw and Fransoo, 2009) and its impact on firm per-
formance (Stank, Keller and Daugherty, 2001). Despite the success stories (Hofman
and Aronow, 2012), SCC inconsistencies have also been reported by researchers and
scholars (Bragg et al., 2011). Hence, the key question of whether SCC has a specific
positive impact on firm performance is still a subject of debate (Gunasekaran and
Ngai, 2012).
These inconsistencies lead to the purpose and objective of this research paper to
contribute to the SCC domain by testing SCC peculiarities of theoretical concepts in
the existing latest academic literature by means of SCC design and its relationship
and effects on operational performance and firm performance. The emphasis of this
study is to research how these theories work in practice in a specific cross-border
inter-firm supply chain context and how impediments in the form of collaboration
barriers and cross-border business barriers moderate and mediate the effects of SCC
on operational and firm performance.
2. Inception and Ascent of Supply Chain Collaboration
In today’s business world, which is characterized by globalization, increased cus-
tomer responsiveness, customer expectation, channel integration and advances in
information and communication technologies under increasing uncertainty (Schoen-
herr, 2009), firms have no other option than participating in a supply chain. There-
upon, collaboration between firms plays a significant role for improving firm per-
formance and to capitalize on sustained competitive advantage (Grant, 2012; Gu-
nasekaran and Ngai, 2012; Hassini et al., 2012; Cao and Zhang, 2011), which then
can help and improve economic and financial development (Mefford, 2011).
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When talking about collaboration, a substantial amount of previous scholars
and researchers cite mutuality of benefits, rewards and risk sharing together with
the exchange of information as the foundation of collaboration (Stank et al., 1999;
Barratt and Oliveira, 2001). Considered as an establishment for governing organiza-
tions in firms (Stein, 1982), it is believed that collaboration in supply chains could
realize exceptional benefits (Mena et al., 2009).
In conclusion, it can be said that collaboration in supply chain means that dif-
ferent firms involve themselves in the flow of products and information from raw
materials to end consumer in order to fulfill customer needs. The areas and functions
in which firms can collaborate are, for instance, supply chain design (procurement,
transportation and distribution); manufacturing (planning, inventory management,
product design and development) and order fulfillment (including order process-
ing, sales, customer service and demand management) (Anderson and Lee, 2001;
Ellaram, 1995; Horvath, 2001).
Collaboration in business can be found in both inter-firms and intra-firms and
ranges from simple partnership to complex multinational corporation. The impor-
tance of inter-firm coordination and integration are examined by most scholars and
researchers as key tasks for SCM. Coordination and integration is achieved by col-
laboration among actors in the supply chain. In fact, Horvath (2001) argues that
collaboration is a prerequisite to achieve SCM; without collaboration, there can be
no SCM. There are several ways to categorize SCC (Simatupang and Sridharan,
2005). Holweg et al. (2005) classified SCC into four types based on inventory and
planning coordination (Mena et al., 2009).
On the other hand, Barratt (2004) distinguishes between internal and external
collaboration and whether it is vertical or horizontal. Vertical collaboration per-
forms both internally or along the supply chain. In case of external collaboration,
along the supply chain, it means working more closely with trading partners to im-
prove each other’s efficiency for collective advantages and benefits. The focus is on
giving and gaining visibility into each other’s processes so that each of the supply
chain members can do a better job. The study in this research paper only deals
with external collaboration in a vertical direction. Thus, external inter-firm vertical
collaboration.
3. Supply Chain Collaboration Synopsis
As the purpose of collaboration is to optimize profitability, supply chain members
need to plan, execute, and control key decisions related to defining and deliver-
ing products to the end customers. By practicing and executing SCC dimensions,
firms have the opportunity to obtain and achieve collaborative advantages over its
competitors. In addition, the dimensions of SCC and the achieved collaborative
advantages are expected to have positive effects, consequences and outcomes on
both operational performance and firm performance. The direct relationships be-
tween these constructs may be mediated through these collaborative advantages
and moderated by the constructs collaboration barriers and cross-border business
barriers, which are expected to have a negative direct main effect on its respective
dependent performance variables.
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3.1. Supply Chain Collaboration Dimensions
In SCM there are different dimensions of collaborative approaches such as infor-
mation sharing, incentive alignment and decision synchronization (Holweg and Pil,
2008; Akintoye et al., 2000; Spekman et al., 1998). SCM and collaborative perfor-
mance system (CPS) requires information sharing, decision synchronization, and
incentive alignment to monitor and improve actual firm performance. Information
sharing reports data about performance status. Decision synchronization allows sup-
ply chain members to optimize performance metrics through effective joint decision
making. Incentive alignment employs performance metrics to construct benefit and
cost sharing agreements. Integrated supply chain processes provide feedback about
the actual benefits of collaboration based on the status of physical supply chain
events.
Information sharing refers to the access to private data in supply chain members’
information systems enabling monitoring of the progress of products as they pass
through each process in the supply chain (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). This
activity covers data acquisition, processing, representation, storage, and dissemi-
nation of demand conditions, inventory status and locations, order status, trans-
parency of costs, and performance status. Visibility of key performance metrics and
process of data enables the participating supply chain members to obtain the big-
ger picture of the situation which includes important factors for making effective
decisions. Effective decisions enable supply chain members to address product flow
issues more quickly, and thereby allowing more agile demand planning to take place.
Several criteria, such as relevancy, accuracy, timeliness, and reliability, can be used
to judge the contribution of information sharing to the integration of supply chains.
The supply chain members are interested in the utility of information sharing
rather than information for its own sake. What makes information sharing valu-
able to supply chain members is eventually the ability to make better decisions
and to take actions on the basis of greater visibility (Davenport et al, 2001). Core
guidelines are that visibility should inform action, and that action becomes visible
if supply chain members understand better the underlying principles that link in-
tegrated information and performance drivers. Thus, information sharing generally
facilitates decision synchronization through providing relevant, timely, and accurate
information required to take effective decisions about supply chain planning and ex-
ecution. It enables participating supply chain members to make use of integrated
information to help fulfill demand more quickly with shorter order cycle times. For
example, demand and inventory visibility can be used to eliminate stock-outs by
accurately replenishing fast-movers (Fisher, 1997).
In connection with supply chain performance, information sharing provides data
about the progress of collaboration and performance status to supply chain perfor-
mance. Supply chain managers and professional can use this data to evaluate and
construct new targets and performance metrics that are relevant to new and volatile
market dynamics and situations. In conjunction with incentive alignment, informa-
tion sharing provides visibility about the status of incentive scores of supply chain
members. It also reveals the actual link between performance measures and incen-
tives. Finally, integration of supply chain processes provides primary useful field
data about product, process, and performance status.
Decision synchronization can be defined as the extent to which supply chain
members are able to orchestrate critical decisions at planning and execution levels
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for optimizing supply chain profitability (Simatupang et al., 2002). The activity
covers constructing joint decision making processes, including reallocating decision
rights in order to synchronize supply chain planning and execution that seeks to
match demand with supply. The method to assess effective decision synchroniza-
tion hinge on the effects of accurate response towards fulfilling customer demand
and supply chain profitability (Corbett et al., 1999). Face-to-face meetings and vir-
tual discussion to take certain decisions are examples of possibilities to implement
decision synchronization.
The significance of decision synchronization is embedded in the fact that sup-
ply chain members have different decision rights and expertise about supply chain
operations. For example, a retailer may have the decision right to determine order
quantity but not order delivery. In most of the situations supply chain members have
conflicting criteria in making decisions resulting in solutions that are less optimal for
the overall and whole supply chain (Lee et al., 1997). Supply chain members need
to coordinate critical decisions that affect the way they achieve better performance.
The use of joint decisions depends on the incremental sales that can be realized
and the significant amounts of inventory costs that can be reduced from this joint
decision making. Joint decisions may include sales and order forecasts, inventory,
replenishment, order placement, order delivery, customer service level, and pricing.
For example, vendor managed inventory (VMI) provides the supplier with decision
rights to determine the frequency and quantity of orders that need to be delivered.
This scheme enables the supplier to match supply with demand from the supply
chain wide perspective and thereby improves profits for both supply chain members.
Decision synchronization provides feedback to supply chain performance con-
cerning how performance metrics guide the supply chain members to make effective
decisions. In relation to information sharing, decision synchronization aids and en-
hances information sharing to identify what kind of relevant data should be collected
and transferred to the decision makers. In supporting incentive alignment, decision
synchronization provides justification for incentive alignment to construct appropri-
ate incentive schemes, because different supply chain members are responsible for
different levels of decision making. Finally, decision synchronization helps supply
chain members to carry out productive actions associated with integrated supply
chain processes such as replenishment, transportation, and customer service.
Incentive alignment refers to the process of sharing costs, risks, and benefits
among the participating supply chain members (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002).
This scheme motivates supply chain members to act in a consistent manner with
their mutual strategic objectives, which includes making decisions that are optimal
for the overall supply chain and revealing truthful private information. It covers
calculating costs, risks, and benefits as well as formulating incentive schemes such
as pay-for-performance and pay-for-effort. The contribution of incentive alignment
can be judged based on compensation fairness and self-enforcement. Compensation
fairness ensures that aligned incentives motivate supply chain members to share
properly and equally the loads and benefits that result from collaborative efforts.
An effective incentive scheme means that supply chain members are self-enforcing
for aligning their individual decisions with the mutual objective of improving total
profits. Expert systems, activity-based costing, and web-based technology can be
used to trace, calculate, and display incentive scores (Kaplan and Narayanan, 2001;
Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002).
Cross-Border Collaboration in European-Russian Supply Chains 123
The theory behind incentive alignment assumes that an individual supply chain
member tends to act in a certain way based on the expectation that the act will
result in mutual benefit and on the attractiveness of that benefit to individual sup-
ply chain members (Simatupang et al., 2002). An appropriate incentive scheme can
be formed in a number of ways (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). Pay-for-effort is
a scheme that links payment and effort. This assumes that rewarding effort would
motivate the individual supply chain member to expand a given amount of effort
which relates to a certain level of performance. Pay-for-performance is a scheme that
links payment and performance. This scheme assumes that rewarding performance
will motivate the individual supply chain member to achieve a particular level of
performance. The supply chain members accept the importance of the potential
rewards that can be obtained from collaboration although costs need to be shared.
The interaction of incentive alignment with other SCC dimensions and indicators is
very profound as it motivates supply chain members to align their actions to the mu-
tual purpose of collaboration that would also enhance their individual profitability.
Incentive alignment links performance scoreboards from supply chain performance
to incentives. The more transparent the linkages between performance and incen-
tives, the more effectively the given incentives are able to motivate the desired
and required behavior. Information sharing is required to signal supply chain mem-
bers that incentives are available, timely and proper. In conjunction with decision
synchronization, incentive alignment provides incentives to motivate supply chain
members to make effective decisions that reinforce the desired level of performance.
Recent research have focused on the development of SCC models that reflect
the latest understanding of collaboration which includes four new dimensions in
addition to the aforementioned three (Cao and Zhang, 2011; Nyaga et al., 2010; Ra-
manathan et al., 2011). Latest research topics on SCC dimensions have shown that
the most dominant SCC dimensions consists of information sharing (Manthou et al.,
2004), goal congruence (Angeles and Nath, 2001), decision synchronization (Stank
et al., 2001), resource sharing (Sheu et al., 2006), and incentive alignment (Simatu-
pang and Sridharan, 2005) among independent supply chain members. However, the
study in this research paper defines SCC dimensions as the following seven inter-
twined components and indicators: information sharing, goal congruence, decision
synchronization, incentive alignment, resources sharing, collaborative communica-
tion, and joint knowledge creation.
These seven dimensions of SCC are expected and ought to be interwoven with
each other. Each of all the dimensions and components of SCC add value by reduc-
ing response time, leveraging resources and improving innovation. Besides the afore-
mentioned initial three core SCC dimensions, contemporary research has identified
the following SCC dimensions and components, namely goal congruence, resource
sharing, collaborative communication and joint knowledge creation.
Goal congruence between supply chain members is the extent to which supply
chain members notice their own goals and objectives are achieved and satisfied
by accomplishing supply chain objectives. It can be said that it is the degree and
level of goal agreement among supply chain members (Angeles and Nath, 2001).
Supply chain members either feel that their objectives fully coincide with those of
the supply chain, or if there is discrepancy, that their goals and objectives can be
realized as a direct result of working toward the goals and objectives of the supply
chain as a whole (Lejeune and Yakova, 2005).
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Resource sharing indicates the process of leveraging capabilities and assets and
investing in it with supply chain members. From the viewpoint of resource based
view (RBV) theory, resources include physical resources, such as manufacturing
equipment, facility, and technology (Harland et al., 2004). Practices of SCC models
such as VMI are used to allow suppliers to assess stock level data and take the
required replenishment actions (Lamming, 1996).
Collaborative communication encompasses the contact and message transmis-
sion process among supply chain members through frequency, direction, mode, and
influence strategy. Tight and close inter-firm relationships are generally open, fre-
quent, balanced, two-way and mutual, and multilevel communications (Goffin et al.,
2006). On the contrary, Mohr and Nevin (1990) highlighted patterns of communica-
tion from a mechanistic perspective. Both provide evidence that collaborative com-
munication has higher frequency, more bidirectional flows, better informal modes,
and increased indirect influence. Frequency relates to the amount of contact between
supply chain members. Direction concerns to the movement of communication up
and down the supply chain (Mohr and Nevin, 1990; Prahinski and Benton, 2004).
Mode of communication refers to method that is used to transmit information. In-
formal communication covers the degree and level to which communication among
supply chain members is formed through a spontaneous and non-regulated way.
While direct influence aims to change behavior by requesting specific actions from
its supply chain members using recommendations, promises, and tends towards legal
obligations, indirect influence focuses to change the supply chain members’ belief
and attitudes about their desires of intended behavior without explicit commanding
or threats (Mohr and Nevin, 1990).
Joint knowledge creation is the extent to which supply chain members develop
a better understanding of the market and exogenous factors that influence it by
collaboration (Malhotra et al., 2005). According to Harland et al (2004), there are
two types of knowledge creation activities: knowledge creation such as search and
acquire new and relevant knowledge, and knowledge exploitation such as compre-
hend and apply knowledge. The capture, exchange, and absorption of knowledge
among supply chain members allow innovation and enhance it to realize long-term
competiveness (Harland et al., 2004). Supply chain members should not only be
involved in creating and building a knowledge framework, but also be engaged in
interpreting knowledge, which allows firms to create added value through develop-
ing new products, building brand image, and satisfying customers’ needs (Kaufman
et al., 2000). Recent research has shown that the value of SCC is not only lim-
ited towards efficiency improvements, moreover it has strategic benefits, which aids
the value chain respond to competition and increasingly satisfy the needs of the
customers (Sobrero and Roberts, 2001).
SCC accelerates a firm’s ability and capability to capitalize swiftly on market
opportunities (Uzzi, 1997). As an example, problem solving increases the velocity
that products are introduced to the market by resolving and overcoming thresh-
olds at a faster pace. Collaboration between supply chain members can eventually
lead to unique sources that enhance new product ideas (Kalwani and Narayandas,
1995). Shared resources between supply chain members could result in reduction
of sub-additive cost, or complementary resources, which increases super-additive
value (Tanriverdi, 2006). SCC for resource sharing and replenishment will result in
Cross-Border Collaboration in European-Russian Supply Chains 125
significant cost reduction in supply chain processes and activities. Such sources of
business synergy can lead to competitive advantage outcomes.
Furthermore, information sharing among supply chain members guarantees on-
time replenishment (Cachon and Fisher, 2000). It also supports supply chain mem-
bers to be involved and engaged in inventory pooling and joint replenishment ac-
tivities (Ramanathan, 2012). Overall, adequate information technology is reliant on
the associated benefits of supply chains such as cost reduction or sales incentives
(Toktay et al., 2000). Therefore, complementary to collaborative planning activities
and collaborative decision making process, the activities and execution of the em-
bedded dimensions and components of SCC help to improve and optimize supply
chain processes.
3.2. Collaborative Advantages
SCC relates to the desired synergy outcomes of SCC activities that could not have
been realized by a firm individually (Vangen and Huxham, 2003). Collaboration
between supply chain members has the prospect to increase the size of joint benefits
and to give each of the supply chain members a share of greater gain that could
not be generated by a firm alone. The value that is created by collaboration could
be in the form of either cost savings and/or cost avoidance, enhanced capacity and
flexibility for collective actions, better decisions making and a surge in revenue
by resource synergy and innovation through the combination and interpretation of
ideas. Therefore, collaborative advantage comprises the following five dimensions:
process efficiency, offering flexibility, business synergy, quality and innovation.
Bagchi and Skjoett-Larsen (2005) have shown that a firm’s collaboration process
with other SCC partners is cost competitive among its competitors. This form of
process efficiency could be information sharing, joint logistics process, joint product
development process or joint decision making process. Hence, process efficiency is
a rate of success and a determinant influencing factor on a firm’s profit (inventory
turnover and operating cost). The benefits of collaboration include cost reductions
and revenue enlargements (Lee et al., 1997).
Offering flexibility points out to how a firm’s supply chain correlates and adapts
to changes in product or service offerings, volume, speed, features, and specifica-
tions, in reaction to environmental and business changes. Generally, it is also called
customer responsiveness based on the existing literature (Kiefer and Novack, 1999;
Holweg et al., 2005). Offering flexibility encompasses the ability of the collaborat-
ing firm to swiftly change process structures or to accustom information sharing
process for altering the features of a product (Gosain et al., 2004). Nowadays, firms
pay more and more attention to customers and an increasing amount of firms use
customer input at the design stage resulting in better product acceptance (Bagchi
and Skjoett-Larsen, 2005).
Furthermore, supply chain members combine complementary and related re-
sources to obtain considerable benefits in the form of business synergy. Ansoff (1988)
found that synergy can lead to a combined return of resources that is greater than
the sum of individual parts. This collaborative effect results from the process of
making more efficiently use of resources in the total supply chain, including phys-
ical assets such as manufacturing facilities and intangible assets such as customer
knowledge, technological competence, and organizational culture (Itami and Roehl,
1987).
126 Max van Dijk
It is expected that firms that are able to respond and adapt quick and agile to
customer demand with high quality products, innovative design and perfect after
sales service supposedly build customer loyalty, increase market share and finally re-
ceive higher profits. On the other hand, Garvin (1988) mentions eight dimensions of
quality, namely: performance, features, reliability, conformance, durability, service-
ability, aesthetics, and perceived quality, which are comprehensive but measures for
each are difficult to establish and to create. By reason of shorter PLCs, firms have to
innovate frequently and in small increments (Handfield and Pannesi, 1995; Kessler
and Chakrabarti, 1996). In order to innovate, firms work jointly with their supply
chain members in introducing new processes, products or services. Firms improve
their ability to engage in process and production innovation by carefully managing
their relationships with suppliers and customers (Kaufman et al., 2000). Firms have
the opportunity and possibility to improve absorptive capacity which could lead to
fast and frequent introduction of new products by systematically joint creativity
capacities, joint organization learning, knowledge sharing and joint problem solving
between supply chain members.
The imperative condition for SCC is that supply chain members are capable to
increase the total gain due to synergy (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2005). Supply
chain members will obtain financial benefits by enhancing responsiveness (Fisher
1997). Another advantage of SCC is to achieve cost savings and reduce and termi-
nate non-value added activities and/or duplication of efforts (Lambert et al., 2004).
The cooperation between supply chain members can foster greater knowledge and
result in synergetic benefits. Initially, firms will obtain operational improvements
through SCC such as higher order fulfillment, lower total logistics costs and less
stock-out. In the long-term horizon, SCC will be beneficial through more compet-
itive products and shorter time-to-market that will transform into possible com-
petitive advantages and increased profits (Stuart and McCutcheon, 1996). Hence,
collaborative advantages will eventually lead to improved operational performance
and firm performance which comprises on how a firm fulfills its operational and
financial goals compared with other firms (Yamin et al., 1999; Barua et al,. 2004;
Li et al., 2006).
Besides, Frohlich and Westbrook (2001) observed that firms who have imple-
mented an effective SCC enjoy the largest rates of performance improvement across
multiple marketplaces (market share and profitability), productivity (cost and lead-
time) and non-productivity (customer service, quality and delivery) measures.
3.3. Operational and Firm Performance
SCC has been linked to enhance and boost firm performance (Simatupang and
Sridharan, 2004; Squire Cousins, Lawson and Brown, 2009; McLaren et al., 2002).
By working with other supply chain members, firms are expected to multiply the
outcomes of the effort from working alone (Wilding, 2006). Such outcomes and
results consist out of a better level of responsiveness and service level improvements
from their SCC programs (Holweg et al., 2005). One more expected benefit is the
reduction of supply chain costs like those that reflect with inter-firm transactions,
inventory and production (McLaren et al., 2002).
Many studies have concluded that a higher degree of SCC can improve firm
performance (Nyaga et al., 2010; Robson et al., 2008) especially on their logistics
activities (Ha et al., 2011). Further, success of collaboration could also lead to more
collaborative actions in the future (Ramanathan and Gunasekaran, 2012). Moreover,
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higher levels of collaboration could lead to elimination of bullwhip effect, inventory
reduction, better transport capacity utilization, and risk mitigation (Holweg et al.,
2005).
Financial performance and operational performance can be measured in terms of
firm performance (Chen and Paulraj, 2004). In addition, firm performance can also
be viewed through the lens of service effectiveness and cost effectiveness (Richey et
al., 2010). Performance can be also measured by cost, quality, delivery and flexibility
(Krause et al., 2007). In general, supply chain performance measures include: order
lead-time, inventory levels, time-to-market, quality, customer service, and flexibility
(Bhatnagar and Sohal, 2005; Gunasekaran et al., 2001). Bagchi et al. (2005) mea-
sured performance in eight dimensions, namely: order fulfillment lead-time, order fill
rate, production flexibility, total logistics costs, return processing costs, inventory
days of supply/inventory turnover rate, on-time delivery, and rate of returns. Gen-
erally, logistics performance is a key determinant for maintaining relationship with
the other supply chain members (Glenn Richey et al., 2010; Ellinger et al., 2006,
2000; Beamon, 1999). Hence, supply chain members gravitate to be more satisfied
when their performance of logistics is improved (Gunasekaran et al., 2001).
Furthermore, according to Porter (1980), the two generic competitive strate-
gies are cost advantage and differentiation. Cost advantage can be realized through
reducing costs, while on the other hand differentiation increases profitability by pro-
viding increased levels of customization and service. By means of efficient and effec-
tive order capture, product availability, on-time delivery, information transparency
and improved responsiveness, a firm can increase its level of service. Further, SCC
creates elements of differentiation by means of customer value which is formed by
superior service (Christopher and Peck, 2003). In addition, there is a positive re-
lationship between high service levels and growth of sales volume and customer
retention (Parasuraman et al., 1991; Mentzer et al., 1999; Ray et al., 2004). There-
fore, this stipulates that SCC should be the silver bullet for reducing costs without
negatively impacting customer service and improving service without exponentially
increasing costs. Increase of operational performance and efficiency by means of
cost savings, inventory reduction, planning accuracy and improved responsiveness
could eventually lead to increase of sales and reduction of costs. Supplementary,
successful SCC and firm performance can be determined in terms of market share
and satisfaction of SCC (Mishra and Shah, 2009).
3.4. Collaboration Barriers
Although, according to the existing literature, SCC amongst independent firms often
result in improvements and larger benefits from effectively satisfying end customers’
needs, lack of awareness about the existence of barriers of collaboration burdens to
grasp the benefits of it. Based on recent literature, there are several identified SCC
barriers that have a negative direct effect on realizing collaborative advantages by
SCC. The final list of collaborations barriers was partially adapted from the study
of Ramesh, Banwet and Shankar (2009).
In most of the supplier-buyer dyads, trust is acknowledged as an essential ele-
ment to bind independent firms (Agarwal and Shankar, 2003). Trust can only exist
when firms believe that its supply chain member is reliable and benevolent (Heikkila,
2002). On the other hand, Chung et al. (2008) mentions that human relations like
trust or long-term orientation are a tremendous important aspect in relationships.
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Thus, according to Cetindamar et al. (2005), a lack of trust is the core argument
behind the difficulties in establishing collaboration between firms.
In order to achieve success, when firms decide to collaborate with each other,
it is important to educate and train employees about awareness of SCC and its
core principles to exploit collaboration and to improve business processes to real-
ize the advantages. A severe lack of understanding and awareness of SCC among
the employees could result in significant diminishing of positive spillover effects of
collaboration advantages (Ramesh, Banwet and Shankar, 2009).
Besides trust, commitment to collaboration and to relationship is also considered
to be an important aspect as an enduring ambition and longing to maintain a
fruitful relationship (Moorman et al., 1992). Morgan and Hunt (1994) concluded
that commitment was the core component to successful long-term relationships.
The inability of vision and understanding of the supply chain is also a barrier
to effective collaboration. As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, supply chains
are getting more sophisticated which results in limited view and understanding of
the entire and complete supply chain. Individual firms focus on their own functional
areas and fail to recognize how collaboration with others, both inside and outside
the firm, will improve overall performance (Mentzer et al., 2000). The inter-firm
comfort levels of collaboration could increase as managers begin to understand
the importance of integrated business processes and commit to working for the
betterment of the whole supply chain.
The depth of collaboration also dependents on the supply chain members’ tech-
nological capabilities. According to Kwan (1999), in cases that supply chain mem-
bers are incapable to exchange information electronically due to low IT resources it
hinders and forms barriers and thresholds to implement and optimize collaboration.
Information sharing is determined as a core requisite for collaboration. Multi-
ple studies (Bowersox et al., 2003; Cannon and Perreault, 1999) pointed out that
successful supplier-buyer relationships are connected with high level of information
sharing. Low level and inadequate information sharing could lead to low level of
trust and commitment that harms the efforts of collaboration.
For a long-term relationship focus between supplier-buyer, risk and reward shar-
ing is an important factor. According to Spekman et al. (1998), firms collaborate
to share risks and benefits in order to create competitive advantage. In addition,
Kaufman et al. (2000) and Kotabe et al. (2003) emphasized that it is essential that
channel participants in a supply chain share risks and rewards.
The lack and inconsistency of appropriate performance metrics and measurement
systems results in the barrier for supply chain alignment between supply chain
members (Fawcett and Magnan, 2001). This could lead to conflicts, because firms
are focusing on improving their key performance indicators (KPI) and metrics rather
than the performance metrics of the whole supply chain performance.
In conclusion, lack of awareness about the existence of barriers of collaboration
hinders to realize the benefits of collaboration. Therefore, it is important to know
and identify the barriers of collaboration so that the collaborative decision makers
can focus on how to overcome and manage these collaboration barriers in order to
obtain higher benefits out of SCC.
3.5. Cross-Border Business Barriers
Cross-border barriers can be defined as the attitudinal, structural, operational and
other constraints that hinder a firm’s ability to initiate, develop or sustain inter-
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national operations (Koksal and Kettaneh 2011). Therefore, in the context of this
paper, which covers cross-border SCC, it is important to achieve a better under-
standing of such barriers since these barriers waste resources of firms and threaten
the efficiency, effectiveness and profitability of a firm’s operations.
The cross-border business barriers that were the most suitable and appropriate
for the study in this research paper were used and included, which are partially
derived adapted from current literature, such as Leonidou (2011). This careful se-
lection of cross-border business barriers, based on their relevance in context of the
study in this research paper, are depicted in the table below.
Table 1: Frequent indicated cross-border business barriers
Cross-border business barrier Authors
Strong international competition Leonidou (2000); Da Silva et al. (2001);
Ortega (2003); Ahmed et al. (2004);
Altintas et al. (2007); Koksal et al. (2011);
Mpinganjira (2011)
High business risk Leonidou (2000); Kneller et al. (2011)
Different customer culture Leonidou (2000); Altintas et al. (2007)
Unfamiliar foreign business practice Leonidou (2000); Altintas et al. (2007)
High tariff and non-tariff barriers Leonidou (2000); Ahmed et al. (2004);
Altintas et al. (2007); Koksal et al. (2011)
Unfavorable foreign exchange rates Leonidou (2000); Da Silva et al. (2001);
Kneller et al. (2011)
Lack of government assistance Leonidou (2000); Ahmed et al. (2004);
Altintas et al. (2011)
Restrictive rules and regulation Leonidou (2000); Mpinganjira (2011)
Transportation difficulties Leonidou (2000); Mpinganjira (2011);
Kneller et al. (2011); Koksal et al. (2011)
Bureaucratic requirements Leonidou (2000); Altintas et al. (2007);
Mpinganjira (2011)
Limited information about foreign markets Leonidou (2000); Mpinganjira (2011);
Koksal et al. (2011)
Source: Partially adapted from Leonidou (2011)
4. Hypothesis Development
From the theoretical background and the literature review, it has become apparent
that there are several prominent dimensions in SCC that are pivotal in the integra-
tive and integral process. By practicing and executing SCC dimensions, firms have
the opportunity to obtain and achieve collaborative advantages over its competi-
tors. In addition, the dimensions of SCC, and the achieved collaborative advantages,
are expected to have positive consequences and outcomes on both operational per-
formance and firm performance. The direct relationships between these constructs
may be mediated through these collaborative advantages and moderated by the
constructs collaboration barriers and cross-border business barriers, which are ex-
pected to have a negative direct main effect on its respective dependent performance
variables.
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The developed conceptual SCC framework suggests that supply chain members
need to embrace SCC dimensions and to conduct and perform the dimensions of
SCC properly. If a firm accomplishes to do so, the properly executed SCC dimen-
sions will lead to efficient and effective collaborative planning activities, collabo-
rative decision making processes and collaborative advantages, which in its turn
will have a positive direct and indirect impact on firm performance and operational
performance.
Based on the results of the literature review, several relevant latent constructs
were identified and defined, namely: supply chain collaboration dimensions (SCCD),
collaborative advantage (CA), operational performance (OP), firm performance
(FP), cross-border business barriers (CBBB) and collaboration barriers (CB). Fur-
thermore, each of the latent construct consists out of several pivotal and key vari-
ables and items. The latent construct SCCD has 7 variables, CA has 5 variables,
OP has 5 variables, FP has 4 variables, and CBBB and CB have 9 variables. The
identification of the latent constructs were converged to the following formulated
hypotheses per latent construct.
Supply chain collaboration dimensions (SCCD):
H1a: Supply chain collaboration dimensions have a significant positive direct
effect on operational performance
H1b: Supply chain collaboration dimensions positively impacts collaborative
advantage at a significant level.
H1c: Supply chain collaboration dimensions have a positive significant direct
impact on firm performance.
Collaborative advantage (CA):
H2a: Collaborative advantage has a positive direct significant impact on oper-
ational performance.
H2b: Collaborative advantage has a direct positive significant influence on firm
performance.
H2c: Collaborative advantage positively mediates the positive relationship be-
tween supply chain collaboration dimensions and operational performance.
H2d: Collaborative advantage positively mediates the positive relationship be-
tween supply chain collaboration dimensions and firm performance.
Operational performance (OP):
H3: Operational performance has a direct positive significant impact on firm
performance.
Collaboration barriers (CB):
H4a: Collaboration barriers positively moderate the positive effect and relation-
ship between supply chain collaboration dimensions and operational performance.
H4b: Collaboration barriers positively moderate the positive effect and relation-
ship between supply chain collaboration dimensions and collaborative advantage.
H4c: Collaboration barriers positively moderate the positive effect and relation-
ship between supply chain collaboration dimensions and firm performance.
Cross-border business barriers (CBBB):
H5a: Cross-border business barriers positively moderate the positive effect and
relationship between collaborative advantage and operational performance.
H5b: Cross-border business barriers positively moderates the positive effect and
relationship between collaborative advantage and firm performance.
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The identified theoretical latent constructs were conceptualized to study the
effects and relationships. The conceptual SCC hypotheses framework that was con-
ducted for the study in this research paper, including the relationships between the
different constructs, mediation and interaction moderations, is visualized in Figure
1.
Fig. 1: Conceptual supply chain collaboration hypotheses framework
Source: partially adapted from Ramanathan and Gunasekaran (2012); Zhang and Cao
(2011)
5. Research Approach and Design
The study in this research paper is considered to be explanatory and deductive,
concerning the latent constructs in the conceptual SCC framework. According to
Hussey et al. (1997), deductive research is a study in which a conceptual framework
and theoretical structure is developed and then tested by empirical observation.
For this reason, the deductive method is referred to as moving from the general
theoretical concepts and theories of SCC in the existing literature to the particular
usefulness in practice for supply chain managers, professionals and practitioners.
In this study the conceptual SCC framework was examined by means of a web-
based survey questionnaire. Analyses were performed after collecting and compil-
ing all the data. The literature on SCC inception, design, advantages, operational
performance and firm performance, as well as on impediments and barriers, was
reviewed first in order to formulate the hypotheses for this study.
5.1. Scope and Delimitations
The geographical scope was constrained to the initial 15 member states, which
are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The
core argument and main reason to constraint the EU to its initial 15 member states,
which nowadays comprises 28 member states, is that the integration of the initial
EU15 member states is more mature and profound, and the economy and financial
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institutions are more interwoven and intertwined with each other than in comparison
with the New Member States (NMS) of the Eastern enlargement. Furthermore, a
study of European Association of Comparative Economic Studies (EACES 2013)
enumerated that the largest bilateral trade flows still take place between neighboring
sovereign countries and geographical areas: between Japan and China, the EU15 and
Russia, the US and Mexico. Hence, for the EU15, Russia is a more important market
than, for instance, China.
Strictly speaking, this development and situation is strengthened by the same
study of EACES (2013) in figures by stating that the EU15 exports recorded their
biggest increase in medium-high technology (MHT) sectors to Russia (machinery,
motor vehicles and chemicals) and in high-technology (HT) goods to Russia (elec-
tronics and pharmaceuticals). In addition, there is also an increase observed in
exports of capital goods to Russia, which received in 2008 almost one-third of the
EU15 exports, and has thus overtaken China as its most important market. Russia
was also the largest market for consumption goods, absorbing half the EU15 exports
in 2008.
From a practical point of view, whereas the European Union (EU) facilitated
economic and trade integration that makes the flow of goods and collaboration
across national borders simple and smooth, the importance of cross-border context
is still high in many parts of the world. Such as the eye-catching case of the EU and
Russia, where the national and cultural differences in many aspects and elements
are quite substantial. While Russia seems to offer low-cost production opportunities
and possibilities for international manufacturers, the study of Hilmola et al. (2008)
showed how difficult it is to achieve cost efficiency in Russian operations in compar-
ison to similar operations in more mature markets. Furthermore, western markets
are starting to get saturated and European firms are starting to look for new growth
opportunities in emerging economies. Countries that used to be targeted for low cost
sourcing are now changing into attractive end markets due to their increase in GDP
and disposable income. Russia is one of those markets. However, besides the fact
that the market is booming, its business environment shows differences in compar-
ison with the European ones and poses specific challenges. This complicates the
supply chain because it not only needs to be globally managed but also adapted to
local conditions. Therefore, export and supply chain operations of semi-finished and
final goods from the EU to Russia are likely to maintain and increase, accentuating
the importance of cross-border context in terms of SCM. Conclusively, European
firms perceive difficulties in the ease of doing business in Russia in areas of customs
regulation, bureaucracy, uncertainty and logistics and transport (Finnish-Russian
Chamber of Commerce, 2004).
In conclusion, Russia is a key factor for the EU15 performance in the aforemen-
tioned markets, which can be explained by the geographic proximity and the nature
of the Russian import demand (capital goods, MHT and HT products). The trends
in the EU15 export intensities to the large emerging economies show that Europe
has by far outperformed the other suppliers in the Russian market. In the other
large emerging markets, the positions of the EU15 tend to converge with the world
average.
5.2. Data Collection and Research Methodology
In contemporary SCM research, little attention has been paid to the comprehen-
sive, integrative and integral approach of SCC and its impact through the con-
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struct collaborative advantage on operational performance and firm performance.
The construct SCC dimensions forms the cornerstone and backbone for the op-
erational business processes of collaborative planning activities and collaborative
decision making processes, and its impact on the mediation construct collabora-
tive advantage, which impacts the dependent constructs operational performance
and firm performance. Therefore, as mentioned throughout this research paper the
high-level and abstract objective is to analyze and to discover the impact of SCC
dimensions on firm performance and operational performance.
Historically, in most of the prior studies in the field of SCM, survey question-
naires have been the most popular research method (Mentzer and Kahn, 1995;
Kotzab et al., 2005; Sachan and Datta, 2005; Burgess et al., 2006; Giunipero et
al., 2008; Chicksand et al., 2012). Furthermore, the logic of researchin this study is
deductive. Deductive research pursues a conscious direction from a general law to a
specific case (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 1994; Andreewsky and Bourcier, 2000; Dan-
ermark, 2001; Kirkeby, 1990; Taylor et al., 2002). Thus, deductive research scans
theory, derives logical conclusions from this theory and presents them in the form
of hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested in an empirical setting and presents
general conclusions based on the corroboration or falsification of the self-generated
hypotheses (Arlbjorn and Halldorsson, 2002; Kirkeby, 1990; Wigblad, 2003).
The subject of study in this research paper is SCC in the contextual cross-border
inter-firm design in a supplier (EU15) - buyer (Russian firm) dyad, whereas the
EU15 supplier is the focal firm. Therefore, the object of study is the focal European
firms of the EU15 member states. The unit of analysis is a sample of EU15 firms
which was primarily extracted from the Amadeus database.
The tool applied for collecting primary data was a web-based survey question-
naire. The sample respondents were expected to have experience in doing business
in Russia. For each construct and their indicators and items, a Likert (1932) type
method of summated five-point scale was used to assess and review its perceived
level and degree of perception on several propositions. This Likert scale was apt,
because it provides an interval. This is the most powerful scale for statistical anal-
ysis (Hair et al., 2010). The potential sample respondents were collected by means
of database Amadeus of Bureau van Dijk. To improve response rate, four waves of
emails were sent once a week. Out of the 72 respondents, 66 were considered as
useable for data analysis.
6. Data Analysis of Depth and Scope of Collaboration
The scope of collaboration encompasses the number of business processes and activ-
ities that are collaborating, and the depth of collaboration measures the integration
of processes that are collaborating. Therefore, the web-based survey questionnaire
included multiple different business processes and departmental variables measuring
the scope and depth of collaboration. Furthermore, the web-based survey question-
naire also included multiple indicators of the independent constructs operational
performance and firm performance to measure the perceived improvements as a
result of collaboration. The respondents were asked to estimate the level of collab-
oration and involvement of their Russian buyer in several organizational areas of
SCC.
Pearson correlation coefficients of the collaboration areas and firm performance
and operational performance were calculated to make some preliminary conclusions
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about the effects and relationship between these dependent variables (firm per-
formance and operational performance) and independent variables (collaboration
areas). The results of the Pearson correlation coefficients are shown in table 2.
Table 2: Pearson correlation of collaboration areas, operational and firm performance
Dependent
/ indepen-
dent
Produc-
tion
Inventory
manage-
ment
Distribu-
tion
R&D Procure-
ment
Supply
chain
design
Product
develop-
ment
Sales growth .082 .177 .316** .018 -.005 .123 .070
Market
share
.183 .209 .149 .138 .074 .035 .157
ROI .134 .289* .218 .129 .091 .137 .085
On-time de-
livery
-.037 .276* .507** .211 .024 .296* .268*
Order ful-
fillment lead
time
.047 .312* .471** .329** .022 .291* .276*
Total logis-
tics cost
.024 .293* .193 .222 .109 .315* .137
Inventory
turns
.089 .346** .133 .211 .109 .129 .254*
Stock-outs .110 .451** .157 .178 .117 .204 .239
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
As illustrated in table 2, statically significant correlations were measured in sev-
eral collaboration areas, namely: inventory management, distribution, R&D, supply
chain design and product development. All of the statistically significant correlations
were positive. Collaboration in distribution led to strong significant correlation with
strong change in operational performance on-time delivery (.507**) and moderate
significant correlation with order fulfillment lead-time (.471**) and sales growth
(.316**). Further, collaboration in inventory management resulted in weak signifi-
cant correlation with ROI (.219*), on-time delivery (.276*), and total logistics costs
(.293*), moderate significant correlation with order fulfillment lead-time (.312*)
and inventory turns (.346**) and stock-outs (.451**). Collaboration in the area of
inventory management showed the most relationships and significant effects with
dependent variables. Also, collaboration in R&D showed a moderate significant cor-
relation with order fulfillment (.329**). In addition, collaboration in supply chain
design led to moderate significant correlation with total logistics cost (.315*) and
weak significant correlation with on-time delivery (.296*) and order fulfillment lead-
time (.291*). Last but not least, collaboration in the area of product development
showed weak significant correlation with on-time delivery (.268*), order fulfillment
rate (.276*) and inventory turns (.254*). Absolutely no significant correlations were
found in the collaboration areas production and procurement. Interestingly, also no
significant correlation was found in the dependent firm performance variable market
share growth.
By computing the composite variables through summing the collaboration area
variables and firm performance and operational performance variables, correlation
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was analyzed between these two composited variables. Interestingly, the sum of
collaboration areas had a significant moderate correlation with the sum of firm
performance and operational performance (.345**). Hence, it can be concluded that
there is indeed a moderate correlation between the scope and depth of collaboration
with firm performance and operational performance.
However, to get a better detailed understanding of the effect of the parame-
ters and elements of SCC to operational performance, and operational performance
to firm performance, multiple regression analyses were performed. Based on prior
conducted researches and studies, the cut-off and threshold value for the adjusted
R square was set on .10 (Bagchi et al., 2005). In addition, there were a numerous
number of significant strong correlations among the independent variables of collab-
oration areas. This could lead to multicollinearity, which is an undesirable situation
where the correlations among the independent variables are strong. Therefore, the
indicators of collaboration areas, operational performance and firm performance
were tested for multicollinearity by means of variation inflation factor (VIF). For
this study, VIF between 5 and 10 indicates high correlation that may be problematic.
And if the VIF is above 10, the regression parameter estimates and coefficients are
poorly estimated due to multicollinearity. The VIF values of the collaboration areas
were in the range of 1.204 to 1.981, therefore, the variables were not subject to mul-
ticollinearity. In the case of operational performance indicators, the VIF values were
in the range of 1.500 to 5.776. Only some variables of operational performance had
a VIF value higher than 5 which might have caused some minor multicollinearity,
but none of them were above 10, so these were negligible, therefore, no adjustments
were made. The results of multiple regressions of collaboration areas as indepen-
dent variables and operational performance indicators as dependent variables are
presented in table 3.
Table 3: Multiple regressions of collaboration areas and operational performance
Operational
performance
variables
Collaboration
area variables
Regression
parameter
estimate (Beta)
Adjusted R
square
On-time delivery Distribution** .395 .304
Order fulfillment
lead time
Distribution** .346 .295
Procurement* -.316
Total logistics cost N.A. N.A. .088
Inventory turns N.A. N.A. .070
Stock-outs Inventory
management**
.530 .158
***. P < 0.001, **. P < 0.01, *. P < 0.05 and N.A.=Not Applicable
Concerning the results of the multiple regression analysis of collaboration areas
on operational performance, the operational performance variable on-time delivery
was significant correlated with collaboration area distribution. The same observa-
tion was made with regards to the operational performance variable order fulfillment
lead-time. Looking back on the Pearson correlation results, the results were par-
tially expected in these collaboration areas. Collaboration in distribution activities
and processes, such as order deliveries in a cross-border context, improves supply
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chain performance and efficiency in on-time delivery and order fulfillment lead-time.
The multiple regression analysis also illustrated that collaboration in collaboration
area inventory management had a significant positive correlation with stock-outs.
Again, this correlation was logic and coherent with its inherent nature of activities
and processes. Collaboration by means of inventory management leads to better un-
derstanding and synchronization of inventories in the pipeline between supplier and
buyer. All these efforts of collaboration in inventory management therefore results in
minor and/or less frequent stock-outs. An interesting and kind of unexpected result
was the significant negative correlation between collaboration area procurement and
order lead-time fulfillment. The explanation of the negative sign of the correlation
could be that collaboration in procurement improves similar and alike processes and
activities which will lead to higher demands from the purchasing and procurement
department to their planning and LSP to meet service-levels of order fulfillment
lead-times. Another explanation could be that due to improvement and optimiza-
tion of activities within the department, the information exchange and sharing with
other departments and external parties changed from the current situation which
could lead to initial misunderstandings and errors.
Again, by computing the composite variables through summing the collaboration
area variables and operational performance variables, a linear regression analysis
was conducted between these two composited variables. The same as with the Pear-
son correlation analysis, the sum of collaboration areas variables had a significant
parameter estimate with the sum of operational performance variables (.379***).
Furthermore, the adjusted R square is higher than the cut-off value of .10, namely:
.130. Therefore, it can be stated that there is indeed a positive effect between the
scope and depth of collaboration with operational performance.
The results of multiple regression of firm performance as dependent variables
are presented in table 4 below.
Table 4: Multiple regressions of collaboration areas and firm performance
Firm performance
variables
Collaboration
area variables
Regression
parameter
estimate (Beta)
Adjusted
R square
Sales growth N.A N.A. .035
Market share growth N.A N.A. -.033
ROI N.A N.A. .007
***. P < 0.001, **. P < 0.01, *. P < 0.05 and N.A.=Not Applicable
The second result of multiple regression analysis of collaboration areas on firm
performance did not show any significant regressions between the variables of collab-
oration areas as independent variables and firm performance indicators as dependent
variables. For all the firm performance variables the adjusted R square was lower
than the cut-off value of .10. However, there were no collaboration area variables
that had a p-value that was lower than .05 to any of the firm performance variables.
Hence, none of the independent variables of collaboration areas had a significant
regression with the dependent variables of firm performance.
However, by computing the composite variables through summing the collabo-
ration areas variables and firm performance variables, a linear regression analysis
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was conducted between these two composited variables. The composite variable col-
laboration area had a positive parameter estimate with the composite variable of
firm performance (.220), but it was not significant. Furthermore, the adjusted R
square was lower than the cut-off value of .10, namely: .033. Therefore, it can be
stated that there was no significant positive effect between collaboration areas on
firm performance.
Last but not least, the results of multiple regressions of operational performance
as independent variable and firm performance indicators as dependent variable are
presented in table 5.
Table 5: Multiple regressions of operational performance and firm performance
Firm performance
variables
Operational
performance
variables
Regression
parameter
estimate (Beta)
Adjusted
R square
Sales growth N.A. N.A. .355
Market share growth N.A. N.A. .247
ROI N.A. N.A. .374
***. P < 0.001, **. P < 0.01, *. P < 0.05 and N.A.=Not Applicable
The results of multiple regression analysis of operational performance on firm
performance did not show any significant regressions between the variables of oper-
ational performance as independent and firm performance indicators as dependent.
However, the adjusted R square was moderate above the cut-off value of .10, while
in comparison with the adjusted R square of the collaboration areas indicators on
firm performance the indicators the adjusted R square was around zero.
To provide an integrative and all-embracing analysis of the scope and depth
of collaboration in the context of EU15-Russian supply chains, a path diagram
of the multiple regressions was conducted. The independent variables of all the
different collaboration areas were combined to one latent construct, which is named:
collaboration areas, whereas the latent constructs operational performance and firm
performance were determined as dependent variables. The results of the multiple
regression analysis and its extension to the visualized path diagram are presented
in Appendix 1. Table 6 shows the results of only significant relationships between
variables.
The table above and the path diagram in Appendix 1 highlight and accen-
tuate that there was a positive significant relationship and effect between latent
construct collaboration areas and latent construct operational performance (.351*).
However, there was no significant positive relationship between latent construct col-
laboration areas and latent construct firm performance. Unexpectedly, there was a
negative effect and relationship between latent construct collaboration and latent
construct firm performance (-.020), but not significant. On the other hand, oper-
ational performance had a strong positive significant effect and relationship with
latent construct firm performance (.576***). Furthermore, the control variables firm
size (.130) and length of customer relationship (.128) had a weak positive effect on
firm performance, but not significant. Moreover, the control variables contributed
and explained a higher degree of variance of the latent construct firm performance,
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Table 6: Regression parameter estimates of depth and scope of collaboration
Relationship Regression
parameter
estimate (Beta)
P-value
Collaboration → Operational
performance
.351* .016
Collaboration → Firm performance -.020 .879
Operational performance →
Firm Performance
.576*** ***
Firm size → Firm performance .130 .242
Length of CR → Firm performance .128 .246
Collaboration → Inventory management .520*** ***
Collaboration → Distribution .338* .033
Collaboration → R&D .785*** ***
Collaboration → Procurement .560*** ***
Collaboration → Supply chain design .361* .014
Collaboration → Product development .803*** ***
Firm performance → Sales growth .901*** ***
Firm performance → Market share growth .922*** ***
Firm performance → ROI .825*** ***
Operational performance→ On-time deliv-
ery
.918*** ***
Operational performance → Order fulfill-
ment LT
.970*** ***
Operational performance → Total logistics
cost
.606*** ***
Operational performance → Inventory
turns
.567*** ***
Operational performance → Stock-outs .597*** ***
***. P < 0.001, **. P < 0.01, *. P < 0.05 and N.A.=Not Applicable
thereby, increasing the reliability of other predictors on the dependent variable firm
performance.
In addition, another model was constructed by compositing all variables and
indicators of collaboration areas, operational performance and firm performance,
the relationship and effect between collaboration and operational performance was
positive and significant (.379***). Furthermore, the relationship and effect between
operational performance and firm performance was also positive and significant
(.654***). In this model the control variables firm size (.228) and length of cus-
tomer relationship (.104) were also positive, but again not significant. The visualized
structural path model of the composite observed variables is included in Appendix
2.
6.1. Concluding Remarks
Overall, the tendency shows that the scope of collaboration, by the number of
business process and activities that are collaborating, was quite moderate, while
the depth of collaboration, by the level and degree of integration of the process
in collaboration, can be determined between low and moderate in the challenging
cross-border contextual design. Hence, the depth and scope of collaboration in the
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EU15-Russian supply chain setting can be defined and concluded as moderate and
modest.
As reported by the Pearson correlation and regression tables, it seems that
collaboration in the areas of distribution and inventory management had the most
positive significant effect on primarily operational performance indicators such as
on-time delivery, order fulfillment lead-time and stock-outs. Nevertheless, it must
be underlined that in many collaboration areas no severe and substantial results
were reported from collaboration. Conclusively, it is clear that distribution and
inventory management are the collaboration areas where EU15 suppliers should
collaborate with their Russian buyer. In the train of thought, supply chain design
can also be considered as a viable and feasible option for collaboration to enhance
and complement mainly operational performance parameters and metrics.
In addition, by compositing all variables of collaboration areas, operational per-
formance and firm performance, the relationship and effect between collaboration
and operational performance was positive and significant (.379***). Furthermore,
the relationship and effect between operational performance and firm performance
was also positive and significant (.654***). In this model the control variables firm
size and length (.228) of customer relationship (.104) were both positive but not
significant.
Additionally, an integrative structural model was conducted to measure the
path coefficient and relationship between the unobserved latent constructs collabo-
ration areas and operational performance (.351*), and collaboration areas and firm
performance (-.020). Furthermore, the effect and relationship between operational
performance and firm performance (.576***) was analyzed.
Hence, it can be concluded that if the latent construct collaboration goes up by
one standard deviation, the latent construct operational performance goes up by a
standard deviation of .351 at the 5 percent level of significance. Thus, more depth
in collaboration, especially in distribution and inventory management, leads to a
significant positive effect on operational performance. Following-up, if the latent
construct operational performance goes up by one standard deviation, the latent
construct firm performance goes up by a standard deviation of .576 at the 0.1
percent level of significance.
The control variables firm size and length of customer relationship were positive,
respectively .130 and .128, but not significant. However, the control variables do
explain more of the latent construct firm performance’ variance and adjusted the
effect of the latent construct operational performance and collaboration areas on
firm performance.
7. Structural Equation Model of Supply Chain Collaboration
In consideration to test the depicted conceptual SCC hypotheses framework that
is visually presented in figure 1, the two-step approach was used for assessing the
structural model (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988).
The two-step approach advocates that in order to test a structural regression
model, the measurement part of the model was firstly identified and consequently
the structural part of the model. Hence, the suitability of the formulated conceptual
model in this research paper was tested before the eventual structural path rela-
tionships in the conceptual SCC hypotheses framework were examined to test the
hypotheses. Hence, first of all, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted
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for the measurement part of the model of the indicators of the latent constructs:
SCCD, CA, OP and FP, including the interaction moderation latent constructs CB
and CBBB.
CFA is a multivariate statistical procedure that is used to test how well the
measured predefined variables represent the above mentioned latent constructs. For
the study in this research paper it was felt that the two-step approach would be the
best, because the conceptual SCC hypotheses model is partially adapted from the
studies of Ramanathan and Gunasekaran (2012) and Zhang and Cao (2011). The
CFA evaluates a priori hypotheses and relies heavily on existing theory of previous
researchers and scholars. Therefore, the number of latent constructs and indicators
are partially determined in advance (Thompson, 2004).
7.1. Reliability and Validity Tests
First of all, it is preferable to determine if a measurement instrument is able to
produce consistent results every time it is conducted under similar circumstances.
Statistically, reliability is defined as the percentage of the inconsistency in the re-
sponses to the survey questionnaire which is the result of differences in the re-
spondents. This implies that responses to a reliable survey questionnaire will vary,
because respondents have different opinions, not because the survey questionnaire
questions are confusing or ambiguous. Therefore, the predefined indicators of each
of the latent constructs were tested to remove confusing indicators in order to im-
prove reliability. In this study, one of the methods that were used to test reliability
was Cronbach’s alpha for each latent construct and its indicators. Furthermore, a
Cronbach’s alpha of all the indicators of all the latent constructs was also calculated.
Generally, Cronbach’s alpha of >0.7 is the cut-off and threshold value (Cooper and
Schindler 2006; Malhotra and Birks 2006). The results of the reliability analyses are
illustrated in table 7.
Table 7: Cronbach’s alpha reliability test
Latent construct Number
of indicators
Cronbach’s alpha
SCCD 7 .895
CA 5 .736
FP 4 .926
OP 5 .897
CB 9 .928
CBBB 11 .844
All indicators 49 .901
The results of the Cronbach’s alpha test indicated that all the latent constructs
had a Cronbach’s alpha above the cut-off and threshold value of 0.7. Hence, based
on the preliminary reliability test of Cronbach’s alpha, all the latent constructs and
its indicators were included in the CFA for further reliability and validity analysis.
However, due to the large number of indicators in the latent construct CBBB and
the distinction in the nature and dimension of the barriers, a principal component
with varimax rotation factor analysis was conducted. The results of the principal
component analysis are included in Appendix 3. The KMO is .818 and Bartlett’s
Test of Sphericity was significant, therefore, the set of variables were suitable for
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factor analysis. As shown in Appendix 3, there are some indicators that had a poor
and low loading, and loaded in multiple factors. Therefore, the indicators with the
lowest loading and that loaded in multiple factors were deleted to rerun the factor
analysis. Furthermore, due to the fact that only two indicators loaded in the last
factor, the number of factors was constrained to two. After deleting the indicators
‘unfavorable foreign exchange rates’ (.341) and ‘strong international competition’
(.542), the KMO increased to .836.
The results of the revised factor analysis showed that the two factors can be
categorized and interpreted in indicators with an environmental dimension, and
indicators with a market dimension. Hence, the revised CFA, in which the latent
construct CBBB was separated in market dimension (MD) indicators and environ-
mental dimension (ED) indicators, is included in Appendix 4.
The outcomes of the CFA analysis functioned as input to conduct composite
reliability, and convergent and discriminant validity tests. If the latent constructs do
not show adequate validity and reliability, the structural model will be of less good
fit, thereby, unreliable. Hence, more thoroughly validity and reliability tests were
conducted, such as composite reliability (CR), average variance extracted (AVE),
maximum shared variance (MSV), and average shared variance (ASV) (Hair et al.,
2010). The same authors established the following cut-off and threshold values that
were used to measure and determine reliability and validity, which are presented in
the table below.
Table 8: Reliability and validity threshold values
Reliability and validity tests Cut-off value
Composite reliability > 0.70
Convergent validity CR > AVE
AVE > 0.50
Discriminant validity MSV < AVE
ASV < AVE
Source: Hair et al. (2010)
In order to calculate the above mentioned reliability and validity tests, the cor-
relation table and standard regression weight table of the CFA, including all the
latent constructs, were used as input values. By means of an Excel macro (Gaskin,
2014), the outcomes of the CFA were used as input to calculate the reliability and
validity tests. The total results of the test are illustrated in the table below.
Table 9: Reliability and validity test results of CFA
LC CR AVE MSV ASV ED SCCD CA FP OP CB MD
ED 0.890 0.623 0.215 0.096 0.790
SCCD 0.888 0.534 0.320 0.131 0.276 0.731
CA 0.741 0.370 0.320 0.127 -0.138 0.566 0.609
FP 0.928 0.763 0.429 0.172 -0.239 0.366 0.516 0.873
OP 0.879 0.600 0.429 0.142 -0.057 0.487 0.390 0.655 0.775
CB 0.929 0.596 0.335 0.102 0.452 0.133 -0.032 -0.234 -0.022 0.772
MD 0.798 0.508 0.335 0.112 0.464 0.037 -0.016 -0.303 -0.173 0.579 0.713
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The results in the table above demarcates that there was one element of con-
vergent validity that did not meet the cut-off value, which is shown by the red font
color. The low AVE number of CA can be explained by the low factor loadings of
some of the observed variables and indicators, such as business synergy (.47), qual-
ity (.53) and innovation (.57), as shown in Appendix 4. In addition, it is noteworthy
to mention that due to the relatively low sample size (n=66), the factor loadings
of each indicator on the latent construct should be approximately around .60 - .65
in order to meet the requirements of the reliability and validity test (Hair et al.,
2010). Nevertheless, in the spirit of the study and the low impact on model fit of
only one criterion that did not meet the reliability and validity requirements, all
the indicators of the latent construct CA were included despite the aforementioned
low loadings of some of these indicators.
As shown in Appendix 4, besides the observed indicators and variables of the
aforementioned latent construct CA, the remaining observed indicators had a load-
ing of approximately .60 and higher to their respective latent constructs. The mea-
surement model met almost all the cut-off and threshold values of composite reli-
ability, convergent validity and discriminate validity. Hereinafter, the measurement
model of the CFA was used to test the common method bias by means of common
latent factor (CLF).
The common method bias test indicates bias in the dataset due to something
external to the measures. Something external to the question may have influenced
the given answers. For example, collecting data using a single (common) method,
such as a web-based survey questionnaire, may introduce systematic response bias
that will either inflate or deflate responses. Significant common method bias is one
in which a majority of the variance can be explained by one single factor. The CLF
was used to capture the common variance among all observed variables and indi-
cators in the measurement model. The CLF was implemented in the measurement
model and the standardized regression weights of the measurement model with and
without the CLF were compared. The measurement model with the CLF is included
in Appendix 5. According to Podsakoff et al. (2003), if the difference between the
adjusted common bias standardized regression weights with CLF and the stan-
dardized regression weights without CLF is greater than 0.2 then the standardized
regression weight results with the CLF should be used. The results of comparison
are included in Appendix 6. As shown in Appendix 6, the difference between the
standardized regression weights of CLF and without CLF was not greater than the
threshold value of 0.2; therefore the measurement model without CLF was used for
the next step of the structural SCC hypotheses model.
7.2. Structural Equation Model
After the first step was conducted and the amended measurement model without
the CLF was approved, the next step, structural model, was done in order to test
the conceptual SCC hypotheses framework by means of SEM.
SEM is a robust statistical analysis technique that is used for multivariate analy-
sis. SEM is a set of linear equations for testing the hypothesis about the relationship
between observed indicators and latent constructs (Hair et al., 2010). SEM is widely
known for the following advantages. First, SEM makes assumptions, unobserved la-
tent construct, and hypothesized relationships. Second, SEM enhances a degree of
precision, since it contains clear definition of latent constructs and the functional
relationship between them. Third, SEM offers a formal framework for constructing
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and testing both theories and measures, and selection of sample size through the
use of estimation methods. Comprehensively, the main goal of SEM is to find the
extent to which a hypothesized model fits or at least adequately describes sample
data.
Model fit of the measurement and structural model was tested by using a number
of goodness-of-fit (GOF) indices. These GOF indices aim to measure the distance
or difference between sample covariance and fitted covariance. Hair et al. (2010)
recommend that in order to establish a robust and vigorous analysis more than one
fit index is mandatory. Hence, the table 10 shows the GOF indices and their cut-off
values that were used in this study to measure model fit. Furthermore, as a side
mark, it is important to point that GOF is inversely related to sample size and the
number of variables in the structural model.
Table 10: GOF indices for structural model
GOF measure Cut-off value
Chi-square/degree of freedom < 3 good; < 5 sometimes permissible
CFI > .95 great; > .90 moderate; > .80 sometimes
permissible
NFI > .90
AGFI > .80
RMSEA < .05 good; .05 - .10 moderate; > .10 bad
Source: Hair et al. 2010
By using the measurement model of the CFA without the adjusted CLF, a
hybrid structural model was constructed, which is included in Appendix 7. The
hybrid structural model showed that the latent construct SCCD had a significant
positive influence and effect on latent construct CA (.588***) and on the latent
construct OP (.442*). The latent construct CA had significantly positive effect
on the latent construct FP (.300*). Furthermore, the latent construct OP had a
significant relationship and impact on FP (.524***). Considering the impediments,
the moderator CB had negative direct effects and impacts on CA (-.104) and FP
(-.111), and a positive direct effect on OP (.078). In case of the cross-border business
barriers, ED had a negative direct effect and impact on OP (-.105) and FP (-.090),
but both of them were not significant. As for MD, the direct effect and impact on
OP (-.180) and FP (-.095) were all negative and not significant.
Consequently, the structural path model was conducted by comprising the un-
observed latent constructs into observed variables, which then does not account
for measurement error as in the hybrid model, because it is just a structural path
model between the newly created imputed composite observed latent constructs.
Furthermore, the control variables firm size and length of customer relationship
were also included. The structural path model between the observed constructs is
included in Appendix 8. The standardized regression weight results of both the
hybrid structural model and the structural model are included in table 11.
The structural model, which includes the imputed composited observed vari-
ables, did not include measurement errors, as in the case with the hybrid structural
model. The results of the structural path model showed that there were significant
positive effects and relationships on SCCD to OP (.472***), SCCD to CA (.651***),
CA to FP (.429***) and OP to FP (.579***). One surprising observation was the
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Table 11: Standardized estimates between hybrid model and structural path model
Relationship Hybrid model Structural
path model
SCCD → OP .442* .472***
SCCD → CA .588*** .651***
SCCD → FP -.022 (ns) -.180*
CA → OP .115 (ns) .122 (ns)
CA → FP .300* .429***
OP → FP .524*** .579***
CB → CA -.104 (ns) -.129 (ns)
CB → OP .078 (ns) .100 (ns)
CB → FP -.111 (ns) -.121 (ns)
ED → OP -.105 (ns) -.126 (ns)
ED → FP -.090 (ns) -.010 (ns)
MD → OP -.180 (ns) -.201 (ns)
MD → FP -.095 (ns) -.070 (ns)
Firm size → FP N.A .122 (ns)
Length of CR → FP N.A .070 (ns)
***. P < 0.001, **. P < 0.01, *. P < 0.05 and ns=not significant
significant negative sign of the standardized estimate of the relationship between
SCCD to FP (-.180*). The most likely explanation for this significant negative sign
and magnitude of the effect of SCCD on FP is that SCC dimensions and the inher-
ent business activities and processes require resources that have to be implemented
and put into place. The direct main effect and impact of implementing, establishing
and executing SCC business activities is negative on firm performance, because in
the structural model with the included mediation variable CA, it implies that no
advantages were obtained through SCC. Thus, if a firm implements SCC dimen-
sions and business practices, but it does not manage to obtain advantages through
collaboration these resources are wasted and have a negative direct main effect on
firm performance, because the wasted resources increases the total costs of opera-
tions and does not lead to an increase in profits. Therefore, increased total costs
of operations increases the marginal costs of the firm’ product which dampens the
profits and decreases the profitability and competiveness of the firm.
As an intermezzo, the table below presents the GOF and model fit of the afore-
mentioned conducted measurement model and structural path model to give an
overview about the development of model fit from the CFA to the structural path
model.
Based on the results in the above table, it can be concluded that the reliability
and validity test improved model fit significantly from the CFA to the structural
path model, including the imputed composite observed constructs. The CFI in-
creased from 0.784 to 0.846, NFI from 0.531 to 0.806 and AGFI from 0.557 to
0.627, while RMSEA increased from 0.099 to 0.180 in the structural model and
decreased to 0.099 in the CFA and hybrid model. On a side note and remark, it has
to be mentioned that the added interaction moderation constructs CB, ED and MD
had a negative impact on model fit. The reason is that these moderation constructs
are exogenous variables that have a direct main effect on one or several dependent
variables and does not explain for all the variance. Hence, hypothetically, the same
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Table 12: Model fitting indices of SEM two-step approach
GOF
measure
Cut-off value CFA Hybrid
model
Structural
path model
Chi-
square/df.
< 3 G; < 5 P 1.635 1.640 3.099
CFI > .95 G; > .90 M;
> .80 P
0.784 0.782 0.846
NFI > .90 0.531 0.592 0.806
AGFI > .80 0.557 0.530 0.627
RMSEA < .05 G; .05 - .10 M;
> .10 B
0.099 0.099 0.180
G=Good, M=Moderate, P=Permissible and B=Bad
structural model was run without the moderation constructs to determine model
fit. Almost all of the GOF measures met the cut-off and threshold values. The re-
sults were as follows: 0.985 for CFI, 0.956 for NFI, 0.854 for AGFI and RMSEA
was 0.082. However, in light of the study and the formulated hypotheses, which
are included in the conceptual SCC framework, no adjustments and revisions were
made despite the moderate and modest model fit of the structural model, including
the impediments moderation variables.
7.3. Mediation Effect of Collaborative Advantages
Due to the mediation latent construct CA in the conceptual SCC hypotheses frame-
work, which was used to measure the chains of causation, a mediation analysis was
conducted. Mediation in SEM is generally used to provide a more accurate explana-
tion of the causal effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. The
mediator variable is in most of the cases bridging the gap in a causal chain. For in-
stance, the latent construct SCCD had a positive main effect on OP and a negative
direct effect on FP, but not in all contextual situations, as not all SCCD activities
always lead to either OP or FP. Hence, some mediation variable, such as the latent
construct CA explains this effect and relationship. Thus, it can be expected that
collaborative advantages positively mediates the relationship between SCCD and
FP and/or OP. This means that the relationship between SCCD with OP and FP
is better explained through the mediation variable CA. The same structural path
model was used to analyze the mediation of the latent construct CA. The results of
the mediation analyses are shown in the table below.
Table 13: Mediation effect of CA on SCCD to OP and FP
Path Direct
without CA
mediator
Direct
with CA
mediator
Indirect
effect
Conclusion
SCCD → CA → OP .559*** .472*** .079 (ns) No media-
tion
SCCD → CA → FP .125 (ns) -.180* .599** Bifurcated
***. P < 0.001, **. P < 0.01, *. P < 0.05 and ns=not significant
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According to the table above, the latent mediation construct CA had no medi-
ation effect on the path from latent construct SCCD to OP. However, on the other
hand, the latent construct CA had a strong bifurcated mediation effect on the la-
tent construct FP. The results can be explained by the fact that the dimensions of
SCC have a direct main effect and impact on the relationship with OP indicators.
For instance, information sharing, decision synchronization and/or collaborative
communicative have a direct positive significant effect on operational performance
indicators such as order-fulfillment lead-time, total logistics cost and/or on-time
delivery.
On the other hand, the dimensions of SCC are fully bifurcated by the mediation
variable CA. This means that the direct main effect of the dimensions of SCC with-
out the mediation variable CA was not significant (.125) on FP. However, when the
mediation variable CA was included between the direct path of SCCD and FP, the
direct main effect and impact of SCCD on FP was significant and negative (-.180*).
On the contrary, the indirect effect of SCCD through the mediation variable CA
on FP was positive and significant (.599**). Thus, it can be strongly implied that,
for instance, by conducting and practicing the dimensions of SCC, collaborative
advantages can be accomplished and realized. These collaborative advantages by
means of indicators such as offering flexibility, process efficiency, quality and in-
novation can result into sustainable competitive advantages which on its turn will
lead to a stronger competitive position in the marketplace in comparison with its
competitors. Therefore, the firm might be able to outperform and outcompete its
competitors to increase its firm performance metrics, such as market share growth
and sales growth.
Conclusively, the direct main effect of SCCD on OP (.559***) without the me-
diation construct CA was significant and positive. However, when the mediation
construct CA was added the direct main effect of SCCD on OP (.472**) was slightly
dampened, because the mediator CA accounted for some of this effect and impact
(.079), but not significant. Therefore, it can be concluded that the mediator CA
had no mediation effect on the relation between SCCD and OP.
Furthermore, the direct main effect of SCCD on FP (.125) is positive but not
significant. When the mediator CA was added the direct effect of SCCD to FP
(-.180*) was negative and significant. However, through the mediator CA the in-
direct main effect of SCCD through CA on FP (.599**) was strongly positive and
significant. This type of mediation is called bifurcation. Hence, if a firm practices
SCCD and realizes CA it has a strong positive effect on FP, because it might obtain
and realize sustainable competitive advantages over its competitors that increases
the metrics of firm performance such as sales growth and market share growth.
7.4. Interaction Moderation Effects of Impediments
There are several identified collaboration barriers that are supposed to have a neg-
ative direct main effect on CA and a positive moderating effect on the realized CA
by means of the independent variable SCCD. Therefore, an interaction moderation
analysis was conducted to determine the moderating effect on the positive relation-
ship of SCCD on CA and OP, and on the negative relationship of SCCD on FP.
The interaction moderation of the impediments was conducted in several steps and
consisted out of a two-way and three-way interaction moderation analyses. The two-
way interaction moderation analysis was done with the independent variable SCCD
and the moderating variable CB to CA, OP and FP, and the three-way moderation
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analysis was done with the independent variables CA and the moderating variables
MD and ED to OP and FP. The interaction moderation is further explained by
plotted slopes following the procedures outlined by Dawson and Richter (2006).
Factoid, interaction moderation effects are in theory actually joint effects of two
predictor variables in addition to the individual direct main effects (Hair et al.,
2010). Interactions enable more precise explanation of causal effects by providing
a method for explaining not only how SCCD directly affects CA, OP and FP,
but also under what circumstances the effect of SCCD changes depending on the
interaction moderating variable CB. Basically, the interaction regression equation
specifies that the slope of the line relating SCCD to CA, OP and FP changes at
different continuous interaction moderation levels of CB, or equivalently, that the
slope of the line relating SCCD to CA, OP and FP changes at different levels of
CB.
First of all, the two-way interaction moderation was conducted with the inde-
pendent variable SCCD and the moderation variable CB to the dependent variables
CA, OP and FP. The main effect variables were standardized before forming the
interaction terms (Cohen et al., 2003). The table below shows the results of the first
and second step that were conducted to perform the moderation analysis.
Table 14: Two-step interaction moderation of collaboration barriers
Relationship Model 1 Model 2
Step 1: Main effects
CB → CA -.129 (ns) -.175 (ns)
CB → OP .100 (ns) .090 (ns)
CB → FP -.121* -.143 (ns)
SCCD → CA .651*** .635***
SCCD → OP .472*** .475**
SCCD → FP -.180* -.170 (ns)
Step 2: Two-way interaction effects
CB x SCCD → CA .251**
CB x SCCD → OP .025 (ns)
CB x SCCD → FP .054 (ns)
Firm size → FP .123 (ns) .124 (ns)
Length of CR → FP .086 (ns) .196 (ns)
***. P < 0.001, **. P < 0.01, *. P < 0.05 and ns=not significant
The results of two-way interaction moderation of CB in the table above shows
that in the first model the main effect of CB on FP was negative and significant
(-.121*). The main and direct effect of CB on CA (-.129) was also negative, while
the main effect on OP (.099) was positive, but both of them were not significant.
The second model included the interaction effects of the multiplied standardized
predictors CB and SCCD which showed that the interaction effect of CB and SCCD
had a positive significant impact on CA (.251**). The interaction effect on OP (.025)
and FP (.054) were also positive but not significant.
In addition, the results of the second model, including the interaction effects,
were used to conduct plots to help to interpret and to understand the interaction
moderating effect of CB on the relationship between SCCD and CA, OP and FP
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better. Gaskin (2014) created an Excel worksheet to visualize and interpret two-way
interaction moderation effects which was used to conduct plots.
The interaction moderation effect of CB on the relationship between SCCD and
CA can be explained as follows. Although, at first glance, the results in figure 2
might seem to go against the grain, intuition and rationale, CB strengthens the
positive relationship between SCCD and CA. Furthermore, it demonstrated that
the relationship between SCCD and CA is always positive. The slope of high CB
is steeper and stronger than the slope of low CB. This means that if CB increases,
in other words, the effect of collaboration barriers are getting stronger, the effect
between SCCD and CA is also getting stronger. In other words, in a scenario where
there are high collaboration barriers the effects of low SCCD to high SCCD are the
most severe and significant on the dependent variable CA. Exactly, the same effect
occurred between SCCD and OP, but the magnitude and impact was less strong in
comparison to the effect between SCCD and CA.
Fig. 2: CB moderation On SCCD and CA
Exactly, the same effect occurred between SCCD and OP, but the magnitude
and impact was less strong in comparison to the effect between SCCD and CA.
Fig. 3: CB moderation On SCCD and OP
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On the other hand, CB dampens the negative effect and relationship between
SCCD and FP. Hence, high CB has less impact and effect on the negative rela-
tionship between SCCD and FP. In other words, this can be explained by the fact
that if a firm decides to practice SCC dimensions such as goal congruence, decision
synchronization, incentive alignment and resource sharing, the elements of SCC
could have a negative direct main effect and impact on a firm if it does not attain
any collaborative advantages. In the scenario of high collaboration barriers, these
aforementioned dimensions of SCC are hindered and affected by the collaboration
barriers, which will work contradictory and lead to disincentives for a firm to con-
duct SCC practices. Therefore, a firm will synchronize, align and adapt less towards
what is best for the overall and whole supply chain, and will focus more on its own
individual goals and objectives which dampens the negative firm performance effects
of the individual firm.
Fig. 4: CB moderation On SCCD and FP
Secondly, the three-way interaction moderation was conducted with the inde-
pendent variable CA, and the moderation variables ED and MD to the dependent
variables OP and FP. The same approach was used as with the two-way interac-
tion moderation. The main effect variables were standardized before forming the
interaction terms. The results of the first, second and third step are depicted in the
table below.
According to the results that are depicted in the table above, the first model
consisted only out of independent variable CA and moderating variables ED and
MD which measured the main and direct effects on the dependent variables OP and
FP. The effect and relationship between CA and FP was positive and significant
(.429***). Furthermore, the effect and relationship between CA and OP was also
positive but not significant (.122). The interaction moderation variables ED and
MD showed weak negative direct main effects within the bandwidth of -.010 to
-.201 to both OP and FP but also not significant.
For the second model the standardized multiplied two-way interaction effects
were included. In comparison with the first model that only included the main effects
and not the interaction effects, the positive effect in the relationship between CA
and FP decreased (.395***). On the contrary, the positive effect in the relationship
between OP and FP amplified (.599***). The main direct effects of ED and MD
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Table 15: Three-step interaction moderation of cross-border business barriers
Relationship Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Step 1: Main effects
CA → OP .122 (ns) .084 (ns) .001 (ns)
CA → FP .429*** .395*** .403***
ED → OP -.126 (ns) -.175 (ns) -.220 (ns)
ED → FP -.010 (ns) -.037 (ns) -.039 (ns)
MD → OP -.201 (ns) -.184 (ns) -.147 (ns)
MD → FP -.070 (ns) .014 (ns) .016 (ns)
OP → FP .579*** .599*** .600***
Step 2: Two-way interaction effects
CA x ED → OP .254* .314*
CA x ED → FP -.121 (ns) -.123*
CA x MD → OP -.112 (ns) -.186 (ns)
CA x MD → FP .215* .218*
ED x MD → OP -.132 (ns) -.104 (ns)
ED x MD → FP -.025 (ns) -.025 (ns)
Step 3: Three-way interaction effects
CA x ED x MD → OP .182 (ns)
CA x ED x MD → FP .003 (ns)
Firm size → FP .122 (ns) .119 (ns) .122 (ns)
Length of CR → FP .086 (ns) .080 (ns) .082 (ns)
***. P < 0.001, **. P < 0.01, *. P < 0.05 and ns=not significant
were also negative in the second model, but not significant, except for MD on FP
(.014). Intriguingly, the interaction effect of CA and ED showed a significant positive
effect and impact on OP (.254*). Additionally, the interaction effect of CA and MD
had a significant positive effect and impact on FP (.215*).
In the last model, the three-way interaction constructs were included to analyze
and to determine the final consequences and effects of the impediments ED and
MD on both OP and FP. Equally interesting, the interaction moderations of the
impediments MD and ED on the relationships CA to OP and FP were also included.
As shown in table 15 in the last column on the previous page, the main and direct
effects of both MD and ED were negative on OP and FP, except for MD on FP
(.016) which was positive, but all the these main effects and direct paths were not
significant. The main and direct effect of CA on FP from model one (.429***) to
model three (.403***) dampened by including the two-way and three-way interac-
tion effect constructs. On the contrary, the effect of OP on FP amplified from .579**
in the first model to .600*** in the third model. As for the three-way interactions,
the interaction effects of MD, ED and CA on both OP (.182) and FP (.003) were
positive, but as expected not significant. It has to be pointed out that, in general,
interaction moderation variables are rarely significant. Moreover, it is equally inter-
esting to see the moderations of OP and FP at different levels of SCCD, ED and
MD.
To conclude, the two-step interaction moderation analyses of CB on the relation-
ships between SCCD and CA, OP and FP indicated that the direct main effects of
the interaction moderation construct CB had a minor negative direct effect on CA
(-.175). Interaction effects of the moderator CB on the relationship between SCCD
and CA (.251**), OP (.025) and FP (.054) were all positive, but only significant
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for the interaction between the relationship SCCD and CA. Thus, it can be stated
that the impediment construct variable CB had a negative direct main effect on the
dependent variables CA and FP and a positive direct main effect on the dependent
variable OP. Furthermore, only the interaction moderation of the product of the
standardized variables SCCD and CB on CA was significant (.251**). Therefore,
it can be concluded that the interaction moderation variable CB had a significant
positive moderation impact on the relationship SCCD and CA. In other words, in
the scenario of high CB, the impact and effect of low SCCD on CA is the lowest
primarily due to high CB. However, in the scenario of high CB, if a firm manages
to accomplish a high level of SCCD, the effect of SCCD on CA will be strengthened
and a firm will obtain even higher collaborative advantages than in the case of low
CB. So to speak, firms retrieve and attain more valued, unique and inimitable col-
laborative advantages in the scenario of high CB if a firm realizes to practice the
indicators of SCCD on a high level and scale.
The three-step interaction moderation analyses of the interaction moderation
variables ED and MD on the structural paths and relationships of CA to OP and
CA to FP determined that the direct and main effects of ED were negative and
low on OP (-.220) and on FP (-.039), but not significant. The same findings were
stemmed from the interaction moderating analysis for the moderation variable MD
on OP (-.147). However, the direct main effect of MD on FP (.016) was positive
but also not significant. Interestingly, the three-way interaction moderators ED and
MD had a positive effect and impact on the structural path and relationship from
CA to OP (.182) and FP (.003). The most reasonable explanation of this finding
can be given by the fact that in the case and scenario of high international and
cross-border barriers, firms can realize an even higher positive effect and result on
OP and FP if they manage to attain and realize high levels of CA. Nevertheless,
the three-way interaction results between ED, MD and CA were statistically not
significant. Thus, these three attributes combined interactively do not predict OP
and FP. Even though the three-way interaction constructs were statistically not
significant, it is still interesting to determine and interpret the interaction effects
between ED, MD and CA on OP and FP.
The relationships and effects between the independent variable CA and the in-
teraction moderation variables ED and MD on the dependent variables OP and FP
can be better understood by visualization and plotting the results. Hence, due to
these sophisticated and complicated relationships, the separate plots of the inter-
action moderation of ED and MD on OP and FP are included below to clarify the
implications and results of the three-way interactions.
In the figure 5 the horizontal axis shows the independent variable CA and the
vertical axis indicates the dependent variable OP. The figure comprises the rela-
tionship between CA and OP moderated by both the impediments ED and MD.
The above plot and graph encrypts and demystifies the interaction effects of the
moderation variables ED and MD on OP.
As shown in figure 5, there is almost no change of effect in the relationship
between CA on OP when both ED and MD are low. This stagnated and horizontal
slope can be clarified and explained by the fact that if there are low cross-border
barriers by means of ED and MD the effect and relationship between CA and OP
(.001) tend to be small and not significant, as shown in table 15 in the last column.
152 Max van Dijk
Fig. 5: Plot of regression slopes for three-way interaction on OP
Source: Author’s own
The effect of CA on OP is larger in the scenario and situation when ED was high.
The findings indicated that under the conditions of high ED the effect of achieved
and attained CA were stronger on OP. Rationally, if a firm operates in a business en-
vironment that is affected and categorized by negative market conditions by means
of high cross-border environmental barriers and impediments, such as bureaucratic
requirements, transportation difficulties and restrictive rules and regulations, a firm
perceives and experiences difficulties executing and practicing its business opera-
tions and activities. These environmental barriers and impediments form burdens
and hurdles for the firm which leads to deoptimization and to non-value added busi-
ness activities in order to get the job done. Hence, if a firm manages to realize and
establish CA such as process efficiency, offering flexibility and quality by means of
highly reliable and highly quality products, and innovation under the conditions of
high ED and low MD barriers, these positive CA effects will be stronger on OP
parameters and metrics such as on-time delivery, order fulfillment lead-time and
total logistics costs.
The effect of CA on OP showed almost the same tendency and steep of slope
for the market conditions when both MD and ED were high. However, there was
a shift of the slope downward meaning that the overall effect of CA on OP was
lower. Thus, in market conditions of both high ED and MD, the effect of CA on OP
showed almost the same steep of slope, but the slope shifted downward. In general,
the effects of CA on OP are lower due to high MD barriers. The most likely expla-
nation that MD barriers decreased the effects of CA on OP is that MD indicators
such as high business risk, different customer culture, unfamiliar foreign business
practices and limited information about markets have a negative direct main effect
on OP. If a firm experiences a business environment that is characterized by high
MD indicators such as high business risk, different customer culture and limited
information about markets, the firm will perceive difficulties to accurately plan de-
mand and to determine which product types are the most suitable and demanded in
the market. Therefore, the firm might be experiencing a higher probability of risk in
that it will experience unexpected higher and frequent stock-outs, lower inventory
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turns, fluctuations and undesired on-time deliveries and order fulfillment lead-time
which will also lead to higher total logistics costs. Nonetheless, the relationship of
CA on OP was positively moderated by the also high ED indicators.
In addition, the effect of CA on OP decreased when MD was high and ED low.
This means that in the case of high CA the effect was lower than it was in the
case of low CA. Therefore, the effect of high CA worked contradictory on OP. This
finding can be explained by the fact that due to high MD indicators, such as high
business risk, different customer culture and limited information about markets, a
low level of CA by means of offering flexibility, process efficiency, innovation and
quality, had a higher effect on OP indicators such as total logistics costs, on-time
delivery, order fulfillment lead-time and inventory turns. For instance, a high level
of business risk and limited information about markets, and a high level and degree
of innovation by means of rapid product development and low time-to-market will
lead to more transactions and operational activities in comparison with low CA.
Therefore, solemnly looking at the operational performance indicators and metrics,
the context in which MD is high and ED is low, the effect of CA has a negative
effect and impact on OP.
Fig. 6: Plot of regressions slopes for three-way interaction on FP
Source: Author’s own
As in the case of the plot of regressions slopes for three-way interaction on
FP, the horizontal axis shows the independent variable CA and the vertical axis
indicates the dependent variable FP. The figure comprises the relationship between
CA and FP moderated by both the impediments ED and MD.
Figure 6 illustrates and presents that the effect of CA on FP is the largest in
the situation of low ED and high MD market circumstances. This can be explained
through the logic and rationale of that high MD indicators, such as limited informa-
tion, high business risk and different customer culture are strengthening the effect
of CA such as offering flexibility, process efficiency, and especially, quality and in-
novation on FP. Specifically, if a firm perceives high CA through SCC the effects on
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sales growth, market share growth and ROI will be bigger, because the perceived
CA such as quality and innovation leads to rapid product development, low time-
to-market and frequent innovations which had an even higher positive impact on
FP in a business environment and market conditions with high MD barriers and
obstacles. The findings tend to show that it might be more difficult and rarer to
attain such collaborative advantages in these types of market circumstances and
therefore the positive effects of CA on FP are even more rewarding than in other
market situations.
The second largest effect of CA on FP was in the situation when both MD and
ED were high. Hence, for both market situations in which MD was high the effect
of CA on FP had the largest effects. This finding seems to be plausible due to the
fact that CA had a bifurcated mediation effect on the path SCCD-¿CA-¿FP. Thus,
the positive effects of SCCD on FP were going through the mediation effect CA.
Therefore, CA had a strong positive effect on FP. Furthermore, due to high ED
barriers, the effect of CA on FP was dampened and the slope was less steep than
in the situation of low ED barriers.
In case of low MD and ED, the effect of CA on FP was even less strong. Despite
the fact of low ED and MD barriers and impediments, the effect of CA on FP was
still positive. However, since MD was low the effect is less strong, therefore, firms
do not have the additional and incremental possibility and opportunity to overcome
these business environment and market conditions by collaborative advantages and
to achieve an even more rare, unique and inimitable sustainable competitive advan-
tages as in a market situation with high MD impediments. Thus, probably in this
market situation, CA is easier to be attained and achieved by firms; therefore, it
does not substantially lead to a tremendous positive effect of CA on FP.
The effect of CA on FP was the least and marginal in a market situation with
high ED and low MD. Nevertheless, the effect of CA on FP was still positive. The
most likely explanation that the effect of CA on FP was the least in a market
landscape in which there are relatively high ED and low MD impediments was that
ED indicators such as bureaucratic requirements, restrictive rules and regulations
and transportation difficulties dampens the positive effect of CA. However, in the
situation of low CA, low MD and high ED, the relatively high FP can be partially
explained by low MD and this same low MD dampened and limited the effect of
high CA on improved FP.
To put the whole sequence and process of structural equation model of supply
chain collaboration in a nutshell, the final measurement model was transformed and
computed in the final structural path model. This final structural path model was
used for mediation analyses of the mediation construct CA, and for the interaction
moderation analyses of the interaction moderators CB, ED and MD to test the
formulated hypotheses in the conceptual SCC hypotheses framework. The full SEM
model results of the standardized regression weights of the structural direct paths
and the mediation and interaction moderations are shown in figure 7.
The results of the structural path model showed that there were significant
positive effects and relationships on SCCD to OP (.472***), SCCD to CA (.651***),
CA to FP (.429***) and OP to FP (.579***). One surprising observation was the
significant negative sign of the standardized estimate of the relationship between
SCCD to FP (-.180*). The most likely explanation for this significant negative sign
and magnitude of the effect of SCCD on FP is that SCC dimensions and the inherent
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Fig. 7: SEM full model results of conceptual SCC hypotheses framework
Source: Author’s own
business activities and processes require resources that have to be implemented and
put into place. The direct main effect and impact of implementing, establishing
and executing SCC business activities is negative on firm performance, because it
implies that no advantages were obtained through SCC. The results of the SEM
model test the hypotheses of structural direct paths and the mediation variable
CB on the relationships SCCD to OP and SCCD to FP. Furthermore, the two-way
interaction variable of the moderation variable CB, and the two-way and three-way
interaction effects of the moderation variable MD and ED are also included. The
results of the hypotheses testing are shown in the table 16.
Conclusively, in the contextual cross-border inter-firm collaboration in the case
of EU15-Russian supply chains, the integrative and integral SEM full model results
show that the different dimensions of SCC have a significant positive impact and ef-
fect on realizing and achieving collaborative advantages and improving operational
performance directly. These collaborative advantages are a form and type of sus-
tainable competitive advantage in which a firm is able to distinguish itself from its
competitors to improve its uniqueness and inimitableness, thereby, increasing its
competiveness. Increased competiveness of a firm leads to significant direct positive
effects on improvement of firm performance, and a positive not significant effect on
improvement of operational performance. Improved operational performance pri-
marily and significantly through the different dimensions of SCC and marginally
and not significantly through collaborative advantages, have a positive significant
effect and impact on improvement of firm performance. The mediation variable CA
had a marginal positive insignificant effect and impact on the path SCCD to OP,
and a bifurcated mediation on the path SCCD to FP. All the interaction moder-
ation impediment variables had a not significant negative direct impact on their
respected dependent variables except for CB on OP. The interaction effect of CB
was only significant on the path SCCD to CA. Last but not least, the three-way
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Table 16: Hypotheses testing and results
Chi-square/df. CFI NFI AGFI RMSEA
Structural
model
3.099 0.846 0.806 0.627 0.180
Hypotheses Structural path Std. est. Result
H1a SCCD ⇒ OP .472*** Supported
H1b SCCD ⇒ CA .651*** Supported
H1c SCCD ⇒ FP -.180* Rejected
H2a CA ⇒ OP .122 (ns) Rejected
H2b CA⇒ FP .429*** Supported
H2c SCCD⇒ CA ⇒ OP .079 (ns) Supported
H2d SCCD ⇒ CA⇒ FP .599** Supported
H3 OP ⇒ FP .579*** Supported
H4a SCCD ⇒ CB ⇒ OP .025 (ns) Supported
H4b SCCD ⇒ CB⇒ CA .251** Supported
H4c SCCD ⇒ CB ⇒ FP .054 (ns) Supported
H5a CA ⇒ ED & MD ⇒ OP .182 (ns) Supported
H5b CA⇒ MD ⇒ OP -.186 (ns) Rejected
CA ⇒ ED ⇒ OP .314* Supported
H5b CA⇒ ED & MD ⇒ FP 003 (ns) Supported
CA ⇒ MD⇒ FP .218* Supported
CA ⇒ ED⇒ FP -.123* Rejected
Source: Author’s own
interaction effects of MD and ED were both positive, but not significant on either
OP or FP, as expected.
7.5. Concluding Remarks and Findings
The SEM full model results of structural direct paths of the developed conceptual
SCC hypotheses model, which was partially adapted from Ramanathan and Gu-
nasekaran (2012) and Zhang and Cao (2011), supported and replicated the results
of prior studies of prominent and well-known scholars and researchers in the re-
search area SCC of SCM literature that in general SCC achieves improvement and
positive changes in firm performance.
The structural paths of the full SEM model showed that the dimensions of
SCC by means of information sharing, decision synchronization, incentive align-
ment, resource sharing, collaborative communication, joint knowledge creation and
goal congruence achieved positive direct changes on operational performance. The
dimensions information sharing and collaborative communication were considered
as pivotal and imperative pillars for SCC in the cross-border and inter-firm context.
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Information sharing between supplier and buyer increases visibility of key per-
formance metrics and process data which enables them to obtain the bigger picture
of the as-is situation that takes into account important factors in making effective
decisions. These effective decisions by both supplier and buyer enable them to ad-
dress product flow issues and hiccups more quickly, thereby allowing more agile
demand planning to take place. Complementary on information sharing, collabora-
tive communication enhances the tight and close inter-firm relationship. Hence, as
Mohr and Nevin (1990) highlighted, the patterns of collaborative communication
increases the intensity and frequency, has more bidirectional flows, better informal
modes, and increased indirect influence. Therefore, information sharing and col-
laborative communication in conjunction lead to more frequent contact points and
moments and increases the accuracy and relevancy of the content. Another spillover
effect of the SCC dimensions information sharing and collaborative communication
is that it increases trust and commitment by means of social exchange processes.
Especially, within a cross-border and international business context this snowball
effect of events accumulates and will have a positive direct main effect on primarily
operational performance.
Conclusively, information sharing through optimized, smooth and lean collab-
orative communication increases the ability to make better decisions and to take
actions on the basis of greater visibility (Davenport et al. 2001). The core cor-
nerstone and backbone of information sharing and collaborative communication
provides the opportunity to link integrated information and performance drivers.
Hence, information sharing and collaborative communication provide a platform
to stimulate joint knowledge creation and decision synchronization by means of
relevant, timely and accurate information. As decisions are incrementally more syn-
chronized between supplier and buyer, incentive alignments come into place which
employs performance metrics to construct benefit and cost sharing agreements. This
new form of business environment of integrated information between supplier and
buyer helps to fulfill demand more quickly with shorter order cycle times.
The results of the study in this research paper showed that the dimensions
information sharing and collaborative communication are paramount for SCC, es-
pecially in a cross-border and inter-firm context. These dimensions incentivize the
more deeply involved dimensions of SCC such as decision synchronization, joint
knowledge creation, incentive alignment and goal congruence.
To summarize, the full SEM model results showed that SCC by means of the
aforementioned seven dimensions has a positive direct effect and impact on both
operational performance and collaborative advantages. The improvement of oper-
ational performance and the established and realized collaborative advantages by
SCC dimensions have a positive effect and impact on firm performance which in-
creases the profitability and competitiveness of the firm.
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8. Conclusions and Implications
The research of this paper provided comprehensive understanding of the relation-
ships and effects of SCC and its effects on both operational performance and firm
performance by testing the latest theoretical concepts of SCC. The novelty and
topicality of this study is the integrative and integral empirical study. Prior studies
only included the direct main effects of SCC activities and dimensions on mainly
firm performance KPIs. This study included collaborative advantages as a media-
tion variable to determine the mediation effects of SCC on operational performance
and firm performance.
Due to the international business dimension of the cross-border inter-firm con-
textual design of the study, the impediments, collaboration barriers and cross-border
business barriers, in the form of market dimension and environmental dimension,
were included as interaction moderation variables. Again, these interaction mod-
eration variables offer novel insights which have not been analyzed before. These
interaction moderation variables measured the change of effect of different hypothe-
sized direct main effects in a variety of different market environments and situations
by means of low and high impediment factors. Furthermore, the direct and main
effects of these interaction moderation variables were also included to conclude their
impact on collaborative advantages, operational performance and firm performance.
The final results of the novel introduced mediation analysis showed and im-
plied that the actual direct main effect of SCC has a negative impact and effect
on firm performance. The most plausible and reasonable explanation for this direct
main effect is that SCC requires tangible and intangible assets of the firm. If the
firm does not achieve any form of collaborative advantages and/or improvements
in operational performance, SCC does not add any value. Hence, these opportu-
nity costs could have been used for different purposes. However, the relationship
SCC through the mediator collaborative advantages shows positive changes and
improvements on firm performance. Thus, collaborative advantages bifurcates the
effect of SCC on firm performance. On the other hand, there is no mediation effect
between the relationship SCC and operational performance. Hence, it can be con-
cluded that collaborative advantage as a mediator explains the relationships and
effects better than prior conducted studies on both operational performance and
firm performance.
Another novel element of the study in this study was the moderator collabo-
ration barriers and cross-border business barriers by means of market dimension
and environmental dimension. The results of the full SEM model of the moderator
collaboration barriers showed that collaboration barriers moderate positively the
positive effect of SCC on CA. Thus, SCC has an even greater effect and impact
on realizing collaborative advantages. Although, the direct main effect of collabora-
tion barriers on collaboration advantages is negative. Therefore, it can be concluded
that under the presence of collaboration barriers, SCC will experience difficulties
to be conducted properly and firms are disincentified and discouraged to conduct
SCC. However, if a firm manages to realize SCC, the effects on collaborative advan-
tages will be even more profound and stronger. These stronger and more profound
collaborative advantages can be interpreted as more unique and rare collaborative
advantages under challenging collaboration business environments which leads to
even greater improvements in firm performance.
Cross-Border Collaboration in European-Russian Supply Chains 159
The results of the moderators market dimension and environmental dimension
showed that the positive effect of collaborative advantages on operational perfor-
mance are even more profound and stronger in market situations which are cate-
gorized by environmental impediments and barriers, while on the other hand, the
positive effect of collaborative advantages on firm performance dampens. As for
market dimensional impediments and barriers, the positive effect of collaborative
advantages on firm performance amplifies in market situations that are character-
ized by market impediments and barriers. In conjunction, both market dimensions
and environmental dimension strengthens the positive relationship between collabo-
rative advantage and operational performance and firm performance. The strength-
ening effects tend to be slightly stronger on operational performance than on firm
performance due to the stronger negative direct effects of both market dimensions
and environmental dimensions on operational performance.
Based on the results of the interaction moderation analyses of market dimension
and environmental dimension impediments, the figure below was constructed.
Fig. 8: Moderation changes in different market situations on OP and FP
Source: Author’s own
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This figure of four quadrants interact the low and high moderation effects and
changes of market dimension and environmental dimension on the effects and re-
lationship between collaborative advantages and operational performance and firm
performance. The numbers within the parentheses show the rank and magnitude
of the interaction moderation effect on the relationship between collaborative ad-
vantages and operational performance and firm performance. In other words, the
higher the rank (1), the higher the moderation effect of collaborative advantages on
operational performance or firm performance.
The figure 8 shows that in a market situation with high environmental and
market impediments and barriers, the effect of collaborative advantages is positively
moderated on both operational performance and firm performance.
The final results showed and implied that the actual direct main effect of SCC
has a negative effect on firm performance. The most plausible and reasonable ex-
planation for this direct main effect is that SCC requires tangible and intangible
assets of the firm. If the firm does not achieve any form of collaborative advantages
and/or improvements in operational performance, SCC does not add any value.
Hence, these opportunity costs could have been used for different purposes. How-
ever, the relationship SCC through the mediator collaborative advantages shows
positive changes and improvements on firm performance. Thus, collaborative ad-
vantages bifurcates the effect of SCC on firm performance. On the other hand, there
is no mediation effect between the relationship SCC and operational performance.
Hence, it can be concluded that collaborative advantage as a mediator explains the
relationships and effects better than prior conducted studies on both operational
performance and firm performance.
In conclusion, after finalizing all the empirical and statistical analyses and for-
mulating the conclusions and implications, the strict and precise contribution and
proposition of this study on the depicted and formulated problem statement, which
stated that it is unclear and ungrounded and that there is no definite and conclusive
answer if SCC has a positive direct impact and effect on operational performance
and on firm performance, and which mechanisms mediate and moderate such im-
pacts and effects in the case of the contextual cross-border inter-firm (EU15-Russia)
design, is as follows.
In the contextual cross-border inter-firm (EU15-Russia) design, SCC has a pos-
itive direct impact and effect on operational performance and indirectly through
collaborative advantages on firm performance. The effects of SCC are bifurcated by
collaborative advantages on firm performance. Furthermore, collaboration barriers
and cross-border business barriers have negative direct main effects, but strengthen
and amplify the effect of collaborative advantages on operational performance and
firm performance.
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Appendix
1. Path Diagram of Scope and Depth of Collaboration
2. Path Diagram of Scope and depth of Collaboration (Composite
Observed)
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3. Factor Analysis Latent Construct CBBB
Table 17: Rotated Component Matrixa
Component
1 2 3
Restrictive rules and regulation ,890
Bureaucratic requirements ,856
Lack of government assistance ,840
Transportation difficulties ,783
High tariff and non-tariff barriers ,587 ,327
Unfamiliar foreign business practice ,871
Different customer culture ,861
High business risk ,621
Limited information about markets ,402 ,576
Strong international competition ,808
Unfavorable foreign exchange rates ,348 ,795
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
Table 18: Rotated Component Matrixa
Component
1 2
Restrictive rules and regulation ,904
Bureaucratic requirements ,869
Lack of government assistance ,845
Transportation difficulties ,767
High tariff and non-tariff barriers ,594
Different customer culture ,878
Unfamiliar foreign business practice ,868
High business risk ,626
Limited information about markets ,593
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
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4. Confirmatory Factor Analysis
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5. Common Method Bias - CFA with CLF
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6. Comparison between CLF with and without CLF
Standardized Regression
Weights
Standardized Regression
Weights:
With CLF Without CLF
Estimate Estimate
var46 <— SCCD 0,747 var46 <— SCCD 0,755 0,008
var45 <— SCCD 0,736 var45 <— SCCD 0,754 0,018
var44 <— SCCD 0,748 var44 <— SCCD 0,707 -0,041
var43 <— SCCD 0,828 var43 <— SCCD 0,81 -0,018
var42 <— SCCD 0,688 var42 <— SCCD 0,709 0,021
var41 <— SCCD 0,521 var41 <— SCCD 0,55 0,029
var47 <— SCCD 0,795 var47 <— SCCD 0,799 0,004
var53 <— CA 0,603 var53 <— CA 0,568 -0,035
var52 <— CA 0,539 var52 <— CA 0,534 -0,005
var51 <— CA 0,498 var51 <— CA 0,467 -0,031
var50 <— CA 0,715 var50 <— CA 0,733 0,018
var49 <— CA 0,672 var49 <— CA 0,699 0,027
var81 <— FP 0,84 var81 <— FP 0,832 -0,008
var80 <— FP 0,899 var80 <— FP 0,91 0,011
var79 <— FP 0,818 var79 <— FP 0,839 0,021
var78 <— FP 0,904 var78 <— FP 0,909 0,005
var88 <— OP 0,909 var88 <— OP 0,933 0,024
var87 <— OP 0,879 var87 <— OP 0,913 0,034
var86 <— OP 0,755 var86 <— OP 0,757 0,002
var85 <— OP 0,713 var85 <— OP 0,619 -0,094
var84 <— OP 0,68 var84 <— OP 0,584 -0,096
var111 <— CB 0,663 var111 <— CB 0,693 0,03
var109 <— CB 0,693 var109 <— CB 0,736 0,043
var108 <— CB 0,7 var108 <— CB 0,682 -0,018
var107 <— CB 0,824 var107 <— CB 0,836 0,012
var106 <— CB 0,827 var106 <— CB 0,819 -0,008
var105 <— CB 0,903 var105 <— CB 0,905 0,002
var104 <— CB 0,896 var104 <— CB 0,884 -0,012
var103 <— CB 0,596 var103 <— CB 0,626 0,03
var110 <— CB 0,7 var110 <— CB 0,716 0,016
var98 <— ED 0,928 var98 <— ED 0,936 0,008
var100 <— ED 0,828 var100 <— ED 0,822 -0,006
var97 <— ED 0,892 var97 <— ED 0,872 -0,02
var99 <— ED 0,68 var99 <— ED 0,681 0,001
var95 <— ED 0,585 var95 <— ED 0,584 -0,001
var94 <— MD 0,872 var94 <— MD 0,91 0,038
var93 <— MD 0,732 var93 <— MD 0,753 0,021
var92 <— MD 0,508 var92 <— MD 0,497 -0,011
var101 <— MD 0,634 var101 <— MD 0,626 -0,008
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8. Structural Strandardized Regression Model
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A Game-Theoretic Model of Pollution Control with
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Abstract In the contribution a problem of pollution control is studied
within the game-theoretic framework (Kostyunin et al., 2013; Gromova and
Plekhanova, 2015; Shevkoplyas and Kostyunin, 2011). Each player is assumed
to have certain equipment whose functioning is related to pollution control.
The i-th player’s equipment may undergo an abrupt failure at time Ti. The
game lasts until any of the players’ equipment breaks down. Thus, the game
duration is defined as T = min(T1, . . . , Tn), where Ti is the time instant at
which the i-th player stops the game.
We assume that the time instant of the i-th equipment failure is described
by the Weibull distribution. According to Weibull distribution form parame-
ter, we consider different scenarios of equipment exploitation, where each of
player can be in “an infant”, “an adult” or “an aged” stage. The cooperative
2-player game with different scenarios is studied.
Keywords: differential game, cooperative game, pollution control, random
duration, Weibull distribution.
1. Introduction
When considering game-theoretic problems of pollution control it is important to
take into account the fact that the game may end abruptly. The reason for this can
be an equipment failure, an economical break-down or a natural disaster among
many others. In this paper we consider one particular case when the game duration
is determined by the life duration of the equipment. Typically, when describing the
life circle of a technical system one considers three different stages: the ”infant”
stage, the ”adult” or regular stage, and the ”aged” or weared-out stage. It is well
known that the life-time for all these stages can be well described by the Weibull
distribution (Weibull, 1951).
In this paper, we consider a pollution control problem for n players. We assume
that the equipment of each player at the beginning of the game can be in any
of three states (”infant”, ”adult” or ”aged”). Thus the life-time of the equipment
differs for each player. The game ends with the occurence of the first failure.
The proposed approach is illustrated by an example of pollution control problem
with two players.
⋆ This work was supported by the grant 9.38.245.2014 from St. Petersburg State Univer-
sity
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2. The Problem Statement
Consider a game-theoretic model of pollution control based on the models
(Breton et al., 2005; Shevkoplyas and Kostyunin, 2011). There are n players (coun-
tries) involved in the game. Each player i manages his emission ei ∈ [0, bi], bi > 0,
i = 1, n. Each country is assumed to have certain equipment whose functioning is
related to pollution control.
The game starts at the time instant t0. The i-th player’s equipment may undergo
an abrupt failure at time Ti. The game lasts until any of the players’ equipment
breaks down. Thus, the game duration is defined as T = min(T1, . . . , Tn), where Ti
is the time instant at which the i-th player stops the game.
We assume that the time instant of the i-th equipment failure is the ran-
dom variable Ti with known probability distribution function Fi(t), i = 1, n
(Petrosjan and Murzov, 1966). Assume also that {Ti}ni=1 – independent random
variables. It is obvious, that T = min{T1, T2, . . . , Tn} is a random variable too. Us-
ing the cumulative distribution functions of the random variables {Ti}ni=1, we can
write the expression for F (t).
Proposition 1. Let {Ti}ni=1 – independent random variables, with probability dis-
tribution functions {Fi(t)}ni=1. Then probability distribution function F (t) of the
random variable T = min{T1, T2, . . . , Tn} has the following form:
F (t) = 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− Fi(t)) . (1)
Proof. According to the distribution function definition:
F (t) = P {T < t} .
Here
P {T < t} = 1− P {T ≥ t} .
The random variable T is defined as T = min{T1, T2, . . . , Tn}, so:
P {T ≥ t} = P {min{T1, T2, . . . , Tn} ≥ t} .
{Ti}ni=1 – independent random variables, then
P {min{T1, T2, . . . , Tn} ≥ t} = P {T1 ≥ t}P{T2 ≥ t} . . . P {Tn ≥ t} .
Using again the distribution function definition, we have
P {T1 ≥ t}P{T2 ≥ t} . . . P {Tn ≥ t} = (1− F1(t)) (1− F2(t)) . . . (1− Fn(t)) ,
i.e.:
F (t) = 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− Fi(t)) .
⊓⊔
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The net revenue of player i at time instant t is given by quadratic functional form:
Ri (ei) = ei(t)
(
bi − 1
2
ei(t)
)
, t ∈ [t0, T ], (2)
bi > 0, i = 1, n. (3)
Denote the stock of accumulated net emissions by P(t). The dynamics of the
stock is given by the following equation with initial condition:
P˙ (t) =
n∑
i=1
ei(t), t ∈ [t0, T ], (4)
P (t0) = P0. (5)
The expected integral payoff of the player i can be represented as the following
mathematical expectation:
Ki (P0, t0, e1, e2, . . . , en) = E
(∫ T
t0
(
Ri(ei)− diP (s)
)
ds
)
,
where diP (t) – is a cost of player i for decreasing of his emission at the moment t.
Then we have the following integral payoff for player i:
Ki (P0, t0, e1, e2, . . . , en) =
∫ ∞
t0
∫ t
t0
(
Ri(ei)− diP (s)
)
dsdF (t). (6)
After simplification of the integral payoff (Kostyunin and Shevkoplyas, 2011),
we get
Ki (P0, t0, e1, e2, . . . , en) =
∫ ∞
t0
(
Ri(ei)− diP (s)
)(
1− F (s))ds. (7)
Denote the described game starting at the time instant t0 from the situation P0 by
Γ (t0, P0). Let the game Γ (t0, P0) develops along the trajectory P (t). Then at the
each time instant θ ∈ [t0;T ] players enter new game (subgame) Γ (θ, P (θ))) with
initial state P (θ) and duration (T − θ). The expected payoff of the player i under
the condition that the game is not finished before the moment θ can be calculated
by following formula:
Ki (P (θ), θ, e1, e2, . . . , en) =
1
1− F (θ)
∫ ∞
θ
(
Ri(ei)− diP (s)
)(
1− F (s))ds. (8)
Further we assume an existence of a density function:
f(t) = F
′
(t), (9)
and using the Hazard function λ(t) which is given by the following definition:
λ(t) =
f(t)
1− F (t) , (10)
we have
1− F (s) = e−
s∫
0
λ(τ)dτ
. (11)
We can prove the following proposition.
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Proposition 2. Let {Ti}ni=1 – independent random variables with probability dis-
tribution function Fi(t), i = 1, n and the hazard functions {λi(t)}ni=1. Then for the
random variable T = min{T1, T2, . . . , Tn} the hazard function λ(t) can be calculated
by the following formula:
λ(t) =
n∑
i=1
λi(t). (12)
Proof. As we say in (1):
F (t) = 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− Fi(t)) , (13)
using (11), we have:
n∏
i=1
(1− Fi(t)) = e
−
t∫
0
λ(τ)dτ
. (14)
Taking the log of both sides in (14), we obtain:
ln
( n∏
i=1
(1− Fi(t))
)
= −
t∫
0
λ (τ) dτ. (15)
Then we have:
n∑
i=1
ln
(
1− Fi(t)
)
= −
t∫
0
λ (τ) dτ. (16)
Similarly, we see that
1− Fi(t) = e
−
t∫
0
λi(τ)dτ
, (17)
and
ln
(
1− Fi(t)
)
= −
t∫
0
λi (τ) dτ. (18)
Substituting (18) in (16), we obtain:
n∑
i=1
t∫
0
λi (τ) dτ =
t∫
0
λ (τ) dτ . (19)
So we can conclude that
λ(t) =
n∑
i=1
λi(t).
⊓⊔
One of probability distributions that can be used for description of random
variables Ti is Weibull Law. The Weibull failure rate function is given by:
λ(t) = λδtδ−1, t > 0; λ > 0; δ > 0, (20)
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where δ is the shape parameter and λ is the scale parameter of the distribution.
Using Weibull distribution allows to consider three “scenarios” of the game in the
sense of behaviour of the random variables Ti:
1. δ < 1 corresponds to “burn-in” period, when the equipment failure is mostly
caused by deficiencies in design (new equipment);
2. δ = 1 corresponds to “adult” period, when failures are due to random events;
3. δ > 1 corresponds to “wear-out” period (worn-out equipment).
For Weibull distribution we have:
1− Fi(s) = e
−
s∫
0
λiδiτ
δi−1dτ
= e−λis
δi
. (21)
Then the payoff of player i in subgame Γ (θ, P (θ)) can be represented as:
Ki (P (θ), θ, e1, e2, . . . , en) = e
n∑
i=1
λiθ
δi
∫ ∞
θ
(
Ri(ei)− diP (s)
)
e
−
n∑
i=1
λis
δi
ds. (22)
Suppose that players are agree to cooperate and maximize the joint payoff:
K1 +K2 + · · ·+Kn = 1
1− F (Θ)
∫ ∞
θ
(
R1(e1) +R2(e2) + · · ·+Rn(en)−
− (d1 + d2 + · · ·+ dn)P (s)
)(
1− F (s))ds. (23)
According to the Proposition 1:
F (s) = 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− Fi(s)) ,
then:
1− F (s) = e−(λ1sδ1+λ2sδ2+···+λnsδn ). (24)
As a result, the expected total payoff of players in the subgame Γ (θ, P (θ)) with
initial state P (θ) and duration (T − θ) is given by the following equation:
n∑
i=1
Ki = e
λ1θ
δ1+λ2θ
δ2+···+λnθδn
∫ ∞
θ
(
R1(e1) +R2(e2) + · · ·+Rn(en)−
−(d1 + d2 + · · ·+ dn)P (s)
)
e−(λ1s
δ1+λ2s
δ2+···+λnsδn )ds. (25)
3. 2-player game
Consider 2-player cooperative game-theoretic model of pollution control.
Let T1 – the time instant of the equipment failure for the player 1 with probabil-
ity distribution function F1(t) and failure rate function λ1(t). T2 – the time instant
of the equipment failure for the player 2 with probability distribution function F2(t)
and failure rate function λ2(t).
The game duration is defined as T = min{T1, T2}.
The game is considered over time t ∈ [0, T ], where T is a random variable with
known probability distribution function F (t) = 1−(1−F1(t))(1−F2(t)) and failure
rate function λ(t) = λ1(t) + λ2(t).
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We use Weibull distribution as a distribution of random variables T1 and T2.
The players are assumed to have the identical scale parameter λ = λ1 = λ2.
Using (25), we get the equation for the joint payoff of players:
K1 +K2 =
∫ ∞
0
(
R1(e1) +R2(e2)− (d1 + d2)P (s)
)
e−λ(s
δ1+sδ2 )ds. (26)
To find the optimal emissions e1, e2 for players 1, 2, we apply Pontrygins max-
imum principle.:
max
e1∈[0,b1],
e2∈[0,b2]
(K1 +K2) =
∫ ∞
0
(
R1(e1) +R2(e2)− (d1 + d2)P (s)
)
e−λ(s
δ1+sδ2 )ds, (27)
where
Ki = Ki (P0, e1, e2) , i = 1, 2,
P˙ (t) = e1 (t) + e2 (t) ,
P (0) = P0.
The Hamiltonian for this problem is as follows:
H(P, e1, e2, Λ) =
=
(
e1(t)(b1 − 1
2
e1(t)) + e2(t)(b2 − 1
2
e2(t))− (d1 + d2)P (t)
)
e−λ(t
δ1+tδ2)+
+ Λ (t) (e1(t) + e2(t)) . (28)
From the first-order optimality condition
∂H
∂ei
= (bi − ei) e−λ(t
δ1+tδ2) + Λ(t) = 0, i = 1, 2, (29)
we get the following formulas for optimal emissions:
ei(t) = bi + Λ(t)e
λ(tδ1+tδ2), i = 1, 2. (30)
Adjoint variable Λ(t) can be found from the from the differential equation:
Λ˙ = −∂H
∂P
. (31)
Then
Λ(t) = (d1 + d2)
t∫
0
e−λ(s
δ1+sδ2)ds+ c. (32)
We consider the problem with time t ∈ [0,∞) and the condition for Λ(t) has a
form:
lim
t→∞Λ(t) = 0. (33)
3.1. Optimal emissions
Different scenarios with possible conditions of players’ equipment are considered in
this section.
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The normal operating mode of the equipment Let’s consider the case, when
the equipments of both players are used in the normal operating mode. It means
that δ1 = δ2 = 1 (“adult” scenario).
Using (30), we have the following form for optimal emissions
ei(t) = bi + Λ(t)e
2λt. (34)
Adjoint variable in this case has a form:
Λ(t) = (d1 + d2)
t∫
0
e−2λsds+ c = − (d1 + d2)
2λ
e−2λt +
(d1 + d2)
2λ
+ c, (35)
where c can be found from (33):
c = − (d1 + d2)
2λ
. (36)
So
Λ(t) = − (d1 + d2)
2λ
e−2λt. (37)
Then substituting (37) in (34) we obtain the two optimal strategies:
ei(t) =

0, bi ≤ d1 + d2
2λ
;
bi − d1 + d2
2λ
, bi >
d1 + d2
2λ
, i = 1, 2.
(38)
The mode of normal operation of the equipment and worn-out equipment
Assume now that the equipment of the first country is in the normal operating mode
(δ1 = 1) and the second one uses the worn-out equipment (δ2 > 1). Without loss of
generality we assume δ2 = 2 (the Rayleigh distribution).
Using (30), we have the following form for optimal emissions:
ei(t) = bi + Λ(t)e
λ(t+t2). (39)
Adjoint variable in this case has a form:
Λ(t) = (d1 + d2)
t∫
0
e−λ(s+s
2)ds+ c =
=
(d1 + d2)
√
πe
1
4
λ
2
√
λ
(
erf(
√
λt+
1
2
√
λ)− erf(1
2
√
λ)
)
+ c, (40)
where c can be found from (33). Then we get
Λ(t) =
(d1 + d2)
√
πe
1
4
λ
2
√
λ
(
erf(
√
λt+
1
2
√
λ)− 1
)
. (41)
Denote by
êi(t) = bi +
(d1 + d2)
√
πe
1
4
λeλ(t+t
2)
2
√
λ
(
erf(
√
λt+
1
2
√
λ)− 1
)
,
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and
Aêi = {t | êi(t) < 0}.
Then we get:
ei(t) =
{
0, if t ∈ Aêi ;
êi(t), otherwise.
(42)
The new equipment for both countries Assume that both of countries use the
new equipment, the shape parameters in this case are δ1 = δ2 =
1
2 .
Using (30), (32),(33), we have:
ei(t) = bi + Λ(t)e
2λ
√
t, (43)
Λ(t) = − (d1 + d2)(2λ
√
te−2λ
√
t + e−2λ
√
t − 1)
2λ2
+ c, (44)
where
c = − (d1 + d2)
2λ2
. (45)
Then we get
Λ(t) = − (d1 + d2)(2λ
√
te−2λ
√
t + e−2λ
√
t)
2λ2
. (46)
Let’s find optimal emissions in this case. If bi ≤ d1+d22λ2 , then
ei(t) = 0. (47)
If bi >
d1+d2
2λ2 , then
ei(t) =

0, t ≥
(
2λ2bi − d1 − d2
2λ(d1 + d2)
)2
;
bi − (d1 + d2)(2λ
√
t+ 1)
2λ2
, 0 ≤ t <
(
2λ2bi − d1 − d2
2λ(d1 + d2)
)2
.
(48)
The worn-out equipment for both countries Consider the problem in the case
when equipment of both countries is worn-out (δ1 > 1, δ2 > 1). Fix the following
values of the shape parameters: δ1 = δ2 = 2.
Using (30), (32),(33), we have:
ei(t) = bi + Λ(t)e
2λt2 , (49)
Λ(t) =
(d1 + d2)
√
2πerf(
√
2λt)
4
√
λ
+ c, (50)
where c can be found from (33).
Then we get the following form for adjoint variable:
Λ(t) =
(d1 + d2)
√
2π(erf(
√
2λt)− 1)
4
√
λ
. (51)
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Denote by
e˜i(t) = bi +
(d1 + d2)
√
2πe2λt
2
(erf(
√
2λt)− 1)
4
√
λ
,
and
Ae˜i = {t | e˜i(t) < 0}.
Then we get:
ei(t) =
{
0, if t ∈ Ae˜i ;
e˜i(t), otherwise.
(52)
The graphic representation of the optimal emissions for four scenarios of the
game we can see at the Fig. 1.
Fig. 1: Optimal emissions of the player 1 for four scenarios of the game.
4. Conclusion
In the paper a problem of pollution control was studied within the game-theoretic
framework. Each player was assumed to have certain equipment whose functioning
is related to pollution control. The i-th player’s equipment may undergo an abrupt
failure at random time Ti which is described by the Weibull distribution with dif-
ferent parameters corresponding to different modes of operation of the equipment.
The game lasts until any of the players’ equipment breaks down. Thus, the game
duration is defined as T = min(T1, . . . , Tn), where Ti is the time instant at which
the i-th player stops the game.
A cooperative 2-player game with different scenarios was studied in detail.
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Abstract The aim of this work is firstly to provide a comprehensive overview
of the current trends in supply chain cooperation modeling and secondly to
highlight the fruitful research avenues in this field based on a systematic
literature review. As a result, it was found that in the previous years the
research work on supply chain management has primarily focused on the
study of materials and information flows and very little work has been done
on the study of upstream and downstream flows of money. It is shown, that
the evolution of the research in the field of supply chain cooperation model-
ing has evolved from centralized cooperative models through decentralized
coordination models to collaborative models. Moreover, the unit of model-
ing has become significantly more complex from unconnected supply chains
to multi-echelone systems. From the authors point of view, the further step
ahead is development of models of collaborative supply chain networks, es-
pecially in the field of financial supply chain management.
Keywords: supply chain management, supply chain cooperation, supply
chain modeling, thematic trend, methodological trend.
1. Introduction
1.1. Justification of the Research
The field of supply chain management (SCM) has developed as an academic disci-
pline in the last 30 years, as can be observed by the growing number of academic
journals and articles that focus on it. This research explores theoretical develop-
ments in this discipline by analyzing the existing stream of literature, what allows
the authors to spot trends and gaps in the literature, and to identify fruitful areas
for future research.
In order to inform future SCM development, it is helpful to reflect on where the
gaps are in current theoretical perspectives. The following discussion is not meant
to be an exhaustive list; rather, it is more a consideration of potential avenues of
thought that may have saliency for SCM in general and supply chain collaboration
(SCC) in particular.
SCM revolves around coordination and cooperation among several business part-
ners that are linked through flows of material, money and information. These part-
ners include suppliers of basic raw materials and component parts, manufacturers,
wholesalers, distributors, transporters, retailers, banks and financial institutions.
In general, the materials, component parts and finished goods flow downstream
⋆ This work is financially supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research under
grant No. 16-01-00805/A
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although the returned merchandise flows upstream. The money in contrast flows
upstream in a supply chain whereas the information flows in both directions. For
an effective supply chain system, the management of upstream flow of money is
as important as the management of downstream flow of goods (Gupta and Dutta,
2011). Nevertheless, the research work on supply chain management has primarily
focused on the study of materials flow and very little work has been done on the
study of upstream flow of money.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the
literature search procedures. The following section presents theoretical background
in terms of SCC meaning, outlines the difficulties faced by SC members in adoption
of SCC and possible causes of lack of coordination in SC. The next section deals
with different mechanisms of SCC. In the next section SCC models are summarized.
The last section concludes the paper and suggests an agenda for future research.
1.2. Research Questions and Objectives
The goal of the paper is to provide a comprehensive overview of the current trends
in supply chain cooperation modeling and highlight the fruitful research avenues in
this field based on a systematic literature review. To achieve the above formulated
goal the following objectives are to be fulfilled:
1. To analyze the evolution of the key concepts in the field of supply chain manage-
ment: supply chain, supply chain management, supply chain cooperation, supply
chain coordination, supply chain collaboration, supply chain performance on the
grounds of theoretical and methodological identification and systematization.
2. To analyze the metrics of supply chain cooperation performance, financial sup-
ply chain cooperation performance on the grounds of theoretical systematiza-
tion.
3. To analyze the existing supply chain cooperation models, financial supply chain
cooperation models and identify their strengths and limitations on the grounds
of theoretical systematization.
1.3. Methodology of the Research
As the goal of the paper is to provide a snapshot of the diversity of the research being
conducted in the field of supply chain management and especially financial supply
chain management in order to outline further research paths on the basis of theo-
retical and methodological gap identification, only the journals ranked 4* or 4 (top
journals in the field) in the Chartered Association of Business Schools Academic
Journal Guide 2015 research were used for the initial search, namely: Journal of
Operations Management, International Journal of Operations and Production Man-
agement, Production and Operations Management (in the field of Operations and
Technology Management). It has been suggested that top-ranked journals should
communicate, diffuse and archive scholarly knowledge more effectively than other
journals.
The period of search was set from 2010 till 2015 year. An initial keyword search
for articles containing any of the terms of the phrase financial supply chain man-
agement (limited to citations and abstracts of periodicals) was then subsequently
limited to the exact phrase, financial supply chain management.
The papers in response to the above-mentioned objectives were gathered and
systematically analyzed.
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1.4. Limitations of the Research
The limitations of the following research are generally related to the method that
we used to obtain the literature sample. Despite the fact that the aforementioned
journals belong to the top-ranked specialist journals in the field, it however limits
the external validity of our study and the possibility of extending the conclusions.
2. Trends and Gaps in Supply Chain Collaboration
2.1. Concept of Supply Chain Management
Globalization, technology boom, organizational consolidation as well as quickly al-
tering government policy and regulation made it very important for companies to
be familiar with the concept of supply chains (SC) that function inside and around
the company. That is the reason why in recent years the area of supply chain man-
agement (SCM) has become very popular. This is evidenced by marked increase
in practitioner and academic publications, conferences, professional development
programs and university courses in the area. While interest in SCM is immense, it
is clear that much of the knowledge about SCM resides in a narrow fields such as
purchasing, logistics, IT and marketing. At least partly as a result of this, there
appears to be little consensus on the conceptual and research methodological bases
of SCM. This has contributed to the existence of a number of gaps in the knowledge
base of the field. Thus, from a conceptualization perspective, the definition of the
term is unclear.
According to Beamon (1998), a simple supply chain (SC) may be defined as
an integrated process wherein a number of various business entities (i.e., suppliers,
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers) work together in an effort to: 1. acquire
raw materials, 2. convert these raw materials into specified final products, and 3.
deliver these final products to retailers. This chain is traditionally characterized by
a forward flow of materials and a backward flow of information (Beamon, 1998).
At its highest level, a SC can be decomposed to two basic, integrated processes: 1.
the Production Planning and Inventory Control Process, and 2. the Distribution and
Logistics Process. These processes, illustrated in Fig. 1 provide the basic framework
for the conversion and movement of raw materials into final products.
Fig. 1: Simple supply chain processes (adopted from Beamon, 1998)
The Production Planning and Inventory Control Process comprises of the man-
ufacturing and storage sub-processes, and their interfaces. More specifically, pro-
duction planning describes the design and management of the entire manufacturing
process (including raw material scheduling and acquisition, manufacturing process
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design and scheduling, and material handling design and control). Inventory control
describes the design and management of the storage policies and procedures for raw
materials, work-in-process inventories, and usually, final products (Beamon, 1998).
The Distribution and Logistics Process determines how products are retrieved
and transported from the warehouse to retailers. These products may be trans-
ported to retailers directly, or may first be moved to distribution facilities, which,
in turn, transport products to the retailers. This process includes the management
of inventory retrieval, transportation, and final product delivery (Beamon, 1998).
These processes interact with one another to produce an integrated SC. The
design and management of these processes determine the extent to which it works
as a unit to meet the required performance objectives.
Definition of an integrated SC was affirmed by Akkermans (2003). He stated that
SC is a network that consists of suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and
customers. This network is supported by three types of flows (material, information
and financial) and requires more careful planning and closer coordination.
The evolution of the concept of SC took 30 years. Internal supply chain integra-
tion transitioned to external supply chain integration as there was a limited amount
of performance improvement that could be achieved without involving suppliers and
customers. External supply chain integration transitioned to goal directed network
supply chains as firms understood that supply chains were non-linear networks and
that there would be benefit for non-strategic (or non-integrated) suppliers to have
visibility of demand. It is generally supposed, that by now we are facing the pro-
cess of undergoing a transition to devolved, collaborative supply chain clusters. It
is suggested that this transition is occurring due to the increased complexity, risk
and costs that are being borne by focal firms who are attempting to manage large
networks. By effectively outsourcing elements of this management to lead suppliers,
there is devolvement of the collaboration into clusters.
The evolution of SC concept displayed in the previous paragraph can be used
further and implemented to the concept of supply chain management, namely the
evolution of SCM shown in Fig. 2.
Today one of the most wide-spread definitions of SCM is one produced the Coun-
cil of by Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP): SCM encompasses the
planning and management of all activities involved in sourcing and procurement,
conversion, and all logistics management activities. Importantly, it also includes
coordination and collaboration with channel partners, which can be suppliers, in-
termediaries, third party service providers, and customers.
Mentzer et al. (2001) define SCM as the systemic, strategic coordination of the
traditional business functions and the tactics across these business functions within
a particular company and across businesses within the supply chain, for the purposes
of improving the long term performance of the individual companies and the supply
chain as a whole.
Given that the aim of this paper is not to review the numerous definitions of
SCM in extant literature, it simply adopts one that of Mentzer et al. (2001) since it
contains all the key elements (strategic coordination, collaboration across the whole
supply chain and long-term performance), while dealing not only with material and
information flows, but also with financial ones.
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Fig. 2: Evolution of SCM concept (adopted from Coyle, et al., 2013)
2.2. Cooperation, Coordination and Collaboration in Supply Chains
A good indication of the maturity level of a field is the attitude of researchers to the
definition of key concepts. In a mature field, most researchers would use existing
standard definitions. In our case, there is no clear convergence among the authors on
a single definition (although most were based on themes associated with operations
research). Though, there are efforts in literature regarding collaboration of different
functions of the SC, the study of coordinating functions in isolation may not help
to coordinate the whole SC. It appears that the study of SC collaboration (SCC) is
still in its infancy. Though, the need for collaboration is realized, a little effort has
been reported in the literature to develop a holistic view of coordination.
Supply chains are generally complex and are characterized by numerous activi-
ties spread over multiple functions and organizations, which pose interesting chal-
lenges for effective SC collaboration. To meet these challenges, SC members must
work towards a unified system and cooperate with each other. Collaboration is an
amorphous meta-concept that has been interpreted in many different ways by both
organizations and individuals. SC collaboration has proven difficult to implement
although still has the potential to offer significantly improved performance. It is
suggested that many of the problems related to SC collaboration are due to a lack
of understanding of what collaboration actually implies. This poor understanding is
further increased due to the association of collaboration with the hype surrounding
e-business whereby technology has been promoted as the key to enabling wide scale
inter-organizational collaboration.The evolution of the collaboration concept from
simple generic integration concept can be tracked through the evolution of SCM
strategies, tools, and techniques in time.
It is argued that SCM developed from a baseline of functional (independent) silos
and the first level of integration was across functions (akin to process integration).
This then moved to full internal integration involving a seamless flow through the
internal supply chain, and finally to external integration embracing suppliers and
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customers. The primary benefits were identified as improved customer service and
reduced inventory and operating costs. What has changed since the introduction
of the concept of SCM is the context within which supply chains operate, and
the enablers of change and performance improvement. As a result the relevance of
narrow, linear-based supply chain models has been challenged as firms have looked
more and more toward networked and collaborative supply chain strategies to deliver
superior performance.
SCM as a discipline has evolved rapidly. The early focus of SCM began when
organizations began to improve their inventory management and production plan-
ning and control. The aim of these practices was to improve production efficiencies
and ensure that the capacity of capital assets and machinery was utilized efficiently.
This extended upstream to include the management of transport of raw materials
at a time when firms were relatively vertically integrated.
The early definition of integration is provided by Frohlich and Westbrook: At
the tactical level, there are two interrelated forms of integration that manufacturers
regularly employ. The first type of integration involves coordinating and integrat-
ing the forward physical flow of deliveries between suppliers, manufacturers, and
customers. The other prevalent type of integration involves the backward coordina-
tion of information technologies and the flow of data from customers to suppliers
(Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001)
The next phase in the evolution of SCM was the systematization of materials,
production, and transport management. This began with materials requirement
planning (MRP) focusing on inventory control. MRP expanded to become MRPII by
incorporating the planning and scheduling of resources involved in manufacturing.
Both MRP and MRPII were conceived in the 1960s but did not gain prominence
until the 1980s. MRP and MRPII evolved to become ERP, in an attempt to gain
greater visibility over the entire enterprise (Stevens and Johnson, 2016).
The mid to late 1980s brought intense retrospection from western firms concern-
ing the threat of Japanese firms that were perceived to be more competitive due
to higher productivity. This period led to the implementation of Japanese practices
such as total quality management (TQM) and lean by firms. These practices focused
on reducing inventory through improving quality and flow and involving suppliers
in product and process design. At this point, one can say, that cooperation is a
substantial prerequisite for further coordination and collaboration.
The next phase in the evolution of SCM included the introduction of other pro-
cess improvement practices (e.g. six sigma) that sought to provide a more concrete
improvement method compared to TQM or lean. As process improvement, and the
standardization of products and processes that facilitated it, took place, there was
increasing awareness that end customers were requiring ever increasing levels of
choice and differentiation. This led firms to consider that they had become too
lean and rigid and should be focusing on creating agile supply chains to adapt to
changing demand. The agile approach was blended with lean as demand could be
decoupled into push and pull to create greater choice for the customer while still
retaining some control (Stevens and Johnson, 2016).
The most commonly accepted definition of coordination in the literature is the
act of managing dependencies between entities and the joint effort of entities working
together towards mutually defined goals (Malone and Crowston, 1994).
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The 1990s also saw a focus upon core competences within firms. This led to a
rise in increased outsourcing of non-core activities to lower cost economies. Political
factors such as unilateral liberalization measures and the removal of formal free
trade barriers have contributed to the growth of developing countries exporting
to high wage economies, encouraging firms to source from lower cost economies.
This, in turn, fuels both demand for products from developed economies and the
competition to supply. This changed the topology of the supply chain as well as
the magnitude, profile and direction of material, and information flows. Significant
changes have also taken place around the understanding of how a firm secures a
competitive position. Traditionally, superior competitive advantage was seen to be
a function of how a firm organized its resources to differentiate itself from the
competition and its ability to operate at a lower cost. The prevailing tendency was
to control as much of its upstream and downstream activities as possible, often
leading to high levels of vertical integration (i.e. within a firm rather than with
suppliers). Thus, firms focused more on managing, in-house, core competences, i.e.
those competencies or capabilities that deliver value (as perceived by the customer)
and outsourcing non-core activities to specialist often lower cost third parties. This
resulted in the advent of 3PL providers and supply chain integrators.
Supply chains are inherently unstable in terms of inevitable challenges of fore-
casting and data integrity. Technology has been used to good effect to improve
information flows. However, the increased remoteness of a global market and sup-
ply base, together with the need to manage an increasingly complex network has
exacerbated the challenge. In addition to the issues caused by information distortion
and a global supply base, the twenty-first century is a time when organizations are
facing pressure from consumers and other stakeholders to have green and ethical
supply chains. This requires organizations to become more transparent in terms of
disclosing their sources of supply, which increases costs and may place pressure on
moving away from the lowest cost economies where labor rights can be poor. At
this period of time the concept of collaboration evolved.
Collaboration is a very broad term and when it is put in the context of the
supply chain it needs yet further clarification. When talking about collaboration
many authors mention mutuality of benefit, rewards and risk sharing on the basis
of the exchange of information. There seems to be no unique definition of SCC,
although different perspectives have been presented in literature for coordinating
SC:
– Collaborative working for joint planning, joint product development, mutual
exchange information and integrated information systems, cross coordination
on several levels in the companies on the network, long-term cooperation and
fair sharing of risks and benefits.
– A collaborative SC simply means that two or more independent companies work
jointly to plan to execute SC operations with greater success than when acting
in isolation.
– A win/win arrangement that is likely to provide improved business success for
both parties.
– A strategic response to the challenges that arise from the dependencies SC
members.
M. Simatupang and R. Sridharan introduced one of the most cited definitions
of SC collaboration in 2002. According to authors: A collaborative supply chain
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simply means that two or more independent companies work jointly to plan and
execute supply chain operations with greater success than when acting in isolation
(Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). But this definition is limited by the boundaries
of the inter-organizational processes. To overcome this problem B. Flynn reflected
more spread definition of Supply Chain Collaboration (SCC): as the degree to which
a manufacturer strategically collaborates with its supply chain partners and collab-
oratively manages intra- and inter-organization processes. The goal is to achieve
effective and efficient flows of products and services, information, money and deci-
sions, to provide maximum value to the customer at low cost and high speed (Flynn,
Hou and Zhao, 2010). This definition more precisely outlined that collaboration in
supply chain can happen not only between several companies but also at the level
of one company.
Summing up, there seems to be no standard definition of SCC. Various perspec-
tives on SCC as reported in the literature are testimony to this, but basically they
fall into two groups of conceptualization: process focus and relationship focus. Some
of these perspectives present the inherent capability or intangibles required to coor-
dinate like responsibility, mutuality, cooperation and trust. The other perspectives
can be visualized, based on the coordination effort required in achieving common
goals in various activities of SC. Since the activities are different, the coordination
requirements also vary with the complexity of the activity. The most challenging
coordination perspective is to extend the concept of coordination from within an
organization to coordination between organizations.
Fig. 3: A timeline of SCM strategies, tools, and techniques (adopted from Stevens and
Johnson, 2016)
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This all points toward an explosion in SCM thinking over the last 25 years.
Fig. 3 presents a timeline of SCM strategies, tools, and techniques. The dates in
the figure are based upon when these practices were popularized, not introduced
(Stevens and Johnson, 2016). Fig. 4 outlines the transition of collaboration.
Fig. 4: Transition of collaboration (adopted from Mentzer at al., 2001)
If the collaboration is to be sustainable then there are a number of strategic
elements, which must be present. Synthesizing the literature, supply chain collabo-
ration consists of seven interconnecting components: 1. information sharing, 2. goal
congruence, 3. decision synchronization, 4. incentive alignment, 5. resources sharing,
6. collaborative communication, and 7. joint knowledge creation. These dimensions
are expected to be inter-correlated with each other, although there might be causal
relationships among them (Barratt, 2004).
Information sharing refers to the extent to which a firm shares a variety of rel-
evant, accurate, complete, and confidential information in a timely manner with
its supply chain partners. Information sharing is described as the heart, lifeblood,
nerve center, essential ingredient, key requirement, and foundation of supply chain
collaboration. Information sharing can be defined as the willingness to make strate-
gic and tactical data such as inventory levels, forecasts, sales promotion, strategies,
and marketing strategies available to firms forming supply chain nodes.
Goal congruence between supply chain partners is the extent to which supply
chain partners perceive their own objectives are satisfied by accomplishing the sup-
ply chain objectives. It is the degree of goal agreement among supply chain partners.
In the case of true goal congruence, supply chain partners either feel that their ob-
jectives fully coincide with those of the supply chain, or, in case of disparity, believe
that their goals can be achieved as a direct result of working toward the objectives
of the supply chain.
Decision synchronization refers to the process by which supply chain partners or-
chestrate decisions in supply chain planning and operations that optimize the supply
chain benefits (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2005). Planning decisions are required to
determine the most efficient and effective way to use the firm’s resources to achieve
a specific set of objectives. There are seven key supply chain management planning
decision categories: operations strategy planning, demand management, production
planning and scheduling, procurement, promise delivery, balancing change, and dis-
tribution management (Barratt, 2004). Joint planning is used to align collaborative
partner and to make operating decisions including inventory replenishment, order
placement, and order delivery.
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Incentive alignment refers to the process of sharing costs, risks, and benefits
among supply chain partners (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2005). It includes deter-
mining costs, risks, and benefits as well as formulating incentive schemes. Successful
supply chain partnerships require that each participant share gains and losses eq-
uitably and the outcomes of the collaboration are quantifiably beneficial to all.
Incentive alignment requires a careful definition of mechanisms that share gains
equitably, which means gains are commensurate with investment and risk (Barratt,
2004).
Resource sharing refers to the process of leveraging capabilities and assets and
investing in capabilities and assets with supply chain partners. Resources include
physical resources, such as manufacturing equipment, facility, and technology.
Collaborative communication is the contact and message transmission process
among supply chain partners in terms of frequency, direction, mode, and influence
strategy. Open, frequent, balanced, two-way, multilevel communication is generally
an indication of close inter-organizational relationships (Barratt, 2004).
Joint knowledge creation refers to the extent to which supply chain partners
develop a better understanding of and response to the market and competitive
environment by working together. There are two kinds of knowledge creation activ-
ities: knowledge exploration (i.e., search and acquire new and relevant knowledge)
and knowledge exploitation (i.e., assimilate and apply relevant knowledge).
There are multiple benefits accruing from effective SCC. Some of these include:
elimination of excess inventory, reduction of lead times, increased sales, improved
customer service, efficient product developments efforts, low manufacturing costs,
increased flexibility to cope with high demand uncertainty, increased customer re-
tention, and revenue enhancements.
These expected benefits of SCC motivated the researchers and practitioners
to develop and test the concept of elements of collaboration, but further research
is required to develop a deeper understanding of the relationships between these
elements of collaboration.
Despite the popularity and potential benefits of SCC, many attempts fall short of
the participants expectations. It was previously observed by Sabath and Fontanella
(2002) that collaboration arguably has the most disappointing track record of the
various supply chain management strategies introduced to date (Cao and Zhang,
2011). The difficulties faced in SCC activities may be visualized in the following
way:
– There exist differences in the interest of SC members as the members work out
of habit as an individual firm based on local perspective. Such an opportunistic
behavior results in mismatch of supply and demand (Arshinder et al., 2008).
– The following types of conflicts may exist: conflicting goals and objectives (goal
conflict), disagreements over domain of decisions and actions (domain conflict)
and differences in perceptions of reality used in joint decision making (perceptual
conflict) between SC members.
– The traditional performance measures based on the individual performance may
be irrelevant to the maximization of SC profit in a collaborative manner.
– The traditional policies, particularly rules and procedures, may not be relevant
to the new conditions of inter-organizational relationship. Moreover, there has
been over-reliance on technology in trying to implement Information Technology
(IT).
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The consequences of lack of coordination may result in poor performance of
SC as a whole, particularly in inaccurate forecasts, low capacity utilization, exces-
sive inventory, inadequate customer service, inventory turns, inventory costs, time
to market, order fulfillment response, quality, customer focus and customer satis-
faction (Arshinder et al., 2008). These problems are solved by implementing some
mechanisms in SC activities, which may result in the improvement of some per-
formance measures. These mechanisms include: joint decision making, information
sharing, resource sharing, implementing IT, joint promotional activities, etc. The
other motivation seems to be the ability of SC members to share the risks and
subsequently share the benefits. Further these mechanisms are discussed in detail.
SC Contracts. SC members coordinate by using contracts for better management
of supplierbuyer relationship and risk management. The objectives of SC contracts
are:
– to increase the total SC profit,
– to reduce overstock/understock costs, and
– to share the risks among the SC partners.
In buyback contract, the buyer is allowed to return the unsold inventory to some
fixed amount at agreed upon prices. The manufacturers accept the returns from the
retailers when the production costs are sufficiently low and demand uncertainty is
not too great (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005).
In the revenue-sharing contracts, the supplier offers the buyer a low wholesale
price when the retailer shares fraction of his revenue with supplier, which helps
partners in selecting order quantities that are optimal for the whole SC (Cachon
and Lariviere, 2005).
In the quantity flexibility contracts, the supplier and the buyer accepts some of
the inventory and stock out cost burden. The supplier allows the buyer to change
the quantity ordered after observing actual demand. The buyer commits to a mini-
mum purchase and the supplier guarantees a maximum coverage (Tsay, 1999). The
coordination achieved by the contracts provides incentives to all SC members and
improves the service level.
There are a number of extensions to buyback contracts are presented in the
literature like two period supply contract model for decentralized assembly system
(Zou et al., 2008) and flexible returns policies in three-level SC (Ding and Chen,
2008) to fully coordinate SC members.
Information technology. IT is used to improve inter-organizational coordination
and in turn, inter-organizational coordination has been shown to have a positive
impact on select firm performance measures, such as customer service, lead time and
production costs. IT helps to link the point of production seamlessly with the point
of delivery or purchase. It allows planning, tracking and estimating the lead times
based on the real-time data. Advances in IT (e.g. internet, EDI (electronic data
interchange), ERP (enterprise resource planning), e-business and many more) enable
firms to rapidly exchange products, information, and funds and utilize collaborative
methods to optimize SC operations. The various coordination problems handled by
information systems are:
– little value to the supplier because of competitive bidding,
– forced implementation of IT,
– incompatible information system at different levels of SC,
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– greater lead times,
– inefficient purchase order, and
– misaligned e-business strategies and coordination mechanisms (Arshinder et al.,
2008).
Information sharing. The SC members coordinate by sharing information re-
garding demand, orders, inventory, POS data, etc. Timely demand information or
advanced commitments from downstream customers helps in reducing the inven-
tory costs by offering price discounts and this information can be a substitute for
lead time and inventory (Reddy and Rajendran, 2005). The value of information
sharing increases as the service level at the supplier, supplier-holding costs, demand
variability and offset time increase, and as the length of the order cycle decrease.
Joint decision making. Joint decision making consists of several key procedures:
– replenishment,
– inventory holding costs with dynamic demand,
– collaborative planning,
– costs of different processes,
– frequency of orders,
– batch size,
– product development to improve the performance of SC.
A coherent decision making helps in resolving conflicts among SC members and
in exceptions handling in case of any future uncertainty.
There are many factors involved in achieving coordination like human, technol-
ogy, strategies, relationship, rewards, sharing of knowledge, sharing benefits, align-
ing goals, scheduling of frequent meetings of stakeholders for conflict resolution,
understanding of nature of intermediates and knowledge of SC concepts, status or
power difference and resistance in following the instructions of other organizations.
Even though SCC improves the performance of the SC, it may not always be
beneficial to coordinate all the SC members. The high adoption costs of joining
inter-organizational information systems and information sharing under different
operational conditions of organizations may hurt some SC members. Therefore, it
is essential to investigate the conditions under which SCC is beneficial, so that it
should not result in higher SC costs and imprecise information.
Cooperation Forms and Dimensions. Based on this definition, SCM can be bro-
ken into two parts: internal (which entails cross-functional coordination and collab-
oration within the company) and external. External SCM can further be broken
into two parts: upstream, which has to do with coordination and collaboration with
suppliers, and downstream, which has to do with coordination and collaboration
with customers. In the SCM literature, these three parts can be referred to as inter-
nal integration, supplier integration and customer integration (Flynn et al., 2010;
Wong et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2013) or supplier relationship management, internal
SCM and customer relationship management (Dey and Cheffi, 2013).
Whilst many organizations have integrated various internal interfaces, e.g. mar-
keting and logistics, purchasing and manufacturing, there are still few organizations
that have achieved complete internal integration, i.e. purchasing-manufacturing-
logistics-marketing (Fawcett and Magnan, 2002). Mentzer et al. (2001) classify these
early forms of integration as predominantly based on interaction, in the sense that
functional departments hold meetings and attempt to share more information. What
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are missing from such initiatives are the joint goals, shared resources, and common
vision that is espoused by the collaborative approach. A potential danger of inter-
nal collaboration is that organizations could achieve internal integration, and have
simply created a larger albeit organizational silo (Barratt, 2004).
External collaboration presents a number of potential opportunities for vertical
supply chain collaboration on the downstream side of the supply chain (customer
relationship management (CRM); collaborative demand planning (which includes
collaborative forecasting, CPFR, etc.); demand replenishment; and shared distri-
bution) as well as on the upstream side of the supply chain (supplier relationship
management (also referred to as supplier development, e.g. VMI, CRP); supplier
planning and production scheduling; collaborative design (which could include new
product introduction); and collaborative transportation).
Supply Chain Cooperation Performance. There is a growing recognition among
company executives that today’s business competition is no longer between indi-
vidual firms, but between SCs. If a SC is properly managed, its whole value can be
greater than the sum of its parts. Not surprisingly, there is an increasing demand
for both scholars and business practitioners to make SCM more financially account-
able. Optimizing financial performance along the SCs should be the ultimate goal
of any SCM strategy. The existing literature has shown SCM’s great potential to
enhance a firm’s key financial outcomes. To demonstrate the financial accountabil-
ity of SCM activities a number of SCM drivers for firm-level financial performance
are identified (Shi and Yu, 2013).
On the basis of collaborative management of relationships between the organiza-
tions that constitute the value chain and integrated coordination of processes from
the ultimate supplier to the ultimate customer, SCM aims to create more value for
customers, as well as for the supply chain partners, thus improving performance
not only within each organization, but also across the whole chain (Shi and Yu,
2013). A SCM system entails the implementation of a set of practices that can be
defined as activities deployed in an organization in order to enhance the effective
management of its supply chain. Despite the constantly growing attention to SCM,
contributions to the link between supply chain management practices (SCMPs) and
performance are very diverse in scope and nature, and most often remain dispersed
and incomplete.
The existing studies on the financial impacts of SCM have enabled the re-
searchers to formulate some empirical patterns, with which we identify a num-
ber of performance drivers attributing to firm financial performance, in particular:
sourcing strategy, information technology (IT), system integration, and external
relationship.
Sourcing strategy. When a firm develops its sourcing strategy in the SCM con-
text, it constantly weighs the total costs associated with the make-or-buy decisions.
A well-developed SC sourcing strategy allows SC partners to focus on their key com-
petitive advantages, thus resulting in a win-win situation for all involving parties.
According to TCE, successful SC sourcing strategy should be able to reduce pro-
duction costs and increase process flexibility since firms no longer need to commit
to asset specificity (Williamson, 1981).
According to Shi and Yu (2013), the performance implications of SC sourcing
strategy are widely debated in the literature. On one hand, several empirical stud-
ies have shown its positive contributions to firms’ financial performance. It was
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discussed, how purchasing and supply management affect financial performance
such as business growth, profitability, cash flow, and asset utilization. On the other
hand, not all the studies are able to establish positive relationship between sourcing
strategy and financial performance. It was previously found, that firms performing
more aggressive outsourcing practices do not experience significant and direct per-
formance improvements. In addition, firm strategy and environmental dynamism
are found to moderate the relationships between outsourcing intensity and financial
performance. (Shi and Wei, 2013). Overall, SC sourcing strategy generate positive
contributions to financial performance. However, an optimal level of outsourceability
may exist to maximize the benefits.
Information technology. According to transaction cost economics (TCE), the
main purpose of IT in SCM is to enhance SC collaboration and reduce coordination
costs along SC by increasing SC visibility and transparency. Meanwhile, there is
a debate on whether the IT capability can really serve as a catalyst in improving
firms’ performance. The skeptics’ major argument is that particular SC technology
can be easily duplicated by competitors, making it difficult for the investing firms
to gain competitive advantages over their competitors. According to resource based
view (RBV), therefore, the increasing investments in IT capability do not guaran-
tee performance improvements. Blankley (2008) provides a comprehensive literature
review relevant to the impacts of IT on the financial performance. He proposes a
conceptual model to demonstrate how an effect chain is extended from SCM tech-
nology to a firm’s financial performance. Therefore, the following empirical finding
regarding the financial impacts of IT can be derived: Information technology in
SCM makes positive contributions to financial performance, but IT alignments and
implementations could affect financial outcomes.
System integration. An integrated SCM system enhances a firm’s capability to
coordinate all business processes within and beyond the firm’s boundary. Enterprise
resource planning (ERP) system, which integrates internal and external information
flows and management functions within and across involving SC participants, is a
typical example.
By collecting survey results from Korean and Japanese firms, Kim (2009) uses
SEM approach to examine the causal relationship among SC activities, competi-
tive strategy, SC integration, and firm performance. For both Korean and Japanese
samples, there exists a significant relationship between SCM activities and com-
petition capability. However, the mechanism of how SC integration impacts firm
performance is different in Korean and Japanese samples due to firm sizes and lev-
els of SC integration. In Korean firms, the interrelationship between SCM practices
and competition capability enhances SC integration, which in turn has a direct ef-
fect on firm performance. On the other hand, some studies are not able to establish
positive relationship between SCM integration and firms’ performance. Hendricks et
al. (2007) report mixed results concerning the impacts of ERP, SCM, and customer
relationship management (CRM) on firms’ long-term financial performance. Specif-
ically, they find some improvements in firms’ financial metrics (ROA and ROS)
for the ERP and SCM adopters, but not for the CRM adopters. To partly explain
this performance puzzle, some studies suggest that the SCM systems be integrated
with other IT infrastructures to achieve the best performance. An integrated SCM
system represents a firm’s general capability to coordinate all business processes
within and beyond the firm’s boundary and improve overall financial performance.
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Summing up, system integration in SCM achieves optimal financial performance
when it is implemented together and aligned with IT infrastructures and overall
business strategies.
External relationships. As a firm’s unique resource and valuable asset, external
relationships in SCM, including supplier and customer management, is expected to
be highly associated with financial performance. As a matter of fact, it can be argued
that the quality of external relationships with upstream and downstream partners
is one of the most important drivers of financial performance. The association be-
tween external and internal contextual SCM factors and various performance mea-
sures in the information industry was earlier investigated in Taiwan. Several studies
focus on the specific components of external relationships in SCM. For example,
Flynn et al. (2010) especially investigate the impact of supplier-customer-internal
(SCI) relationship on firms’ performance in China. Empirical analysis shows that
the SCI relationship is positively associated with both operational and financial
performance.
SC collaboration and mutual trust are especially important to manage external
relationships with suppliers and customers. Cao and Zhang (2011) investigate SC
collaboration and its impact on firm performance. The empirical results indicate
that SC collaboration considerably improve collaborative advantage, which in turn,
has significant positive effect on firms’ financial performance. In particular, the
mediator role of collaborative advantage is stronger for small firms than medium
and large firms. Therefore, we have following empirical finding: as a firm’s unique
resource and valuable assets, SC external relationships are highly associated with
financial performance.
Over the past few decades, more and more executives have realized the strategic
importance of SCM and recognized the distinctive competitive advantages that a
well-managed SC can bring to the company. SCM has therefore attracted substantial
investments across various industries recently and company executives not only
need to know whether SCM is able to make positive contributions to firm-level
financial performance, but also want to know how to direct their SC investments to
enhance competitive advantages and optimize financial outcomes. SCM managers,
therefore, are obliged to demonstrate SCM’s positive financial contributions and
justify relevant expenses.
As we constrain this study on the financial impacts of SCM practices, only
accounting- and market-based financial measures are discussed in this section.
The accounting-based financial measures are direct indicators of a firm’s financial
conditions from different perspectives. For example, return on assets (ROA), return
on equity (ROE), and return on investment (ROI) are usually used to examine a
firm’s asset and capital utilization, while profit margin, cost of goods sold (COGS),
and economic value added (EVA) are common measures of a firm’s capability to
make profits. Some accrual measures, such as ROA, ROI, and profit margin, are
particularly popular in the SCM literature. However, it is worth noting that the
accrual measures are not always appropriate in performance measurement due to
their own limitations. First, most accrual measures are not able to catch intangible
or non-cash benefits associated with SCM practices, such as market share, market
reputation, and company goodwill. Second, they are used to measure the past per-
formance but are not forward-looking indicators. Third, they are relatively easy to
be manipulated by accounting frauds and illegal practices. A few studies, therefore,
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propose financial measures based on cash flow to directly evaluate a firm’s profits
and liquidity. To better catch the company-wide effects of SCM practices, several
studies develop comprehensive financial measures by combining multiple corporate
income and balance sheet values together.
As an essential complement to accounting-based financial measures, market-
based measures focus on shareholder value. Shi and Yu (2013) state, that in one
of the early studies investigating the impacts of SC strategy on shareholder value,
Christoper and Ryals (1999) define the shareholder value as the financial value cre-
ated for shareholders by the companies in which they invest. Since SCM activities
are strongly associated with revenue growth, operating cost reduction, fixed and
working capital efficiency, they are expected to impose significant effects on share-
holder values. It is consistent with studies in other disciplinaries. Swink et al. (2010)
employ Sharpe ratio to characterize how well the excess return of SCM excellence
compensates the stockholder for the risk taken. As the most popular market-based
measure, abnormal stock return documents the difference between the expected
stock return and the actual stock return, which is often triggered by special SCM
events (see event study in research method section for details). In a widely-cited
study, Hendricks and Singhal (2003) propose a framework to link SC performance
to shareholder value through operational metrics and intangible assets. In an ef-
ficient financial market, the improved SC performance eventually will be reflected
on shareholder values. Johnson and Templar (2011) develop a unified performance
proxy composing of different elements in profitability, liquidity, and productivity.
Since a significant proportion of firm value today lies in intangible assets, market-
based measures provide a more objective approach than the accounting-based mea-
sures. In the absence of deep understanding of SCM’s contributions to shareholder
value, SCM professionals have great impediments to assess the true value of SCM
activities and justify the continuous SCM investments.
Fig. 5 summarises all the paths that link learning and growth perspective and
internal process perspective (SCMPs and some operational non-financial perfor-
mance measures) to the customer and financial perspectives (customer satisfaction,
product quality and financial performance), which constitute a firms strategic ob-
jectives.
Theoretical Gaps in Supply Chain Cooperation. Despite research confirming the
positive benefits of supply chain integration, and its importance to a firms suc-
cess (Flynn et al., 2010), ambiguity remains as to what constitutes supply chain
collaboration (Fabbe-Costes et al. 2014).
Currently there exists a gap in the SCM literature to link theoretical background
and empirical evidences. A few authors have attempted to lay theoretical founda-
tions for SCM by employing a variety of organizational theories, such as TCE,
RBV, agency theory, institutional theory, network theory, game theory, and strate-
gic choice theory (Chatha and Butt, 2015). With the exception of TCE and RBV,
most theories, however, did not receive sufficient empirical supports in the literature.
Thus, the following points can become starting points for further research:
1. More diverse theoretical foundations. Most of current empirical studies formu-
late their hypothesis in the framework defined by either TCE or RBV. Several
other organizational theories, such as principle-agent theory and network the-
ory, are discussed in the SCM context. Apparently, more diverse theoretical
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Fig. 5: Linkage of SCM practices on performance (adopted from Okongwu, Brulhart and
Moncef, 2015)
foundations will enhance our understanding of SCM’s financial impacts from
different perspectives.
2. Narrow focus. Regarding the fundamental question of which SCM practices
impact individually or collectively on which performance measures, most stud-
ies often focus on only one or few aspects (or parts) of the supply chain such
as the upstream network (Eltantawy et al., 2015) or the internal relationships
(Williams et al., 2013). In this field, two research streams can be distinguished:
first, studies that aim to establish a link between two variables (a SCM practice
and a performance measure) based on a unique construct of SCM and perfor-
mance, Second, studies focusing on the impact of two or more SCM practices
(considered separately or collectively) on one or several performance variables.
3. Under-researched SC variables. Besides the discussed variables, more SC vari-
ables should be empirically examined on its contribution to financial perfor-
mance. For example, what quality characteristics are available to drive SCM
improvement and what is their financial impact?
4. Robustness of empirical results. As stated in the previous section, this is an
emerging research area and most studies reviewed in this paper are published
recently. Therefore, the robustness of the empirical findings should be tested
under different environmental settings. For example, what is the role of SCM
under different macroeconomic climates? Are the financial contributions from
effective SCM enhanced or weakened during economic recessions? What are the
SC variables attributable to the performance change?
5. Corporate bond market. For empirical studies based on the secondary data, most
of them employ the financial data from stock market. The influential corporate
bond market is largely ignored in the literature. The inclusion of corporate bond
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market is necessary to extend our understanding beyond the stock market. For
example, how SCM activities affect a firm’s cash flows and its ability to raise
capitals from the corporate bond market?
2.3. Financial Supply Chain Cooperation
What emerges from the definitions and associated discussions on supply chain and
supply chain cooperation is a broad concept that focuses on the flow of physical
goods and services supported by business processes that run along the full extent
of the supply chain from the end user to the raw materials suppliers and includes
every organization involved in the design, manufacture, distribution and retail of
the product or service. To contribute to the development of research into financial
supply chains and to set out the broad scope of the case study, a formal definition
of financial supply chains is proposed.
A financial supply chain (FSC) is the network of organizations and banks that
coordinate the flow of money and financial transactions via financial processes and
shared information systems in order to support and enable the flow of goods and
services between trading partners in a product supply chain (Blackman, Holland,
and Westcott, 2013).
Lately the importance of understanding the relationship between physical and
financial supply chains has arised among supply chain finance practitioners such
as finance providers, corporate, commercial and small and medium-sized (SME)
clients, market investors, regulators or legal practitioners as well as it and infras-
tructure providers (Standard Definitions for Techniques of Supply Chain Finance,
2016). According to this document as one of the first attempts to establish this
link, the Financial Supply Chain (FSC) is the chain of financial processes, events
and activities that provide financial support to physical supply chain participants.
Financial Supply Chain Management (FSCM) refers to the range of corporate man-
agement practices and transactions that facilitate the purchase of, sale and payment
for goods and services, such as the conclusion of contractual frameworks, the sending
of purchase orders and invoices, the matching of goods sent and received to these,
the control and monitoring of activities including cash collections, the deployment
of supporting technology, the management of liquidity and working capital, the
use of risk mitigation such as insurance and guarantees, and the management of
payments and cash-flow. FSC management involves the orchestration of a range of
contributors to meeting FSC needs such as internal corporate functions, trading
parties, and service providers in the area of supply chain automation and in the
whole range of financial services.
In order to reduce vagueness in the term, it is needed to introduce master defini-
tion of a supply chain finance (SCF) provided in Standard Definitions for Techniques
of Supply Chain Finance, (2016): the Supply Chain Finance is defined as the use
of financing and risk mitigation practices and techniques to optimise the manage-
ment of the working capital and liquidity invested in supply chain processes and
transactions. The following aspects of this definition are highlighted by the authors:
– Portfolio. SCF is a portfolio of financing and risk mitigation techniques and
practices that support the trade and financial flows along end-to-end business
supply and distribution chains, domestically as well as internationally. This is
emphatically a holistic concept that includes a broad range of established and
evolving techniques for the provision of finance and the management of risk.
198 Anastasiia A. Ivakina, Ekaterina N. Zenkevich
– Parties. Parties to SCF transactions consist of buyers and sellers, which are
trading and collaborating with each other along the supply chain. As required,
these parties work with finance providers to raise finance using various SCF
techniques and other forms of finance. The parties, and especially anchor par-
ties on account of their commercial and financial strength, often have objectives
to improve supply chain stability, liquidity, financial performance, risk manage-
ment, and balance sheet efficiency.
– Event driven. Finance providers offer their services in the context of the fi-
nancial requirements triggered by purchase orders, invoices, receivables, other
claims, and related pre-shipment and post-shipment processes along the supply
chain. Consequently, SCF is largely event-driven. Each intervention (finance,
risk mitigation or payment) in the financial supply chain is driven by an event
or trigger in the physical supply chain. The development of advanced technolo-
gies and procedures to track and control events in the physical supply chain
creates opportunities to automate the initiation of SCF interventions in the
related financial supply chain.
– Evolving and flexible. SCF is not a static concept but is an evolving set of prac-
tices using or combining a variety of techniques; some of these are mature and
others are new or leading edge techniques or variants of established techniques,
and may also include the use of traditional trade finance. The techniques are
often used in combination with each other and with other financial and physical
supply chain services.
There is clearly a close and reciprocal relationship between physical and finan-
cial processes within a supply chain. The crucial importance of business processes in
manufacturing supply chain management and that business processes run through-
out the supply chain and connect separately owned companies was identified. The
financial business process is defined as the set of activities involved in the coordina-
tion of financial transactions within and between separate companies that comprise
a manufacturing supply chain and their banking partners. This could include, for
example, invoices, domestic and international payments, foreign exchange trans-
actions and remittance advice. In general, financial business processes operate in
tandem with manufacturing and logistics processes because typically money flows
mirror product flows in a supply chain.
Given that financial supply chains operate in parallel with product supply chains
it is reasonable to adapt the framework proposed by Mentzer et al. (2001) and use it
as the basis for our further research as these authors identified three interdependent
supply chain dimensions: business processes, management components and network
structure.
Financial Cooperation Forms and Dimensions. The goal of FSC structure is to
increase the transparency and the level of automation of business processes along
the financial value chain. The purpose is to save processing costs and reduce the
working capital of the company. This definition does not consider where the financial
supply chain actually begins and ends, because there are also analytical processes
that are not directly related to a business process but which belong nonetheless to
the financial supply chain.
According to Weiss (2011), the financial supply chain is different from the phys-
ical supply chain because it deals with the flow of cash instead of goods. Just as
in the physical supply chain, though, every day that is lost in the cash-to-cash
Supply Chain Cooperation Modeling: Trends and Gaps 199
cycle equals lost revenue. Besides a number of rather operational problems, there
are several concrete key performance indicators and metrics that can be used to
analyze financial supply chain. The financial supply chain stretches across different
business processes, which are, in a broader sense, the two processes: order-to-cash
and purchase-to-pay. The order-to-cash process includes, from the perspective of
a supplier (or creditor), the following business process steps: 1. creditworthiness
check, 2. invoice creation, 3. cash forecast, 4. financing of working capital, 5. pro-
cessing of dispute cases, 6. cash collection, 7. settlement and payment, 8. account
reconciliation.
From the perspective of a customer (or debtor), the purchase-to-pay process
consists of the following business processes: 1. procurement, 2. cash forecast, 3.
financing of working capital, 4. receipt of invoices, 5. resolution of discrepancies or
exceptions, 6. invoice approval, 7. settlement and payment, 8. account reconciliation.
There are a number of operational factors within the order-to-cash and purchase-
to-pay processes that can serve as indicators of a suboptimal financial supply chain:
– The number of paper-based business processes is very high and there are several
changes in medium (for example, the creation of invoices).
– The straight-through processing rate is low, which means that there are multiple
manual interventions and process steps.
– Companies struggle with a large number of dispute cases during the creation of
invoices, and it takes them a lot of time to process these.
– There is a large amount of uncollectable receivables on the balance sheet, and
many employees in receivables or collections management are involved in the
resolution process.
– Enterprises have not implemented a consistent credit management policy, which
results in a number of bad debt losses.
– Management has difficulties in predicting cash flows.
– There is no centralized cash management to control payment streams, and the
company maintains too many bank connections.
The business process construct maps directly onto financial supply chains. Man-
agement components is concerned with the integration and coordination of busi-
ness processes. In a financial supply chain, financial business processes are managed
through information technology based systems and the sharing of information within
and between organizations. To reflect the critical role of information technology
combined with management systems, the term financial and banking information
systems is used in place of management components. Network structure has been
identified as a key feature in the supply chain literature and this concept applies
equally to the network structure of organizations and banks involved in the financial
supply chain.
If to look closer to the operations that are the essential parts of the compa-
nies that are using FSCM approach, they could be generally defined into several
categories:
Receivables Purchase. Receivables discounting is a form of Receivables Purchase,
flexibly applied, in which sellers of goods and services sell individual or multiple
receivables (represented by outstanding invoices) to a finance provider at a discount.
Forfaiting is a form of Receivables Purchase, consisting of the without recourse
purchase of future payment obligations represented by financial instruments or pay-
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ment obligations (normally in negotiable or transferable form), at a discount or at
face value in return for a financing charge.
Factoring is another form of Receivables Purchase, in which sellers of goods and
services sell their receivables (represented by outstanding invoices) at a discount to
a finance provider (commonly known as the factor). A key differentiator of factoring
is that typically the finance provider becomes responsible for managing the debtor
portfolio and collecting the payment of the underlying receivables.
Payables finance is provided through a buyer-led programme within which sell-
ers in the buyers supply chain are able to access finance by means of Receivables
Purchase. The technique provides a seller of goods or services with the option of
receiving the discounted value of receivables (represented by outstanding invoices)
prior to their actual due date and typically at a financing cost aligned with the
credit risk of the buyer. The payable continues to be due by the buyer until its due
date.
Loan, or Advance-based. Loan or Advance against Receivables is financing made
available to a party involved in a supply chain on the expectation of repayment
from funds generated from current or future trade receivables and is usually made
against the security of such receivables, but may be unsecured.
Distributor finance is financing for a distributor of a large manufacturer to cover
the holding of goods for re-sale and to bridge the liquidity gap until the receipt of
funds from receivables following the sale of goods to a retailer or end-customer.
Loan, or Advance against Inventory is financing provided to a buyer or seller
involved in a supply chain for the holding or warehousing of goods (either pre-sold,
un-sold, or hedged) and over which the finance provider usually takes a security
interest or assignment of rights and exercises a measure of control.
Pre-shipment finance is a loan provided by a finance provider to a seller of goods
and/or services for the sourcing, manufacture or conversion of raw materials or
semi-finished goods into finished goods and/or services, which are then delivered to
a buyer. A purchase order from an acceptable buyer, or a documentary or standby
letter of credit or a Bank Payment Obligation, issued on behalf of the buyer, in
favour of the seller is often a key ingredient in motivating the finance, in addition
to the ability of the seller to perform under the contract with the buyer.
Financial Supply Chain Cooperation Performance. There is a diversity of ap-
proaches and different frameworks to measure the performance of supply chains,
taking into account financial and nonfinancial measurements, operational perfor-
mance, strategic performance and highlevel measures of overall firm performance
such as profitability.
One of the adapted frameworks to measure financial supply chain performance is
the framework proposed by Gunasekaran et al. (2004) to measure the performance
of physical supply chains. The advantages of using this rather broad framework
are that it allows the researchers scope to examine the performance characteris-
tics over three main performance areas (operational/tactical, quality and strategic)
without being overly prescriptive at this relatively early stage of theory develop-
ment concerning financial supply chains. In the context of financial supply chains,
the operational/tactical performance includes measurements such as reduction in
international payments from offsetting, efficiency of the foreign exchange process,
the lead-time for the payment cycle within the banking system and the reduction
of variability of customersupplier settlement dates. Six sigma quality measurement
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concepts from manufacturing map directly onto financial processes, for example
to measure the quality of payment and foreign exchange transactions. Examples of
strategic outcomes from a financial supply chain are increased cohesion in the global
financial supply chain and the development of a global payment factory.
The financial supply chain strategy is logically related to the manufacturing and
logistics supply chain strategy and this is captured in the model by the interde-
pendence between the financial supply chain strategy and the manufacturing and
logistics supply chain strategy (Heuser and Brockwell, 2009). There is a two-way
influence where the manufacturing activities place demands on the financial sys-
tems, and in turn the financial activities enable the functioning and operation of
the manufacturing supply chain. This means that changes in the product supply
chain such as new suppliers, increased globalization of operations and new com-
mercial arrangements place demands on the financial supply chain. Similarly, new
capabilities in the financial systems such as certainty of payment on a specific future
date, guaranteed in a local currency and at a fixed exchange rate may enable better
trading relationships.
The financial supply chain strategy is an adaptation of the supply chain model
proposed by Lambert et al. (1998) and is defined by the set of inter-related the-
oretical constructs: financial business processes, financial and banking information
systems, and financial network structure. The performance of the financial sup-
ply chain is defined in terms of the quality of operations measured by six sigma
techniques, financial operational benefits such as reduced cash balances and bet-
ter foreign exchange rates, and strategic outcomes such as the development of a
global payments factory. The important aspect of performance is that it should be
measured dynamically and related to the evolution of the financial supply chain
strategy in order to develop a better understanding of how changes in the financial
supply chain strategy are empirically related to performance. To understand how
the model operates in practice it is applied in a global setting and the methodology
and data collection are described in the next section.
In order to define the interdependency of the financial supply chain and the man-
ufacturing supply chain research into Motorola has been made (Blackman, Holland
and Westcott, 2013). The case data clearly shows that it is only possible to build
a sophisticated global treasury management and payments system in tandem with
a global production network, because the financial system uses core supply chain
data to support its business processes. The interdependency between manufactur-
ing and financial supply chains also makes strategic changes more complex. This
partly explains the long time-scales involved in the implementation of standardized
financial processes based on automated systems.
The empirical evidence that demonstrates the relationship between financial
supply chain strategy and performance is mapping out of the evolutionary timeline
of the financial supply chain strategy and relating key events and strategy changes
to performance outcomes. Changes in the financial supply chain strategy can then
be related to qualitative improvements in areas such as financial process innova-
tions and better relationships with suppliers and banks, and also to quantitative,
operational performance improvements, for example time-series payment volumes
and six sigma levels.
Summing up, the overwhelming trend is towards a standard financial supply
chain model to coordinate international banking and payments throughout the
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physical supply chain. The movement of products and services encapsulated by
the manufacturing supply chain is now supported by parallel financial and bank-
ing systems. As close collaboration is required between the trading partners within
the supply chain to meet customer needs, the movement of funds has evolved to
track the movement of goods in a concomitant manner rather than as a distinct
and separate management function.
Theoretical Gaps in Financial Supply Chain Cooperation. Similar to other rapidly
developing subject areas, there is no consensus or agreed definition of the concept.
Global supply chain management systems rely on financial processes in addition to
manufacturing, logistics and marketing activities to coordinate the flow of goods,
services and money between separate stages in the supply chain. Financial supply
chains are therefore an integral component of supply chains and yet there is very
little research that specifically addresses the strategy, implementation and perfor-
mance of global financial supply chains. Financial processes such as invoices, pay-
ments, foreign exchange and banking transactions have received very little attention
in the supply chain literature because previous research has tended to focus almost
exclusively on the movement of products and services in the supply chain and largely
ignores the movement of money and related financial activities.
The literature in this area is only just emerging and is fragmented across aca-
demic and business publications. For example, in the academic literature Fairchild
(2005) examined the integration of data from financial and physical supply chains
to explore how companies can increase the efficiency of financial processes by inte-
grating data from physical processes involved in the movement of goods and services
with financial processes. Gupta and Dutta (2011) modelled the dynamics of finan-
cial supply chains in terms of the flow of money between customers and suppliers.
Hofmann (2011) has analyzed two specific aspects of financial supply chains, risk
and supplier financing in the automotive industry.
From a consultancy perspective, Hartley-Urquhart (2006) argued that companies
should manage financial supply chains as closely as they manage physical supply
chains in order to deal with the inherent complexity and risk of global produc-
tion systems: as companies operate in a global environment where outsourcing and
sourcing arrangements lead to more complex supply chain arrangements and risk
management strategies (Chopra and Sohdi, 2004), the financial processes concerned
with payments, visibility of the financial process, foreign exchange and risk manage-
ment need to be much more sophisticated and integrated with the product supply
chain. Heuser and Brockwell (2009) addressed similar issues, though from a bank-
ing perspective. Their focus was on the treasury management aspects of financial
supply chains. In terms of early research originating from industry and manage-
ment practice, there are parallels with the early development of the supply chain
management concept, which was influenced by consultancy practice and industry
specific research.
The logic of considering financial supply chains as an integral component of
supply chains is that the flow of money and related financial and banking services
is coordinated by shared financial processes that connect each stage of the supply
chain in much the same way that manufacturing and logistics processes manage the
flow of products from raw material suppliers through manufacturing, distribution
and retail. Financial processes are therefore inextricably linked to the supply chain
activities defined by Mentzer et al. (2001).
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There is very little research that directly addresses the subject of financial supply
chains that takes an overview of the topic and attempts to define a conceptual
framework and illustrate it with significant empirical evidence over a period of
time. There is also little consensus regarding the formal definition of the financial
supply chain concept. An important element of the research is to understand the
strategic evolution of financial supply chains in the context of the manufacturing
supply chain over a significant time period, synthesize the performance metrics of
a financial supply chain and set out a research agenda for financial supply chains.
To start to address the lack of research into financial supply chains, it is necessary
to define a framework that captures the core elements of the financial supply chain
concept and relates it to the broader literature on manufacturing and logistics. In
the next section a review of the literature is presented that forms the basis for the
development of a research framework.
The literature that specifically addresses financial supply chains is scant and
typically focuses on one specific aspect of the financial supply chain. Finance papers
have tended to focus on the technical aspects of financial supply chains (Gupta and
Dutta, 2011) and failed to address the strategic and operations management issues.
Other research is also very specialized in nature. For example, researchers have
examined the integration of manufacturing and financial data (Fairchild, 2005),
currency hedging (Hofmann, 2011), financing arrangements (Hofmann, 2005) and
technical risk from electronic payments (Johnson, 2008). However, none of these
authors provide a conceptual framework or definition of financial supply chains. A
broader view has been offered by practicing managers see for example Heuser and
Brockwell (2009) who proposed a model of treasury management in the supply chain
from a banking perspective but did not provide evidence for its use in practice.
Based on the following gaps defined there is number of research opportunities
existing. Research into financial supply chains is in its infancy when compared to
research into manufacturing supply chains. An agenda for future research oppor-
tunities is therefore proposed. The research frameworks used earlier were effective
at capturing the principles of financial supply chains but the model could be ex-
tended in terms of additional variables, for example the nature of the strategic
change process and project management techniques, and also into the nature of the
relationships between the variables in the research framework.
Another important area is the detailed modeling of the flow of payments, akin to
the modeling of product flows based on shared information between manufacturers
and suppliers (Blackman, Holland and Westcott, 2013; Gupta and Dutta, 2011).
What are the benefits to suppliers of receiving advance notification of payments
with a certainty that they will receive funding in their own currency on a specific
and guaranteed date? How should benefits such as reduced borrowing and foreign
exchange requirements be quantified? How will the frequency of payments change
in the future as it becomes possible to manage financial exchanges between trad-
ing partners at the level of individual items on a purchase order because of lower
transactional costs from advances in information technology and banking systems?
In terms of formulating strategy for financial supply chains, moving away from
a standard adversarial stance to a cooperative partnership approach with suppliers
and banks requires a significant shift in the mind-set of senior finance managers who
are typically accustomed to maximizing financial benefits within the organizational
boundary of their own firm rather than looking to the competitive nature of the sup-
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ply chain as a whole. However, the strategic benefits such as managing finances on a
global scale and better relationships with suppliers, coupled with evidence from pre-
vious research that shows supply chain management capabilities are correlated with
firm performance (Johnson and Templar, 2011) should encourage finance specialists
to work closely with manufacturing and logistics managers to realize the benefits of
closer integration across functional areas within the company and along the supply
chain. In an economic environment where the availability and cost of bank funding
are becoming significant problems, particularly for smaller companies, supply chain
financing based on closer financial ties between large organizations and their supply
networks becomes an attractive and strategically important opportunity. Empirical
research in other global financial supply chains is needed to tackle these types of
questions convincingly.
Another very important issue is the inability of key performance indicators
(KPIs) of the FSCM defining. There are various key performance indicators that
are relevant for measurement in financial supply chain management. One key metric
is the cash flow cycle, which defines the period from delivery by suppliers until the
cash collection of receivables from customers . It is the time period required for
the company to receive the invested funds back in the form of cash. The cash flow
cycle can be divided into the operating cycle which is the time period between
delivery by suppliers and the actual cash collection of receivables, and the cash flow
cycle which is the time period between the cash payment for inventory and the cash
collection of receivables. The longer the cash flow cycle, the greater is the working
capital requirement of a company, which means that a reduction of the cash flow
cycle will immediately free up liquidity. However, the motivation as well as KPIs
for an effective financial supply chain is very unobvious to define (Weiss, 2012).
In summary, it can be said that, empirical supply chain research has a limited
focus on FSCM and is thus lagging behind. Similarly, scholars focusing on trade
finance rather investigate the topic from a corporate risk perspective than a supply
chain perspective (e.g. Chauffour and Malouche, 2011) and thus often omit the
interplay of financial and operational flows in supply chains (Protopappa-Sieke and
Seifert, 2010). Since FSCM by definition has a broad scope, the purpose of this
paper can only be an initial attempt at investigating FSCM.
3. Trends and Gaps in Supply Chain Cooperation Modeling
3.1. Typology of Supply Chain Cooperation Models
As supply chain members are often separate and independent economic entities,
a key issue in SCM is to develop mechanisms that can align their objectives and
coordinate their activities so as to optimize system performance. In our research we
are going to implement the typology of SCC models introduced by Li and Wang in
2007.
According to it, ideally, a decision in a supply chain can be made by a centralized
decision maker with access to all available information to optimize system perfor-
mance. This is possible when the entire supply chain is under the control of a single
decision maker, or the coordination benefits can be fairly distributed among the in-
dividual members by a central planner. When such a solution can be implemented,
the system is referred to as a centralized system. However, in general, neither a
supplier nor a buyer can control the entire supply chain. Each supply chain member
has its own state of information and decisions that can be made use to optimize its
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own interest. When the supply chain members are separate and independent eco-
nomic entities, they will act independently and opportunistically to optimize their
individual benefits. In this case, an action plan has to be complemented with an
incentive scheme that can allocate the benefits of coordination among the supply
chain members so as to align their objectives of coordination. Such a system is
regarded as a decentralized supply chain system.
In a supply chain, entities such as suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, and re-
tailers, can belong to a single organization or independent organizations. However,
the distinction between centralized and decentralized systems is more properly re-
lated to the incentive structures within the chain. At the most basic level, in a
centralized supply chain, there is a central planner who makes decisions for the en-
tire system, while each entity in a decentralized system functions as an autonomous
unit. Decentralized control policies can be easily implemented and analyzed at the
local level (function, department, firm, etc.), however coordinated planning of the
individual entities in a way that optimizes the value of the overall supply chain
(system) is a difficult undertaking. Research tools that are used for planning such
systems include network flow models and Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) mod-
els.
1. Centralized supply chain systems. The objective is to develop a produc-
tion/inventory policy to minimize system cost. It is typically assumed that demand
occurs at a buyer/retailer continuously at a constant rate, and no backlogging, lost
sales, or transshipment is permitted anywhere in the system. Early studies have fo-
cused on the existence and development of optimal policies. However, such policies
are usually difficult to characterize and implement. Recent studies have focused on
approximate policies that are nearly optimal and practically useful.
1.1. Deterministic systems. 1.1.1. No time coordination. The problem of op-
timizing a multi-echelon inventory system is a classical one. When the planning
horizon is finite, an optimal lot-sizing policy exists. This optimal policy is typically
non-stationary. Discrete-time lot-sizing problem was solved by developing various
algorithms. The continuous-time version of the problem can be solved approximately
by a discrete-time algorithm with a very small base planning period. When the plan-
ning period is infinite, however, an optimal policy is very difficult to characterize
when there is more than one buyer.
1.1.2. Time coordination. The optimal replenishment policy of a multi-echelon
inventory system, however, typically entails a very complex non-stationary structure
and thus is difficult to obtain and of little practical use. As such, previous studies
have considered heuristic policies by restricting the timing of orders for the supplier
and buyers so as to meet the above necessary properties for an optimal solution.
Specifically, early studies have focused on stationary-nested or single-cycle policies.
A policy is called stationary if each facility orders at equally-spaced points in time
and in equal amounts. A policy is nested if each facility orders every time any of its
immediate suppliers does, and perhaps at other times as well (Li and Wang, 2007).
Stationary and nested policies are attractive because they are easy to implement.
However, such policies may result in very bad results in some cases.
A special case of the above model is the classical joint replenishment problem
(JRP). Consider an inventory system in which multiple items are ordered from a
common source. A major ordering cost is incurred each time an order is placed
to the common source, independently of the number of items that are included in
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the order, and a minor ordering cost is incurred for each item that is included in
the order. Obviously, ordering cost savings can be obtained when several items are
replenished jointly. The key issue is then how to group these items. Many studies
adopted group replenishment at constant intervals of time.
1.2. Stochastic systems. In reality, a stochastic model that specifies demand as
a stochastic process is often more accurate than its deterministic counterpart the
economic order quantity (EOQ) model (Li and Wang, 2007). However, a barrier to
the application of a stochastic model is that the optimal policy does not have a
simple structure, and is not easy to implement even if it does exist. This implies
that appropriate coordination mechanisms are especially necessary.
Following the developments of multi-level production/ inventory systems, two
classes of inventory control policies have been used for supply chain inventory man-
agement: an operationally simple, but not optimizing system performance instal-
lation policy (control of inventory is decentralized in the sense that each member
makes its inventory decision separately based entirely on the local inventory po-
sition) and echelon stock policy that replenishes inventory based on the echelon
inventory position (the sum of the local inventory position and the inventory posi-
tions at all its downstream members). Echelon base-stock policies are optimal in a
periodic-review finite-horizon setting when there are no economies of scale in plac-
ing orders at all the stages except the most upstream stage in a serial inventory
system. This result was later generalized to an infinite-horizon setting and assem-
bly systems. Nevertheless, optimal echelon stock policies are extremely difficult to
characterize when there are economies of scale in placing orders at all stages. Be-
cause of this difficulty, most previous studies have considered heuristic policies for
serial inventory systems.
Obviously, as the echelon stock policy incorporates downstream agents inventory
information for inventory control, it is superior to an installation policy.
Unfortunately, neither the installation stock nor the echelon stock completely
characterizes the inventory state of a supply chain. To optimize system performance,
inventory should be replenished at the supplier based on the exact inventory posi-
tions at the buyers. Nonetheless, this requires that demand and stock information
at each stocking point be shared on a real time basis between the supplier and buy-
ers in the supply chain. With the recent advances in information technology such
as electronic data interchange (EDI) and other related developments, this is now
possible. In fact, these developments have had a substantial impact upon SCM. As
the time and cost to process orders are substantially lowered, impressive improve-
ments in supply chain performance have been obtained. It is now a general belief
that capturing and sharing real-time demand and stock information is the key to
improving supply chain performance.
1.2.1. Independent and exogenously determined demand process. In a recent re-
search by Sazvar (Sazvar et al., 2014) a stochastic mathematical model id developed
in order to propose a new replenishment policy in a centralized supply chain for de-
teriorating items. In this model, they consider inventory and transportation costs, as
well as the environmental impacts under uncertain demand. The paper (Rezapour
and Farahani, 2010) develops an equilibrium model to design a centralized supply
chain network operating in markets under deterministic price-depended demands
and with a rival chain present. The two chains provide competitive products, ei-
ther identical or highly substitutable, for some participating retailer markets. They
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model the optimizing behavior of these two chains, derive the equilibrium condi-
tions, and establish the finite-dimensional variational inequality formulation, and
solve it using a modified projection method. Correlated demand process
2. Decentralized distribution system.Although more and more firms have realized
that collaboration with their supply chain partners can significantly improve their
profits, the centralization of inventory and production decisions for a decentralized
supply chain is often unrealistic. The challenge, then, is to devise coordination
mechanisms that are not only able to coordinate the activities but also able to align
the objectives of independent supply chain members (Chen et al., 2000).
2.1. Deterministic systems. Previous research on the coordination of decentral-
ized deterministic systems has focused on using quantity discounts to induce inde-
pendent buyers to increase their order quantities.
Many studies have been done independently from the viewpoints of inventory
and production management and marketing channel coordination. The studies in the
two areas differ in their focuses and model assumptions. Specifically, previous studies
in the inventory and production management literature have typically focused on
improving channel efficiency in managing inventory and production activities under
the assumption that annual demand is exogenously determined. In contrast, studies
in the marketing literature have typically focused on sales profit maximization under
the assumption that inventory and production costs are independent of the pricing
decision. Various discount pricing policies have been developed.
In general, it is assumed that the external demand rate, which could be constant
or price-sensitive, occurs at a retailer continuously over an infinite horizon, and the
supplier has symmetrical information about the annual demand and relevant cost
parameters of a buyer. The objective is to determine the inventory and quantity
discount policies to minimize cost or maximize profit.
2.1.1. The case of a single retailer.Many existing studies have analyzed quantity
discount policies in the setting of a supplier and a single buyer. Although a supplier
normally faces many buyers in reality, this setting has been adopted for simplicity
of analysis.
In addition to quantity discount policies, profit sharing mechanisms have also
been proposed. Under this proposal, the system performance is first optimized and
the resultant benefit is then shared between the supplier and the buyer. This solution
can be considered as a cooperative solution. Its implementation, however, depends
on the development of a profit sharing scheme that is acceptable to both parties.
The model proposed by Li, Wang and Cheng (2010) investigates the sourcing
strategy of a retailer and the pricing strategies of two suppliers in a supply chain
under an environment of supply disruption, characterizing the sourcing strategies
of the retailer in a centralized and a decentralized system. As a result, they derive
a sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium price in the decentralized
system when the suppliers are competitive. Based on the assumption of a uniform
demand distribution, the authors obtained an explicit form of the solutions when
the suppliers are competitive.
2.1.2. The case of heterogeneous retailers. When there are many buyers, an im-
portant issue for the coordination of a decentralized supply chain is whether incen-
tive schemes can be designed on an individual basis. However, such a coordination
mechanism with a unified incentive scheme is difficult to develop. There are two
reasons. First, as discussed previously, a suppliers optimal inventory replenishment
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policy when facing a group of heterogeneous buyers typically entails non-stationary
replenishment intervals and, thus, does not admit an explicit formulation. Second,
a unified discount policy must be designed according to buyers cost and demand
structures, as well as their economic behaviors, so as to fully exploit the benefits of
coordination. When individual incentive schemes are permissible, a straightforward
solution to the problem that is able to optimize system performance is for the sup-
plier to negotiate a separate discount policy with each buyer, fixing the lot size and
annual volume at the quantities that optimize system profit and selecting a price
that is agreeable to both parties.
Suppliers in reality usually offer a common pricing policy that contains multiple
break points to all buyers. Other than legal considerations, a common pricing policy
is desirable not only for fairness of trade but also for ease of implementation. Mul-
tiple break points are offered to accommodate different cost and demand structures
of heterogeneous buyers. However, a general discrete quantity discount is difficult
to develop. As such, early studies adopted continuous approximations.
The models above, however, suffer from a common weakness that a heuristic
inventory policy or simply an approximation of the inventory related cost function
is assumed for the supplier. Obviously, neither a lot-for-lot policy nor a heuristic
replenishment policy is desirable for the supplier.
2.2. Stochastic systems. In view of the difficulties in managing centralized stochas-
tic multi-echelon inventory systems, it is an understatement that it is a challenge to
coordinate a decentralized supply chain with stochastic demand. It is then not sur-
prising that the literature in this category is scattered. As most real supply chain
inventory systems fall into this category, this of course represents challenges and
opportunities for future research.
Xu et al. (2014) investigate the impact of establishing a dual-channel supply
chain coordinating contract when the supply chain agents are risk aversion under a
mean-variance model. They present an analytical framework for marking price deci-
sions in a centralized and a decentralized dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse,
and analyze the impact of risk tolerance on the manufacturer and retailer’s pricing
decisions. The results show that the price set by a risk-averse dual-channel supply
chain is lower than the one set by a risk-neutral dual-channel supply chain. Further-
more, compared with a centralized system, the vertical and horizontal competition
in a decentralized system tends to result in channel inefficiency. To achieve channel
coordination, the two-way revenue sharing contract is proposed that demonstrates
the coordination of the dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse, and then it is
analyzed how the risk attitude changes the parameters of the coordinating contract.
3.2. Typology of Financial Supply Chain Cooperation Models
In the field of supply chain management cooperation and collaboration are linked
through flows of goods, information and finance business partners (basic raw ma-
terials and components suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, transporters, banks
and financial institutions, etc.) and are core concepts. Thus, in terms of paradigm
shift from competition to cooperation supply chains are often viewed as a networks
of integrated companies (Mentzer et al., 2001). For an effective supply chain the
management of upstream flow of money is as important as the management of
downstream flow of goods (Gupta and Dutta, 2010). The problem of flow of goods
in supply chains has been studied widely. But mainly the research on supply chain
systems has focused on inventory cost, transportation cost and cost related to goods
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procurement. However, there has been very little research work that focuses on the
upstream and downstream flows of money (Kouvelis et al., 2006). Scholars only
recently began to demonstrate in formal analytical models how planning, manag-
ing and controlling financial flows along supply chains positively affect supply chain
profitability (Raghavan and Mishra, 2011). Even though the aforementioned studies
provide an analytical framework to evaluate the financial impact of supply chain
performance, they are based on implicit assumptions, such as joint decision-making,
absenteeism of opportunism and perfect information sharing, which are rarely ap-
plicable. Considering the theoretical basis of the proposed research, there is a need
of further step toward understanding the supply chain in terms of integration of fi-
nancial, material and information flows (Mentzer et al., 2001, Wuttke et al., 2013).
According to Gupta and Dutta (2011) the research on flow of money in a supply
chain has not yet attracted the attention of mainstream Operations Management
scholars even though the problem is important and bears a great resemblance to
flow of material. The money flow problem has primarily been studied as the problem
of cash circulation, cash management and cash balance. Based on the available
literature, the research work under the rubric of financial supply chains can be
divided into the following three categories:
– Cash flow systems analogous to ERP systems.
– Models for cash management based on inventory concepts.
– Cross functions models integrating manufacturing and finance decisions.
Cash flow systems analogous to ERP systems. There is a plenty of literature
on financial supply chains that has primarily focused on the use of technology in
improving the cash flow process similar to that of ERP in a manufacturing envi-
ronment. The main focus of these studies is on the improvement of actual business
process interactions across multiple organizations in financial supply chain systems.
Although, this approach of cash management may not be applicable in value-added-
service operations where it is very difficult to pin point the exact return for each
and every purchase and investment. In many cases such purchase and investment
are made for strategic advantages, with no immediate clear-cut return. We believe
that the flow of cash needs to be managed as an overall problem rather than try-
ing to map which upstream flow results in which downstream flow and then make
decisions. Such mapping approach may result in a non-optimal performance of the
overall business in terms of cash situations of the company. The studies that deal
with cash flow process or the C2C research do not develop a scheme for an optimal
or near-optimal management of cash flow in financial supply chain system, as we
have done in this paper. They do not optimize the payment schedule. These stud-
ies could be considered complimentary to the contribution of this paper because
our paper specifies the optimal payment schedule whereas these studies focus on
efficient processes.
Models for cash management based on inventory concepts. Another stream of re-
search in cash management literature has borrowed concepts from inventory theory.
In general, an organization maintains a portfolio of assets that include liquid cash,
treasury bills, commercial papers, etc. The optimal cash policies for these organiza-
tions can be determined by minimizing costs of holding cash and various transaction
costs to convert from one asset type to another. The mathematical models for cash
balance primarily focus on balancing the cash in hand with the liquid asset like mar-
ketable securities based on firms needs for cash and predictability of such needs.
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The cash balance problems addressed in this type of models are orthogonal to the
problem of our research. The cash balance problems in these papers deal with in-
ternal cash management of an organization so that transaction cost is minimized or
higher return can be found from these transactions. However, the problem we are
studying focuses on management of external cash transactions such as cash received
from downstream partners and cash payables to upstream partners.
Cross functions models integrating manufacturing and finance decisions. Some
papers have emphasized that financial supply chain decisions should be integrated
with advanced planning and scheduling decisions. These papers developed mixed
integer linear programming based formulations for cash management in a chemical
process industry. Cash management problem studied in these papers is based on
maximizing the cash position by combining profit and the cost of making that
profit. This approach may be applicable for manufacturing industries. However,
in service industries such an approach may not be plausible. Our research bears
some similarity to the approach presented in these papers. However, we address the
problem of cash management to prioritize the payment schedule based on incoming
revenue stream and pending invoices to be paid. The results of this study can
be applied between any two levels of upstream and downstream partners, in both
manufacturing and service industry in a supply chain.
The majority of the most recent research in financial supply chain management
belongs to this stream of works. The outcome of the research by Blome, Paulraj
and Schuetz (2014) is the analysis of the deviation from an optimal profile of supply
chain collaboration and its detrimental effect on sustainability performance as well
as market performance. The model obtained shows that the effects of alignment
on performance measures are mediated by the firm’s internal sustainable produc-
tion. The research by Cao and Zhang (2011) inspects the nature of supply chain
collaboration and explore its impact on firm performance based on a paradigm of
collaborative advantage. As the result, valid model of these constructs was developed
through empirical analysis which shows, that supply chain collaboration improves
collaborative advantage and indeed has a bottom-line influence on firm performance,
and collaborative advantage is an intermediate variable that enables supply chain
partners to achieve synergies and create superior performance. A further analysis of
the moderation effect of firm size reveals that collaborative advantage completely
mediates the relationship between supply chain collaboration and firm performance
for small firms while it partially mediates the relationship for medium and large
firms. In their work Schoenherr and Swink (2012) cross-validate Frohlich and West-
brook’s framework (Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001) utilizing multi-dimensional per-
formance measures collected from supply chain managers. They also extend Frohlich
and Westbrook’s study by investigating the moderating role of internal integration
on the relationships between arcs of integration and performance. In accordance
with information processing theory, the results indicate that internal integration
strengthens the positive impacts of external integration on both delivery and flex-
ibility performance. The model obtained by Hadid and Afshin Mansouri (2014)
lean constructs are identified and operationalized to establish their interrelation
and impact on organizational performance. This paper synthesizes a comprehensive
set of lean technical practices, lean supportive practices, inhibitors and expected
outcome of lean service. Moreover, six influential contextual variables on the lean-
performance relation are identified based on a review of the management accounting
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literature, organizational strategy literature and diversification literature to over-
come limitations of previous studies.
3.3. Gaps in Financial Supply Chain Cooperation Modeling
Different models of SCC have been proposed considering isolated activities or dif-
ferent functions of SC, nevertheless these models appear to be fragmented efforts.
A great deal has been written on centralized supply chain systems. When de-
mand and lead time are deterministic, exact optimal coordination policies for many
buyers are still difficult to characterize. However, power-of-two and integer-ratio
policies provide a highly effective and practically useful framework to coordinate
supply chain inventory activities. Nevertheless, similar coordination mechanisms
have not been developed for a supply chain system when demand and lead time are
stochastic. Although power-of-two and integer-ratio policies can also be applied,
their applicability and effectiveness have not yet been fully established in this case.
A future research area is then to develop optimal, or nearly-optimal but practically
useful, inventory policies for supply chain systems with uncertain demand and/or
lead time. For example, a suppliers (optimal) inventory policy when facing multiple
heterogeneous buyers with uncertain demand and/or lead time is still an open issue.
With the recent advances in information technology, real time data exchange
has become feasible and affordable. As a result, an equally important issue for
SCC is to incorporate information into a coordination policy. The issue, however,
is no longer whether information is useful, as this has been demonstrated by many
previous studies. Rather, future research should focus on what information to be
shared among supply chain members and how to use such information. Previous
studies adopted different coordination policies and, as a result, obtained very dif-
ferent assessments for the benefits of information sharing. Apparently, this shows
that optimal supply chain inventory policies depend on the information structure.
When demand and stock information can be shared among all members in real
time, neither the installation policy nor the echelon stock policy is optimal. Future
research must then identify the desirable information structures and coordination
policies under various supply chain structures.
In comparison to centralized supply chains, the literature on decentralized sup-
ply chain systems is less extensive. The coordination of decentralized supply chain
systems is more difficult: facing the same challenge to optimize system performance
and also requiring a scheme to reallocate the benefits of coordination so as to main-
tain the interest and participation of all independent supply chain members. When
demand is deterministic, many incentive schemes have been studied. Among these
incentive schemes, quantity discounts stand out to be the most widely employed
mechanism to entice the cooperation of independent supply chain members. How-
ever, quantity discounts are usually not able to optimize system performance when
there are heterogeneous buyers and/or multiple products. There is a need to de-
velop more effective and practically useful incentive schemes. Furthermore, as an
action plan to coordinate supply chain decisions and activities often lead to unbal-
anced cost burdens to different supply chain members, the incentive scheme and
the coordination policy must be developed together as a single mechanism.
Finally, real research opportunities exist for the coordination of decentralized
supply chain systems with stochastic demand and/or lead time. As compared to
the above categories, the amount of literature in this area is severely unbalanced.
Although a few previous studies have developed non-cooperative (Nash equilib-
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rium) solutions, the coordination issue represents a real challenge. In view of the
previous studies, a coordination mechanism for a decentralized supply chain system
should include at least three components: 1. an operational plan to coordinate the
decisions and activities of the supply chain members, 2. a structure to share infor-
mation among the members, and 3. an incentive scheme to allocate the benefits of
coordination so as to entice the cooperation of all members.
4. Conclusion
This literature review offers implications for both researchers and practitioners. For
SCM research, this study makes contributions to existing knowledge by providing
a state-of-the-art picture on the relationship between SCM and firm-level finan-
cial performance. On the one hand, effective SCM enhances both accounting- and
market-based performance measures through the improvements in revenue growth,
operating costs reduction, and working capital efficiency. On the other hand, dis-
ruptive SCM causes substantial financial losses in both short-term and long-term
periods. The slow recovery from SC disruptions makes the firms even more vulner-
able in this time-sensitive business environment.
Although, there is an emergent stream of literature which has highlighted the
need to improve that kind of integration (Fairchild, 2005, Gupta and Dutta, 2011),
these attempts are rather scant and fragmented. The review addresses a distinct gap
in the operations and supply chain management literature by proposing that the
improvement of supply chain performance and the optimisation of working capital
along the supply chain requires a holistic understanding of the flow of physical and
financial resources across supply networks.
This study pays particular attention to the problem, that over the past two
decades the operations and supply chain management literature has focused pri-
marily on the flows of physical goods and information, rather than financial supply
chains (Fairchild, 2005; Gupta and Dutta, 2011). The financial supply chain, which
runs parallel to the flow of goods and information, is common to all economic supply
networks, and its integration with the physical supply chain is therefore a critical
and ubiquitous aspect. It is shown, that the evolution of the research in the field of
supply chain cooperation modeling has evolved from centralized cooperative models
through decentralized coordination models to collaborative models. Moreover, the
unit of modeling has become significantly more complex from unconnected supply
chains to multi-echelone systems. From the authors point of view, the further step
ahead, which is expected to be a fruitful avenue of thought, is development of mod-
els of collaborative supply chain networks, especially in the field of financial supply
chain management.
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Abstract In this paper the problem of alliance in the form of joint ven-
ture stability evaluation is considered. The longevity of joint ventures exis-
tence is determined by long term motivation of alliance partners to achieve
stated goals, which in turn, is determined by alliance stability. Analysis of
the existing papers on alliance stability topic showed that the research is
very fragmented. Most well-known papers in the area are mainly focused on
the investigation of different internal and external factors that can influence
joint venture stability. At the same time, no joint venture stability definition
and concept has been suggested. For this reason, authors developed original
approach to the definition of strategic alliance stability and its conceptual-
ization which allows evaluation of stability, taking into account influence of
both, internal and external factors.The introduced concept is implemented
to the analysis of the Renault-Nissan strategic alliance.
Keywords: strategic alliance, joint venture, joint venture stability, internal
stability, external stability, Renault-Nissan alliance.
1. Introduction
In recent decades, globalization of the economy has been growing rapidly, boost-
ing rapid changes in the market structure, business competition and information
environment. At the same time, consumers are becoming more aware and raise de-
mands for quality and consumer properties of products. In such circumstances, it
is extremely difficult for a manufacturing company to meet its needs for resources,
technologies, skills, competencies, knowledge and information to achieve competi-
tive advantage. Therefore, strategic alliances in general and joint ventures (JV) in
particular are an effective strategic tool of competition as they allow companies to
merge their resources (Shuvalova, 2008). Joint ventures enable companies to part-
ner and to expand their geographic presence rapidly, to enter new markets, to gain
access to new knowledge, information, skills, technologies and the necessary com-
petence. Nowadays more and more manufacturing companies see a joint venture as
a source of their competitive advantage in terms of globalization of markets. How-
ever, the percentage of international strategic alliances fulfilling the tasks stated
prior to the relationships development remains extremely low, while failure rate
grows (Zafar et al., 2014).
The term ”strategic alliance” in this article refers to a long-term cooperative
agreement on cooperation between partner companies in order to achieve economic
benefits, while maintaining their legal and economic independence; and the term
”joint venture” refers to a form of a strategic alliance incorporating raising parts
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of the capital of two or more partner companies forming one that may have either
equal or unequal stakes in the company. To be more precise, partner companies in
equity strategic alliances establish an independent company (a joint venture) by
combining some of its assets to start long-term relationships and the transmission
of tacit knowledge.
During the study of dynamic development of joint ventures, stability of the
alliance is considered as a necessary condition to achieve the best result of the joint
venture. It is clear that in order to maintain the stability of a JV the motivation
to cooperate should be maintained during the whole period of its existence, even
though the motivation of the partners may be affected by various internal and
external factors. Therefore, the term of JV stability is referred to the success of its
activities during the period of implementation under the continuous motivation of
each partner company to achieve maximum results.
Analysis of existing approaches to the assessment of the stability of alliances has
shown that there is currently no relevant methodology for assessing the stability
which takes into account both external and internal factors (most of them suggest
univariate analysis). It should be noted that a model designed to predict econometric
analysis cannot offer practical recommendations for overcoming the instability of
alliances (stabilization of a joint venture), and, therefore, managerial application
of the results presented in research papers remains low. Thus, the problem of one
unified methodology for assessing the stability of joint ventures is still unsolved.
This paper suggests a JV stability concept for assessing the JV stability based
on the external stability forecasting and game-theoretic modeling of the internal
stability of the alliance. It appears that this approach to define stability can become
widely used for joint ventures in various sectors of the economy.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. The first section introduces
an overview of the concept of strategic alliances and joint ventures. The second
section is dedicated to a concept of strategic alliances stability. In the third section
the proposed concept was used on a retrospective analysis of stability of Renault
and Nissan JV. The main findings are presented in conclusion.
2. Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
2.1. The Concept of Strategic Alliance
In order to start with the assessment of stability of joint ventures, it is essential
to clarify the terms and understand what forms of cooperation fall into this cat-
egory. Joint venture is defined as a special case of a strategic alliance, which is a
broader class of inter-firm cooperation. Historically, the term of strategic alliance
appeared in the scientific literature a little less than a hundred years ago. In the
economic literature it was first introduced by Hoxie (1923) for the different types of
professional associations. After 30 years Estey (1955) also used the terminology of
Hoxie to study the effectiveness of trade unions activities. Therefore, the initial in-
terpretation of the term of strategic alliance meant a union between a ”dependent”
organization (in need of help to achieve its goals), and economically self-sufficient
firms able to provide the dependent side with the necessary assistance by their high
position in the industry.
Early explorers emphasized that the strategic alliance is not necessarily formed
on the basis of a formal agreement and is often informal, verbal or even secret.
Despite the fact that the term of strategic alliance started to be actively used
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only in the 1980s, researchers and business consultants of the 1930s became inter-
ested in forms of inter-firm cooperation. For example, in the famous Gault work
(Gault, 1937) the author studied the problem of cooperation of business groups in
the field of marketing and gave a prediction about growth of large-scale inter-firm
cooperation in the coming decades based on the analysis of benefits from the joint
actions in the form of strategic alliances.
In the middle of the 20th century, another area of research was the study of
inter-firm cooperation in the form of joint ventures. With the development of com-
munication and transport, domestic markets of other countries have become more
readily available for different companies. New markets in Europe and Asia were
developing especially actively getting open for US companies, which introduced a
new way of entering foreign markets through an establishment of a joint venture, all
assets of which belonged to two or more independent companies. Therefore, almost
all the works of this period are devoted to the analysis of international joint ven-
tures established for the purpose of expansion - entering foreign markets. Until the
late 1970s joint ventures were considered by economists as an additional tool for the
company’s expanding into new geographical markets. At the same time, strategic
aspects of cooperation between companies remained outside of the analysis.
The approaches to the definition of a strategic alliance differ and there is no
uniform understanding. Currently, the term of strategic alliance has a broad mean-
ing that embraces many forms of inter-organizational cooperation. The alliance is
an organizational form that includes more than just a market transaction; it is
a form of contractual relations, a merger or an acquisition along with forms of
inter-organizational cooperation, such as joint ventures, licensing agreements, joint
projects in product development, joint purchase or production (Inkpen, 2001).
As already mentioned above, there is currently no common understanding of the
term of strategic alliance and the approach to the classification of strategic alliances.
Table 1 shows only some definitions of strategic alliance widely used in studies in
chronological order.
Analysis of the definitions shows that researchers emphasize different pecu-
liarities of alliances. In all cases, it is stated that an alliance is a cooperative
agreement between two partner companies. This emphasizes voluntary participa-
tion in the alliance (Gulati, 1998; Das and Teng, 2000); the fact that companies
receive economic benefits or the benefits of cooperation (Rangan and Yoshino, 1996;
Clarke-Hill et al., 1998b; Das and Teng, 2000; Ireland et al., 2002; Todeva and Kno-
ke, 2005); and the necessity of participation of two or more organizations (Rangan
and Yoshino, 1996; Osborn et al., 1998; Dussauge et al., 2000; Pyka and Windrum,
2003; Contractor and Lorange, 2002; Ireland et al., 2002; Clarke-Hill et al., 1998a;
Todeva and Knoke, 2005). The attachment of other cooperative forms created out-
side of the alliance to the new alliances remains arguable.
The diversity of views on the strategic alliance in the scientific literature cor-
relates with goals of a particular research. Summing up views on the concept of a
strategic alliance of different researchers, it is possible to identify the characteristic
properties to be satisfied by the term of strategic alliance; e.g. strategic alliance
is a form of implementing the cooperative strategy of partner companies, which
have common goals and can also have their own private purposes; it requires the
participation of at least two partner companies; partner companies remain legally
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independent; partner companies are jointly implementing management control and
distribute the benefits of cooperation.
One important characteristics of an alliance is a formal independence of part-
ner companies (Inkpen, 2001), whereas cooperation makes partners interdependent
within the alliance (Inkpen, 2001; Ireland et al., 2002). This fact indicates the dif-
ference between the alliance and mergers or acquisitions. The interdependence of
partner companies gets complicated by uncertainty about the behavior of partners
(Inkpen, 2001).
Table 1: Different interpretations of the term of strategic alliance.
Authors Interpretation
Hill, Hwang,
Kim,
1990, p. 218
Strategic alliances can be placed on a continuum where contractual
agreements lie on one end of the continuum, representing low control
and low resource commitment, whereas joint ventures lie on the other
end of the continuum, representing high control and high resource
commitment
Varadarajan,
Cunningham,
1995, p. 282
Strategic alliances, a manifestation of inter-organizational coopera-
tive strategies, entails the pooling of specific resources and skills by
the cooperating organizations in order to achieve common goals, as
well as goals specific to the individual partners
Rangan, Yoshino,
1996, p. 7
A strategic alliance is an arrangement that links specific facets of
the business of two or more firms. The basis of the link is a trad-
ing partnership that enhances the effectiveness of the participating
firms’ competitive strategies by providing for the mutually beneficial
exchange of technologies, products, skills or other types of resources
Clarke-Hill,
Robinson, Bailey,
1998, p. 300
Strategic alliance is a coalition of two or more organizations to achieve
strategically significant goals and objectives that are mutually bene-
ficial
Gulati,
1998, p. 293
Define strategic alliances as voluntary arrangements between firms
involving exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, technolo-
gies, or services
Das, Teng,
2000, p. 33
Strategic alliances are voluntary cooperative inter-firm agreements
aimed at achieving competitive advantage for the partners
Dussauge,
Garrette,
Mitchell,
2000, p. 99
Strategic alliance is an arrangement between two or more indepen-
dent companies that choose to carry out a project or operate in a
specific business area by coordinating the necessary skills and re-
sources jointly rather that either operating on their own or merging
their operations
Elmuti,
Kathawala,
2001, p. 205
A strategic alliance is an agreement between firms to do business
together in ways that go beyond normal company dealings, but fall
short of a merger or a full partnership
Contractor,
Lorange,
2002, p. 486
An alliance is any inter-firm cooperation that falls between the ex-
tremes of discrete, short-term contracts and the complete merger of
two or more organizations
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Ireland, Hitt,
Vaidyanath,
2002, p. 413
Strategic alliances are cooperative arrangements between two or more
firms to improve their position and performance by sharing resources
Pyka, Windrum,
2003, p. 245
Cooperative agreement between two or more autonomous firms pur-
suing common objectives or working towards solving common prob-
lems through a period of sustained interaction
Todeva, Knoke,
2005, p. 125
A strategic alliance involves at least two partner firms that remain
legally independent after the alliance is formed, share benefits and
managerial control over the performance of assigned tasks and make
continuing contributions in one or more strategic areas, such as tech-
nology or products
Hitt, Ireland,
Hoskisson,
2007, p. 269
Strategic alliances are partnerships between firms whereby their re-
sources, capabilities, and core competencies are combined to pursue
mutual interests in designing, manufacturing, or distributing goods
or services
For the purpose of further analysis of the strategic alliances stability, the pa-
per is focused more on long-term agreements, long-term cooperation with partner
companies (for at least 5 years) opposed to co-market transactions or short-term
agreements. It should be noted that very often in the literature, the term of strate-
gic alliance is used to refer to long-term cooperation, yet, in fact, it is a temporary
form of organization (Das, 2006).
In this paper, the strategic alliance is understood as a long-term cooperative
agreement between the partner companies that are legally independent after the for-
mation of the alliance, share the benefits of their co-operation and management
control to implement the tasks and activities carried out continuously in one or
more strategically important areas such as technologies or products.
2.2. The Concept of Joint Ventures
Moving to the concept of a joint venture, it is essential to return to what was stated
earlier. A JV in this paper is considered as a special case of a strategic alliance in
the framework of their classification to attract capital of partner companies within
the alliance. One should distinguish between alliances involving capital and without
it.
The strategic alliances with capital raising (equity strategic alliance) partner
companies create a legally independent company (JV) by combining some of their
assets. Joint ventures are typically created to establish long-term relationships be-
tween partners as well as to transfer their tacit knowledge. They can have both
equal and different stakes in the company.
Strategic alliances without raising capital (non-equity strategic alliances) include
agreements for the supply, production or distribution of products and services with-
out the formation of a joint venture and cooperative agreements in the fields of
marketing activities or knowledge sharing.
Alliances of this type are less formal and carry fewer risks. However, such al-
liances are not always suitable for complex joint projects requiring effective ways
of long-term use of shared resources and the exchange of competencies between the
partners.
Because of the special historical role of the JV development in Russian economy,
authors observed confusing of strategic alliances and joint ventures notions in a
number of domestic research papers, which complicated the reader’s understanding
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of differences in terminology. For example, Strovsky (1999) confused the definitions
of the joint venture in the wide and narrow sense in his work, essentially repeating
the definition of strategic alliances and joint ventures.
In this paper, the joint venture is understood as a form of equity strategic alliance
of two or more partner companies, which may have equal or different shares of
participation in the venture. In equity strategic alliances partner companies create
an independent company, combining some of their assets for establishing long-term
relations between partners and transferring tacit knowledge (Zenkevich et al., 2014,
p. 34-35).
What is more, only strategic alliances with capital raising (JV) are considered
in this paper, so the terms ”strategic alliance” and ”joint venture” can be seen as
synonyms, unless otherwise stated.
A classification of joint ventures is also introduced there. The first category
can be distinguished by the number of partner companies within a joint ven-
ture: there could be two (bilateral) and numerous partners (multilateral). The
first type of a joint venture is the simplest and more common in business prac-
tice (Das and Teng, 2002). Multilateral alliances are less studied, because they are
more complex in terms of management. Recently, in addition to the literature of
multilateral alliances the term of strategic network can be found, referring to the
organizational forms of multilateral organizations having entered into several coop-
erative agreements (Hitt et al., 2007). Joint ventures can be created by companies
operating in the same industry (intra-alliance) and in different sectors (intersec-
tional alliance).
During the analysis of the terms of strategic alliance and joint venture there
is an opportunity to track certain evolution of the concept of strategic alliances
and joint ventures. The first attempts to analyze the strategic aspects of coop-
eration of companies were made in the late 1970s. In 1976, Pfeffer published an
article that explains the creation of joint ventures by the theory of resource de-
pendence (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), exploring the re-
lationships of resource and power companies that had access to the resources them-
selves or from other companies. According to the theory of resource dependence,
the company has two reasons for establishing a joint venture (Das and Teng, 2000;
Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004):
1) to have an access to important resources of a partner;
2) to increase the control over partner-companies.
The next decade could be characterized by the prosperity of joint ventures in
business practice in variety of forms and objectives of cooperation. Therefore, in
the late 1980s - early 1990s the phenomenon of strategic alliances formation (joint
ventures in particular) was explained in terms of several theories of resource con-
cepts, theories of dynamic capabilities, the concept of market power and the theory
of transaction costs.
According to the concept of resources, the main reason for the formation of a
joint venture is the desire to maintain or achieve the desired possession of resources.
In other words, companies have access to their partners’ resources that allows them
to purchase a set of resources within the joint venture that will have the great-
est value for the alliance (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Das and Teng, 2000;
Harrison et al., 2001).
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The distinction between the concept of resource and resource dependence the-
ory is that the first one studies the internal resources, as companies need a set
of rare and valuable resources for their competitiveness. Joint ventures can be
used to accomplish this task. At the same time, the theory of the resource depen-
dence focuses solely on the resources that can be obtained from the environment
(Barringer and Harrison, 2000). This, in its turn, leads to the creation of mecha-
nisms depending on the resources and power management.
Other researchers used the theory of market power to explain the reasons for
the JV formation (Kogut, 1988; Hagedoorn, 1993; Barringer and Harrison, 2000).
According to the theory of market forces, the company creates a joint venture in or-
der to improve its competitive position in relation to its competitors (Kogut, 1988).
This includes not only the improvement of the competitive position of the com-
pany, but also contributes to preventing attempts of competitors to improve their
position. In addition, joint ventures are used by companies as means for increasing
market power. Empirical studies have shown (Hagedoorn, 1993) that the companies
use alliances to enter the market and as an instrument of influence in the market
structure.
According to the theory of transaction costs, joint ventures and alliances are one
of the ways to avoid inefficient transaction costs. The transaction may not be effec-
tive for two reasons: first, the market transaction makes the company dependent on
other companies (Kogut, 1988); secondly, markets themselves may be ineffective,
resulting in high transaction costs. Manufacturing companies also may not be effec-
tive, for example, due to lack of knowledge, competencies, technology and human
resources. Therefore, in case production costs are high and markets are inefficient,
mergers and acquisitions entail additional costs, such organizational forms as a joint
venture may be the most promising strategic alternative.
The end of the last decade of the 20th century was characterized by the new
direction of the development of the resource concept - the concept of dynamic ca-
pabilities (Teece et al., 1997; Sanchez, 2001). Within this concept, joint ventures
are created with the purpose of gaining access to rare poorly reproducible re-
sources and intangible assets of its partners (including knowledge). Being a part
of a joint venture companies have access to the intangible assets of their alliance
partners, and they are able to internalize (Dussauge et al., 2000). Some interesting
research focuses on aspects of learning within the alliance. (See, e.g.: Hamel, 1991;
Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Dussauge et al., 2000).
At the turn of the 21st century, when the creation of strategic alliances has
become an integral part of the company’s strategy and the number and complexity
of the alliances was constantly increasing (some companies have about a thousand
current strategic partnerships with different companies), new social approach to the
study was developed in two research areas: relational approach and the approach
of network structures.
Relational approach is considering a joint venture in terms of the interaction
of social systems, as in the real world a joint venture is established not only for
economic, but also attitudinal characteristics, such as trust, reputation and com-
munication. According to this approach (Seabright et al., 1992), the relationship
between the partners is forming, evolving, deteriorating and eventually terminating
as a result of repetitive attitudinal interactions that affect the success or failure of
the alliance as a whole.
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One of the most important attitudinal factors is the trust (Arino and de la
Torre, 1998; Inkpen and Currall, 2004). Trust defines the company’s expectations
with regard to the behavior of their partners. In particular, the relationship between
the partners can be honest and not be opportunistic (Gulati, 1995). The article
(Koza and Lewin, 1998) based on the study shows that in successful joint ventures
partners trust each other, while in unsuccessful ventures trust was lost or missing.
The network approach studies the interaction of the market elements, where
a lot of companies (components), interact with each other one way or another
(Gulati, 1998; Wilkinson and Young, 2002). These elements and their relationships
form a social network, covering the investigated company and its alliances (including
joint ventures) in which it is present (Gulati, 1998). The social network of the com-
pany, in which it is present, affects its behavior and activities. Gulati gives some
examples of the impact of social networking on companies. Thus, social network
allows an observer to see new possibilities for creating a joint venture for the com-
pany and determines how often and with whom the company forms joint ventures.
In addition, if the two companies form an alliance, their position in the network is
changed, and it determines new proximity of alliance management. Unlike previ-
ously described approaches, the networking approach is primarily a mechanism to
identify links and relations of the company.
In the new millennium, the prevailing approaches to the analysis of strategic
alliances and joint ventures were the concept of dynamic capabilities, network and
relational approaches. The main focus in all the above mentioned theories was placed
on identifying reasons of firms to establish joint ventures, as well as factors affecting
the results of joint venture. Questions of prosperity of a joint venture in terms of a
long temporal gap, the causes of success and failure, termination of the JV existence
are still poorly understood. Currently, in the scientific literature there is no suitable
theory that could predict the future development of alliances and joint ventures in
dynamic.
One reason for the existing situation is that existing approaches use static cases,
therefore, it is not always possible to explain the reality and effectiveness of the
operation of alliances in the long run. What is more, this is also the reason why
explanations of partner companies behavior in joint venture on the basis of these
approaches is not convincing; joint ventures had to be analyzed over time, as each
stage takes its substantial period of time, formation of a joint venture takes from
few months to several years, it operates for years or even decades before ceases to
exist. The life cycle of a joint venture includes three stages: the formation of the
alliance, the implementation phase and the completion stage.
The first phase includes intra preparation, choice of a partner and negotiations
on the composition of a joint venture and cooperative agreements within its frame-
work. In the second phase (implementation) the joint venture starts to operate,
and its management should be able to sustain and contain the pressure of adverse
internal and external factors which can have impact both on the current results
and prospects of the continuation of the joint venture activity. Finally, in the third
phase (completion) the joint venture ends its existence that does not necessarily
mean its inconsistency.
The dynamic perspective of the alliance is related directly to the interaction of
the alliance partners over the lifetime of the alliance. The determining factors of
the relationship between the partners in the joint venture are: trust, involvement,
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balance and coordination between partners. Although these factors are often the
subject of research (Doz, 1996; Arino and de la Torre, 1998; Koza and Lewin, 1998;
Das and Teng, 2002), the development of partners’ relations in the long term still
has not been paid enough attention to (Inkpen, 2001).
Determining the extent of the JV success, the researchers focus specifically on
its results. However, this area of research is problematic, because so far there is no
consensus about which set of factors determines the activity of the joint venture,
nor an agreement on how to assess its results.
There are several ways to determine the activity of a joint venture in terms of
success or failure. Indicators of the success of a joint venture may be indicators
of its survival and duration of existence (Pangarkar, 2003). On the one hand, the
long period of the joint venture existence may be indicative of its success and sat-
isfaction of its partnership companies. Long period of existence enables partners to
share knowledge and achieve good results within the alliance. On the other hand,
the premature termination of the alliance does not mean its failure as well as the
prolonged existence of a joint venture does not always imply its success. Therefore,
the duration of the alliance can be an indicator of the success of the joint venture,
but not of a particular one. The results of the joint venture can also be determined
by the following approaches:
– Achievement of strategic goals (Parkhe, 1993). The results of a joint venture are
considered in terms of achieving the objective pursued by the company during
the formation of the alliance.
– Financial indicators of the results of a joint venture (Combs and Ketchen, 1999).
Thus, the costs, sales growth, profits are often considered as financial indicators
for assessing the performance of the joint venture.
– Knowledge sharing among the partners of the alliance (Kale et al., 2002). Quite
often the company decides to create a joint venture in pursuit of subjective non-
financial goals, such as getting a new technology or knowledge of a new market.
Should one, several or all of the partners have not reached the goal, such an
alliance can be considered unsuccessful for partners, despite the fact that they
can be satisfied with the financial results of the joint venture. However, subjec-
tive measures to assess the performance of the joint venture have been criticized
for being biased in the definition and evaluation due to their inaccuracy.
It should be noted that usage of these approaches can have positive results for the
joint venture, but it still does not guarantee that the partnership will be successful
in cooperation and constructive relations, and vice versa. These considerations lead
to the need for the formulation of a different approach evaluating the success of the
joint venture, including its analysis from the standpoint of a dynamic perspective.
3. Alliance Stability
3.1. The Concept of Stability of Alliances
As alternative indicators of the results of a joint venture indicators of stability of
the alliance can be considered (Mohr, 2006). Stable joint ventures may serve longer
than unstable ones, while within the first companies the likelihood of achieving de-
sired goals and strong financial performance being members of the alliance increases.
However, despite the increasing number of papers analyzing performance of differ-
ent forms of alliances, joint ventures turn to be fails more often than activities of
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independent firms, established branches and subsidiaries, as well as the mergers and
acquisitions (Alexandrovsky and Fomenkov, 2011). In this regard, there is a need
for a more detailed study of the concept of stability of a joint venture.
Many researchers regard an assessment of the alliance’s performance an indicator
of the stability of the joint venture (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). However, according
to the authors, it is more correct to consider the stability of a joint venture not as
a way to assess its performance, but as a way to determine the achievement of the
desired results. Stability is vital for development, evolution and survival of a joint
venture, as it is both a prerequisite and a good estimate for the benefits of the JV
success (Beamish and Inkpen, 1995; Dussauge and Garrette, 1995). Once the joint
venture is created, its resistance becomes a ”prerequisite for extracting competitive
benefits of participation in strategic alliances” (Bidault and Salgado, 2001, p. 619).
Currently, in literature there is no single point of view on the concept of stability
of a strategic alliance as a whole and joint ventures in particular. This largely
explains the fact that the stability of alliances is one of the least studied aspects in
modern business literature.
The term ”stability of a joint venture” was first introduced in 1971 in the work
by Franko (1971). Basing on the empirical study of 170 joint ventures operating in
the United States, L. Franko analyzed the cases in which, in his opinion, there was
no resistance. The main conclusion of the work is very obvious and has no practical
implementation, it lies in the fact that the alliance is unstable when partner changes
or sells its stake in the alliance or alliance is liquidated.
Existing approaches to assessing the stability of joint ventures are listed in Ta-
ble 2. The conventional time division into two periods of work due to the fact that
earlier studies rely primarily on the degree of the foreign partner business peculiar-
ities in the home country of the alliance (Kogut, 1989; Beamish and Inkpen, 1995).
Research projects related to the later period consider market power of each of the
partners as a key factor in the stability of the joint venture (Inkpen and Beamish,
1997; Sim and Ali, 2000; Gill and Butler, 2003).
Cross-cultural differences between the two companies are an integral part of
intercultural alliances, defined as partnerships between companies from different
countries to meet mutual interests and sharing of resources and capabilities (Doz
and Hamel, 1998; Yan and Luo, 2001).
The following example can be given: in autumn of 1991 the company Vitro,
SA, a Mexican glass manufacturer, signed an agreement establishing a joint venture
with the American company Corning Inc. Over the next few years the company ex-
isted in a conflict of interests. First of all, there were problems associated with the
JV management- in Mexico top management made all the decisions, that slowed
the pace of work significantly for those accustomed to the American style of do-
ing business. Vitro’s marketing strategy has been less aggressive than the one of
the company Corning Inc. This was due to the fact that Mexican company has
been conducting its activities in a closed economy for a long time. Although the
choice of partners was strategically right (Corning Inc. specialized in melting glass
and cookware and Vitro - in the manufacture of glassware) and the alliance was
economically attractive for both sides, in 1994 partners decided to return money
which was invested in the joint venture and joint activities were terminated due to
irreconcilable contradictions (Doh, 2003).
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Table 2: Overview of research on joint venture’s stability.
Authors Approach Stability factors and hypothesis
Inkpen,
Beamish,
1997
Conceptual
model
Bargaining power of each of the partners is a key factor in
the stability of the alliance
Yan,
1998
Conceptual
model
Factors of instability: the unexpected circumstances, lack of
economic benefits, low market power of one of the alliance
partners, lack of training opportunities within the alliance
Yang, Zeng,
1999
Conceptual
model
In order to understand the stability of the strategic alliance
it is necessary to compare the results with results that could
be achieved in the absence of co-operation
Das, Teng,
2000
Conceptual
model
Cooperation/competition, rigid structure/flexibility, focus on
short-term/long-term results as the main factors of stability
Sim, Ali,
2000
Empirical
study
The psychological distance between the partners and their
willingness to cooperate are the main factors of stability of
the joint venture
Bidault,
Salgado,
2001
Case
method
The organizational complexity of the joint venture leads to a
deviation from the basic goal of its creation and, consequently,
to its instability
Gill, Butler,
2003
Case
method
Key factors: the confidence of partners, conflicts and power
of their dependence on each other
Ernst,
Bamford,
2005
Practical
study
Constant restructuring and revision of the organizational
structure of the joint venture guarantees stability
Nakamura,
2005
Empirical
study
Transfer of experience inside of a joint venture may eventually
change the market force of partners, leading to restructuring
and, therefore, to its instability
The market power of the partners in the alliance largely determines the stability
of the joint cooperation. This approach was first introduced in 1997 by Inkpen and
Beamish (1997) in their scientific paper, in which, basing on the analysis of various
joint ventures, they have come to the conclusion that the fundamental element of
stability is the bargaining power of each of the partners. In the article by Nakamura
(2005) 231 companies in a strategic alliance since the end of World War II and until
1971 were also studied; M. Nakamura discovered that changes in the market power
of partners can lead to instability of a strategic alliance.
To be more precise, there is a possibility to consider an example of a strategic
alliance between the Norwegian company Statoil and British BP - one of the leading
representatives of the oil and gas industry in the world. In 1991 companies merged to
create a joint venture aimed at achieving long-term strategic goals for both partners.
The BP, despite many years of international experience, was in a difficult financial
situation which did not allow to continue a natural development. In its turn, Statoil
had considerable material resources in absence of conducted international activities,
which also gave it the opportunity to continue its development. The share of the
company’s participation in the joint venture was as follows: BP possessed 66.65%,
and the Statoil held the remaining 33.35%. By the time Statoil has made significant
progress in the international market by developing its own fields, it has increased
its market power; the alliance has ceased operations in the distribution of activities
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they mentioned in the agreement. Changing forces of partners in this case had a
significant impact on the stability of the joint venture.
Another direction of research of stability of joint ventures is associated with the
study of external factors, such as changes in the external environment, unforeseen
events, unfavorable economic situation, leading to deterioration in the financial
results of the alliance (Yan, 1998). There was no comprehensive study of internal
and external factors, despite the fact that in a situation of real business they must
be taken into account.
In order to investigate the stability of existing joint ventures, static methods are
used most commonly. The main approach is aimed at studying the results of the joint
venture in its final stages. In the course of such a research factors that influenced
the decision on cooperation of firms are analyzed. Special attention is given to the
analysis of the literature on cases of JV instability and the factors affecting it.
In this paper, the problem of the successful development of the joint venture is
analyzed mainly in the long term starting with its implementation, which requires
the study of the contractual relationship between companies (Jiang et al., 2008).
Analysis of stability in the long term lets provide and reduce losses of each of the
partner companies at the stage of the alliance formation.
Another obstacle in the field of stability in the JV research projects is the current
lack of its rigorous conceptualization. For this reason, several problems arise:
– The stability of the joint ventures is understood differently in different works
and may vary depending on the purpose of the research and the theoretical
position of the scientist. This, in its turn, leads to contradictory assumptions,
a wide variety of concepts, unconvincing arguments (De Rond and Bouchikhi,
2004);
– Scientists often do not distinguish between the concepts of stability and insta-
bility of a joint venture. For example, in the works devoted to the stability
of the alliance scientists often go on to analyze the reverse phenomenon - the
instability of the alliance - or a mix of these concepts;
– In many studies, stability of an alliance is regarded in its relation to a particular
type of a joint venture, for example, international joint venture, which prevents
generalization of the results to other forms of strategic alliances;
– Studying the stability (instability) is often not held by its evaluation, but only
through the identification of significant factors of influence.
After the analysis of studies on the stability of joint ventures, it was possible to
determine only one definition of stability and two definitions of the instability of
the alliance (Table. 3).
As seen from the definitions above, all of them are quite abstract and difficult
to operationalize in practice. Thus, in the definition of stability, proposed by Jiang,
Li and Gao (2008) it is not clear what degree of effective relationships between
partners this is and how it can be measured. According to Inkpen, Beamish (1997)
and work by Das and Teng (2000) all joint ventures that do not meet the definitions
of instability are stable. However, this argument is contentious.
In this paper the study of the dynamic stability of joint ventures of the alliance
is seen as a prerequisite for achieving the best possible result of the joint venture. It
seems that for the stability of a joint venture companies’ motivation to cooperate
during the whole period of existence must be maintained, while it should be noted
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Table 3: Different interpretations of the term of strategic alliance.
Authors Definition
Inkpen, Beamish,
1997, p. 182
Instability is defined as a major change in partner relationship status
that is unplanned and premature from one or both partners’ perspec-
tive
Das, Teng,
2000, p. 77
Alliance instabilities refer to major changes or dissolutions of alliances
that are unplanned from the perspective of one or more partners
Jiang, Li, Gao,
2008, p. 178
Alliance stability is the degree to which an alliance can run and
develop successfully based on an effective collaborative relationship
shared by all partners
that motivation of the partners may be affected by various internal and external
factors.
There are no specific differences in the phenomenon of stability of a joint venture
and strategic alliance. In the view which was formed after the analysis, a stable
strategic alliance is understood as the success of joint venture’s activities during the
implementation in a situation of continuous motivation of every partner company
to achieve maximum results.
One of the fundamental theoretical approaches to the study of joint ventures is
a resource concept (Oliver, 1990; Barringer and Harrison, 2000), aimed at assessing
how the resources obtained during the signing of an agreement between the two com-
panies help to reduce uncertainty and interdependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978;
Harrigan and Newman, 1990).
Methods of assessing the stability of joint ventures based on the concept of
resource are widely represented in the scientific literature. The paper of 1980 by
Provan, Beyer and Kruytbosch (1980) bears the idea that by forming a joint venture
a company is increasing its market power, thereby reducing dependence on suppliers
of resources through joint ventures. Later the correlation between the size of the
company and gain from cooperation was proven – major partners get less from
cooperative agreements, thus, the joint venture of the largest companies are less
stable (Das et al., 1998).
At the beginning of the 21st century special attention was paid to international
joint ventures in connection with the integration of resources in the world economy.
International joint ventures were claimed to be stable when both partners were
dependent on each other, but remained in strategic control of the company that has
the greatest resources (Yan and Gray, 2001). The possibility of misappropriation of
resources through the creation of inter-institutional relations and the formation of
different security policies for small companies was analyzed in more recent studies
(Katila et al., 2008).
The resource concept is often used in conjunction with the theory of networks
(Gulati, 1995), as it applies the same approach to the assessment of partners’ depen-
dence, but pays more attention to the social context of relationships. In addition, it is
used in conjunction with game theory and theories of organizational behavior to as-
sess the strength of a partner (Saxton, 1997), with the theory of agency agreements
to build the model of separation of control in the alliance (Kumar and Seth, 1998);
theory of transaction to predict future action of each of the partners (Elg, 2000;
Steensma et al., 2000). However, despite the wide applicability of the concept of a
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resource, there is a need for a more practical approach to evaluating the stability of
joint ventures, which would allow a more accurate assessment, which could thereby
adjust the strategic management of the company and reduce costs.
Other methods that are more theoretical in nature are based on an evaluation
of external factors affecting the stability of joint ventures. Such factors include,
for example, the structure of the alliance management, namely the division of ad-
ministrative power (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004), and the credibility of each part-
ner (Fryxell et al., 2002). Later works expand range of external factors affecting
the stability by adding a degree of difficulty to achieve the objectives of the joint
venture, the national peculiarities of partners, the experience of participation in
the partner alliances, as well as a mismatch of expectations of partners (see, e.g.,
McCutchen et al., 2008). To test the hypothesis, an electronic survey of 490 em-
ployees of biopharmaceutical companies was conducted in 1998. The authors used
two models of a binary logistic regression and polynomial regression; alliances were
divided into two groups: those that have ceased to exist, and those that were un-
derway or were completed successfully (the respondent had to estimate the values
of the first three variables – 1 or 0, and the second set of variables – from 1 to
8). Due to the external factors mentioned, it is difficult to assess the perception of
different employees because it differs for many reasons, often it is not related to
the relationship between the two companies, therefore the results which are given
by empirical study had no practical use and did not propose universal estimation
procedure of stability of joint ventures.
Numerous studies show the influence of various internal or external factors on
the stability of a joint venture, however, they do not offer a practical solution
to overcome the instability. Among these factors there is the degree of informa-
tion exchange between the partners (Stuart, 2000), trust of partners to each other
(Deitz et al., 2010), the degree of involvement of partners in the activities of the
joint venture (Meschi and Wassmer, 2013).
In the present paper while investigating dynamic development of joint ventures,
stability of a JV alliance is regarded as a requirement for maximization of JV
performance. It appears that in order to maintain stability of a JV, motivation to
cooperate within the whole period of its existence should be preserved, while the
motivation is affected by various internal and external factors.
3.2. External and Internal Stability of Joint Ventures
Analysis of existing approaches shows that in conditions of globalization and inte-
gration of resources there is an urgent requirement for creating methods to detect
weaknesses of joint ventures and ways to address the evolving problems. In the long
run, this allows companies to follow the revised strategic development plan and re-
duce operational costs. The model developed and introduced in the present paper
includes assessment of external and internal stability of the JV, embracing analysis
of all factors affecting it. Most significantly, the model is widely applicable and can
be used in the evaluation of joint ventures from all industries. In our opinion, it is
advisable not only to examine potential impact of specific factors on motivation of
JV partners and, thereby, its stability, but also to introduce a comprehensive con-
cept of stability which would let us take into consideration all basic factors that can
affect the stability of the strategic cooperation between companies. Thus, stability
is understood as the success of the JV during its implementation period in terms of
motivation of all partners to achieve the maximum results of the alliance activity.
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From the definition it follows that stability is a multiconceptional notion due to
the fact that the nature of motivation of participants in various joint ventures is
diverse and multicomponent. Therefore, the stability-related factors may have dif-
ferent character. The figure shows the structural configuration of the JV stability
concept.
Fig. 1: Joint venture’s stability concept
It should be noted that in the strategic management literature there is a variety
of approaches to determining the success of alliances in general and joint ventures
in particular. Some approaches allow for a qualitative assessment, others for a quan-
titative, based on economic performances of the JV.
Due to the fact that it is customary for companies to evaluate the achievements
by means of economic indicators, let us compare the notion of the success of the
joint venture and the concept of external stability of the joint venture thus wise:
a joint venture has the external stability property, if its economic performances
show an upward economic trend in the long term. Given a long term upward trend
of a JV, the partners assume that their cooperation is successful and the alliance
brings economic benefits. Thus, the partners keep their long-term motivation for
cooperation being a tool for achieving the benefits. To illustrate the importance
of the long-term economic trend influence let us provide a theoretical example.
Supposing that some joint venture started operating in 2004, when its long-term
trend of economic results was rising, however, along with the global financial crisis
in 2008, the JV obtained negative economic outcomes that resulted in a short-term
descending trend. Nonetheless, if all partners appraised the loss as temporary and
in the long term saw an upward trend of economic benefits, they have then no
motive to doubt rationality of their strategic partnership. If the situation caused
by the crisis, did not allow to define the trend in economic outcomes as long-term
positive, the advisability of cooperation may be questioned by the partners, leading
to external instability of this joint venture. The concept of external stability provides
an opportunity to assess stability of a JV as a separate economic entity. It helps
to remember that the alliance was formed by the partners each being an economic
entity and having its own economic interests.
Accordingly, the next step of assessing the stability of the JV should be consid-
eration of the internal, or cooperative, stability. (Zenkevich et al., 2009b). It seems
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clear that internal stability is determined by numerous factors such as partner satis-
faction, confidence in the choice of a partner, content with the distribution of bene-
fits from the joint venture between the partners, etc. In the strategic management lit-
erature there is a number of studies (both theoretical and empirical) on the internal
stability of a JV (e.g.: Dyer et al., 2008; Gill and Butler, 2003; Wong et al., 2005;
Kumar, 2011). At the same time, in cooperative game theory strict definitions of
the various types of internal stability are introduced; and the theoretical basis for
their evaluation is developed in (Zenkevich et al., 2009b). Therefore it seems use-
ful to combine the approaches of strategic management and the approach of game
theory to the assessment of internal stability as an alternative path to the already
existing directions in the theory of strategic management.
First, the stability of the motivation of participants to cooperate needs to be
considered. So, one component of the internal stability of the joint venture will be
its motivational stability. The success of cooperation between two or more institu-
tions is influenced not only by internal and external economic and other factors,
but also by interpersonal relationships of the alliance partners (Deitz et al., 2010).
The motivation for the continuation of the joint activity is supported by corporate
objectives as well as extent of partners’ involvement in permanent cooperation. It
was noted earlier that a number of factors, such as trust to each other and attention
to intercultural differences between the partners, has an impact on the financial per-
formance of the joint venture, namely its stability. In order to assess the internals
stability of the JV, we must admit an assumption that the companies within the
joint venture are rational: each of them tries to maximize its benefits. According to
the definitions of a joint venture and a strategic alliance, JV is created in conditions
where the results achieved by the partners are better than if they worked separately
owing to the synergistic effect. Therefore, both partners should make each of the
participants in the JV try to increase the total income of the cooperation by working
in conditions of mutual understanding and trust. This approach is required to antic-
ipate possible actions of partners, to maximize benefits from cooperation. However,
it should be noted that there are not only positive benefits from collaboration, but
also potential threats, such as loss of management control, control over technology
and know-how. Consequently, the analysis of motivational stability is carried out
to determine the motivation of participants of a joint venture to cooperate with
regard to all possible circumstances. The authors also offer to consider other types
of internal stability – strategic and dynamic, which are well conceptualized and
examined in cooperative game theory (Zenkevich et al., 2009a). They allow consid-
ering important aspects of strategic cooperation within the alliance that affect its
stability.
The importance of strategic stability can be illustrated by the following exam-
ple. Given that several companies have created a joint venture, however, during the
implementation phase one of the JV partners felt that the relationship with the se-
lected partners does not bring the desired results, and that he could possibly achieve
better results within a joint venture with other partners or as part of another type
of interaction with companies. Nevertheless, the early exit from the joint venture
inflicts a lot of costs. Even if one partner finds a better alternative to participation
in this JV, they cannot always leave the alliance and realize it due to the fact that
the benefits of other alternatives (taking into account the costs of early exit from
the joint venture) may be less than the benefits that the partner derives from the
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cooperative agreement. Strategic stability suggests that none of the alliance part-
ners finds it profitable to deviate from their cooperative agreement under conditions
when all the partners stick to it. Starting the joint venture; each of the partners
makes a strategic choice in favor of an alliance. During the implementation period
of the JV partners may doubt the choice and, consequently, begin to consider the
decision to withdraw from the JV.
To assess the stability associated with the distribution of gains from cooperation
within a joint venture, it is necessary to consider the concept of dynamic stability,
introduced in game theory. The term dynamic stability was first introduced in the
academic literature by Leon Petrosjan (1977). According to this concept, when cre-
ating the JV partners imagine types and quantity of benefits they will receive at
the time of concluding the cooperation agreement of sharing the benefits of the
JV. Dynamic stability implies that when considering one partner in a moment of
realization of a joint venture, the benefits he has already received in the framework
of cooperation in conjunction with the benefits he still expects to receive prior to
the expiration of the agreement shall not be less than the benefits he expected to
obtain at the stage of signing the cooperation agreement. Thus, dynamic stability
implies that the above-mentioned character of benefits will be fair for each of the
partners in any review period of the JV implementation. This conceptualization of
dynamic stability seems logical. Because if the partner finds that the benefits he will
receive by the end of the existence of the joint venture will be less than expected,
his motivation to participate in the JV may be severely reduced or even disappear.
Conversely, if at any moment of the implementation of the JV a participant under-
stands that they will reach the benefits initially planned by the end of the alliance
existence, they will not have desire to withdraw from the agreement.
The proposed concept of stability of a strategic alliance enables assessment of
cooperative agreements concerning presence of each component of the stability.
In the next chapter the stability of Renault–Nissan strategic alliance will be
analyzed according to the introduced concept of stability.
4. Stability Analysis of the Renault–Nissan Joint Venture
We illustrate the above-described concept of the stability by an example of Renault
and Nissan strategic alliance in a joint venture form.
4.1. Renault–Nissan Strategic Alliance
Strategic French–Japanese partnership in the field of motor industry between the
French Renault and the Japanese Nissan came into force on the 27th of March, 1999.
Implementation phase of the alliance began in 2003, when the partners moved on to
joint activities and a JV was created. Thus, data between 2003 and 2012 is analyzed
in the case; that allows us to assess the stability of this strategic alliance.
The beginning of the XXI century is characterized by fast pace of the motor
industry development, which led to numerous agreements, amalgamations and take-
overs. Thus, in 1999 Renault acquired a 36.8% stake in Nissan, and two years
later increased the stake up to 44.4%. In its turn, the Japanese company bought a
15% stake in Renault in 2001. The established ownership structure was stable and
survived to the present day. Renault–Nissan BV (RNBV) alliance located its head
office in Amsterdam (the Netherlands), was established on a parity basis for the
exchange of ideas and technologies, as well as for synergy effects maximization.
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The alliance structure is presented in Figure 2.
Considering that there was an exchange of shares, it is clear that both companies
are interested not only in the success of the jointly created enterprise, but also in
the further development of a partner company.
Fig. 2: The Renault–Nissan alliance structure
The aim of the alliance is to achieve a scale effect without sacrificing the unique-
ness of each partner that is ensured by joint development of engines, batteries and
other components. For example, the increase of Nissan market share in commercial
vehicles segment resulted from adoption of elements of Renault vans such as Renault
Kangoo/Nissan Kubistar, Renault Master/Nissan Interstar, Renault Trafic/Nissan
Primastar. In addition, Renault is the engines constructor of almost all Nissan
diesel engines in Europe. Cooperation between Renault and Nissan also focuses on
capital-intensive research projects (transport with zero gas emission and the increase
of sales in emerging markets such as Brazil, Russia and India). Moreover, partners
reduce suppliers and logistics related expenses owing to the fact that procurements
and supply chains are formed simultaneously for two companies. Product output
of each partner in the region with no factory is carried out by the other partner’s
manufacturing division that also allows to maximize effect from economy of scale.
In general, the alliance estimated cost reduction by means of synergy at 1.5 billion
e in 2010.
Ten years after signing of the initial agreement, in 2009, under the strategy of
Renault and Nissan partnership strengthening a separate group of experts from both
companies was created. The role of the group was to promote closer cooperation in
16 different fields, including research and advanced engineering research, parts and
accessories production as well as marketing. In 2012, sales of the alliance reached
a record of 8.1 million units worldwide (a 1%-increase compared to the previous
year), thereby continuing to grow for the fourth year running.
4.2. Prerequisites of a Strategic Alliance Establishment
By the mid-1990s Nissan has been experiencing significant financial difficulties, so its
controlling stake was sold to Renault. Following the signing of the agreement, Carlos
Ghosn assumed the position of President and CEO of Nissan. The set of reforms
proposed by the new President and designed to save the stuck in debt company
obtained the title ”Nissan Revival Plan – NRP”. It included job cuts, shutdowns of
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factories, reduction in the number platforms, investments in new technologies and
creation of an efficient production system.
Traditionally, Nissan had stronger positions in the US and Japan, while Renault
operation was more efficient in Russia, France and Brazil. Renault sales were mostly
in Europe, in 1998 the company did not sell a single car in the USA and sold 2476
units in Japan. At the same time, both companies announced their intention to carry
out joint development and production to increase their share in emerging markets
such as China, India and Brazil. Thus, one of the goals of the JV was territorial
expansion.
Due to the fact that the new technologies development was conducted jointly,
both partners maximized synergy effects in the field of capital-intensive projects.
For example, it was announced in 2013 that the company sold the 100.000th elec-
tric vehicle, and the Nissan Leaf has become the most popular electric car in the
world. Additionally, Renault and Nissan agreed on joint control of the Russian ”AV-
TOVAZ”, which could be very difficult for each company on a stand-alone basis.
Reduction of expenses and achieving maximum synergies in this area was also one
of the goals of the alliance.
4.3. Stability Assessment of the Renault–Nissan Joint Venture
External Stability. According to the accepted definition, for an external stabil-
ity assessment of the Renault–Nissan JV it is necessary to analyze whether the
economic performance trend of the alliance is positive in the long run.
Figure 3 presents information about the economic performance of the alliance in
the period from 2004 to 2011 in the form of a graph and an economic performance
smooth curve with an interval of three years.
Let us consider trend lines presented in Figure 4, for the smooth curve of the
strategic Alliance economic performance.
Fig. 3: Economic performance of the Renault–Nissan JV and its smooth curve
Figure 4 shows that trend lines 1 and 2 of the alliance economic performance
are descending because of the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009. In 2006-2007 short-
term instability was observed. However, this period did not last more than two
years. As shown in Figure 3, in 2008 trend line 3 becomes upward. Renault–Nissan
successfully overcame the crisis. Trend lines 4 and 5 are rising. It is evident that a
long-term trend represented by line 6 is upward as well.
Despite a small fluctuation in the economic performance trend of the JV, the
company hoped that the difficulties they had to face were temporary; nevertheless,
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Fig. 4: Trend lines and economic performance smooth curve of the Renault–Nissan JV
the growth of economic results of the alliance is expected in long-term perspec-
tive. Thus, it can be argued that Renault–Nissan joint venture has the property of
external stability.
Internal Stability. First, we should analyze motivational strength of the partners.
Benefits and risks for the partners from participation in the alliance are presented
in Table 4.
Table 4: Benefits and risks for Renault and Nissan in the alliance∗.
Benefits Risks
Renault Access to the markets of North America and
Asia.
Engineering solutions in the motor industry.
Nissan reputation in SUVs and pickup market.
Loss of management control.
Cross-cultural conflicts.
Nissan debts.
Nissan Access to the European market.
Financial and managerial support.
Skills in design and production, marketing and
design. The expansion of the model range.
Loss of management control.
Takeover threat.
Cross-cultural conflicts.
Ranking of possible outcomes for Renault and Nissan according to their prefer-
ence on the basis of benefits and risks comparison for both partners depending on
the selected strategies combination was conducted by the expert consultant with
work experience in M&A and Due Diligence for enterprises and an employee of the
Product Management Department of Adam Opel AG.
The expert analysis results were processed using the instrument DSSS ASPID-
3W (Table 5).
∗Sources: authors’ analysis based on information in Nissan Company Corporate Website,
Renault Company Corporate Website.
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Table 5: Outcome ranking in Renault and Nissan motivational game in the alliance.
Situation in a game (A; A) (A; P ) (P ; A) (P ; P )
Renault outcome ranking 4 1.7 2.7 1.7
Nissan outcome ranking 4 2 1.7 2.3
Table 5 generates a motivational game set in Table 6. In this game the only
strong equilibrium realized is in the situation (A; A), which indicates a motivational
stability of the Renault and Nissan companies JV.
Renault had to enter the markets of North America and Japan, which were
the largest consumers of car manufacturers. Despite the fact that the French com-
pany owned a rich set of competencies including advanced knowledge in the field
of marketing and design, for the further successful development of the company
new engineering solutions and production skills were required. Apart from this,
Nissan had stronger positions in a pickup and SUV market resulting from a wide
representation of the products.
Table 6: Renault-Nissan alliance motivational game.
Nissan strategies Participation Exit
Renault strategies
Active position (4; 4) (1.7; 2)
Passive position (2.7; 1.7) (1.7; 2.3)
Each JV has a threat of loss of its management control, which appears in case
of a passive strategy of behavior in the alliance. Although the stage of signing
the agreement and preparation for its implementation lasted for nearly four years,
for both partners there was a threat of cross-cultural conflicts associated with the
special identity of the Japanese culture. In addition, Renault had to cope with debt
obligations of Nissan, which entered its area of responsibility. This means that the
failure of the ”Nissan Revival Plan” could undermine its economic position.
Regardless of strong and stable Nissan positions in Japan and the US, the Eu-
ropean market remained its weakness. As a result, the alliance with the French
Renault pursued the goal of entering a new market where the partner had already
had an influence. Along with the acquisition of numerous skills, for instance, in the
field of development and production, marketing and design, Nissan received finan-
cial support and a new CEO who was able to save the company from a complete
bankruptcy. Hence, there was a takeover threat related to the fact that Nissan was
materially and morally bound by obligations with Renault. Model range expansion
was gradual and did not give significant advantages to any of the companies specif-
ically; however, it should be noted that partially the success of Nissan is stipulated
by the use of body models of Renault vans.
Thus, both companies were encouraged to choose an active strategy and to
participate in the work of the JV; that indicates motivational resistance, which was
preserved throughout the time of the alliance implementation.
In 1998, when Renault and Nissan signed an agreement, both of them needed
a strategic partner for its development. Since the stage of implementation of the
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Alliance started 11 years ago, we may perform a retrospective analysis. Renault
needed to enter the markets of North America and Asia in order to maintain its
competitiveness in the long term. Alliances with American companies such as Ford,
General Motors and Daimler-Chrysler seemed unlikely due to the fact that these
companies were interested in mergers and takeovers. It was important to apply to
companies widely represented in the Asian market that led to a partner search in
Japan. However, Japanese companies Subaru and Isuzu were under the influence of
General Motors, and Mazda - under Ford. The most suitable partner was Nissan,
whose strategic plans in geographical expansion corresponded with those of Renault.
In its turn, competencies of the companies were of mutual necessity. Production
optimization skills and engineering solutions of Nissan in combination with design
solutions and marketing strategy of Renault provided a competitive advantage that
the companies could not have obtained on their own. It should be noted that the
companies made a share exchange (44,4% of the Japanese company was given to
Renault, 15% of the French company passed to Nissan), which means closer cooper-
ation between the partners. Total investments of Renault and Nissan to the alliance
reached $2.1 billion. Besides, at present time Renault and Nissan have a common
supply chain, and some models in different countries are manufactured in partner
factories. Therefore, even if there is a more attractive alternative at the market,
costs of exiting the alliance will be rather high. Let us proceed to the formalization
of the game according to the above-described methodology of strategic stability
assessing.
Similar to motivational stability, ranking of possible outcomes for Renault and
Nissan according to their preference on the basis of benefits and risks comparison
for both partners depending on the selected strategies combination was conducted
by the expert consultant with work experience in M&A and Due Diligence for
enterprises and an employee of the Product Management Department of Adam Opel
AG. The rankings of the strategic outcomes of the conflict are given in Table 7.
Table 7: Renault and Nissan JV strategic conflict outcome rankings.
Situation in a game (P ; P ) (P ; E) (E; P ) (E; E)
Renault outcome ranking 4 1.7 2.7 1.7
Nissan outcome ranking 4 1.3 2.3 2.3
Table 7 gives rise to a strategic game represented in Table 8, in which the only
strong equilibrium is realized in the situation (P ; P ), which proves the stability of
the Renault–Nissan strategic alliance.
Table 8: Renault-Nissan alliance strategic game.
Nissan strategies Participation Exit
Renault strategies
Participation (4; 4) (1.7; 1.3)
Exit (2.7; 2.3) (1.7; 2.3)
Renault–Nissan JV dynamic stability. Renault and Nissan not only established
a joint venture in the framework of strategic cooperation, but also made mutual
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exchange of shares. Therefore, Renault and Nissan cooperation brings benefits in
the form of JV profits and the joint cost of the companies themselves. As long as
the partners are joint owners of each other, dividend payments must be considered
as the benefits of cooperation as well.
Eventually, to estimate the total annual economic benefits of the Renault–Nissan
alliance, we use the following formula:
Profitalliance + ShEqR + ShEqN +DivR +DivN ,
where Profitalliance is a net profit of the Renault–Nissan alliance in the form of
JV for a year; ShEq
R
– capitalization of Renault (assessed through equity share);
ShEq
N
– capitalization of Nissan in the current year (assessed through equity share);
Div
R
– dividends paid by Renault in the current year; Div
N
– dividends paid by
Nissan in the current year. Total economic benefits of the Alliance in its implemen-
tation period from 2004 to 2014 are presented in Table 9.
Table 9: Renault and Nissan economic benefits, billion e ∗.
Year JV net
profit
Capitalization
of Renault
Capitalization
of Nissan
Renault
dividends
Nissan
Dividends
Total
economic
benefit
2004 5.26 15.86 18.40 1.80 0.70 42.03
2005 6.36 19.49 22.57 2.40 0.77 51.60
2006 5.33 21.07 24.55 3.10 0.90 54.95
2007 4.39 22.07 24.00 3.80 0.94 55.20
2008 1.25 19.42 23.35 0.00 0.83 44.85
2009 -4.07 16.47 27.81 0.00 0.00 40.21
2010 5.02 22.76 34.18 0.30 0.18 62.43
2011 4.10 24.57 38.47 1.16 0.57 68.85
2012 3.68 24.55 39.74 1.72 0.83 70.52
2013 2.82 23.21 36.22 1.72 0.87 64.84
2014 4.15 24.90 36.14 1.90 0.94 68.04
The benefits of participation in the alliance for each company are measured
using the same components as for the benefits of the entire alliance; still, the share
of mutual participation of partners in the capital stock of each other is also taken
into account. Therefore, the economic benefits of Renault can be assessed by the
following formula:
Profitrenault + 0, 85ShEqR + 0, 444ShEqN + 0, 85DivR + 0, 444DivN ,
where Profitrenault is the Renault profit from participation in a JV with Nis-
san, 0, 85ShEq
R
– Renault benefits from the management of 85% of its own stake;
0, 444ShEq
N
– Renault benefits from possession of 44.4% stake in Nissan; 0, 85Div
R
– the dividends of Renault shareholders; 0, 444Div
N
– Renault dividends on 44.4%
of Nissan’s shares.
∗ Sources: Compiled information from Nissan Company Corporate Website, Renault Com-
pany Corporate Website and the annual reports of the companies from these websites.
240 Anastasia F. Koroleva, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
Calculation of economic benefits from participation in the alliance for Nissan is
performed similarly according to the formula
Profitnissan + 0, 15ShEqR + 0, 5596ShEqN + 0, 15DivR + 0, 5596DivN .
Profit and economic benefits of Renault and Nissan in each year from 2004 to 2012
are shown in Table 10.
Table 10: Economic benefits of Renault–Nissan alliance, billion e ∗.
Year Renault
profit in JV
Nissan
profit in JV
Renault
economic
benefit
Nissan
economic
benefit
2004 1.35 3.91 24.78 17.25
2005 1.18 5.19 30.07 21.53
2006 1.07 4.26 32.82 22.12
2007 1.45 2.95 34.41 20.78
2008 0.25 1.00 27.40 17.44
2009 -2.17 -1.91 24.08 16.13
2010 2.41 2.61 37.13 25.30
2011 0.81 3.29 39.86 28.99
2012 0.50 3.18 40.54 29.64
2013 -0.80 3.62 36.72 28.11
2014 0.44 3.71 39.55 28.48
Table 11 summarizes the results of the previous calculations of the distribution
of benefits from cooperation (tables 9 and 10), and indicates the share of each
company from the common benefits of the alliance for each year.
Table 11: Distribution of profits from participation in the alliance, billion e∗.
Year Renault
economic
benefits
Nissan
economic
benefits
Total economic
benefits
of the alliance
Renault
share
Nissan
share
2004 24.78 17.25 42.03 0.59 0.41
2005 30.06 21.53 51.60 0.58 0.42
2006 32.82 22.12 54.95 0.59 0.40
2007 34.41 20.78 55.20 0.62 0.38
2008 27.40 17.44 44.85 0.61 0.39
2009 24.08 16.13 40.21 0.60 0.40
2010 37.13 25.30 62.43 0.59 0.40
2011 39.86 28.99 68.85 0.58 0.42
2012 40.54 29.64 70.18 0.58 0.42
2013 36.72 28.11 64.83 0.56 0.43
2014 39.55 28.48 68.03 0.58 0.42
Distribution of shares presented in Table 11 is also illustrated in Figure 5.
∗ Sources: Compiled information from Nissan Company Corporate Website, Renault Com-
pany Corporate Website and the annual reports of the companies from these websites
as well as authors’ calculations.
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Figure 5 shows that distribution of total benefits from cooperation within the
framework of the strategic alliance was structurally stable: 58,96% for Renault and
41,04% for Nissan. There are small annual fluctuations, standard deviation from
the specified distribution of which is σ = 0.02%. Therefore, Renault–Nissan joint
venture is dynamically stable, that reaffirms its general resistance as it possesses all
types of stability – external and internal (motivational, strategic and dynamic).
Fig. 5: Economic benefits of Renault and Nissan from participation in the alliance
5. Conclusion
In the first section of the article an overview of the literature and the evolution
of the concept of strategic alliance and joint venture is provided; main tendencies
of development of the given forms of cooperation of companies are revealed. We
suggest author’s definitions of the strategic alliance and joint venture, based on
the analysis of the results of existing research, and meeting the requirements of
the study; their classification is introduced and evolution of theories of strategic
alliances and joint ventures is traced. The second section of the article describes the
basic concepts of stability of strategic alliances and joint ventures, identifies their
advantages and disadvantages. On the basis of the existing research we describe the
factors affecting the stability of cooperative agreements. In addition, it is shown
that modern stability theories cannot fully cover all possible factors and conditions
peculiar to joint ventures, and address the JV stability problem from only one
position that is of interest to researchers.
In addition, most existing approaches to the assessment of stability can hardly be
called applicable. The reasons for this are various: from the inability to quantify the
stability of the alliance to the problems with clear allocation of factors and criteria
affecting the JV stability. In this regard, the authors propose their own approach to
the definition of stability of a joint venture. The introduced concept of stability is a
kind of synthesis of modern approaches to the alliance stability. Unlike all previous
models, it does not consider the specific nature of motifs that influence creation or
dissolution of an alliance. In the framework of this concept the existence of motifs
for following or deviation from the cooperative path suffices. Thus, the author’s
concept of JV stability covers all previously listed theories and approaches to the
definition of strategic alliance stability. Besides, it should be noted that this concept
is a result of the integration of the strategic management theory and mechanisms
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of dynamic games theory. The advantages of this approach are obvious: it combines
both the accuracy of game-theoretic analysis and its application to a variety of
factors (determining the nature of motivation of the joint venture participants), the
plenty of which can be found in the strategic management theory.
Finally, it was demonstrated that the stability concept can be applied to assess-
ing the stability of existing ventures and predicting the stability of a potential JV,
which helps to formulate recommendations and requirements of the agreement on
formation of an alliance. The results of the research can serve as a theoretical base
for future research in the field of stability analysis of strategic alliances.
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Abstract We consider the cooperative behavior in stochastic games. We as-
sume that players cooperate in the game and agree on realizing the Shapley
value as an imputation of their total payoff. The problem of subgame (time)
consistency of the Shapley value is examined. The imputation distribution
procedure is constructed to make the Shapley value subgame consistent. We
redefine the payoffs in stochastic game applying the imputation distribution
procedure. The problem of strategic support of the Shapley value is exam-
ined. We prove that the cooperative strategy profile is the Nash equilibrium
in the stochastic game with re-defined payoff functions when some condi-
tions are satisfied. The theoretical results are demonstrated on the example
of a data transmission game for a wireless network of a specific topology.
Keywords: cooperative stochastic game, time consistency, subgame consis-
tency, imputation distribution procedure, strategic support
1. Introduction
We consider the class of stochastic games with discounted payoffs when players
use stationary strategies. This class of games for two players was introduced by
(Shapley, 1953a). Most papers devoted to stochastic games examine the non-coope-
rative behavior of the players, e. g. see (Herings and Peeters, 2004), (Ja´skiewicz
and Nowak, 2015), (Rosenberg et al., 2003). The cooperative model of a stochas-
tic game was initially proposed by (Petrosjan, 2006). He investigated the problem
of subgame consistency of cooperative solutions in a stochastic game played over
a finite tree. The same problem was examined for discounted stochastic games
when the set of states is finite and players use stationary strategies in (Petros-
jan and Baranova, 2006). In this paper the method of finding a cooperative solu-
tion and verifying if the solution satisfies the principle of subgame (time) consis-
tency. The problem of time consistency of the cooperative solution was proposed
by Petrosyan in (Petrosyan, 1977). He proposed to modify the payment mecha-
nism along cooperative trajectory of the initial game and introduced the IDP (im-
putation distribution procedure) to make the cooperative solution time-consistent
(Petrosyan and Danilov, 1979). This idea was realised for the class of differential
games but it is actual for stochastic games as well.
Two other principles of stable cooperation in dynamic games were formulated
in (Petrosyan and Zenkevich, 2009) including the principle of strategic support of
a cooperative solution. If the cooperative solution is strategically supported, then
⋆ This work was supported by Saint Petersburg State University (research project
9.38.245.2014) and Russian Foundation for Basic Research (project 16-01-00713).
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there exists the Nash equilibrium in trigger strategies with the players’ payoffs equal
to their payoffs in cooperation. The trigger strategy punishes the deviating player
by allowing him to obtain the maxmin value in a subgame starting from the stage
following the stage when the deviation has been observed (Petrosyan, 2008). The
problem of strategic support is considered in (Parilina and Zaccour, 2015b) where
the subgame perfect ε-equilibrium is constructed for the dynamic games played
over event trees1 . Another principle of stable cooperation is irrational-behaviour-
proof (Yeung, 2006). It allows players to guarantee that their payoffs in cooperation
will be not less than the payoffs when the cooperation breaks down at some stage
and then players proceed playing the game as singletons. These three principles of
stable cooperation were adopted to the discounted stochastic games (Parilina, 2015).
Recently, the existence of cooperative solutions (Harsanyi, Shapley, Nash solutions)
for discounted stochastic games was proved in (Kohlberg and Neyman, 2015).
In our paper we focus on two problems of cooperation in stochastic games:
subgame consistency and strategic support. We prove the theorem which allows to
construct the imputation distribution procedure to make the Shapley value subgame
consistent. Then we define the behavior strategy profile in trigger strategies to
support cooperation in case when some player deviates from the cooperative strategy
profile. We need to mention here that initially we find the cooperative solution
assuming that players use stationary strategies, but the construction of the trigger
strategies requires considering the class of behavior strategies. Behavior strategies
allow to observe the player’s deviation and switch to a trigger mode of the trigger
strategy.
As an example of a stochastic game we examine the problem of data transmission
in the simple wireless network. The simple network of data transmission consisting of
three nodes is taken as a basis of network topology. Two of the nodes generate data
packages in each time slot with the corresponding probabilities. The third node is the
destination one. The first two nodes are connected by a channel, the connection is
one-way, i.e. the first node (first player) can transmit a package directly to node 3 or
to node 2. For the transmission of a package to node 2 node 1 receives a nonnegative
reward. The system of rewards and costs makes it possible to support cooperation
between nodes 1 and 2 which are players 1 and 2 in the game, respectively. The
described situation can be solved as a cooperative stochastic game.
Modeling data transmission as a stochastic game was introduced in
(Altman et al., 2003, Parilina, 2010, Sagduyu and Ephremides, 2006). The game
theory models of the behaviour in ad hoc wireless networks with emphasis on
the development of cooperation mechanisms to stimulate package forwarding are
considered in (Michiardi and Molva, 2003). Game theoretical models are useful for
modeling the data transmission not only in ad hoc but also in CSMA networks
(Benslama et al., 2013). The problem of constructing and analyzing the simple
mechanism to stimulate the nodes for package forwarding is investigated in
(Buttyan and Hubaux, 2003).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model of
non-cooperative stochastic game, and Section 3 deals with the construction of the
cooperative version of the stochastic game. Section 4 contains the description of
the subgame consistency problem and the method to make the cooperative solu-
1 The details of the specification of a game played over event trees may be found in
(Haurie et al., 2012)
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tion subgame-consistent. The idea of strategic support of a cooperative solution is
investigated in Section 5. We provide an illustrative example of data transmission
in wireless network in Section 6, and briefly conclude in Section 7.
2. Non-cooperative stochastic game
We consider a stochastic game with finite number of states when player’s payoff is
a discounted sum of the stage payoffs which players obtain along the realized tra-
jectory (sequence of the realized action profiles). The game begins with the chance
turn, i.e. with the choice of the initial state of the game which the game process be-
gins with. The state of the stochastic game is determined as a normal form game of
n players. One of the finite number of states is realized at each stage of the stochas-
tic game. In the state some action profile is realized depending on the transition
probabilities.
Definition 1. Let stochastic game G be determined by the set(
N,
{
Γ j
}t
j=1
, δ, π0,
{
p(j, k;xj)
}
j=1,t,k=1,t,xj∈
n∏
i=1
X
j
i
)
, (1)
where
– N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players.
– Γ j = 〈N,Xj1 , . . . , Xjn,Kj1 , . . . ,Kjn〉 is a non-cooperative normal form game which
defines the state j, j = 1, . . . , t, Xji is the finite set of pure actions of player i
in Γ j , Kji
(
xj1, . . . , x
j
n
)
= Kji (x
j) is a payoff function of player i in state Γ j ,
j = 1, . . . , t.
– p(j, k;xj) is the probability that state Γ k is realized if at the previous stage (in
state Γ j) action profile xj = (xj1, . . . , x
j
n) has been realized, p(j, k;x
j) > 0 and∑t
k=1 p(j, k;x
j) = 1 for each xj ∈ Xj = ∏
i∈N
Xji and for any j, k = 1, . . . , t.
– δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
– π0 = (π01 , . . . , π
0
t ) is the vector of the initial distribution on states Γ
1, . . . , Γ t
where π0j is the probability that state Γ
j is realized at the first stage of the
game,
∑t
j=1 π
0
j = 1.
For constructing the cooperative model of a stochastic game we need to define its
subgame and the class of strategies which players use in the game.
Definition 2. Stochastic game (1) with vector π0 = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) (the j-th
component is equal to 1), i.e. game beginning from state Γ j , is called a stochastic
subgame Gj , j = 1, . . . , t.
We assume that players realise stationary strategies in the game. Let Ξi = {ηi}
be the set of stationary strategies of player i ∈ N in game G. Using stationary
strategies a player chooses an action in each state from
{
Γ 1, . . . , Γ t
}
depending
only on which state is realized at this stage, i.e. ηi : Γ
j 7−→ xji ∈ Xji , j = 1, . . . , t.
Considering stochastic game in stationary strategies, and taking into account that
the set of states is finite and the game has an infinite horizon, there are a finite
number of subgames of game G. The number of subgames equals the number of the
states.
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Remark 1. Obviously, the stationary strategy of player i in game G is also a
stationary strategy of the player in subgames G1, . . . , Gt.
The payoff to the player in game G is a random variable. Consider the mathe-
matical expectation of the player’s payoff as his payoff in game G. Let E¯i(η) be the
expected payoff of player i in game G and Eji (η) be the expected payoff of player
i in subgame Gj when strategy profile η is realised in game G (subgame Gj). Let
Ei(η) be the vector (E
1
i (η), . . . , E
t
i (η))
′.
The expected payoff to player i in subgame Gj satisfies the following recurrent
equation:
Eji (η) = K
j
i (x
j) + δ
t∑
k=1
p(j, k;xj)Eki (η) (2)
s. t. η(Γ j) = xj , i. e. η(·) = (η1(·), . . . , ηn(·)) where ηi(Γ j) = xji ∈ Xji , xj =
(xj1, . . . , x
j
n) for any j = 1, . . . , t, i ∈ N . Hereinafter, let η(·) = (η1(·), . . . , ηn(·)) be
the stationary strategy profile such as ηi(Γ
j) = xji ∈ Xji where j = 1, . . . , t, i ∈ N .
The transition matrix of stochastic game G when stationary strategy profile η(·)
is realised is:
Π(η) =

p(1, 1;x1) . . . p(1, t;x1)
p(2, 1;x2) . . . p(2, t;x2)
. . . . . . . . .
p(t, 1;xt) . . . p(t, t;xt)
 . (3)
We can rewrite equation (2) in a matrix form using matrix (3) in the following
way:
Ei(η) = Ki(x) + δΠ(η)Ei(η), (4)
where Ki(x) = (K
1
i (x
1), . . . ,Kti (x
t)), and Kji (x
j) is the payoff to player i in state
Γ j when action profile xj ∈ Xj is realized in this state.
Equation (4) is equivalent to the equation2 :
Ei(η) = (It − δΠ(η))−1Ki(x), (5)
where It is an identity t× t matrix.
The expected payoff to player i in game G is calculated by formula:
E¯i(η) = π
0Ei(η). (6)
3. Cooperative stochastic game
Suppose that the players from the grand coalition N decide to cooperate and receive
the maximal total payoff. Denote the strategy profile maximizing the sum of the
expected players’ payoffs in game G as η¯(·) = (η¯1(·), . . . , η¯n(·)):
max
η∈ ∏
i∈N
Ξi
∑
i∈N
E¯i(η) =
∑
i∈N
E¯i(η¯). (7)
2 Matrix (It − δΠ(η))
−1 always exists for δ ∈ (0, 1). The proof follows. It is known that
all the eigenvalues of stochastic matrix Π(η) are in the interval [−1, 1]. For the existence
of matrix (It − δΠ(η))
−1 it is necessary and sufficient that the determinant of matrix
(Π(η)− 1
δ
It) be not equal to zero. Thus matrix (Π(η)−
1
δ
It) must not have the eigenvalue
to be equal to 1
δ
. The last condition takes place because 1
δ
> 1, so this number cannot
be the eigenvalue of stochastic matrix Π(η).
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Call the strategy profile η¯(·) cooperative strategy profile.
The cooperative model of a non-cooperative game G is given by set (N, v), where
N is the set of players and v is a real-valued function, called the characteristic
function of the game, defined on the set 2N (the set of all subsets of N), and
satisfying the property: v(∅) = 0. The value v(S) is a real number which is assigned
to coalition S ⊂ N , and may be interpreted as the worth or power of coalition S.
The members of coalition S play together as a unit.
Define the characteristic function v¯(S) in stochastic game G using characteristic
functions vj(S) of stochastic subgames Gj , j = 1, . . . , t, as follows:
v¯(S) = π0v(S) (8)
for any coalition S ⊂ N where v(S) = (v1(S), . . . , vt(S))′. And vj(S) is the value
of the characteristic function for subgame Gj calculated for coalition S. Now the
problem is to define the characteristic function vj(S) for any coalition S. We use
α-approach to define the characteristic function. According to this approach the
value of characteristic function for coalition S is equal to the maximal total payoff
of coalition S which this coalition can guarantee when the left-out players cooperate
and minimize total payoff of coalition S.
First, consider coalition S = N . Bellman equation for v(N) is:
v(N) = max
η∈ ∏
i∈N
Ξi
[∑
i∈N
Ki(x) + δΠ(η)v(N)
]
=
∑
i∈N
Ki(x¯) + δΠ(η¯)v(N),
where η¯(·) is the cooperative strategy profile.
Therefore, the value v(N) is:
v(N) = (It − δΠ(η¯))−1
∑
i∈N
Ki(x¯). (9)
Second, consider coalition S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅. To define the value of characteristic
function vj(S), j = 1, . . . , t, for each subgame Gj , we consider a zero-sum stochastic
game GjS with two players (coalitions S and N\S) where coalition S ⊂ N plays
as a maximizing player and coalition N\S plays as a minimizing player. Define the
value vj(S) for subgame Gj as a maxmin of the payoff of coalition S in stochastic
game GjS (in fact, the lower value of matrix game):
vj(S) = max
ηS
min
ηN\S
∑
i∈S
Eji (ηS , ηN\S), (10)
where (ηS(·), ηN\S(·)) is a stationary strategy profile such that ηS(·) = (ηi1(·), . . .,
ηik(·)) is a vector of stationary strategies of players i1, . . . , ik ∈ S, i1 ∪ . . .∪ ik = S,
ηS(·) ∈
∏k
j=1 Ξij , the set of stationary strategies of coalition S ⊂ N , and ηN\S(·) is
a vector of stationary strategies of players ik+1, . . . , in ∈ N\S, ik+1∪. . .∪in = N\S,∏n
j=k+1 Ξij , the set of stationary strategies of coalition N\S.
Third, consider S = ∅. Let the value of characteristic function be:
vj(∅) = 0. (11)
Remark 2. Characteristic functions v¯(S) determined by (8) and vj(S) determined
by (9)–(11) are superadditive.
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Definition 3. Cooperative stochastic subgame Gjco is a set (N, v
j), where N is the
set of players and vj : 2N −→ R is the characteristic function calculated by (9)–(11).
Definition 4. Cooperative stochastic game Gco is a set (N, v¯), where N is the set
of players and v¯ : 2N −→ R is the characteristic function calculated by (8).
Definition 5. Vector αj = (αj1, . . . , α
j
n) satisfying the two following conditions:
1.
∑
i∈N α
j
i = v
j(N),
2. αji > v
j({i}) for any i ∈ N ,
is called an imputation in subgame Gjco (j = 1, . . . , t). Denote the imputation set
in cooperative subgame Gjco as A
j .
Definition 6. The vector α¯ = (α¯1, . . . , α¯n), where α¯i = π
0αi, αi = (α
1
i , . . . , α
t
i),
and (αj1, . . . , α
j
n) = α
j ∈ Aj is called an imputation in game Gco. Denote the
imputation set in cooperative stochastic game Gco as A¯.
Suppose that the imputation set in any subgame Gjco, is nonempty, j = 1, . . . , t.
Therefore, the imputation set in cooperative stochastic game Gco is also nonempty.
4. Subgame consistency of the Shapley value
Suppose that players decide to cooperate in stochastic game and for every subgame
Gjco they agree to choose an imputation α
j = (αj1, . . . , α
j
n) ∈ Aj . The problem is to
realize payments to the players at each stage of the stochastic game to guarantee
the expected payoff αji for player i in stochastic subgame G
j . If players receive stage
payoffs according to their payoff functions they hardly ever obtain the components
of the chosen imputation in mathematical expectation sense. To solve this problem
we should suggest the method of redistribution of the total players’ payoff in every
state which may be realized during the game. Initially, the method was proposed
by (Petrosyan and Danilov, 1979), for differential games.
There are two principles of constructing the payment scheme in a dynamic game
which can be applied to the theory of stochastic games:
1. The sum of the payments to the players in every state is equal to the sum
of the players’ payoffs in action profile realized in this state according to the
cooperative strategy profile η¯(·).
2. The expected sum of the payments to player i in the game G is equal to the ith
component α¯i of the imputation α¯.
Taking into account that in stochastic game (1) with stationary strategies the num-
ber of subgames is equal to the number of possible states, we need to define the vec-
tor βi = (β
1
i , . . . , β
t
i ) for every i ∈ N , where βji is a payment to player i in state Γ j ,
j = 1, . . . , t. If these payments satisfy the two mentioned principles, they are called
imputation distribution procedure (IDP) (see (Petrosyan and Danilov, 1979)). We
are interested in constructing the subgame-consistent (time-consistent) IDP.
Definition 7. We call the IDP subgame-consistent in stochastic game G if for any
subgame of game G the vector of the expected discounted sums of the payments to
the players 1, . . . , n belong to the same cooperative solution3 .
3 Let the cooperative solution be a singleton like the Shapley value. Then in any subgame
we consider the Shapley value as a cooperative solution. The case where the cooperative
solution is the set (e.g., the core) is considered in details by Parilina and Zaccour, 2015a
for the games played over event trees.
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In the paper we examine the Shapley value as a cooperative solution. Therefore,
the subgame-consistent IDP guarantees any player to obtain the corresponding com-
ponent of the Shapley value in any subgame.
Theorem 1. Let the components of the IDP be calculated by equation:
βi = (It − δΠ(η¯))αi, (12)
where αi = (α
1
i , . . . , α
t
i), and (α
j
1, . . . , α
j
n) = α
j is the Shapley value in the co-
operative game Gjco with characteristic function v
j(S). Then the IDP is subgame-
consistent.
Proof. First, prove that βi, i ∈ N , calculated by equation (12) is the IDP. Taking
into account equation (9) we obtain∑
i∈N
βi = (It − δΠ(η¯))
∑
i∈N
αi = (It − δΠ(η¯))v(N) =
∑
i∈N
Ki(x¯).
Second, we calculate the expected sum of the payments to player i in the game G
according to equation (12). Denote this sum for player i by B¯i and it satisfies the
equation:
B¯i = π
0Bi = π
0(B1i , . . . , B
t
i)
′,
where Bji can be found from equation:
Bji = β
j
i + δ
t∑
k=1
p(j, k;xj)Bki ,
or in a vector form:
Bi = βi + δΠ(η)Bi. (13)
Equation (13) is equivalent to the following one:
Bi = (It − δΠ(η))−1 βi. (14)
Taking into account equation (12), we prove that Bi = αi and then B¯i = α¯i. The
equity Bi = αi proves the subgame consistency of the IDP determined by equation
(12).
Remark 3. Equation (12) is equivalent to the following one:
αi = βi + δΠ(η¯)αi. (15)
The second summand at the right-hand side of the equation (15) is the expected
value of the component of the Shapley value in subgame starting from the next
stage. Therefore, any player will receive his component of the Shapley value in any
subgame if the payments to the players are the IDP satisfying equation (12).
Obviously, if players realise the cooperative strategy profile η¯(·), the expected
payoff of player i in stochastic game G with new payments in cooperative action
profiles is equal to the expected value of the correspondent component of the Shapley
value in cooperative stochastic game Gco.
Now for the imputation α¯ = (α¯1, . . . , α¯n), where α¯i = π
0αi, αi = (α
1
i , . . . , α
t
i),
(αj1, . . . , α
j
n) = α
j ∈ Aj , we determine the regularization of game G in the following
way.
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Definition 8. Noncooperative stochastic game Gα (subgame G
j
α, j = 1, . . . , t) is
called α-regularization of stochastic game G (subgame Gj), if for any player i ∈ N
in state Γ j payoff function Kα,ji (x
j) is defined as follows:
Kα,ji (x
j) =
{
βji , if x
j = x¯j ;
Kji (x
j), if xj 6= x¯j , (16)
where IDP β = (β1, . . . , βn) satisfies equation (12)
4 .
We suggests a method of construction of the new payoff function in the game G
(subgame Gj) in every state when the action profile is cooperative. Here we may ask
a question: “Do the players agree to redefine the payoff function in the game?” Our
answer is “Yes”, if they want to make the payoff functions in the states subgame-
consistent in the sense of Definition 7. Redistributing the payoffs using the IDP
β1i , . . . , β
t
i in the states Γ
1, . . . , Γ t respectively, player i receives the same sum (in
terms of mathematical expectation) in gameGα (G
j
α) as he has planned to receive in
the cooperative stochastic game Gco (G
j
co). Moreover, in any subgame his expected
payoff will be the corresponding component of the Shapley value. In this case, we
can state the subgame consistency (time consistency) of the chosen cooperative
solution.
5. Strategic support of the Shapley value
In this section we need to consider the additional notations. Let Γ (k) ∈ {Γ 1, . . . , Γ t}
be the state realized at stage k of game Gα. Let x(k) be the action profile realized
in state Γ (k). Denote the subgame of game Gα starting from state Γ (k) as G
Γ (k)
α .
Call the sequence ((Γ (1), x(1)),(Γ (2), x(2)),. . .,(Γ (k − 1), x(k − 1))) the history of
stage k and denote it as h(k). Let T be the set {(Γ 1, x¯1), (Γ 2, x¯2), . . . , (Γ t, x¯t)}.
In this section we consider stochastic game Gα as the game with perfect infor-
mation in the sense that at each stage k (k = 1, 2, . . .) all players know state Γ (k)
and the history of stage k. We would like to prove that the cooperative strategy
profile in the game Gα is the Nash equilibrium in trigger strategies. To construct
the Nash equilibrium we need to consider the sets of behavior strategies Φi, i ∈ N .
Definition 9. We call the behavior strategy profile ϕ∗ = (ϕ∗1,. . .,ϕ
∗
n) the Nash
equilibrium in game Gα if for any player i ∈ N the inequality
E¯αi (ϕ
∗) > E¯αi (ϕ
∗ ‖ ϕi) (17)
is true for any behavior strategy ϕi ∈ Φi of player i, and E¯αi (·) is the expected
payoff of player i in α-regularization Gα.
The following theorem gives the condition when the cooperative strategy profile
in the game Gα is the Nash equilibrium in the α-regularization Gα of game G.
Theorem 2. If in the α-regularization Gα the following inequality is true for any
coalition player i ∈ N :
βi > (It − δΠ(η¯))F ({i}), (18)
4 The IDP for stochastic games was initially proposed in (Petrosjan, 2006) when the game
process is realised on a graph and in (Petrosjan and Baranova, 2006) when the number
of states in stochastic game is finite and players use stationary strategies.
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where F ({i}) = (F 1({i}), . . . , F t({i})),
F j({i}) = max
x
j
i∈Xji
x
j
i 6=x¯ji
{
Kji (x¯
j ‖ xji ) + δ
t∑
l=1
p(j, l; x¯j ‖ xji )vl ({i})
}
, then in the game Gα
there exists the Nash equilibrium with payoffs (α¯1,. . .,α¯n).
Proof. Consider the behavior strategy profile ϕˆ(·) = (ϕˆ1(·), . . . , ϕˆn(·)) in game Gα:
ϕˆi(h(k)) =

x¯ji , if Γ (k) = Γ
j , j = 1, t, h(k) ⊂ T ;
xˆji (p), if Γ (k) = Γ
j , j = 1, t, ∃ l ∈ [1, k − 1]
and p ∈ N , p 6= i: h(l) ⊂ T ,
and (Γ (l), x(l)) /∈ T ,
but (Γ (l), (x(l) ‖ x¯p(l))) ∈ T ,
anyone in other cases,
(19)
where xˆji (p) is an action of player i in state Γ
j which with actions xjk, k 6= i, k 6= p
forms the strategy of coalition {N\p} in zero-sum game against player p in subgame
GΓ
j
.
The proof of the theorem is based on the proof of any folk theorem (for example,
see (Dutta, 1995)) using the structure of the trigger strategy (19). We prove that
ϕˆ(·) = (ϕˆ1(·), . . . , ϕˆn(·)) determined in (19) is a Nash equilibrium in stochastic game
Gα.
If the player p does not deviate from the cooperative strategy profile η¯, then
taking into account the definition of the strategy (19), the expected payoff of player
p in the subgame Gjα, j = 1, . . . , t, is
Ejp(ϕˆ(·)) = Ejp(η¯(·)).
Let Ep(ϕˆ(·)) be equal to the vector (E1p(ϕˆ(·)), . . . , Etp(ϕˆ(·))), then for any player
p ∈ N the equation is true:
Ep(ϕˆ) = (It − δΠ(η¯))−1βp. (20)
Consider the strategy profile (ϕˆ(·) ‖ ϕp(·)), p ∈ N , when player p ∈ N deviates from
strategy ϕˆp(·). Let stage k be such that there exists number l ∈ [1, k− 1] such that
history h(l) ⊂ T and state (Γ (l), x(l)) /∈ T but (Γ (l), (x(l) ‖ x¯p(l))) ∈ T . Without
loss of generality, we suggest that Γ (k) = Γ j. Calculate the payoff of player p in
game Gα in strategy profile (ϕˆ(·) ‖ ϕp(·)) as
E¯αp (ϕˆ ‖ ϕp) = π0Eαp (ϕˆ ‖ ϕp),
where
Eαp (ϕˆ ‖ ϕp) = Eα,[1,k−1]p (ϕˆ ‖ ϕp) + δk−1Πk−1(ϕˆ ‖ ϕp)Eα,[k,∞)p (ϕˆ ‖ ϕp), (21)
where E
α,[1,k−1]
p (ϕˆ ‖ ϕp) is the expected payoff of player p at the first k − 1 stages
of game Gα, and E
α,[k,∞)
p (ϕˆ ‖ ϕp) is the expected payoff of player p in the subgame
of game Gα starting from stage k. Since there were no deviations of any players
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from the cooperative strategy profile η¯(·) up to stage k−1 inclusive as it was shown
before, the following equalities holds for the elements of the right side of (21):
Eα,[1,k−1]p (ϕˆ ‖ ϕp) = Eα,[1,k−1]p (η¯),
Πk−1(ϕˆ ‖ ϕp) = Πk−1(η¯).
In the second term of the right side of (21) by E
α,[k,∞)
p (ϕˆ ‖ ϕp) we mean vector
(Eα,1p (ϕˆ ‖ ϕp), . . . , Eα,tp (ϕˆ ‖ ϕp)) where Eα,jp (ϕˆ ‖ ϕp) is the expected payoff of
player p in regularized subgame Gjα starting from the state Γ
j .
Now we calculate the expected payoff of player p in subgame Gjα starting from
stage k when the state Γ (k) is Γ j :
Eα,jp (ϕˆ ‖ ϕp) = Kjp(x¯j ‖ xjp) + δ
t∑
l=1
p(j, l; x¯j ‖ xjp)vl ({p}) , (22)
because players from coalition N \ p will punish player p playing in zero-sum game
against player p beginning from stage k + 1 according to the definition of strategy
profile ϕˆ(·).
Since the expected payoffs of player p in strategy profiles ϕˆ(·) and (ϕˆ(·) ‖ ϕp(·))
equal until stage k − 1, then as a result of the deviation, player p can guarantee
the increase of his payoff only at the sacrifice of the part of game Gα beginning
with stage k, i.e. at the sacrifice of the expected payoff in subgame Gjα, j = 1, . . . , t.
Player p in strategy profile (ϕˆ(·) ‖ ϕp(·)) can guarantee the following expected
payoff from stage k:
max
xjp∈Xjp
xjp 6=x¯jp
{
Kjp(x¯
j ‖ xjp) + δ
t∑
l=1
p(j, l; x¯j ‖ xjp)vl ({p})
}
. (23)
According to the definition of IDP, the expected payoff of player p in the subgame
Gjα in strategy profile ϕˆ(·) can be calculated by the equation:
Eαp (ϕˆ) = (It − δΠ(η¯))−1βp, (24)
where Eαp (ϕˆ) = (E
α,1
p (ϕˆ(·)), . . . , Eα,tp (ϕˆ(·)). Taking into account the inequality (18)
and (23), (24) and we prove the inequality
Eαp (ϕˆ(·)) > Eαp (ϕˆ(·) ‖ ϕp(·)).
Therefore, the behavior strategy profile (19) is the Nash equilibrium in α-regulari-
zation of game G. The expected payoff of player p in game Gα in strategy profile
ϕˆ(·) is equal to α¯p where α¯p = π0αp and vector αp = (α1p, . . . , αtp) consists of p-th
components of the Shapley value α1, . . ., αt calculated for the cooperative subgames
G1, . . ., Gt accordingly. This completes the proof.
6. Data transmission game
6.1. Model
In this section we introduce an example of a stochastic game application in telecom-
munication systems. We consider a slotted synchronous system in which nodes 1
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and 2 independently generate packages in each time slot with probabilities a1 and
a2, respectively, provided that their individual queues were empty at the end of
the previous time slot. The graph of wireless network is depicted in Fig. 1. Some
assumptions about this system are as follows:
1. Nodes 1 and 2 (players 1 and 2, respectively) are going to send their packages
to a common destination (node 3).
2. The maximum buffer capacity of any node equals one. The destination node
can accept only one transmitted package in one time slot. We do not assume
multiple package transmissions or simultaneous transmissions and reception by
any node in any time slot.
3. If players simultaneously transmit packages to the destination node, the last
one rejects these packages and they return to their initial nodes, i.e. at the next
time slot no new packages can be generated in nodes 1 and 2.
4. All transmitted packages have the same length, and it requires one time slot
to transmit a package from one node to the other which has the direct channel
with the first one.
5. Player 1 chooses between sending a package directly to node 3 or relying on
node 2 to forward the package to the final destination (node 3).
6. If player 1 (node 1) transmits a package to player 2 (node 2) which has already
had a package in its queue, player 2 rejects this package. Otherwise, player 2
decides on whether to accept or reject the package from player 1.
Fig. 1: Topology of a wireless network.
We suggest the following system of rewards and costs:
– f > 0 is a reward to player 1 or player 2 for each successful transmission to the
destination node.
– Player 1 receives a reward c > 0 from player 2 for delivering a package to
player 2 which can obtain the value f only after successful transmission of that
particular package to the final destination in a subsequent time slot.
– Each time slot of package delay results in an additional cost d > 0 for the node
that has that particular package in its queue (regardless of that package source).
– Dij is an energy cost of one package transmission from node i to node j.
We suppose that the game ends in any time slot with the probability 0 < q < 1.
The probability 1−q can be interpreted as a discount rate. The transmission problem
in a wireless network can be solved as a stochastic game. Denote the pair (Q1, Q2)
as the state of the stochastic game where Qi is a queue content of node i, i = 1, 2.
The queue content Qi can be equal to 0 or 1 if no or one package is present at the
queue of node i, respectively.
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The set of states in stochastic game is
Q = {(0, 0); (0, 1); (1, 0); (1, 1)}.
Consider the game in a cooperative setting meaning that the players’ actions are
coordinated by one center to improve the work of the network. The coordination of
the device actions are useful to increase the speed of data transmission. For solving
the cooperative version of the stochastic game, we assume players have information
not only on their own queues but also on the other player’s queue.
Now we need to describe the states, i. e., the games in normal form corresponding
to the states:
1. State (0, 0): Player 1 has a unique action W (waiting), player 2 has the same
action W (waiting). The payoffs to the players are (0, 0).
2. State (0, 1): Player 1 has a unique actionW (waiting), player 2 also has a unique
action T 3 (transmission to node 3). The payoffs to the players are (0, f −D23).
3. State (1, 0): Player 1 has two actions: i) T 3 (transmission to node 3), ii) T 2
(transmission to node 2). Player 2 has two actions: i) Ac (accepting a package
from node 1), ii) Rej (rejecting a package from node 1).
The payoffs to the players are represented in the matrix:(
(f −D13, 0) (f −D13, 0)
(c−D12,−c) (−d−D12, 0)
)
4. State Γ (1, 1): Player 1 has two actions: i) T 3 (transmission to node 3), ii)
W (waiting). Player 2 has two actions: i) T 3 (transmission to node 3), ii) W
(waiting). The payoffs to the players are as follows:(
(−d−D13,−d−D23) (f −D13,−d)
(−d, f −D23) (−d,−d)
)
6.2. Transition matrix
Assume the players use the stationary strategies. In the game defined in stationary
strategies the players’ choice of an action in the states depends neither on the
history, nor on the time slot, in which the game is at present, but depends only on
the state. In applications of stochastic games it is important to use a simple set of
strategies for decreasing the number of calculations of players’ expected payoffs.
Denote the set of mixed stationary strategies of player i as Ξ¯i, i = 1, 2. According
to the game structure the player 1’s mixed stationary strategy assigns him to choose
action W with probability one in the states (0, 0), (0, 1), action T 3 with probability
p11 in the state (1, 0), and action T 3 with probability p12 in the state (1, 1). The
player 2’s mixed stationary strategy assigns him to choose actionW with probability
one in the state (0, 0), action T 3 in the state (0, 1), action Ac with probability p21
in the state (1, 0), and action T 3 with probability p22 in the state (1, 1). Denote a
player i’s mixed stationary strategy as ηi = (pi1, pi2). A stationary strategy profile
is η = (η1, η2) = (p11, p12, p21, p22).
The transition matrix when players realise stationary strategy profile η is
Π(η) = {p(k, l;xk)}k=1,...,t;l=1,...,t, (25)
where
p(1, 1;x1) = (1− a1)(1− a2),
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p(1, 2;x1) = (1− a1)a2,
p(1, 3;x1) = a1(1 − a2),
p(1, 4;x1) = a1a2,
p(2, 1;x2) = (1− a1)(1− a2),
p(2, 2;x2) = (1− a1)a2,
p(2, 3;x2) = a1(1 − a2),
p(2, 4;x2) = a1a2,
p(3, 1;x3) = p11(1 − a1)(1− a2),
p(3, 2;x3) = p11(1 − a1)a2 + (1− p11)p21(1 − a1),
p(3, 3;x3) = p11a1(1 − a2) + (1− p11)(1− p21)(1− a2),
p(3, 4;x3) = p11a1a2 + (1− p11)p21a1 + (1 − p11)(1− p21)a2,
p(4, 1;x4) = 0,
p(4, 2;x4) = p12(1 − p22)(1− a1),
p(4, 3;x4) = (1− p12)p22(1− a2),
p(4, 4;x4) = p12p22 + (1− p12)(1 − p22) + p12(1− p22)a1 + (1− p12)p22a2.
6.3. Payoff functions
If the stationary strategy profile η is realized, the payoff to player 1 in the stochastic
game is
K1(x) = (K
1
1 (x
1),K21 (x
2),K31 (x
3),K41 (x
4))′,
where
K11(x
1) = K21 (x
2) = 0,
K31(x
3) = p11(f −D13) + (1− p11)p21(c−D12) + (1− p11)(1 − p21)(−d−D12),
K41(x
4) = p12p22(−d−D13) + p12(1− p22)(f −D13) + (1− p12)(−d).
If the stationary strategy profile η is realized, the payoff to player 2 in the
stochastic game is
K2(x) = (K
1
2 (x
1),K22 (x
2),K32 (x
3),K42 (x
4))′,
where
K12(x
1) = 0,
K22(x
2) = f −D23,
K32(x
3) = (1 − p11)p21(−c),
K42(x
4) = p12p22(−d−D23) + (1− p12)p22(f −D23) + (1− p22)(−d).
We consider the set of pure stationary strategies which is denoted as Ξi, i = 1, 2.
For example, player 1’s pure stationary strategy η1 = (1, 0) assigns player 1 to choose
action T 3 in the state (1, 0) and actionW in the state (1, 1). Each player has 4 pure
stationary strategies in the stochastic game, therefore, there are 16 pure stationary
strategy profiles. For each pure stationary strategy profile η = (η1, η2) the transition
matrix Π(η) is determined by (25).
For example, for the pure stationary strategy profile η1 = (1, 1, 1, 1) the transi-
tion matrix is
Π(η1) =

(1− a1)(1 − a2) (1− a1)a2 a1(1− a2) a1a2
(1− a1)(1 − a2) (1− a1)a2 a1(1− a2) a1a2
(1− a1)(1 − a2) (1− a1)a2 a1(1− a2) a1a2
0 0 0 1
 .
For each strategy profile η ∈ Ξ = ∏2i=1 Ξi we can calculate the expected players’
payoffs for subgames which are denoted as: Ei(η) = (E
(0,0)
i (η), E
(0,1)
i (η), E
(1,0)
i (η),
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E
(1,1)
i (η))
′, and
Ei(η) = (It − (1 − q)Π(η))−1Ki(x), (26)
where Ki(x), Π(η) are determined above.
The expected payoff to player i in the whole game including the chance move is
E¯i(η) = π
0Ei(η), (27)
where π0 = (π0(0,0), π
0
(0,1), π
0
(1,0), π
0
(1,1)) is a vector of the initial probabilities, and π
0
k
is the probability that the first state in the stochastic game will be k ∈ Q. Vector
π0 is given.
6.4. Algorithm of solving cooperative stochastic game
In this section we describe the steps of solving cooperative stochastic game of data
transmission in a wireless network of topology represented in Fig. 1.
1. For any state k ∈ Q and any pure strategy profile η = (η1, η2), ηi ∈ Ξi, i = 1, 2,
calculate the expected players’ payoffs Eki (η) in subgame G
k by equation (5)
and their expected payoffs in the whole game E¯i(η) by equation (6).
2. Find the cooperative strategy profile η¯ by equation (7).
3. Calculate the values of the characteristic functions vk(S) for any state k ∈ Q
and any coalition S ⊂ N using equations (9), (10), (11). Then calculate the
values of the characteristic function v¯(S) for any S ⊂ N by (8).
4. Calculate the Shapley values αk = (αk1 , . . . , α
k
n) for any subgame G
k starting
from state k ∈ Q using formula (Shapley, 1953b):
αki =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(|N | − |S| − 1)!
|N |!
(
vk(S ∪ {i})− vk(S)) . (28)
Then calculate the Shapley value for the whole game α¯ = (α¯1, α¯2) using equation
α¯i = π
0αi.
5. Calculate the components of the IDP βki , i = 1, 2 and k ∈ Q by equation (12).
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6. To construct the subgame-consistent Shapley value we determine the α-regula-
rization Gα re-defining the payoff functions by equation (16).
7. Verify if there exists the Nash equilibrium in behavior strategies with payoffs
(α¯1, α¯2) using inequality (18).
6.5. Numerical illustration
We introduce the numerical example of the data transmission game for wireless
network. We identify the parameters of the simulation. The probability of package
appearance at node 1 is higher than in node 2: a1 = 0.4, a2 = 0.1. The probability
of a game end is q = 0.01 which is equivalent to the discount rate 0.99. The rewards
and costs are f = 1, d = 0.1, c = 0.3, D12 = 0.1, D13 = 0.6, D23 = 0.2. We may
notice that the cost of package transmission from node 1 to node 3 is three times
more than the cost of package transmission from node 2 to node 3. Therefore, the
cooperation of nodes 1 and 2 may be profitable. Let the game begin from any state
with equal probability, i. e., π0 = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25).
Table 1 represents the expected players’ payoffs
Ei(η) =
(
E
(0,0)
i (η), E
(0,1)
i (η), E
(1,0)
i (η), E
(1,1)
i (η)
)′
for any pure stationary strategy profile η for any player i = 1, 2, and the sum of
the expected payoffs. The last column in Table 1 is E¯1 + E¯2 which is the total
expected players’ payoff in the whole game taking into account the vector of initial
probabilities π0.
The cooperative strategy profile maximizing the total players’ payoff is
η¯ = η11 = (0, 0, 1, 1),
in which the player 1’s strategy η111 = (0, 0) assigns him “not to transmit to
node 3, but transmit to node 2” in state (1,0) when there is a package at node 1
and there is no package at node 2. In this state the player 2’s strategy η112 = (1, 1)
assigns her “to accept the package” from player 1 in state (1, 0). When the game in
state (1, 1), player 1 “waits” and player 2 “transmits” to node 3.
The maximum of the total expected players’ payoff in the whole game is
max
η∈Ξ
∑
i∈N
E¯i(η) =
∑
i∈N
E¯i(η¯) = 26.9472.
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Table 1: Expected payoffs in the stochastic game.
η E1(η) E2(η) E¯1 + E¯2
η1 = (1, 1, 1, 1)
−53.0129
−53.0129
−52.6129
−70.1000
−22.9935
−22.1935
−22.9935
−30.0000
−81.7048
η2 = (1, 1, 1, 0)
15.8400
15.8400
16.2400
16.2400
6.76818
7.56818
6.76818
7.27732
23.1355
η3 = (1, 0, 1, 1)
14.7353
14.7353
15.1353
14.8563
7.9200
8.7200
7.9200
8.7200
23.1855
η4 = (1, 0, 1, 0)
−5.10968
−5.10968
−4.70968
−10.0000
−7.02581
−6.22581
−7.02581
−10.0000
−13.8016
η5 = (1, 1, 0, 1)
−53.0129
−53.0129
−52.6129
−70.0000
−22.9935
−22.1935
−22.9935
−30.0000
−81.7048
η6 = (1, 1, 0, 0)
15.8400
15.8400
16.2400
16.2400
6.76818
7.56818
6.76818
7.27732
23.1355
η7 = (1, 0, 0, 1)
14.7353
14.7353
15.1353
14.8563
7.9200
8.7200
7.9200
8.7200
23.1855
η8 = (1, 0, 0, 0)
−5.10968
−5.10968
−4.70968
−10.0000
−7.02581
−6.22581
−7.02581
−10.0000
−13.8016
η9 = (0, 1, 1, 1)
−64.7464
−64.7464
−65.9794
−70.0000
−27.3398
−26.5398
−27.9446
−30.0000
−94.3241
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η E1(η) E2(η) E¯1 + E¯2
η10 = (0, 1, 1, 0)
11.5347
11.5347
11.8060
12.0060
13.4228
14.2228
13.6218
13.8218
25.4926
η11 = (0, 0, 1, 1)
4.90248
4.90248
5.04298
4.87602
21.4759
22.2759
21.8337
22.4792
26.9472
η12 = (0, 0, 1, 0)
−8.93504
−8.93504
−9.06741
−10.0000
−8.73596
−7.93596
−8.97396
−10.0000
−18.1458
η13 = (0, 1, 0, 1)
−64.2491
−64.2491
−65.4128
−70.0000
−26.728
−25.928
−27.248
−30.000
−93.4537
η14 = (0, 1, 0, 0)
−8.4855
−8.4855
−8.8128
−7.6828
5.60847
6.40847
5.57380
6.13680
−2.43475
η15 = (0, 0, 0, 1)
−18.532
−18.532
−19.010
−18.910
7.9200
8.7200
7.9200
8.7200
−10.426
η16 = (0, 0, 0, 0)
−10.559
−10.559
−10.917
−10.000
−8.8313
−8.0313
−9.0826
−10.000
−19.49526
We calculate the values of the characteristic functions for subgames by equations
(9), (10), (11):
v({1}) = (−5.10968,−5.10968,−4.70968,−10.0)′,
v({2}) = (−8.735960,−7.93596,−8.97396,−10.0)′,
v({1, 2}) = (26.3784, 27.1784, 26.8766, 27.3553)′,
The characteristic function of the whole game is found by equation (8):
v¯({1}) = −6.23226,
v¯({2}) = −8.91147,
v¯({1, 2}) = 26.9472.
Then we may calculate the Shapley Values for the subgames and the whole game
using equation (28):
– for subgames:
• α1 = (15.0023, 15.0023, 15.5705, 13.6776)′,
• α2 = (11.376, 12.176, 11.3062, 13.6776)′,
Strategic Support of the Shapley Value in Stochastic Games 263
– for the whole game:
• α¯1 = 14.8132,
• α¯2 = 12.134.
The cooperative payoff distribution procedure β1 for player 1 and β2 for player 2
are found by equations (12) using the Shapley values:
– β1 = (0, 0, 1.24274,−1.54974)′,
– β2 = (0, 0.8,−1.34274, 2.24974)′,
where βki is a payment to player i in the state k. Remind that the payoffs of the
players in the states defined in the matrix forms are as follows:
– K1 = (0, 0, 0.2,−0.1)′,
– K2 = (0, 0.8,−0.3, 0.8)′,
We may notice that in states (0, 0) and (0, 1) the components of IDP coincide with
the payoffs according to the payoff functions K1 and K2. But in states (1, 0) and
(1, 1) there is a redistribution of the total payoffs among the players. In state (1, 0)
players obtain −0.1 together and according to the IDP player 1 receives 1.24274
instead of 0.2, and player 2 receives −1.34274 instead of −0.3. Therefore, player 2
gives 1.04274 to player 1 to make IDP subgame-consistent. In state (1, 1) players
obtain 0.7 together and according to the IDP player 1 receives −1.54974 instead of
−0.1, and player 2 receives 2.24974 instead of 0.8. Therefore, player 1 gives 1.44974
to player 2 to make IDP subgame-consistent.
Thus, the Shapley Value α¯ = (14.8132, 12.134)′ is subgame consistent if the
payoffs to the players in the states are made according to the IDP β1 = (0, 0, 1.24274,
−1.54974)′, and β2 = (0, 0.8,−1.34274, 2.24974)′.
Now we need to examine the problem of strategic support of the cooperative
strategy profile. First, calculate values F k({i}) for i = 1, 2 and k ∈ Q determined
in Theorem 2:
1. F ({1}) = (−5.10968,−5.10968,−4.70968,−5.28632)′,
2. F ({2}) = (−8.73596,−7.93596,−8.97396,−8.1858)′.
Second, verify if the inequalities (18) are true. For player 1 the inequality (18) takes
the form: 
0
0
1.24274
−1.54974
 >

−0.186662
−0.186662
0.418853
−0.566649

We notice that the inequality is not true. In state (1, 1) there is an intense for
deviation of player 1 as his payoff according to IDP in this state −1.54974 is less
than his payoff in case of deviation −0.566649. This means that the cooperation
cannot be supported strategically by the behavior strategy profile (19).
For player 2 the inequality (18) takes the form:
0
0.8
−1.34274
2.24974
 >

−0.0718427
0.728157
−1.01842
0.620393

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Again, we notice that the inequality is not true. In state (1, 0) there is an intense for
deviation of player 2 as her payoff according to IDP in this state −1.34274 is lower
than her payoff in case of deviation −1.01842. We state that the behavior strategy
profile determined by (19) cannot strategically support the cooperative payoffs.
7. Conclusion
We have examined the problem of cooperation in a dynamic game having a stochas-
tic structure. First, we construct the subgame consistent cooperative solution of the
game by redefining players’ state payoff functions using the imputation distribution
procedure. Second, we provide the conditions to verify if the cooperative solution
can be supported strategically. All theoretical results are demonstrated by the exam-
ple of a stochastic game modeling data transmission in an ad hoc wireless network
with a simple topology. Numerical simulations show the actuality of an application
of a game-theoretical model to telecommunication problems because it proposes the
method of cost reduction.
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Abstract In this work we consider the games where P can terminate pur-
suit at will on any of two terminal manifolds. If the optimal feedback strate-
gies for every variant of termination are known, an obvious pursuit strategy
assigns the control that corresponds to the alternative with less value at ev-
ery state. On the manifold with equal alternative values, this strategy may
become discontinuous even when the value functions themselves are smooth.
We describe smooth approximations for the minimum functions that allow
to construct smooth alternative strategies and to deal with generalized solu-
tions for differential equations with discontinuous right-hand sides. However,
as shown by an example, the state may stay on a equivalued manifold and
the game never terminates.
Keywords: approximations of minimum and maximum functions, alterna-
tive pursuit, generalized solutions for differential equations with discontinu-
ous right-hand sides.
1. Introduction
Differential games advanced far beyond the initial findings of their founders. How-
ever, finding solutions for concrete games still involves more art than craft. In this
paper, we study a method for generating pursuit strategies and evaluation of their
guaranteed results when the goal functions represent the minimum of two value
functions.
2. Smooth approximations for minimum functions and their derivatives
Certain values between v1 and v2 that described, e.g., as
Fα(v1, v2) = αv1 + (1− α)v2, 0 < α < 1
may be considered as “rough“ approximations for min(v1, v2) from above or for
max(v1, v2) from below. In “more accurate“ approximations, α depends on v1 and
v2, and α(v1, v2) takes the value close to 1 for min(v1, v2) and to 0 for max(v1, v2)
if vi < v3−i, i = 1, 2. Thus,
F
ξ
λ(v1, v2) =
λ1v
ξ
1v2 + λ2v1v
ξ
2
λ1v
ξ
1 + λ2v
ξ
2
, v1, v2, ξ ∈ R+, (1)
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and
F ξλ(v1, v2) =
λ1v
ξ+1
1 + λ2v
ξ+1
2
λ1v
ξ
1 + λ2v
ξ
2
, v1, v2, ξ ∈ R+, (2)
which correspond to Fα with
α(v1, v2) =
λ2v
ξ
2
λ1v
ξ
1 + λ2v
ξ
2
and
α(v1, v2) =
λ1v
ξ
1
λ1v
ξ
1 + λ2v
ξ
2
approximate min(v1, v2) from above and max(v1, v2) from below, 0 < λi < 1,
∑2
i=1 λi =
1, i = 1, 2, respectively; see, e.g., (Stipanovic´ et al., 2009). Moreover, their partial
derivatives approximate the corresponding partial derivatives of the minimum and
maximum functions where they exist; see, e.g., (Shevchenko, 2009, 2012).
Since, e.g.,
min(v1, v2, . . . , vn) = min(v1,min(v2, . . . , vn)), n > 2, (3)
approximations for the arbitrary number of arguments minimum functions may be
easily constructed with use of approximations for min(v1, v2) and max(v1, v2).
A more general approach is based on using monotonic functions; see, e.g., (Sti-
panovic´, 2012, 2014). Let g be a strictly decreasing non-negative differentiable func-
tion R+ → R+ and vi0 = min(v1, . . . , vn). Then,
vi0 ≤ vi,
g(vi0 ) ≥ g(vi),
λig(vi0) ≥ λig(vi), 0 < λi < 1,
n∑
i=1
λi = 1,
n∑
i=1
λig(vi0) ≥
n∑
i=1
λig(vi),
g(vi0) ≥
n∑
i=1
λig(vi),
n∑
i=1
λig(vi0) ≥
n∑
i=1
λig(vi).
Since g is an invertible function,
vi0 = g
−1(g(vi0)) ≤ g−1(
n∑
i=1
λig(vi)).
Let Ggλ be the following symmetric function (R
+)n → R+
Ggλ(v1, . . . , vn) = g
−1(
n∑
i=1
λig(vi)). (4)
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If 0 < λi < 1 and
∑n
i=1 λi = 1, (4) approximates min(v1, . . . , vn) from above since
min(v1, . . . , vn) < G
g
λ(v1, . . . , vn), if vi 6= vj , i 6= j, (5)
In addition,
min(v, . . . , v) = Ggλ(v, . . . , v) = v. (6)
Similarly,
g(vi0 ) ≤
n∑
i=1
λig(vi), λi ≥ 1,
vi0 = g
−1(g(vi0)) ≥ g−1(
n∑
i=1
λig(vi)).
If λi ≥ 1, (4) approximates min(v1, . . . , vn) from below since
min(v1, . . . , vn) > G
g
λ(v1, . . . , vn), if v1 6= v2, (7)
min(v, . . . , v) > Ggλ(v, . . . , v) = g
−1(
n∑
i=1
λig(v)). (8)
Fig. 1: Approximations for the minimum function; ξ = 5; µ1 = 0.5, µ2 = 0.5 (upper);
ν1 = 1, ν2 = 1 (lower)
Certain upper (M ξµ) and lower (m
ξ
ν) approximations for min(v1, v2) may be
generated, e.g., with use of the family {v−ξ}ξ>0,
M ξµ(v1, v2) =
(
µ1v
−ξ
1 + µ2v
−ξ
2
)− 1
ξ
, 0 < µi < 1,
2∑
i=1
µi = 1, (9)
mξν(v1, v2) =
(
ν1v
−ξ
1 + ν2v
−ξ
2
)− 1
ξ
, νi > 1, (10)
see Figs. 1–2.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2: Approximations for the minimum function; ξ = 5; µ1 = 0.3, µ2 = 0.7 (upper);
ν1 = 3, ν2 = 1 (lower)
The derivatives of Ggλ are described as
∂Ggλ
∂vj
(v1, . . . , vn) = λj
g′(vj)
g′ (g−1 (
∑n
i=1 λig(vi)))
, (11)
and
∂Ggλ
∂vj
(v, . . . , v) = λj ,
if 0 < λi < 1 and
∑n
i=1 λi = 1.
For example, the derivatives of min(v1, v2) (where they exist) are approximated
by the derivatives of M ξµ since
lim
ξ→+∞
∂M ξµ
∂vj
(v1, v2) =

1 if vj < v3−j ,
0 if vj > v3−j
µj if vj = v3−j .
Now, let g be a strictly increasing non-negative differentiable function R+ → R+.
Obviously, if 0 < λi < 1 and
∑n
i=1 λi = 1, (4) approximates max(v1, . . . , vn) from
below and if λi ≥ 1 from above. All other mentioned formerly results related to the
use of (4) for approximations of the minimum function may be easily reproduced
for approximations of the maximum function.
3. Alternative pursuit
Let Z ⊆ Rm be an open set, Z be a playing space and ∂Z = Z\Z be its boundary.
Let zP (t) ∈ RnP and zE(t) ∈ RnE meet
z˙P (t) = fP (zP (t), uP (t)), zP (0) = z
0
P , (12)
z˙E(t) = fE(zE(t), uE(t)), zE(0) = z
0
E, (13)
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where t ≥ 0, uP (t) ∈ UP ⊂ RmP , uE(t) ∈ UE ⊂ RmE , UP and UE are compact sets,
fP : R
nP × UP → RnP fE : RnE × UE → RnE , z0P ∈ RnP z0E ∈ RnE are initial
states. Let z(t) = (zP (t), zE(t)) ∈ Z ⊆ Rn, n = nP + nE ,
z˙(t) = f(z(t), uP (t), uE(t)), z(0) = z
0, (14)
where z(0) = z0 = (z0P , z
0
E) ∈ Z, f(z, uP , uE) = (fP (zP , uP ), fE(zE , uE)). We
assume that f is jointly continuous and locally Lipschitz with respect to z for all
uP ∈ UP and uE ∈ UE .
A strategy is a rule to determine the control depending on available information
at any instant of the game. For a given strategy, the equation (14) is used to gen-
erate a pencil of all potential motions and evaluate the guaranteed payoff over all
admissible countering actions.
For z0 ∈ Z, ∆ = {t0, t1, . . ., ti, ti+1, . . .} and a strategy SP , let ZP (z0, SP , ∆)
be a pencil of piecewise constant solutions of the inclusion
z˙(t) ∈ co{f(z(ti), uP (ti), uE) : uE ∈ UE}, (15)
where t ∈ [ti, ti+1), i ∈ N, t0 = 0, ti →i→∞ ∞, z : R+ → Z is a continuous function
that has an absolutely continuous restriction to [0, θ] for any θ > 0 and meets (15)
for almost all t ∈ [0, θ].
A pursuit game is called alternative if
– from any internal state z ∈ Z, it can be terminated by P at will on any of two
given terminal manifolds Ma ⊂ ∂Z or M b ⊂ ∂Z,
– for every alternative termination, the payoffs of Boltza type differ only in their
terminal parts,
– for every alternative termination, the optimal feedback pursuit (SaP (·), SbP (·))
and evasion (SaE(·), SbE(·)) strategies and the value functions (V a(·), V b(·)) are
known.
Among the games that may be considered as alternative are the obstacle tag
(Isbell, 1967) and successive pursuit (Breakwell and Hagedorn, 1979) games.
For a given alternative terminal manifoldMl, let the payoff functional be defined
as
Pεl (z(·)) =
{
τεl +Kl(z(τ
ε
l )), if τ
ε
l = τ
ε
l (z(·)) <∞,
∞ otherwise, (16)
where
τεl (z(·)) =
{
min{ti ∈ ∆ : z(ti) ∈M εl }, if ∃ti ∈ ∆ : z(ti) ∈M εl ,
∞ otherwise, (17)
M εl is the ε neighbourhood of Ml, M
ε
l = {z : z ∈ Z,minz′∈Ml ||z − z′|| ≤ ε},
Kl : Z → R+, l ∈ L = {a, b}. Then the guaranteed result may be evaluated as
Pˇl(z0) = lim
ε→0+
Pεl (z0), (18)
where Pˇεl (z0) = infSP Pˇεl (z0, SP ),
Pˇεl (z0, SP ) = lim|∆|→+0 Pˇ
ε
l (z
0, SP , ∆), |∆| = sup
i∈N
(ti+1 − ti),
Pˇεl (z0, SP , ∆) = sup
z(·)∈ZP (z0,SP ,∆)
Pεl (z(·)).
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Let Pˆl : Z → R be a similar index for E and V l(z0) = Pˇl(z0) = Pˆl(z0), ∀z0 ∈ Z.
Then the value function V l : Z → R+ represents a joint guaranteed result for both
players.
If V a(·) and V b(·) are continuous in Z, satisfy the terminal conditions
V l(z) = Kl(z), z ∈M l, (19)
and are continuously differentiable in Z, then the Isaacs’ main equation
H l(z,DV l(z)) + 1 = 0 (20)
is satisfied, where
H l(z,DV l(z)) = min
uP∈UP
max
uE∈UE
λlf(z, uP , uE) = max
uE∈UE
min
uP∈UP
λlf(z, uP , uE) l ∈ L.
If there are bounded u∗P : Z × Λ→ UP and u∗E : Z × Λ→ UE such that
u∗P (z
l, λl) ∈ Arg min
uP∈UP
(
max
uE∈UE
λlf(z, uP , uE)
)
, (21)
u∗E(z
l, λl) ∈ Arg max
uE∈UE
(
min
uP∈UP
λlf(z, uP , uE)
)
, (22)
the optimal feedback strategies are designed as follows
SlP (z) = u
∗
P (z,DV
l(z)), SlE(z) = u
∗
E(z,DV
l(z)). (23)
When solving such kind of games, a standard problem is to combine SaP and S
b
P
into a pursuit strategy that guarantees a result less or equal to min(V a(z), V b(z))
for every state z ∈ Z (Shevchenko, 2009).1 An obvious candidate strategy for
alternative pursuit is
S
a|b
P (z) =

SaP (z) if V
a(z) < V b(z),
SbP (z) if V
b(z) < V a(z),
uP ∈ [SaP (z), SbP (z)] or
uP ∈ {SaP (z), SbP (z)} if V b(z) = V a(z),
(24)
or
SlP (z) =

u∗P (z,Dmin(V
a(z), V b(z))) if V b(z) 6= V a(z)
uP ∈ [u∗P (z,DV a(z)), u∗P (z,DV a(z))] or
uP ∈ {u∗P (z,DV a(z)), u∗P (z,DV a(z))} if V b(z) = V a(z),
(25)
where [v1, v2] = {v : κv1 + (1 − κ)v2, κ ∈ [0, 1]}. To evaluate the guaranteed payoff
for S
a|b
P , one needs to determine pencils of solutions for differential equations with
discontinuous right-hand sides. The generalized solutions (Krasovskii and Subbotin,
1988) include all possible absolutely continuous motions for all values of the con-
trol at a discontinuity point (as, e.g., the Filippov’s solutions (Filippov, 1988)).
1 A similar problem arises when optimal feedbacks are constructed with the use of a
synthesis procedure based on the main equation and its smooth characteristics within
the Isaacs’ approach (Isaacs, 1967).
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The constructive motions (Krasovskii and Subbotin, 1988) are absolutely continu-
ous limits of motions along the Euler broken lines. The constructive motions are
usually included into the generalized solutions and provide better guaranteed re-
sults. However, they are less stable (Krasovskii and Subbotin, 1988).
One way to avoid discontinuous controls at the regular states is to use smooth
upper approximations of min(V a(z), V b(z)) in (23) as, e.g., (9). Then with
SlP (z) = u
∗
P (z,DM
ξ
µ(z)), S
l
E(z) = u
∗
E(z,DM
ξ
µ(z)) (26)
some subsets of the generalized motions are obtained.
Practically in all games solved with use of the Isaacs’ approach, the value func-
tions are not smooth globally (Isaacs, 1967). Call a state z ∈ Z regular with re-
spect to known value functions V a and V b if SlP and S
l
E meet (20)–(23) with
V l, H l ∈ C2, u∗P ∈ C, l ∈ L, in some neighbourhood of z. A set of such states
is also called regular. Let Ea|b = {z ∈ Z : V a(z) = V b(z)} be a two-sided regu-
lar smooth hypersurface separating two regular sets. Moving along any direction η
from z ∈ Ea|b for a small enough time, the state shifts to a regular state z′ on Ea|b
(V a(z′) = V b(z′)) or in Z (V a(z′) < V b(z′)) or in Z (V a(z′) > V b(z′)).
If
∂
∂z
(V a(z)− V b(z))f(z, SaP (z), SaE(z)) > 0, (27)
∂
∂z
(V b(z)− V a(z))f(z, SbP (z), SbE(z)) > 0, (28)
on Ea|b and P uses (25) or (26) in its close neighbourhood, the state may stay there
for some time (Shevchenko, 2014).
4. Constructing strategies in a simple alternative pursuit game
Three points P , E1, and E2, E = (E1, E2), with bounded velocities move on the
plane as
z˙ = (uP , ue), z = z
0,
zP , z1, z2 ∈ R2, ze = (z1, z2) ∈ R4, z = (zP , ze) ∈ R6,
z0 = (z0P , z
0
e), z
0
e = (z
0
1 , z
0
2),
uP ∈ UP , ue = (u1, u2) ∈ Ue,
UP = {uP : ||uP || ≤ 1}, Ue = {ue : ||u1|| ≤ β1 < 1, ||u2|| ≤ β2 < 1}
It’s required to determine the minimal guaranteed time τ1|2 for P to approach one
of E’s by a given distance r > 0 and the corresponding strategy.
The value of the game at the initial state z0 ∈ Z may be evaluated as
V (z0) = min(V 1(z0), V 2(z0)), (29)
where
V i(z0) =
||z0i − z0P || − r
1− βi , (30)
the optimal feedback pursuit strategy is
S
i(z0)
P (z) = −
∂V i(z
0)
∂zi(z0)
(z)/||∂V
i(z0)
∂zi(z0)
(z)||, z, z0 ∈ Z, (31)
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and i(z0)(= 1 ∨ 2) satisfies the condition
V i(z
0)(z0) = min(V 1(z0), V 2(z0)). (32)
It was noted in (Krasovskii and Subbotin, 1988) that in this game with β1 = β2
and r = 0 there is a dispersal line where both pursuers are equidistant and it may
become a singular line with the payoff equal to +∞ due to the measurement errors.
Look at an alternative version of the game with the pursuit strategy
S
1|2
P (z) = −
∂V i
∗(z)
∂zi∗(z)
(z)/||∂V
i∗(z)
∂zi∗(z)
(z)||, z ∈ Z, (33)
where i∗(z)(= 1 ∨ 2) meets the condition
V i
∗(z)(z) = V 1|2(z) = min(V 1(z), V 2(z)). (34)
This strategy is discontinuous in z on
E1|2 = {z : V 1(z) = V 2(z), z ∈ Z}.
To construct smooth in z approximations for S
1|2
P , M
ξ
µ may be used as follows
SξP (z) = −
∂M ξµ
∂zP
(V 1(z), V 2(z))/||∂M
ξ
µ
∂zP
(V 1(z), V 2(z))||, z ∈ Z, (35)
where
∂M ξµ
∂zP
(V 1(z), V 2(z)) =
∑
i=1,2
∂M ξµ
∂vi
(V 1(z), V 2(z))
∂V i
∂zP
(z),
∂V i
∂zP
(z) = − 1
1− βi
zi − zP
||zi − zP || , z ∈ Z, i = 1, 2.
Note that the time derivatives of V 1|2 and M ξµ along a trajectory that corre-
sponds to the strategies SP , S1, S2 are described by the following expressions (where
exist)
dV 1|2
dt
=
∑
i=1,2
∂min
∂vi
(V 1(z), V 2(z))
∂V i
∂z
(z)
dz
dt
,
∂min
∂vi
∈ {0, 1},
dM ξµ
dt
=
∑
i=1,2
∂M ξµ
∂vi
(V 1(z), V 2(z))
∂V i
∂z
(z)
dz
dt
,
∂M ξµ
∂vi
∈ [0, 1]
where
dz
dt
= (SP , (S1, S2)), z
0 = (z0P , (z
0
1 , z
0
2)).
A locally optimizing strategy corresponds to the case when instant controls
minimize/maximize the time derivative of a goal function for any z ∈ Z. Obviously,
S
1|2
P (see (33)) is locally optimizing for V
1|2 as well as
Smaxi = βi
zi − zP
||zi − zP || , z ∈ Z, i = 1, 2, (36)
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for V i. SξP , ξ > 0, (see (35)) may be considered as an approximation for S
1|2
P .
Let Ei use S
max
i (z) = βie(ψ
max
i ) and P use S
E
P = e(ϕ
E). The state moves along
E1|2 if ϕE meets the condition
β1
1− β1 −
β2
1− β2 −
(
e(ψmax1 )
1− β1 −
e(ψmax2 )
1− β2
)
e(ϕE) = 0. (37)
If Ei uses S
max
i , i = 1, 2, and β1 = β2 = β, then S
ξ
P = e(ϕ
ξ) keeps the state on
E1|2 with the corresponding payoff
τ1|2(z, SξP , (S
max
1 , S
max
2 )) = +∞, z ∈ E1|2, ξ > 0,
see Fig. 3.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: Instant velocities on E1|2 (a) and trajectories in vicinity of a point of attraction (b)
The inequality
dM ξµ
dt
< 0, (38)
holds on E1|2 only if 0 ≤ γ < 2 arccosβ. Whereas, for Si(z0)P , Smax1 and Smax2 ,
dV i(z
0)
dt
= −1, z ∈ Z. (39)
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we provide an analysis on smooth approximations of the minimum
function thus allowing construction of the corresponding strategies for a pursuer
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in an alternative pursuit game with two evaders. As a drawback of the procedure
we show through an example how the state may never leave a manifold where two
value functions are equal and thus the game never ends if the pursuit strategy is
applied.
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Abstract The game problems between seller and buyer of an American
contingent claim relate to large scale problems because a number of buyer’s
strategies grows overexponentially. Therefore, decomposition of such games
turns out to be a fundamental problem. In this paper we prove the exis-
tence of a minimax monotonous (in time) strategy of the seller in a loss
minimization problem considering value-at-risk measure of loss. The given
result allows to substantially decrease a number of constraints in the origi-
nal problem and lets us turn to an equivalent mixed integer problem with
admissible dimension.
Keywords: decision making under uncertainty, value-at-risk, scenario tree,
stopping time, hedging.
1. Introduction
A seminal series of papers (Merton, 1973; Black and Scholes, 1973; Shiryaev, 1999)
initiated an extensive number of studies on financial asset pricing and minimization
of risk associated with failure of contingent claim hedging (building a portfolio of
assets to exceed the claim value). The authors assumed that trades occur contin-
uously in time. Consideration of discrete models of a financial market for solving
investment problems allowed to apply new methods, particularly ones of mathe-
matical programming and game theory. This is due to the fact that the number of
market scenarios is finite.
The first discrete models of contingent claims valuation were examined in (Har-
rison and Kreps, 1979). This paper proposed a new concept of a discrete market
applying stochastic programming approach. The novel idea was to describe a finan-
cial market with a scenario tree. They formulated the notions of arbitrage (market
condition which permits investment strategies with a guaranteed profit), a self-
financing strategy, hedging (implementing the contingent claim) basing on scenario
tree framework. The fundamental theorem of asset pricing was presented as well.
The problem of maximizing the expected value of terminal portfolio was formu-
lated in (Pliska, 1997). The author derived analytically the amount of initial capi-
tal needed for perfect hedging of various contingent claims. In paper (King, 2002)
the existence of arbitrage opportunities was analyzed using the duality theory. He
stated the linear and nonlinear programming problems to determine optimal buyer
⋆ The reported study was funded by RFBR according to the research project No. 16-31-
00070 mol a.
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and seller’s strategies. In addition, the author proved a criterion for the existence
of an optimal solution in the utility maximization problem.
SPAN system (Standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk) is a good example which il-
lustrates practical use of the discrete models of a financial market. It was introduced
at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 1988 (Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 1999).
This is the portfolio risk assessment methodology which determines the minimum
margin requirements to cover losses for one trading period. 16 market scenarios are
simulated in the system representing possible ranges of percentage changes in price
and volatility of the underlying asset.
The main feature of an American contingent claim is an uncertain moment
of exercise (using the right to oblige a seller to make a transaction). So, American
claims may be exercised by its buyer at any time t = {0, ..., T } up to expiration date.
Exercise time is usually considered as an uncertain factor in investment problems.
As a result a zero-sum game between the seller and the buyer arises in this scope.
Perfect hedging (with probability one) of an American contingent claim generally
requires considerable initial endowment from the seller.
There are several common ways to assess the risk of imperfect hedging. The au-
thors of (Fo¨llmer and Leukert, 1999) suggested to use strategies of two types. The
first one is quantile hedging. It allows to hedge the contingent claim with the high-
est probability. This approach does not take the investor’s attitude towards the risk
into account in contrast to the second type of strategies that minimize a linear func-
tion of losses associated with imperfect hedging. The authors proved existence of
the optimal solutions for a continuous model of the market using Neyman-Pearson
lemma. Perez-Hernandez formulated optimization problems of the described two
types of imperfect hedging for financial markets with discrete time and an infi-
nite number of states (Perez-Hernandez, 2007). In this paper he also stated new
problems and proved the existence of their optimal solutions under minimizing the
initial portfolio endowment and the fixed losses. The paper (Novikov, 1999) con-
siders the analogous problem of minimizing the initial endowment. However, the
constraints are more complicated to deal with. The probability of full hedging is
bounded from below. There are two tradable assets: risky and riskless ones. It was
assumed that the contingent claim can not be exercised until the specific time mo-
ment which is optimal for the buyer. Then, the optimal hedging strategies were
found in (Lindberg, 2012) for a slightly more general model of the market but a
set of exercise times was restricted in a foregoing way. The problem of imperfect
hedging from the buyer’s perspective was proposed in (Pinar, 2011). An alterna-
tive description of the decision making process connected with exercising the claim
allowed to formulate the mixed-integer problem which is equivalent to the origi-
nal one. The paper (Camci and Pinar, 2009) stated a theorem which leads to even
more reduction and equivalently turns to finding the optimal solution to the relaxed
problem. Pinar (2011) also provides numerical results using real data.
In a present paper we propose value-at-risk (VaR) as a risk measure to estimate
the losses from imperfect hedging. It is equal to the minimum value such that
the expected losses do not exceed it with a specified probability. In other words,
VaR corresponds to the amount of uninsured risk which the seller can take, see
first (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000) for the details. Nowadays VaR method meets
the standards of banking regulation approved by the Basel Committee on Banking
278 Alexey I. Soloviev
Supervision. This measure is recommended primarily for monitoring market risks
and effectiveness of hedging strategies.
VaR approach of risk estimation was widely studied in (Rockafellar and Uryasev,
2000). The authors proved that minimization of VaR, CVaR (conditional value-at-
risk that is roughly interpreted as expected losses which exceed VaR value) and
Markowitz problem have the same optimum under some conditions. The analytic
formula of a CVaR value was obtained in (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2002) for a
discrete model of a financial market. The distribution of future losses was assumed
to be known. The paper (Sarykalin et al., 2008) provided detailed comparison of
VaR and CVaR. In short, advantages of VaR measure include the fact that it is not
subject to errors in the measurement of the biggest losses, assessment of which is
rather difficult. The disadvantage of VaR is its non-convexity (in contrast to CVaR)
which complicates problem solving in practice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the discrete model
of securities market and define the basic notions of subject area in Sect. 2. Sect. 3
formally defines a zero-sum game (strategies of players and a loss function) and
introduces a problem of VaR minimization consisted in finding of minimax for the
game. We state and prove the main result in Sect. 4. Then, we apply it showing
how to substantially reduce a number of constraints in the original problem.
2. The Model of a Financial Market
The market consists of d + 1 tradable securities, whose prices are denoted at each
state n by a non-negative vector Sn = (S
0
n, ..., S
d
n). We assume the security indexed
by 0 to be riskless (a bank deposit or a bond), it has strictly positive prices at
each state. We choose this asset to be the numeraire and introduce the discounts
1/S0n. Let a vector Xn = Sn/S
0
n denote the discounted security prices relative to
the numeraire. Its zero entry X0n equals 1 in any state n.
The set of states N of the market has a tree structure; see examples of it in
Fig. 1 and in (Harrison and Kreps, 1979, p. 393; Pliska, 1997, p. 79). It is divided
into pairwise disjoint subsets of states Nt which may occur at specific time moments
t = 0, ..., T. The set N0 contains the only element – a root of the tree denoted by
0. Every node n ∈ Nt, where t = 1, ..., T , has a unique parent a(n) ∈ Nt−1. We put
a(0) = 0, a0(n) = n, as+1(n) = as(a(n)), s = 1, ..., t, for all n ∈ Nt, t = 1, ..., T.
Next, each node n ∈ Nt, where t = 0, ..., T−1, has a set of child nodes C(n) ⊂ Nt+1.
Let D(n) be a set of all the nodes which may occur after n, i.e. child nodes, their
children and so on (D (0) = N\{0}, D(n) = C(n) for all n ∈ NT−1).
♥0
✑
✑
✑
✑✑
❜
❜
❜
❜
❜❜♥l ♥m ♥r
✄
✄✄
❈
❈❈
✓
✓
✓
✄
✄✄
❈
❈❈
❙
❙
❙
✁
✁
✁
❆
❆
❆♥1 ♥2 ♥3 ♥4 ♥5 ♥6 ♥7 ♥8 ♥9
t = 0
t = 1
t = 2
Fig. 1. A scenario tree (T = 2, N1 = C(0) = {l,m, r}, C(l) = {1, 2} ⊂ NT = {1, 2, ..., 9}).
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A unique path ω = (n0, n1, ..., nT ) leads from the root to a leaf node n ∈ NT ,
where n0 = 0, nt−1 = a(nt) ∈ Nt−1 for all t = 1, ..., T, nT = n. These paths
are interpreted as scenarios of market movement. They form atoms of probabil-
ity space Ω. The set Nt partitions Ω into subsets (events). Each of them is de-
fined by a node n ∈ Nt and consists of all the paths containing n. The partition
generates an algebra Ft (algebra of events observed up to time moment t). Here,
F0 = {∅, Ω} ⊂ F1 ⊂ ... ⊂ FT . The family of sets {Ft} is a filtration. Throughout
the paper we will consider {Ft}-adapted stochastic processes b = {b(t)}, where a
random variable b(t) takes values bn, n ∈ Nt, and, thus, is Ft-measurable.
The probability measure p = (pn, n ∈ N ) defined on Ω attaches values pn > 0,∑
n∈NT pn = 1 to all the terminal states. The probabilities of other states can be
defined consecutively: pn =
∑
m∈C(n) pm for all n ∈ Nt, t = T − 1, ..., 0. Note that
p0 = 1. Suppose that measure p defines true (statistical) probabilities of events. It
can be uniquely determined by a probability distribution pT = (pn, n ∈ NT ). To
define values of p it is convenient to set conditional measures at first:
p(·|n) = (p(m|n) = pm/pn, m ∈ C(n)) .
They indicate the probabilities of turning from states n ∈ Nt, t = 0, ..., T − 1, to
the next states m ∈ C(n). Then, values of pn can be derived using the following
formula:
pn =
t−1∏
s=0
p(as(n)| as+1(n)).
3. Game Description
Let us consider a zero-sum game with two players: a seller of the contingent claim
and its buyer. The seller is an investor in wide sense, he builds a trading strategy to
hedge the American contingent claim. The buyer exercises the claim in some moment
of time (i.e. obliges the seller to pay the claim value using his right specified in a
contract). Next, we define strategies of players.
Seller’s Strategy
We denote amount of security j held by the investor in state n ∈ N by θjn. We
will consider a portfolio process θ = {θ(t)}, where the portfolios θn = (θ0n, ..., θdn),
n ∈ Nt, formed at stage t are the values of a random variable θ(t). So, the investor
has an initial portfolio θ0 at stage t = 0, then he forms a portfolio θn in state n ∈ N1
(buying some securities and selling others) and so on.
Portfolio process θ is called an investor strategy if a self-financing condition is
satisfied:
Xn · θn = Xn · θa(n), ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 1, ..., T.
Self-financing means that an investor does not spend money and does not get any
revenue from outside. Let
Yn = Xn −Xa(n), ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 1, ..., T,
be the vector of increments of securities prices. Then, Yn · θa(n) means a discounted
profit of investor from portfolio θa(n) in state n.
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Portfolio value process V = {V (t)} corresponds to a trading strategy θ. A ran-
dom variable V (t) takes values Vn equal to scalar products of price and portfolio
vectors:
Vn = Xn · θn =
d∑
j=0
Xjnθ
j
n, ∀n ∈ N .
It is easy to see (Fo¨llmer and Schied, 2011, Prop. 5.7; Pliska, 1997, Prop. 3.2) that
V (t) can be represented in the following form for any strategy θ
V (t) = V0 +
t∑
s=1
Y (s) · θ(s− 1), ∀ t = 1, ..., T.
Since each child node of the scenario tree has a unique parent, we may specify all
the preceding nodes for each n ∈ Nt, t = 1, ..., T. They are at(n), at−1(n), ..., a(n).
Hence, the portfolio values Vn, n ∈ Nt, are equal to
Vn = V0 +
t∑
s=1
Yas−1(n) · θas(n), ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 1, ..., T.
It also follows from (Fo¨llmer and Schied, 2011, Prop. 5.7). We will use these equa-
tions later to describe the relationship between trading strategy and portfolio values.
To make the dependance more convenient we denote the amount of portfolio value
increment up to state n by
(Y θ)n =
t∑
s=1
Yas−1(n) · θas(n), ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 1, ..., T,
and let (Y θ)0 = 0.
It is said that the market has an arbitrage opportunity if there is a trading
strategy θ such that V0 ≤ 0 and Vn ≥ 0 for each n ∈ N\{0} and at least one
of these inequalities meets strictly. Following trading strategy θ, the investor loses
nothing and yields a positive profit with a positive probability. Suppose further that
there are no arbitrage opportunities in the market.
Strategy θ is called admissible if Vn ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N . We will consider only
admissible trading strategies because they prevent the investor from ruin.
Remark 1. It is easy to show (King, 2002, p. 546) that strategy θ is admissible for
arbitrage-free markets if Vn ≥ 0 for all terminal states n ∈ NT . Indeed, otherwise
suppose that portfolio value is negative in some state m ∈ N\NT and Vn ≥ 0 for all
terminal states which follow m (n ∈ NT ∩D(m)). Then, the investor may guarantee
a positive profit for all future market scenarios.
Buyer’s Strategy
Buyer’s strategy is a moment of time when the contingent claim is exercised – a
stopping time. Let us describe it with a random variable
τ : Ω→ {0, ..., T}
for which {τ = t} ∈ Ft. We use T to denote a finite set of all buyer’s strategies.
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Exercise time τ produces the only state nτ(ω) ∈ N , where stopping occurs for
each simple event ω = (n0, ..., nT ) ∈ Ω. Let us denote the set of such states as Nτ .
It can be seen that a set N˜ ⊂ N conforms to some exercise time τ (in the sense
that N˜ = Nτ ) if there exists exactly one element of this set in each sequence of
consecutive states (n0, ..., nT ) .
A set of buyer’s strategies grows very quickly while a number of trading periods
T increases. A number of exercise times can be determined recursively. Let Kn
denote it for the subtree with node n and other nodes D(n). Then
Kn = 1, ∀n ∈ NT , Kn = 1 +
∏
m∈C(n)
Km, ∀n ∈ Nt, t = T − 1, ..., 0.
There is an exact formula for the value of T for specific cases when a number of
child nodes C(n) is constant for all n ∈ N\NT and equals 2 or 3. It is the following:
| T | =
[
kc
T
]
, (1)
where [x] is an integral part of x, k ≈ 1,5028 when c = | C(n)| = 2 (Aho and Sloane,
1973), and k ≈ 1,2766 when c = | C(n)| = 3 (McGarvey, 2007). A number of buyer’s
strategies (exercise times) is shown in Table 1 for different values of T.
Table 1: A number of exercise times under different numbers of trading periods T.
T 0 1 2 3 4 5
| T |, where c = 2 1 2 5 26 677 458330
| T |, where c = 3 1 2 9 730 389017001 ≈ 5,9× 1025
American contingent claim
We describe an American contingent claim with a non-negative stochastic process
F = {F (t)}, where a random variable F (t) takes discounted values Fn with prob-
ability pn, n ∈ Nt, t = 0, ..., T. The simple example of a contingent claim is an
option payment. Portfolio strategy θ hedges an American contingent claim F exer-
cised in time τ if the corresponding portfolio value process V satisfies Vn ≥ Fn for
all n ∈ Nτ .
Suppose that the seller does not have a necessary sum for perfect hedging and
decides to manage with less initial endowment taking the risk of future losses. So,
if the claim is exercised in state n ∈ N of the market, then seller’s losses are equal
to (Fn − Vn)+ = max{Fn − Vn; 0}. Let us evaluate seller’s losses in exercise time τ
using the value-at-risk function:
VaRα
(
(F (τ)− V (τ))+) = min{B ∈ R |P((F (τ) − V (τ))+ ≤ B) ≥ α},
where α is a preset level of significance which is usually not less than 95%.
Therefore, we defined a zero-sum game between a seller of the claim and its
buyer. Let us state the optimization problem from the seller’s side to find an op-
timal investment strategy (V, θ) which imperfectly hedges contingent claim F and
minimizes a loss function VaRα under uncertain exercise time τ. The given prob-
lem consists in finding a minimax value of the game and can be formulated in the
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following way:
min
(V, θ)
max
τ∈T
VaRα((F (τ) − V (τ))+)
Vn = v + (Y θ)n ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N .
(2)
4. Conversion of an Original Problem
Let us introduce an auxiliary variable u to bound the maximum of (2) from above.
Then, we may rewrite the problem (2)
min
(V, θ, u)
u{
u ≥ VaRα((F (τ) − V (τ))+) , ∀ τ ∈ T
Vn = v + (Y θ)n ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N .
Next, we use the definition of VaR and introduce variables Bτ for all τ ∈ T . Hence:
min
(V, θ, u)
uu ≥ minBτ∈X(V,τ)Bτ , ∀ τ ∈ TVn = v + (Y θ)n ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N ,
(3)
where X(V, τ) = {Bτ ∈ R |P((F (τ) − V (τ))+ ≤ Bτ ) ≥ α} for any fixed V and τ.
Now we show that problem (3) can be equivalently reduced to the following one:
min
(V, θ, u)
u{
P((F (τ) − V (τ))+ ≤ u) ≥ α, ∀ τ ∈ T
Vn = v + (Y θ)n ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N .
(4)
Indeed, for any Bτ ∈ X(V, τ) and u ≥ Bτ
α ≤ P((F (τ) − V (τ))+ ≤ Bτ) ≤ P((F (τ) − V (τ))+ ≤ u) .
Conversely, for optimal solution (V ∗, θ∗, u∗) of (4) we may put
B∗τ = Arg min
Bτ∈X(V ∗,τ)
Bτ = max
n∈Nτ
(Fn − V ∗n )+ ≤ u∗.
The first group of constraints in (4) shows that losses do not exceed u with
probability not less than α for all the exercise times. So, when the seller deter-
mines his investment strategy, he separates all the states of the market into two
groups whether planned losses exceed u or not. Let us incorporate binary variables
xn ∈ {0, 1} for all n ∈ N which represent the seller’s choice of states. Then, the
problem (4) has the following reformulation:
min
(x, V, θ, u)
u
∑
n∈Nτ
pnxn ≥ α, ∀ τ ∈ T
Vn ≥ xnFn − u, ∀n ∈ N
Vn = v + (Y θ)n ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N
u ≥ 0,
xn ∈ {0, 1} , ∀n ∈ N .
(5)
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Indeed, u ≥ (Fn−Vn)+ if xn = 1. The constraint Vn ≥ xnFn−u becomes redundant
if xn = 0.
Direct solving of (5) is complicated by a huge number of coupling constraints
which correspond to all possible exercise times τ ∈ T . A lot of binary variables
remains an issue to deal with as well. Next theorem proves the main outcome of
this study – the existence of optimal solution for problem (5) such that x∗ has a
monotonic nature over time. Namely, we will show that
x∗n ≥ x∗m, ∀m ∈ C(n), n ∈ N\NT . (6)
It can be interpreted in the following way. For each scenario ω = (n0, ..., nT ) , i.e.
for each sequence of consecutive nodes of the scenario tree, leading from the root to
a leaf node, the following is true: if x∗nt = 0, then x
∗
ns
= 0 for each s = t+ 1, ..., T,
hence we only want the portfolio value to be non-negative from a state nt up to the
terminal moment of time.
Theorem 1. There will always be an optimal solution (x∗, V ∗, θ∗, u∗) of (5) such
that x∗ satisfies the monotone condition (6).
Proof. Let us fix an optimal solution (x∗, V ∗, θ∗, u∗) and define a process x˜ = {x˜(t)}
recursively for t = T, ..., 0:
x˜n = x
∗
n, ∀n ∈ NT , x˜n = min
{
x∗n,
∑
m∈C(n)
p(m|n)x˜m
}
, ∀n ∈ Nt, t = T − 1, ..., 0.
A stochastic process x˜ is analogous to Snell envelope (Fo¨llmer and Schied, 2011,
p. 285) and turns out to be a submartingale, i.e.
x˜n ≤
∑
m∈C(n)
p(m|n)x˜m, ∀n ∈ Nt, t = 0, ..., T − 1.
Besides, we conclude the following from the definition of process x˜ :
min
τ∈T
∑
n∈Nτ
pnx
∗
n = min
τ∈T
∑
n∈Nτ
pnx˜n = x˜0.
Next, we define the stopping rule τ˜ ∈ T for each scenario ω = (n0, ..., nT ) ∈ Ω,
where nt ∈ Nt :
τ˜ (ω) =

T, if x∗nt ≥
∑
m∈C(nt)
p(m|nt)x˜m, ∀nt ∈ ω, t = 0, ..., T − 1,
min
{
t
∣∣∣∣ x˜nt = x∗nt < ∑
m∈C(nt)
p(m|nt)x˜m
}
, otherwise.
(7)
According to definition of τ˜ the buyer stops and exercises the contingent claim until
T if x˜nt = x
∗
nt
= 0. Therefore, (7) is equivalent to
τ˜(ω) =
{
T, if x∗nt = 1, ∀nt ∈ ω, t = 0, ..., T − 1,
min
{
t|x∗nt = 0
}
, otherwise.
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In other words, we stop in the first possible state where x∗n = 0 or in the final state
if there was no stopping before that. Let us note that
τ˜ ∈ Argmin
τ∈T
∑
n∈Nτ
pnx
∗
n.
For all states m ∈ D(n) which occur after n ∈ Nτ˜ we may put x∗m = 0. Indeed,
V ∗m ≥ Fmx∗m−u∗ and a value minτ∈T
∑
n∈Nτ pnx
∗
n does not change. Minimum value
of the objective function u remains unchanged too. Therefore, the optimal process
x∗ satisfies the monotone condition (6). ⊓⊔
We use this theorem to reduce the problem (5) excluding the exercise times:
min
(x, V, θ, u)
u
∑
n∈NT
pnxn ≥ α,
xn ≥ xm, ∀m ∈ C(n), n ∈ N\NT
Vn ≥ xnFn − u, ∀n ∈ N
Vn = v + (Y θ)n ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N
u ≥ 0,
xn ∈ {0, 1} , ∀n ∈ NT .
(8)
Corollary 1. Any optimal solution of (8) is optimal for (5) too.
Proof. A set of feasible solutions of (5) can be reduced by Theorem 1 incorporating
the monotone condition. First, we show that a minimum value of the objective
function does not change if we remove the constraint xn ∈ {0, 1} for all n ∈ N\NT .
Non-negativity xn ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N follows from this system of inequalities
xaT (n) ≥ . . . ≥ xa(n) ≥ xn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ NT .
If there is a state n˜ ∈ N\NT such that xn˜ > maxm∈C(n˜) xm, then we may put
xn˜ = maxm∈C(n˜) xm decreasing xn˜. Indeed,
Vn˜ ≥ Fn˜xn˜ − u > Fn˜ max
m∈C(n˜)
xm − u, xa(n˜) ≥ xn˜ > max
m∈C(n˜)
xm.
So, xn = maxm∈C(n) xm for each n ∈ N\NT , that is why xn ∈ {0, 1} for all n ∈ N .
Decreasing of x does not change the values of xT . Using monotone condition (6),
we conclude that ∑
n∈Nτ
pnxn ≥
∑
n∈NT
pnxn
for all exercise times τ ∈ T . Thus,∑
n∈NT
pnxn = min
τ∈T
∑
n∈Nτ
pnxn ≥ α.
Therefore, turning to (8) is equivalent in the sense that the objectives achieve the
same minimum values and any optimal solution of (8) remains optimal for (5). ⊓⊔
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Equivalent reduction to problem (8) allows to change |T | linear coupling con-
straints into |N | monotone conditions and one constraint which couples terminal
values xT . We remark here that a number of nodes |N | in the scenario tree grows
exponentially with increasing number of trading periods T. For a constant number
of child nodes (|C(n)| = c for all n ∈ N\{0}) it equals a sum of geometric series:
|N | = c
T+1 − 1
c− 1 . (9)
To estimate a number of monotone conditions if a number of child nodes is non-
constant and does not exceed c we may bound |N | above with the fraction of (9).
One should compare this formula with (1) to see clearly the effect of Theorem 1.
5. Conclusion
In this study we suppose that security trading in financial market occurs in deter-
ministic time moments and a market has a finite number of scenarios. If there are
a lot of trading periods and market scenarios, we deal with large-scale problems.
There are no transaction costs during the trading and the market has no arbitrage
opportunities.
Here for the first time we state the problem of finding the investment strategy
which produces the minimal losses associated with imperfect hedging of American
contingent claim using VaR measure. The main problem has a game form and con-
sists in finding a minimax value of a specific zero-sum game. The main result of this
study states that the seller always has a minimax strategy which is monotonous
over time. It allows us to not only reduce the dimension of the original optimiza-
tion problem, but also actually exclude the uncertainty associated with the time of
exercising the contingent claim. The outcome can be used to create the software sys-
tems for financial institutions which deal with valuation and hedging of contingent
claims, building trading strategies and so on.
In future research we are planning to investigate the formulations of the main
game problem in which the seller may use mixed strategies and the buyer may use
behavioral ones.
Acknowledgments. The author is grateful to Prof. Vladimir V. Morozov for valu-
able remarks.
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Abstract The paper is aimed at improving the mechanism of forming the
variable part of CEO compensation. The novelty of the given research paper
is improving the methodology of evaluation the value of variable part of CEO
compensation with the chosen model, so it can be applied on practice. The
model is game theoretical interpretation of the principal-agent phenomenon
whose objective is to model the variable part of CEO compensation to stim-
ulate strategy implementation In detail, 14 company cases of the U.S. public
companies in retail and technology industries were presented, the applicabil-
ity of the model was proven and suggestions for methodology improvement
were made.
Keywords: corporate governance, agency problem, CEO compensation,
game theory, theoretical modeling, U.S. public companies.
1. Introduction
The research deals with the problem of CEO compensation value modeling which
is one of the core issues of corporate governance. In theory, contracts should be
designed by boards of directors to maximize company value. Contacts should at-
tract and retain talented CEOs, incentivize them to exert high level of efforts to
implement the company’s strategy and ensure its competitive advantage.
To begin with, CEO compensation structure usually consists of base salary and
variable part. Base salary of CEO is less dependent on performance compared to
variable part of compensation and is usually determined by the reputation of a man-
ager, his experience at managing companies, size of a considered company, certain
industry specifics and the level of CEO base salary across the chosen industry. Con-
trary, variable part of CEO compensation is directly dependent on performance of
a company. According to Frydman and Saks (2010), a variable part of top manage-
ment compensation in form of option grants and cash bonuses has been prevalent
since 1950s in the U.S. public companies.
Traditionally, a variable part of executive compensation is considered as a tool
for solving the agency problem, that is caused by the conflict of interests between
an agent (CEO) and a principal (company owners). Principal owns capital and del-
egates responsibility to manage it in his/her interest to the agent, however, because
of the conflict of interests in separation of profits gained by the company between
two parties, temptation of ex post opportunistic behavior occurs for the agent. That
is why the mechanism of determining the value of variable part of CEO compen-
sation, which eliminates motivation for opportunistic behavior, should be worked
out.
⋆ Authors are indebted to Prof. Nikolay A. Zenkevich whose help, valuable comments and
helpful conversations improved the quality of this work.
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There are quite a lot of scientific studies on the topic of executive compensation
studies. Prevailing optimal contract theory (pioneered by Holmstrom (1979), Gross-
man and Hart (1983)) claims that a compensation program can be constructed so
that interests of shareholders and CEOs are aligned and the most talented CEOs
at a competitive market are attracted and retained due to fair remuneration of
their talents and efforts. On the other hand, managerial power theory (Bebchuk
and Fried, 2004) argues that high value of executive compensation is the result of
CEOs’ rent-seeking behavior.
Despite vast research conducted on the matter of executive compensation, none
of the existing theories offers a fully coherent explanation for historical evolution of
executive compensation during the 1970s, some of the cross-sectional and time-series
patterns in the data, and provides a convincing mechanism designing consistent
compensation programs. Thus, the goal of the research paper was to improve the
mechanism of forming the incentive plan of CEO compensation based on the existing
theoretical models and approaches, and test the applicability of this mechanism for
the U.S. public companies.
Mandatory disclosure of executives’ compensation in the U.S. public compa-
nies added transparency to the issue in question in 1992 and mirrored disconnect
between pay of executives and average employees. Additionally scandalous cases
such as Enron, Tyco and WorldCom of the early 2000s and the Great Recession
concluding the late 2000s attracted more attention to corporate governance issues,
raising a question of necessary cuts in compensations and more rigorous monitoring
of the CEO activities. In the 2000s compensations still remained generous but de-
creased in value in comparison to the peaking year 2000. One example of outrageous
compensation is a case of the former J.C. Penney CEO compensation that in 2012
amounted to 53.5 million USD and exceeded an average worker wage by 1795 times
The U.S. publicly traded companies (without a controlling shareholder) were in
focus of our analysis. Confirmed by research and scandalous media examples, when
ownership and management are separated (like in public companies), CEOs might
abuse substantial power to enjoy individual benefits without putting additional
efforts into the company management.
Even though ownership structure in U.S. and Russian public companies is differ-
ent, (scattered ownership in the U.S. vs. concentrated ownership in Russia) conclu-
sions derived from the analysis of the U.S. compensation programs could be applied
to some extent in the Russian environment.
2. Executive compensation problem
The subject of the research is executive compensation (interchangeably: compensa-
tion program or compensation package) for CEOs that incentivizes top managers to
align their efforts with owners’ expectations. Therefore, we refer to corporate gover-
nance, a system by which companies are controlled, directed and made accountable
to shareholders and other stakeholders (Demirag, 1998). Since the emergence of for-
malization of the problem, academic literature on the subject has been enormous,
spanning around accounting, finance, economics, law, strategy, organizational be-
havior and other disciplines.
As was mentioned earlier, the modern history of executive compensation research
was evolving in parallel with theory on the principal-agent problem that was start-
ing to be generally accepted in the early 1980s. To apply principal-agent approach
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to our research, we stated that under the agent we understand the CEO (inter-
changeably: chief executive or top manager) and under the principal we understand
the shareholders and their proxy – the board of directors.
Both parties have utility functions. The utility of the principal depends on be-
havior of the agent: he wants the agent to behave in a way that maximizes his own,
the principal’s, utility. Since the agent maximizes his own utility and ownership
stake in the company is rather small, his actions may contradict the interests of
the principal who owns the company and would like its value to be maximized. In-
formation asymmetry prevents the principal from obtaining direct information on
the agent’s efforts and actions. The agent’s utility is assumed as his compensation
less opportunity costs, a.k.a. efforts put into value creation, whereas the principal’s
utility function is the return on investment or value of the company.
Separation of ownership and control within the company is a cornerstone of
corporate governance; it has been a central concern since the early 20th century
(Berle and Means, 1932); therefore, the main driver of public companies analysis.
Different problems arise due to the fact that interests of owners and managers
vary whereas corporate governance tends to resolve these conflicts between different
stakeholders in a public company (Kenneth, Nofsinger, 2004).
Another important aspect of executive compensation research is sensitivity to
the company performance (pay-performance sensitivity). The earlier group of stud-
ies tried to find dependencies between changes in executive compensation and stock
prices and was criticized to concentrate only on current remuneration but not on
executive cumulative wealth (Murphy, 1985; Bernston, 1985). Jensen and Murphy
(1990) integrated various factors and assessed relationship between the company
performance and CEO wealth for large U.S. public companies for the time period
of 1974-1986 (dollar change in wealth for a dollar change in the company value).
Hall and Liebman (1998) continue research proposing to assess dollar-percentage
change (equity-at-stake as measure of CEO incentives). Thus different measures in
assessment of pay-performance sensitivity lead to different magnitude of incentives.
Baker and Hall (2004) demonstrate that the measure of incentives is dependent
upon CEO operations-company value relationship. Since 1990s the strength of pay-
performance hypothesis has been questioned by various researchers, remaining one
of the major issues of the executive compensation theory.
The principal’s payoff – shareholders value – is understood differently in different
models. Older models generally tend to consider company profit as the value to be
maximized whereas contemporary models usually follow ideas of value-based man-
agement, so shareholders seek for company value maximization. Therefore, modern
models of executive compensation use market capitalization instead of profit as the
principal’s value.
Within the principal-agent problem, traditionally, CEO compensation is either
an instrument to solve the principal-agent problem (optimal contracting approach)
or is itself a part of the principal-agent problem (managerial power approach).
3. Executive compensation model
Theoretical model
Current research studies on executives’ compensation investigate dependencies
compensation and other variables, including performance. The limitation of these
research papers is that these models are used as purely theoretical, intended to get
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qualitative findings. As a result, there is lack of convincing explanations of compen-
sation evolution starting from 1970s and explicit recommendations for construction
of compensation packages, incentive plans in particular.
Under the requirements mentioned in theoretical background of the paper, a
special theoretical model, developed by Casamatta and Guembel in 2007, was used
in order to obtain quantitative results and practical recommendations for CEOs’
incentive plan in 10 case studies. In their article Managerial Legacies, Entrenchment
and Strategic Inertia Casamatta and Guembel consider two models. The first model
implies one strategy for both periods but allows the principal to change the agent
after the first period if he is not satisfied with his performance. The second model
assumes that after the first period the principal can change the strategy and/or the
agent. We have chosen a modified model since it appears more realistic. Usually after
the first phase of strategy implementation if performance goals are not attained, the
board of directors can question the effectiveness of the strategy and implementation
efforts of the CEO.
The model is a game theoretical interpretation of the principal-agent phenomenon
whose objective is to model the incentive plan of CEO compensation (performance-
based pay component) to stimulate strategy implementation. The principal (owner,
shareholder, investor) hires the agent (CEO, manager) to choose a company strat-
egy to implement in the subsequent time, followed by the principal’s decision to
terminate or not the contract with the current CEO. The underlying assumption
for the model is that the company strategy can be amended in both periods. In
order to design the model the following assumptions were considered:
1. There are two players in the game – principal (owner / investor / shareholder;
Board of directors can be a proxy for the owner) and agent (CEO / manager);
interaction is happening within the company scope.
2. Interaction between shareholder and top manager happens during 2 periods,
t ∈ {1, 2}.
3. At the beginning of the 1st period the principal hires the agent and signs a
contract regarding his/her compensation, w(R), where w is incentive plan of the
agent’s compensation and R is the Company performance during one period.
4. The agent can be of two types: H – high type and L – low type. The high
type manager always chooses a successful strategy S0 = G whereas the low
type manager chooses a poor, non-successful strategy S0 = B. The probability
that CEO is of high type H (before strategy implementation in the Company)
is denoted as q0 ≥ 0.5 and called CEO’s reputation. The type of CEO is not
known to the principal or the agent him/herself. Reputation of the agent after
the 2nd and the 1st period are denoted as follows: qi,j = prob (M = H | R1 =
Ri and R2 = Rj) and q
i = prob (M = H | R1 = Ri), i, j ∈ {l, h} respectively.
5. In order to execute the chosen strategy the agent has to choose whether to exert
high or low efforts e1 ∈
{
e1, e1
}
; efforts are non-observable for the principal
(which reflect the essence of the principal-agent problem). High level of efforts
e1 means individual costs c for the manager. The difference between high and
low levels of efforts is expressed by the following formula:
△e1 = e1 − e1.
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Fig. 1: Game tree
6. The nature also participates in the game. If CEO chooses the successful strategy
S0 = G, then the Company performance is high Rh with probability e1 and low
Rl = 0 with probability (1− e1). If the chosen strategy is unsuccessful, S0 = B,
the Company performance is low Rl = 0 with probability equal to 1.
7. At the end of the 1st period the principal receives an information signal sG
regarding the needed strategy. We assumed that pG = Prob(sG = G) is proba-
bility that the signal identifies the successful strategy.
8. The principal makes a decision related to the strategy choice for the 2nd period.
If the Company performance after the 1st period is high Rh, there is no value in
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changing the strategy, thus S1 = S0 = G. However if the Company performance
is low Rl = 0, the principal considers the signal sG: s/he observes whether the
signal confirms the choice of the strategy. If sG = S0, the strategy is not to be
amended; otherwise S1 ∈ {sG, S0}.
9. Afterwards the owner decides whether to leave the CEO or terminate the con-
tract with him and hire a new CEO.
10. In the 2nd period the CEO (old or new) decides whether to exert high or low
efforts e2 ∈
{
e2, e2
}
; analogously efforts are non-observable for the owner. Again
high efforts of the manager correspond to individual costs c for the manager. The
difference between high and low levels of efforts is expressed by the analogous
following formula:
△e2 = e2 − e2.
11. If the applied strategy is successful S1 = G, the Company performance is high
Rh with probability e2 and low Rl with probability (1− e2). In case of the un-
successful strategy S1 = B the Company performance is low Rl with probability
equal to 1.
As it has been already mentioned, the chief executive cares not only for his
monetary contract but also for his reputation after the strategy implementation or
contract termination. Let us denote the CEO’s reputation after period i as qi, the
definition of reputation is probability that the manager is of high type H provided
the Company performs well or poorly (Rh or Rl respectively) and whether the
Company strategy is amended or not in the 2nd period.
Let us denote the CEO value as f(q) provided s/he has a reputation q; the
formula representation is provided below:
f(q) = αq, (1)
where α > 0.
The reputation of the agent keeps updating even if the contract with him/her
was terminated after the 1st period. Only reputation of the first, old, CEO who
made a strategic decision to implement is considered in the model. A new CEO has
no reputational risks as he is not the one who chooses the strategy.
Let us find the value of reputation q with Bayes’ formula:
1. If R1 = Rh, also S1 = S0 and R2 = Rh, then q = q
h = 1.
2. If R1 = Rl, S1 = S0 and R2 = Rl, then
q = ql,l0 =
q0(1− e1)(1− pG)(1 − e2)
q0 (1− e1) (1− pG) (1− e2) + 1− q0 . (2)
3. If R1 = Rl, S1 6= S0 and R2 = Rl, then
q = ql,l1 =
q0(1− e1)(1− pG)
q0 (1− e1) (1− pG) + (1− q0)(pG (1− e2) + (1− pG)) . (3)
4. If R1 = Rl, S1 6= S0 and R2 = Rh, then q=ql,h1 = 0.
Interaction between the owner and CEO is represented in the form of a decision
tree in Fig. 1. Dotted lines incorporate the same information sets, in other words
the player with the move cannot differentiate between nodes within the information
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set. Several branches are not depicted in detail due to the fact that the outcome
will never occur. Branches where CEO exerts low efforts are analogous to branches
where s/he exerts high efforts; the only difference is in probabilities. Also. There
are 4 alternatives for the owner: A – not change the strategy nor the CEO; B – not
change the strategy, hire a new CEO; C – change the strategy and hire a new CEO;
D – change the strategy, leave the old CEO.
Payoffs of each player are described as follows:
1. If the contract with the agent is not terminated, then he receives a sum of
payoffs for two periods. If he gets fired, he receives compensation only for the
1st period while the new manager receives compensation for the 2nd period.
Let us denote the following:
wi is CEO’s compensation for the 1st period provided R1 = Ri, where i ∈ {h, l};
wi,j is CEO’s compensation for the 2nd period provided R1 = Ri, R2 = Rj
where i, j ∈ {h, l};
wi,jnew is a new CEO’s compensation for the 2nd period provided that a new
manager is hired and R1 = Ri, R2 = Rj where i, j ∈ {h, l}.
2. The principal’s payoff is equal to a sum of Company performance figures for
two periods less compensation of the agent(s).
Solution of the model. Compensation contract is accounted for the solution
of the model. Equilibrium strategies for the principal and the agent constitute the
overall Nash equilibrium; the model is solved by backward induction.
Let us consider the last move of the game where the top manager makes a
decision about the level of efforts. In each sub-game the manager has 2 alternatives:
exert high level of efforts e2 or shirk and exert low level of efforts e2. High efforts
mean higher payoff for the principal.
Let us denote conditional probability that executed strategy of the 2nd period is
successful (accounted for the Company performance in the 1st period and the fact
whether the strategy has been changed or not) as p:
p =
 1 if R1 = Rh or sG = S0,p0 if R1 = Rl, sG 6= S0 and S1 = S0,
p1 if R1 = Rl, sG 6= S0 and S1 = sG,
(4)
where
P 0 =
q0(1− e1)(1− pG)
q0 (1− e1) (1− pG) + 1− q0 , (5)
P 1 =
pG(1− q0)
q0 (1− e1) (1− pG) + 1− q0 . (6)
In order to find compensation value we are required to solve linear programming
problem: the principal maximizes his/her expected payoff for the 2nd period by
minimizing the agent’s expected compensation. The objective function looks as
follows:
min
[
p
(
e2 w
i,h + (1− e2 )wi,l
)
+ (1− p)wi,l] .
Subject to:
wi,h − wi,l ≥ c
p△e2 −△f,
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p(e2w
i,h − (1− e2)wi,l + (1− p)wi,l ≥ c,
wi,h ≥ 0, wi,l ≥ 0.
There are four possible outcomes:
1. R1 = Rh. It is not feasible to change the strategy and therefore results are
equivalent to the Base game in App. 1:
wh,h =
c
△e2 , (7)
wh,l = 0. (8)
Compensation is the same for the old and new CEOs.
2. R1 = Rl, sG = S0, then p = 1. Compensation for the old CEO is the following:
wl,hS1=sG=S0 = max
[
c
p△e2 −△f ;
c
e2
]
, (9)
wl,lS1=sG=S0 = 0. (10)
3. R1 = Rl, sG 6= S0 but S1 = S0, then p = p0, compensation for the old CEO is:
wl,hS1=sG=S0 = max
[
c
p0△e2 −△f ;
c
p0e2
]
, (11)
wl,lS1=S0 = 0. (12)
4. R1 = Rl and the strategy was changed (S1 6= S0).
The contract with old CEO is not terminated:
wl,hS1 6=S0 =
c
p1△e2 −△f, (13)
where
△f = f (qi,h)− f (qi,l) , (14)
wl,lS1 6=S0 = 0. (15)
The contract with new CEO is the following:
wl,hS1 6=S0,new =
c
p1△e2 , (16)
wl,lS1 6=S0,new = 0. (17)
Under these compensation values for the 2nd period the CEO will always exert
high level of efforts, as his expected payoff accounted for high efforts is higher than
in the case of low efforts.
Now let us consider the principal’s move.
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1. If after the 1st period the Company performance is highRh or the performance is
lowRl = 0 but the signal identifies that the initial strategy should be maintained
sG = S0, the owner has two alternatives: pursue the initial strategy with the
old or the new CEO. Base game solution presented in App. 1 demonstrates
that hiring a new manager under the initial strategy is not optimal; therefore
we assume that in such a case the owner always prefers to leave the old top
manager in the Company.
2. If or the performance is low Rl and the signal confirms that the initial strategy
will fail sG 6= S0, the owner has four alternatives:
A – not change the strategy nor the CEO
B – not change the strategy, hire a new CEO (non-optimal)
C – change the strategy and hire a new CEO
D – change the strategy, leave the old CEO (non-optimal)
Base game solution presented in App. 1 demonstrates that option B is not op-
timal. Let us consider alternatives C and D provided that the strategy is changed,
S1 6= S0. In this case compensation for the old and new CEOs should be compared
(formulas (1.15) and (16) respectively, taking into account△f < 0 in formula (14)).
Compensation of the old CEO is higher than for the new CEO; that is why when a
new strategy is adopted, the owner prefers hiring a new chief executive. Alternative
D is therefore non-optimal, so the owner chooses between options A and C.
Under the condition that expected payoff of the owner in case of the initial
strategy execution is higher than in case of a new strategy implementation in the
2nd period, he decides to follow the initial strategy (and leave the old CEO).
Let us consider the first move of the manager. He has 2 options in 2 sub-games:
exert high or low level of efforts. In order to find optimal compensation incentivizing
to exert high efforts, the following linear programming problem should be solved:
min
[
q0
(
e1 w
h + (1− e1 )wl
)
+ (1− q0)wl
]
.
Subject to:
wh − wl ≥ c
q0△e1 − e2
(
wh,h − wl,hS1=S0
)
− (1− e2)△f,
wh ≥ 0,
wl ≥ 0.
The problem solution is the following:
wh = max
[
0;
c
q0△e1 − e2
(
wh,h − wl,hS1=S0
)
− (1− e2)△f
]
, (18)
wl = 0. (19)
Considering these results it is transparent that the manager will exert high efforts
in every sub-game in the 1st period in order to maximize his expected compensation.
Therefore Nash equilibrium strategies for both players are as follows:
1. For the manager: in both periods he should exert high efforts e1 and e2.
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2. For the owner: accounted for
P 0 ≥ P 1 −
P 1wl,hS1 6=S0,new − P 0w
l,h
S1=S0
R2
. (20)
He should not change the strategy or the manager. Otherwise, he should change
the strategy and hire a new manager.
Let us calculate expected payoff for the owner for both periods:
1. If S1 = S0 :
q0
(
e1
(
R− wh + e2(R− wh,h)
)
+
+(1− e1)
(
pGe2(R− wl,hS1=sG=S0 + (1 − pG)e2(R − wl,hS1=S0)
))
. (21)
2. If S1 6= S0:
q0
(
e1
(
R− wh + e2
(
R− wh,h)+ (1− e1) pGe2 (R− wl,hS1=sG=S0)))+
+ (1− q0)pGe2(R− wl,hS1 6=S0,new). (22)
The game solution is demonstrated in Fig.2.
Fig. 2: Game solution
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4. Specification of parameters for U.S. public companies
In order to make corresponding computations using the model, we needed to obtain
data for corresponding variables or develop methods to approximate some of the
variables.
Principal role. A very important issue is who to consider the principal while
illustrating the model. In theoretical model we assumed that the principal can
intervene and make a decision in regard to a strategy and CEO choice. In reality
shareholders certainly have rights to monitor and oversee the CEO activities but
with big limitations. Once there is a majority shareholder1 in the company, i.e.
investor that owns more than 50% of the company’s outstanding shares, we can
assess the probability of his/her intervention, dependent on individual behavior
patterns (e.g. prior active participation in the company strategic decisions). Due
to high control and voting interests in the company the majority shareholder is
rather influential in business operations and strategic directions. However, as it has
been mentioned U.S. public companies usually have scattered ownership and are,
therefore, scarce for majority shareholders.
Due to the above mentioned reasons operational monitoring is delegated to the
board of directors, so we approximate the role of the principal by the board of
directors that is believed to execute actions in the shareholders’ interest. We also
can observe whether Chairman is independent director and how long he has been a
part of the board, testing the assumption that independent directors are objective in
pursuing shareholders’ interest and are not captured by the CEO2. The underlying
assumption based on literature review is that the longer chairman stays in his
position, the more entrenched and the more dependent on CEO he becomes.
In either case we will consider ownership structure of the company under anal-
ysis.
Agent role. We have also underlined that the agent is a party who is delegated
management of the principal’s assets in order to maximize the principal’s utility,
i.e. maximize shareholders’ value3 . Therefore, it is natural that the CEO is assumed
to be the agent in the model.
Strategy. Another essential aspect is definition of strategy in general, as well
as strategy types. Strategy is strategy is the means by which individuals or organi-
zations achieve their objectives (Grant, 2010). The strategy is focused on achieving
certain goals (under resource constraint) that can be attained by pursuing critical
actions that are consistent are cohesive with the decisions.
For our model it is essential to differentiate between successful and non-successful
strategies. A successful strategy aims at achieving maximum economic results. How-
ever, high economic results are dependent not only on strategy choice but also on
external factors (macro-environment, industry specifics) and different internal fac-
tors (including but not limited by efforts during the implementation). In reality,
we understand that consistent long-term (over 3-5 years) above-industry average
performance is results of a successful strategy implementation. Once again we will
1The majority shareholder is often the founder of the company, or in the case of long-
established businesses, the founder’s descendants.
2Gutierrez-Urtiaga M. (2000) Managers and Directors: a Model of Strategic Informa-
tion Transmission. Working Papers from Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros;
Cyert, Kang, Kumar (2002); Core, Holthausen, Larcker (1999)
3And/or if needed for utility maximization, optimize other Company parameters
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stress that the working model focuses on incentivizing the manager at the phase of
strategy execution.
There are different ways to categorize strategies described in strategic manage-
ment academic resources. In a public company strategies can be divided into four
layers (corresponding responsible managers are specified in the parentheses): corpo-
rate (CEO), division/ business (division president or executive vice president (VP)),
functional (finance, marketing, manufacturing, R&D, HR, etc. manager) and opera-
tional (department, plant, etc. manager). Certainly, lower-level strategies should be
in line with upper-level strategies. As follows from the paper name, we are focusing
on corporate strategies in public companies.
The corporate strategy considers the following main elements: vertical scope
(value chain), geographical scope, and product scope (Grant, 2010). A more thor-
ough typology of strategies includes the following types: intensive in terms of prod-
uct scope (market penetration, market development, product development), inte-
gration in terms of vertical and geographical scope (forward, backward, horizontal),
diversification (concentric, conglomerate, horizontal), divestiture, retrenchment, liq-
uidation, and a combination strategy.
According to Michael Porter (1980), there are two generic business strategy
types – cost leadership and differentiation, which can lead to a competitive advan-
tage defending against market forces of the industry. Whereas cost leadership means
offering of standardized products, commodity, at low average unit cost, usually tar-
geted at price-sensitive audience, product differentiation implies unique product
offering desired by relatively price-insensitive customers. Cost leadership is aimed
at wide range of customers while the product is distributed at the lowest price at
the market. It usually highly correlates with high barriers of entry as the mentioned
strategy requires economy of scale and, therefore, (prohibitively) high capital invest-
ment. Differentiation can incorporate several of the below mentioned dimensions:
different design, brand image, number of features or different production technol-
ogy. Additionally, the company can focus on a niche market achieving either a low
cost advantage or differentiation in a narrow market segment.
Strategies can also be classified according to degree of activity: aggressive, de-
fending and regressive.
Successful strategy is the result of simple, consistent, long-term goals; solid un-
derstanding of the competitive environment; objective appraisal of resources and
effective execution efforts (Grant, 2010). The chosen model helps to incentivize the
CEO to implement the strategy effectively.
Financial performance. In a general case while assessing the company per-
formance shareholders usually care for the following aspects:
1. Their earnings (current and future)
2. Risk of their investment
In order to measure these parameters, we can assess the company performance –
either financial or non-financial performance. However, we assume that non-financial
metrics of company performance can be approximated by the financial ones4 ; there-
fore, let us consider types of financial performance metrics. Financial performance
4Even though company objectives can be expressed in non-monetary metrics too
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indicators can be grouped into four categories. This classification is based on con-
ventional financial analysis and corporate finance methods.5
Targets can be set for any of these metrics, hereby at the end of the periods in
the model performance will be measured against these targets. Usually operational
profitability performance metrics are set as targets for non-incentive equity plan (e.g.
Operational profit, sales). As for performance-based stock awards, market ratios are
usually taken into account while setting performance targets for this component (e.g.
EPS).
In a specific situation, however, performance indicators are identified on the base
of the strategy. Realized target values are the outcome of successfully implemented
strategy.
Since financial targets chosen for specific cases usually combine several metrics,
in case analysis we calculate multiples based on weights and values of metrics chosen
by the Company to evaluate financial performance. Then we normalize performance
indicator against the target figure.6
Table 1: Financial performance measures. Source: own rendering
Financial performance
Group Most common variables
Profitability
incl. Investor ratios
Market ratios
EBIT / Operating Profit, NI, revenue,
costs
ROI, ROE, ROIC
EPS, P/E, P/B
Shareholder value Intrinsic value, market cap, cash flows
Operations management solvency, liquidity, business activity (effi-
ciency) ratios
Gearing ratios D/E, financial leverage
International aspect. The U.S. public companies chosen for the case study
analysis should be involved in international commercial transactions that occur be-
tween two or more regions in order to be qualified as international (transnational
or global) companies, i.e. sales, investments, logistics, etc. Since our research covers
the largest U.S. public companies most of them have international operations, in-
ternational suppliers or other logistics partners or hold international investments in
their portfolio. We specify the international aspect of each company in the Company
profile.
Compensation. In order to denote an unknown variable that corresponds to
compensation package in the model, there are two approaches to measure compen-
sation:
5Choi F., Frost C., Meek G. (2002) International Accounting. 4th Int.ed. Prentice
Hall/Pearson Education Int.; Brigham E., Ehrhardt M. (2010) Financial Management:
Theory & Practice. 13th ed. Thomson-South Western; Ross S, Westerfield R., Jordan
B. (2008) Essentials of Corporate Finance. 6-th ed. McGraw Hill
6Therefore, as financial result figures we have 0 or R calculated for the specific Company
300 Ekaterina M. Syrunina, Boris V. Yanauer
1. Non-equity incentive plan that is considered due to two reasons: it is a
performance-based compensation component (can be short- and long-term); tar-
gets are usually rigorously described in the annual proxy statements.
2. Performance-based stock units and Non-equity incentive plan can be consid-
ered an integral incentive package. Targets for stocks awards component are also
described in the annual proxy statements.
Other performance-based compensation components (stock options and time-
based restricted stock units) are not considered in the scope of current research due
to the following reason: these instruments are usually offered by the Company to
retain the CEO in the Company for a particular time. Granting common shares (so
that shares are realized7 , i.e they can be sold or be subject to any other transactions)
usually has a downside risk since the owner of shares can also experience losses if
the Company stocks are plummeting.
We use formulas (7) – (13), (14), (18) – (19) to calculate compensation values
for the old CEO at the end of the 1st or 2nd period (accounted for the Company
results and information signal regarding the applied strategy). Formulas (16) – (17)
are used to calculate compensation of the new CEO if the decision was made to
replace the old CEO after the 1st period.
Other variables used in the analysis. A full list of variables used in the
model can be found in Tab. 3
Table 2: Additional model variables. Source: own rendering
Variable Brief description Calculation method
q CEO reputation See supplementary computation
method of initial reputation q0;
Formulas (2) and (3)
f CEO value Formula (1)
△f Change in CEO value Formula (14)
c Cost of exerting high efforts Planned bonus for the period; if
no bonuses were paid out, mean
bonus for the industry
e Efforts exerted by CEO See supplementary computation
method below
p Conditional probability of imple-
mentation of successful strategy in
the 2nd period
Formulas (4) - (6)
pG Probability of identification of the
successful strategy via signaling
See supplementary computation
method below
Condition for changing the strategy Formula (20)
Further clarifications should be made regarding evaluation of probabilities in the
model.
Reputation of CEO. There are 3 methods of the reputation variable construc-
tion.
7Refer to Center on Executive Compensation (realized vs. realizable pay):
http://www.execcomp.org/Issues/Issue/pay-for-performance/realized-pay
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1. We assess the whole prior history of the CEO. Additional variables that need
to be calculated are the following:
• total number of years when the person in question was performing success-
fully as a CEO in all previous companies;
• total number of years when the person in question was serving as CEO in
all previous companies.
Quotient of these two variables is the required probability.
2. We assess only last CEO tenure prior to the current position. We additionally
calculate analogous variables:
• number of years when the person in question was performing successfully
as a CEO in the previous company;
• number of years when the person in question was serving as CEO in the
previous company.
Quotient of these two variables is the required probability.
3. Rating of the CEO in the press, assessed by the industry experts (CEO rating
divided by the maximum possible rating).
However, there are possible limitations to these calculation methods.
In case study analysis we considered for this research paper for most CEOs some
of the prior positions did not include CEO position but executive position. Then we
adjust calculations and calculate probabilities based on experience at other execu-
tive positions (trying to correspond executive’s positions to appropriate performance
metrics to assess his/her success).
There are also cases when prior work places were private companies or sub-
sidiaries with non-disclosed performance figures. Then we adjust our calculations
and use Method 2.
In case of prior history within the Company (we assess implementation of a new
strategy but the CEO was serving in the Company as chief executive) we assess the
period prior to evaluation as it was a case of a separate company in regard to the
number of successful and total years.
Efforts of CEO. There are 2 methods to evaluate efforts level in the model.
1. Similar to the CEO reputation, this variable is based on historic behavioral
patterns of the CEO. We assume that in order for the company to perform
above industry average extra efforts from the CEO’s side should be applied.
We, therefore, find information on the following variables:
• number of years when the company was performing above the industry
average during the CEO tenure, by company;
• number of years when the person was serving as CEO in the company, by
company.
We calculate corresponding quotients by company and choose the highest prob-
ability of high efforts and the lowest probability of low efforts.
2. Due to the fact that high efforts cause additional costs for CEO and we proxy
these costs as Bonus assuming that additional efforts are reimbursed to the CEO
in the amount of bonus, we can assess bonus history of the CEO in all prior
companies. Quotient of number of years with bonuses over number of years s/he
was performing as CEO but didn’t receive any additional rewards for efforts,
by company, will correspond to the required probabilities. Again, we choose the
highest probability to represent high efforts and the lowest probability for low
efforts.
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There are also certain limitations to calculations. For some case study we can
obtain information only on the prior work place. Then we consider different perfor-
mance metrics and compare them against the industry average. Then analogous to
the above mentioned method, we calculate corresponding quotients by performance
metric; the highest probability represents high efforts and the lowest probability
reflects low efforts.
Analogously, In case of prior history within the Company (we assess implementa-
tion of a new strategy but the CEO was serving in the Company as chief executive)
we assess the period prior to evaluation as it was a case of a separate company in
regard to the number of successful and total years.
Probability of successful strategy identification by the principal. This
variable is computed based on analysis of the board of directors. The share of
independent directors in the board should be used as approximation of successful
strategy determination. Current academic studies such as Gutierrez-Urtiaga (2000),
Cyert, Kang, Kumar (2002) and Core, Holthausen, Larcker (1999) suggest that
independence of directors increases the quality of their responsibilities fulfillment.
Since their duties include strategic monitoring and efficient CEO compensation
programs, we assume that this quotient reflects probability of successful strategy
identification.
5. Industries
In order to analyze the applicability of the considered theoretical approach it was
necessary to narrow the research area to concentrate on several industries. Industry
should have been representative that means companies should differentiate by size.
That is, outcomes for the considered industries can be probably extrapolated on
other industries. Realistically the industry incorporates not only public but also
private companies, which compete along. However, lack of data regarding private
companies’ performance measures and compensation packages are not available for
the public, so we considered only public companies. Moreover, conflicts in corpo-
rate governance in private companies are not as acute since the ownership is more
concentrated. Another requirement for the examined industries is low volatility in
examined year, so we chose the period between 2011 and 2013.
All public companies in the U.S. could be divided into 14 different key industries.
For the purpose of our research, retail and IT-industry were chosen. The choice
of sectors is interesting due to the following reason: retail is a relatively mature
sector whereas information is rapidly growing sector. Therefore, such elements as
demand, competition and product itself would differ; therefore, key success factors
and strategies adopted in these industries would also be different. IT-industry is
particularly interesting because key success factors here are brand development,
fast product development and realization on the market, innovations, but mature
industries can benefit from cost and scale efficiency, and low input costs. However, we
considered top performing U.S. sectors, therefore, large players in mature industries
also try to innovate and disrupt the course of conventional business operations
Overall, in the first research there were 16 companies from retail and technol-
ogy industry, in the second research there were 80 companies from retail and 82
companies from IT-industry in our research. The data on such parameters as base
salary, cash bonuses, stock awards, stock options, Non-equity incentive plan, other
compensation, total compensation, market capitalization, CEO age and working
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experience in years was gathered. It was done in order to access industry average
parameters included in the research, find companies for case studies and show in
descriptive statistics that variable part of compensation package of CEO is very
significant for those industries. So, for retail industry a variable part is 74,8% of
total compensation of CEO in 2011-2013, and for IT-industry – 88,2%.
6. CEO incentive plan case studies analysis
Penney Company incentive plan practice
Company profile. J. C. Penney Company Inc. (JCP), incorporated on January
22, 2002, whose main operating subsidiary is J. C. Penney Corporation, Inc.8 JCP
encompasses selling merchandise and rendering services to consumers through de-
partment stores and online channel (jcp.com). The Company operates in the USA
and internationally (1,104 department stores throughout in the USA and Puerto
Rico).9 Product offering includes: family clothes and footwear, accessories, jewelry,
beauty products (Sephora) and home furnishings. Service offering consists of the
following: styling, optical, photography and other services.
Ownership structure. Ownership structure can be found in the annual report
and proxy statements. The majority of shares are owned by institutional stockhold-
ers (75.91% in monetary value) who are usually more long-term oriented than in-
dividual investors. 23.63% of total equity belongs to mutual funds and only 0.46%
to insiders. According to Morningstar, the 20 largest owners (institutions and mu-
tual funds) possess 58% of total shares.10 Even though the figure is rather high,
concentration of ownership is still rather low. Due to scattered ownership in the
U.S. public companies we will use the Board of directors and its characteristics and
guidelines for the model as a proxy of the principal.
Shareholders meetings (meetings of all stockholders) that happen annually mostly
deals with matters regarding election of directors, approval of compensation plans,
regulations and adopted-to-be documents that improve Company policies for tax
benefits. Theoretically speaking, the Meeting can consider any other business prop-
erly brought before the meeting. However, it is certainly rather complex to be
actively engaged in strategic planning of the Company. At each meeting of stock-
holders, the holders of a majority should constitute a quorum for the transaction of
business. In the absence of a quorum the meeting may be adjourned until a quorum
is present.11
The JCP Corporate Guidelines require stock ownership quota for the CEO: the
goal in 2013 is 5x-6x of annual base salary within 5 years after being appointed
(beforehand the goal was 10x of annual base salary).
Board of directors. Issues regarding corporate governance in the company are
reflected in Corporate Governance guidelines where objectives and responsibilities
of the stakeholders.
8Refer to Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=JCP
9As of February 2, 2013
10Refer to Morningstar:http://investors.morningstar.com/ownership/shareholders-
overview.html?t=XNYS:JCP&region=usa&culture=en-US
11Refer to JCP Bylaws
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One of the most important elements of corporate governance and interaction
with CEO in particular is the board of directors. The size of the board should not
be less than 3 directors; size of 10-15 directors is considered appropriate in the
current Guidelines. The Board meets at least 6 times per annum unless called upon
more frequently by the Chair.12
The Chairman of the Board may also serve as the JCP CEO, which underlines
the source of possible asymmetry of information. However, the Board is comprised of
a majority of independent directors (according to NYSE criteria for independence)
According to the Guidelines, business matters are managed under the supervi-
sion of the Board, which represents and is accountable to JCP stockholders. Among
the Board’s responsibilities, among others, are overseeing and regular evaluation of
strategy of JCP, the management effectiveness of strategy implementation and the
selection, evaluation and setting of appropriate compensation for JCP CEO.
There are five corresponding committees that treat corresponding issues and
therefore execute delegated responsibilities: Audit, Corporate Governance, Finance
and Planning, Human Resources and Compensation, and the Committee of the
Whole.13
The independent directors committee, so-called Committee of the Whole, meets
annually to assess the CEO’s performance based on goals and objectives previously
set out by the Committee of the Whole. The evaluation is usually conducted on
the base on objective criteria (e.g. performance of the business, accomplishment of
long-term strategic objectives, etc.) and used by the Committee of the Whole to
construct CEO’s compensation package (along with data and information regarding
CEO compensation matters and a non-binding recommendation received from the
Human Resources and Compensation Committee).14
In 2012 the Board consisted of 12 directors, thereof 11 were independent. Thomas
J. Engibous was a non-employee, independent director. These figures are used for
probability of successful strategy identification (pG = 0.92). Hereby we believe that
probability that the highly independent Board with independent Chair can deter-
mine the best possible decisions for the Company.
Problem description. Mr. Johnson was hired to lead rebranding of JCP to
shake up the store’s stodgy image and attract new customers by introducing upper
class product portfolio of higher pricing and rejected a former policy of discounts on
markup prices. While his rebranding effort was ambitious, he was said to have ”had
no idea about allocating and conserving resources and core customers. He didn’t do
test the concept on a sample market and his strategy failed.
New strategy in 2012: changes in pricing strategy, corporate branding, mar-
keting, store layout and merchandise assortments, namely substantial changes in
merchandise, edition and introduction of more global brands into the merchan-
dise assortment, re-organization of department stores into curated unique specialty
stores.15
12Refer to Corporate Governance Guidelines:
http://ir.jcpenney.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=70528&p=irol-govguidelines
13Refer to Investors relations web page:
http://ir.jcpenney.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=70528&p=irol-govcommcomp
14Refer to the Committee of the Whole Charter
15Refer to 10-K annual report
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CEO profile: Ronald Ron B. Johnson, 54 yrs16 (tenure: Nov. 2011 –
2013). Mr. Johnson has over 20 years of experience in retail and merchandising
and impressive growth achievements in billion-dollar companies such as Apple and
Target.
Career timeline:17
Nov, 2011 – Apr, 2013 – CEO at J.C. Penney Company, Inc.
2000 – 2011 - Senior Vice President, Retail for Apple, Inc. (Apple’s retail strat-
egy)
1985 – 2000 – Senior Vice President of Merchandising of Target Corporation
and other senior management positions (initiatives for branding, marketing and
merchandising)
Mr. Johnson’s history of performance in the companies is provided in App. 7.
Based on App. 7 reputation and probabilities of exerting high and low efforts are
constructed for the model testing.
Current incentive plans. Due to prior long history of unsuccessful results and
current transformation strategy CEO compensation structure in JCP is designed to
tie compensation and performance. The target compensation mix of 2013 reflects the
desired pay composition, including 29.8% of total pay in cash incentive awards and
26.6% in performance-based restricted stock units (PBRSUs), resulting in 56.4% of
total pay in performance-based awards (against targets) and 78.4% in performance-
based compensation (including stock options). History of actual compensation in
Tab. 3 demonstrates that after rich initial payment in the form of stock awards
to the new CEO in 2011, all incentive payments were equal to 0 (short-term and
long-term incentives) due to outrageous bad performance of JCP and failure of
implementation of the diversification strategy.
Table 3: CEO compensation at JCP. Source: rendering from DEF 14A proxy statements
Compensation, ths USD 2011 2012 2013
Salary 1 864,583 1 500 810,606
Bonus 0 0 0
Stock awards 64 056,935 0 0
Option awards 3 600 0 0
Non-equity incentive plan 2 111,302 0 0
All other compensation 16 210 388,587 1 582,024
Total compensation 87 842,827 1 888,587 2 392,630
Annual cash incentive awards. Cash incentives are paid out in accordance to
annual Management Incentive Compensation Program. The incentive plan in 2012
was based only on Operating profit as an indicator of earnings and cost savings
attainment whereas for the year 2013 performance metrics were broadened, then
sales objectives were also included in the program for the CEO stimulation. In 2013
weights for performance metrics were 50% and 50% for operating profit and sales
16At the time when he started serving as CEO
17Refer to Bloomberg Businessweek:
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=
652443&ticker=AAPL
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respectively. Once the target had been achieved, the CEO would have been paid
out as a percentage from the base salary.18
Long-Term Incentive Awards. Long-term incentive awards are paid out corre-
sponding to long-term incentive plan (3 years). In 2012 there were no PBRSUs
offered to the CEO. Equity-based incentives in 2013 were offered to the CEO once
he achieves Earnings/loss per share (EPS) target. The number of units granted was
considered as a target award and this figure could be adjusted dependent on the
actual EPS value.
Targets during the CEO tenure are also presented below in Tab. 4 along with
actual figures. Target and actual figures are used to normalize JCP performance
figure in order to obtain compatibility of numbers.
Table 4: Target and actual performance at JCP.Source: rendering from DEF 14A proxy
statements and 10-K annual reports
For incentive plans 2012 Weights 2013 Weights
T A T A
Operating profit target, bln USD 1,099 -1,016 100% -0,106 -1,244 50%
Sales, bln USD N/A N/A 12,872 11,859 50%
EPS, USD per share N/A N/A -1,22 -4,64
Model illustration and reality check. The case is broken down into two peri-
ods: first period is year 2012 and the second is year 2013. Based on the methodology
presented in section 4, we constructed variables in order to assess incentive com-
pensation package as well as evaluate probability to change the company strategy
and current CEO.
In order to calculate initial reputation of the CEO we used data from App. 7.
Since Ron Johnson was previously working in Apple, we obtained data on operating
profits and net sales of Apple during the years. For successful years we considered
years of the company growth (8 successful years against 12 years overall). Therefore,
the initial reputation q0 = 0.67 according to Method 2 of reputation calculation and
0.75 based on Method 3 (Businessweek and Forbes expert qualitative valuation was
put into scale).
Efforts were analyzed against industry average results for growth rates and op-
erating margins. High efforts probability is, therefore, e1 = 0.92 (11 successful years
against 12 total years) and e1 = 0.42 (5 successful years against 12 total years).
For the second period history for Mike Ullman was analyzed due to his re-
placement of Ron Johnson and effort figures were applied for him (e2 = 0.75 and
e2 = 0.3).
Due to the fact that bonuses were not paid out in the Company for a number
of years, we took an average bonus value for the retail industry (c = 150).
Using corresponding formulas (1) – (6) and (14) for amended reputations, con-
ditional probabilities and value of the CEO we construct additional variables that
can be found in Tab. 5. Then using formulas (7) – (13), (14), (18) – (19) and (16) –
(17) we calculate all possible compensation values for the case (our model in Excel
18We point out again that independent directors set out targets and incentive opportu-
nities(a corresponding multiple that translates objective into incentive) for the CEO,
according to JCP Corporate Governance Guidelines
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is constructed for the general case, therefore, it calculates all values), applicable for
this case formulas are (15) and (17).
Overall model results are presented in Tab. 5 According to the model JCP Board
of directors should have let go the CEO and immediately changed the strategy to
improve the company financial performance. Along with an amended strategy, the
Board should have also hired a new CEO who will be executing a new recovery
strategy. Incentive package for current CEO should be 0 (compensation to a new
CEO should also be 0).
Actual life was escalating similarly to what the model has predicted: the con-
tract with the current CEO Ron Johnson was terminated and his successor (and
predecessor Mike Ullman) came back as a CEO to get the company back on the
feet. However, already for the past 7 years the company was stagnating (Operating
profit) and until now the profitability situation hasn’t improved. So Mr. Ullman
hasn’t obtained any incentive compensation yet since he returned back to his posi-
tion.
Table 5: Model results for JCP case. Source: own rendering
q0 e1 e1 e2 e2 pG c R
0,67 0,92 0,67 0,75 0,29 0,92 150 1000
△e1 △e2 p
0 p1 q
l,l
0
f(ql,l
0
) ql,l
1
f(ql,l
1
)
0,25 0,46 0,014 0,904 0,00346 0,104 0,043 1,28
wh,h w
l,h
S1=S0
w
l,h
S1 6=S0,new
whS1=S0 w
l,h
S1=sG=S0
△f Change?
323,077 23554,7 357,343 18316,3 293,181 29,896 Yes
Applied procedure for the theoretical model was tested on 10 case studies: 5 for
companies of retail industry and 5 companies of IT-industry.
Target Corporation
Company profile. Target Corporation (TGT), incorporated on February 11,
1902, is engaged with selling general merchandise and food in stores (CityTarget
and SuperTarget). TGT operates in three business segments based on product and
geographical scope: U.S. Retail, U.S. Credit Card and Canadian (costs incurred in
the U.S. and Canada related to its Canadian retail market). Product offering in-
cludes: everyday essentials and fashionable, differentiated merchandise at discounted
prices.19
Ownership structure. Currently 70.8% of total equity (in monetary value)
belong to institutional investors, 29.1% to mutual funds and only 0.1% to insiders.
The largest 20 institutional and mutual fund investors hold 62.48%.20 Even though
the value is rather high, concentration of ownership is still considered low. Due
to scattered ownership, the Board of directors again is used as a proxy for the
principal’s role.
19Refer to Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=TGT
20Refer to Morningstar:http://investors.morningstar.com/ownership/shareholders-
overview.html?t=TGT&region=usa&culture=en-US
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The Board of directors. The appropriate size for a Board of Directors from
Target perspective is 5 to 21 members. The Board believes that a membership of 11
directors is appropriate (however, it can vary in accordance with regular review).21
According to Governance Guidelines, the Compensation Committee of the Board
of Directors annually evaluates CEO performance and its relationship to reward
and provides recommendations. After that the independent members of the Board
annually review the recommendations of the Compensation Committee and approve
the CEO performance review along with compensation value and composition. The
Compensation Committee also produces a report for inclusion in the Corporation’s
proxy statement in accordance with SEC rules and regulations.
The Board in year 2011 encompassed 11 members, 10 of which were indepen-
dent.22 These numbers will be used for calculation of probability of successful strat-
egy identification once the model is tested in this case. Moreover, the CEO was also
the Chairman of the Board.
Problem description. Mr. Steinhafel had to adjust to a more modest after-
crisis shopper in the wake of the recession, Target’s offerings had become more
commonplace — heavy on food and other consumer staples. Fewer new products,
especially creative unique to Target, were introduced. The product portfolio dete-
riorated; Target had to add pressure due to tough situation. Risk taking behavior
also changed: Target became more risk cautious to new items. Rather than bet on
the newest, most unique products, Target increasingly relied on a placement system
that awarded prime shelf space to the highest bidders.23
CEO profile: Gregg W. Steinhafel, 52 yrs24 (tenure: 2008 – 2014; 6 years).
Mr Steinhafel was a genuine internally made CEO: he went through various job
roles before he achieved top executive positions.
Career timeline25
2008 – CEO at Target
1999 – 2008 – President at Target
1994 – 1999 - Executive Vice President Merchandising at Target
1979 – 1994 – merchandise trainee at Target; variety of merchandising and op-
erational management positions
Current incentive plan practice. After years of stagnating performance Tar-
get adjusted its compensation structure to be tightly linked to performance. Ac-
cording to proxy statements, performance-based compensation that is calculated
against target performance measures (including performance-based restricted stock
units (PBRSUs), performance share units (PSUs) and short-term incentive plan
(STIP)) accounted for 57% in 2011 whereas in 2013 it amounts to 87% of total
compensation.26 Interestingly whereas the Company was using options awards as
21Refer to Board Committee web page:
http://investors.target.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=65828&p=irol-govcommittees
22Refer to DEF 14A Proxy statement (2012) retrieved from the U.S. SEC EDGAR
database
23Hajewski D. (2008). Journal Sentinel (Bloomberg reporter). Steinhafel To Take Over at
Target. Retrieved from: http://www.jsonline.com/business/29548034.html
24At the time when he started serving as CEO
25Refer to Bloomberg Businessweek: http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/
people/person.asp?personId=174446&ticker=TGT; Refer to App. 7 to find data on pa-
rameters evaluation
26Refer to proxy statements retrieved from U.S. SEC EDGAR database
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remuneration element, it completely abandoned this component in 2013. Summary
of compensation values and composition is presented in Tab. 6.
Table 6: CEO compensation at TGT. Source: rendering from DEF 14A proxy statements
Compensation, ths
USD
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Salary 1345,769 1350 1500 1500 1500 1500
Bonus 447,68 0 1200 1250 0 0
Stock awards 6750,041 4425,064 8017,549 4857,502 5285,245 10224,12
Option awards 4074,038 3503,393 3189,299 3696,982 5248,573 0
Non-equity Incentive
Plan
0 3250 4101 2205 2880 0
All other compensation 1020,642 778,177 5982,035 6197,623 5733,646 1229,094
Total compensation 13638,17 13306,63 23989,88 19707,11 20647,46 12953,21
Short-Term Incentives. STIP allows the CEO cash awards based on the following
financial metrics, Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) and Economic Value
Added (EVA). These performance measures reflect objectives for profitability and
investment discipline. The weights for these financial metrics are 50% and 50%
respectively.
Long-Term Incentives. Long-term incentive plan is comprised of PSUs and PBR-
SUs. PSUs have a three-year performance period; they are granted in stock based on
change in market share (calculated through net sales), EPS growth and return on
invested capital (ROIC27) in equal proportions. PBRSUs are linked to total share-
holders’ return (TSR) in comparison to peers. Once the total magnitude of long-term
performance-based compensation is identified, 75% of this value is granted in the
form of PSUs and 25% in PBRSUs.28
Due to the fact that performance metrics are measured in rankings, we will need
corresponding scale to interpret ranking results and then we will have to normalize
he scale against the target value. Therefore, we would have to adjust measures
twice, which is too much of value distortion. So we decided to test the model for
short-term incentive plan only.
Table 7: Target and actual performance at TGT.Source: rendering from DEF 14A proxy
statements and 10-K annual reports
For incentive plans 2011 2013 Weights
T A T A
Operating profit target, bln USD 5,416 5,421 5,459 5,186 50%
EVA, bln USD 0,949 0,936 0,712 0,676 50%
Model illustration and reality check. We divided the real case in two pe-
riods: the first period of 2008-2011 and the second of 2012-2013. Analogously to
27New metric introduces in 2013; calculated as three year average net operating profit
after-tax (NOPAT) divided by average invested capital
28Before 2013 the mix was the following: 50% stock options, 25% PSUs, and 25% RSUs.
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JCP case we constructed all variables and calculated payoffs of the players based
on methodology 1.5 and App. 7 figures.
According to the model the Board should have paid 2.05 mln USD to Target
CEO in the first period and 0 in the second period due to overperformance in the
first period and underperformance in the second period. The modeled results state
that the strategy and the CEO shouldn’t be changed.
In the actual situation Mr. Steinhafel also stayed in the company, so there was no
change in the company strategy and CEO. Moreover, TGT CEO received non-equity
incentive compensation during the first period (2.2 mln USD) and also obtained
performance-based RSUs for the next three years as a long-term incentive plan. As
performance was plateauing during the 2nd period, he didn’t receive any non-equity
incentive compensation in 2013.
Table 8: TGT case – model results. Source: own rendering
q0 e1 e1 e2 e2 pG c R
0,83 0,8 0,4 0,76 0,45 0,91667 1.25 1331
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1
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wh,h w
l,h
S1=S0
w
l,h
S1 6=S0,new
whS1=S0 w
l,h
S1=sG=S0
△f Change?
2.032 3.238 2.765 2.05 2 29,4118 No
CEO incentive plan in EMC Corporation
Company profile. EMCCorporation (EMC), incorporated on August 23, 1979,
develops, de livers and supports the information and virtual infrastructure technolo-
gies, solutions and services, including IT as a service (ITaaS). EMC operates three
segments as federated businesses: EMC Information Infrastructure (provider of in-
formation storage, intelligence and security solutions), Pivotal (vendor of application
and data infrastructure software) and VMware Virtual Infrastructure (provider of
virtualization infrastructure solutions).29
Ownership structure. Currently 69.25% of equity is owned by institutional
29% by mutual funds and 0.46% by insiders (based on monetary value of equity).
Due to the fact that ownership is so scattered: the largest 20 shareholders (institu-
tional; and mutual funds) own only 33.12% of total shares30 , according to Morn-
ingstar, it is impossible to consider any of the shareholders as the principal in the
model. Therefore, we approximate the principal’s role by the Board of directors.
In order to align the CEO’s interests with shareholders’ expectations, the CEO
is required to own 650,000 shares of the Company’s common shares.
Board of directors. The main responsibility of the EMC Board of Directors
according to Corporate Governance Guidelines is to foster the long-term success of
the Company and to build long-term value for the Company’s shareholders, consis-
29Refer to Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=EMC
30Refer to Morningstar:http://investors.morningstar.com/ownership/shareholders-
overview.html?t=EMC&region=usa&culture=en-US
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tent with the Board’s fiduciary duties31 . Therefore, the Board is also responsible for
evaluation of the corporate strategy, challenges, industry situation and the Company
performance. The Board also identifies potential candidates, selects and monitors
performance of the CEO. The Company’s strategy is presented by the CEO to the
Board and evaluated and discussed on the regular basis.
The Board consists of no fewer than 8 nor more than 11 directors (it annually re-
views the size of the Board). A majority of the Board should qualify as independent
directors under the NYSE listing standards.32
Currently there are five standing committees of the Board: Audit Commit-
tee; Leadership and Compensation Committee; Finance Committee; Mergers and
Acquisition Committee; and Corporate Governance and Nomination Committee.
However, if needed, new committee may be established or old committee may be
disassembled.33
According to the Corporate Governance policies and Committee’s charter, the
Leadership and Compensation Committee annually reviews and approves (either
as a committee or together with the other independent directors) composition
and value of compensation for the CEO. Additionally it should communicate in
the annual Board Compensation Committee Report to shareholders the required
disclosures.34
CEO may or may not annually serve on the Board as Chairman; however, ne-
cessity of his presence at the Board should be annually reviewed by the Board.
CEO profile: Joseph Joe Tucci, yrs35 (tenure in the contract: 2001 – present;
14 years). Mr. Tucci is an aggressive and outspoken leader who
Career timeline36
2001 – present – CEO at EMC Corporation (Chairman since 2006 )
2000 – COO at EMC Corporation
1993 – 1999 – CEO and Chairman at Wang Global (former bankrupt Wang
Laboratories)
1990 – 1993 - Executive vice president of operations at Wang Global
1986–1990 - President of U.S. Information Systems at Unisys Corporation
1970–1986 - systems programmer, followed by several other positions at RCA Cor-
poration
Problem description. Joe Tucci has already been the Company CEO for
8 years. Starting from 2003 EMC started to acquire specialized companies in or-
der to become the leader in software-defined storage. Soon enough the EMC was
expending not only in storage but in virtual infrastructure (VMWare) provision;
31Refer to Corporate Governance guidelines:
http://www.emc.com/collateral/corporation/corp-gov-guide.pdf
32Refer to Corporate Governance guidelines:
http://www.emc.com/collateral/corporation/corp-gov-guide.pdf
33Refer to Corporate Governance web page: http://www.emc.com/corporate/investor-
relations/governance/board-committee.htm
34Refer to the Leadership and Compensation Committee Charter:
http://www.emc.com/collateral/corporation/charter-compensation-committee.pdf
35At the time when he started serving as CEO
36Refer to Reference for business: http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/biography/S-
Z/Tucci-Joseph-M-1947.html; Refer to App. 7 to find data on parameters evaluation
312 Ekaterina M. Syrunina, Boris V. Yanauer
the Company is on the way to provide enterprises with an integral IT-as-a-Service
(ITaaS) solution. Complexity and virtualization of the products were increasing
from virtualized IT-owned application in customer companies through Enterprise
critical applications to complete virtualization of IT business. The second stage of
this transformation started in year 2009. The milestone phase was identified for the
next year 2010 and further development was to be checked further along in year
2013.37
Current incentive plans. Compensation contract at EMC puts larger em-
phasis at long-term incentives that comprised from 2009 till 2013 48.8% and 77.3%
respectively, which reflects intention to link remuneration of the CEO to attain-
ment individual and corporate longer-term strategic objectives and alignment of
CEO interest with the shareholders’ interest. CEO compensation consists of the
following parts: base salary, non-equity incentives (short-term and long-term) and
equity incentives (performance-based stocks, time-based stocks and stock options).
The Tab. 9 provides an overview of compensation value and composition in years
2009-2013.
Table 9: CEO compensation at EMC.Source: rendering from DEF 14A proxy statements
Compensation, ths USD 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Salary 872,308 1000 1000 1000 1000
Bonus 0 0 0 0 0
Stock awards 5995,8 7355,9 8408,713 12697,669 9426,404
Option awards 962,085 1337,077 1557,752 1310,657 650,417
Non-equity incentive plan 1068,42 2592 2140,869 1467,36 1260,058
All other copmensation 149,15 151,184 131,523 116,545 309,079
Total compensation 9047,763 12436,161 13238,857 16592,231 12645,958
% of STIP 10% 13,40% 12,80% 7,50% 77,30%
% of LTIP 48,80% 46,40% 47% 69% 12,20%
Non-equity incentive plan (Cash bonus plan): Non-equity incentive plans are
annually designed to motivate the CEO to achieve specified corporate, strategic,
operational and other financial performance goals. They require attainment of a
threshold level performance to obtain compensation. For CEO non-equity incen-
tive plan consists of two parts: the Corporate Incentive Plan (CIP) corresponding
to longer-term goal achievement and the Management by Objectives Plan (MOP)
mirroring short-term metrics and functional goals attainment. Through attainment
of MBO objectives that are set out by the Compensation Committee the CEO
receives semi-annual cash payments whereas through CIP top chief executive is
semi-annually evaluated based on several metrics and can receive up to 200% of
target bonus opportunity set out for him by the Compensation Committee (subject
to negative discretion if needed). The performance targets used are Earnings per
Share (non-GAAP adjusted EPS), Revenue and Free Cash Flows (FCF). The corre-
sponding weights are 50%, 30% and 20% respectively. Actual performance against
target metrics is presented in Tab. 3.8.
37Refer to EMC Investor relations web page: http://www.emc.com/corporate/investor-
relations/strategy.htm
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Performance stock units and performance stock options : Performance stock units
and performance stock options are usually provided for 3-year vesting and then
they become granted upon attainment of the performance targets. Performance
targets used in this evaluation are also EPS and Revenue since the Compensation
Committee believes that growing revenue and EPS leads to long-term shareholder
value. The weights are 60% and 40% respectively. Actual performance against target
metrics is presented in Tab. 10
Table 10: Target and actual performance at EMC.Source: rendering from DEF 14A proxy
statements and 10-K annual reports
Performance 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Weights
Target / Actual T A T A T A T A T A for for
NEIP LTEP
Revenue, bln 15 14 16 17 19,6 20 22 21,7 23,5 23,2 30% 40%
EPS, USD per share 0,87 0,9 1,12 1,26 1,46 1,51 1,7 1,7 1,85 1,8 50% 60%
FCF, bln USD38 0,87 1,27 1,42 3,44 4 4,43 4,9 5,02 5,53 5,51 20%
We test the model using long-term non-equity incentive plans as well as per-
formance equity granted in year 2010 based on achievement of target performance
goals. Therefore, we evaluate attainment of financial results based on two weighing
scales (for non-equity incentive plan and for performance stock units and options).
Model illustration and reality check. Overall model results are presented
in Tab. 11. According to the model EMC should not change the strategy of the
Company (and therefore, the CEO) after the first period due to successful results
and consent of the Board with the realized strategy. The modeled compensation
after the first period should amount to 2.489 mln USD whereas the actual non-
equity incentive plan in this period was equal to 2.592 mln USD. The modeled
remuneration for the second period should have been 0 whereas in real case it was
1.260 mln USD. The game is finite, which is why we can hypothesize compensation
for the second period is 0 whereas in real life we keep incentivizing the CEO to
exert efforts and execute the chosen strategy.
Table 11: Model results for EMC case. Source: own rendering
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38FCF was calculated on per share basis in years 2009 and 2010.
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Incentive plan practice in eBay
Company profile. eBay Inc. (eBay), incorporated on March 13, 1998, oper-
ates at the commerce market through three business segments: Marketplaces (online
commerce), Payments (financial services), and GSI (logistics). EBay provides plat-
forms, tools and services to facilitate online and mobile commerce and payments.
The revenue streams stem from transactions fees and advertising services.39
Ownership structure. The majority of equity in monetary terms (66.91%) be-
longs to the institutional investors; mutual funds won 26.69% of total equity whereas
6.4% belongs to insiders. According to Morningstar, the largest 20 institutional in-
vestors and mutual funds possess only 33.15%, which confirms our assumption on
low concentration of ownership in the U.S. public companies.40 Therefore, we will
consider the Board of Directors as a determining decision-making force in strategy
and compensation setting.
Board of Directors. Corporate Governance guidelines establish rules for the
Board of Directors, so they act in the best interests of the shareholders and eBay
itself. The size of the board is determined by the corresponding resolutions that
evaluate the needs of business on a regular basis. The Board consists of at least the
majority of independent directors. It is also recommended that the CEO is on the
Board and up to several former executives serve at the Board for the best interests
of the shareholders. The Board is responsible for selection and appointment of the
CEO.41
There are five existing committee now: the Audit Committee, the Compensa-
tion Committee, the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee, the Non-
Officer Option Committee, and the Strategic Investment, Acquisition, and Disposi-
tion Committee.
According to the Committee Charter, the Compensation Committee sets com-
pensation levels for the CEO; it conducts evaluation with assistance of with the in-
dependent compensation consultant (CEO is not present during these meetings).42
Within Say on Pay practice the Board increases investors engagement in review-
ing and providing feedback for the compensation program. Shareholders cast their
advisory vote and the Board is intending to increase provision of direct feedback in
regard to remuneration packages.43
39Refer to Reuters:
http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=EBAY.OCuriously,
eBay also created an open source platform to develop software and solutions for
commerce (more than 800,000 members)
40Refer to Morningstar:http://investors.morningstar.com/ownership/shareholders-
overview.html?t=EBAY&region=usa&culture=en-US
41Refer to eBay Investor relations web page: http://investor.ebayinc.com/corporate-
governance-document.cfm?DocumentID=727
42Refer to the Compensation Committee Charter:
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ebay/0x0x646152/b556f694-7b2c-4860-bd26-
bf63ad018f6f/eBay COMPEXHIBITA-CompCommitteeCharter FINAL.pdf
43Refer to DEF 14A Proxy statement (2014) retrieved from the U.S. SEC EDGAR
database
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The Board in year 2011 encompassed 11 members, 9 of which were independent.44
These numbers will be used for calculation of probability of successful strategy iden-
tification once the model is tested in this case. Furthermore, the CEO is not the
Chairman of the Board (Mr. Omidyar is the Chair), which can mean lower proba-
bility of the Board being captured by the CEO and dictated in regard to strategic
and compensation decisions.
CEO profile: John Donahoe, 47 yrs45 (tenure: 2008 – present). Mr. Don-
ahoe is a seasoned and highly qualified top manager who was prepared to become
eBay CEO during Ms. Meg Whitman’s tenure (being President of eBay Market-
places).
Career timeline46
2008 – President, CEO and Director at eBay;
2005 – 2008 – President of eBay Marketplaces, responsible for eBay’s global
e-commerce businesses;
1999 – 2005 – CEO and Worldwide Managing Director at Bain & Company;
1982 – 1999 – Managing Director at Bain & Company.
Problem description. After eBay spectacular growth with Ms. Meg Whitman,
the company was starting to struggle as its marketplace business was starting to
slow down whereas PayPal business unit was gradually picking up. In the face of
the crisis and increasing competition in the marketplace space Mr. Donahoe was
to strengthen eBay retail position (acquisition of GSI Commerce in 2011) and keep
growing financial services division. Whilst balancing the retail and financial services
business units, Mr. Donahoe was then pursuing a growth strategy at the mobile
commerce and mobile payments market, trying to capture a share not only at the
online commerce market but commerce in general. Since the conventional online
auction business still amounted to 7.4 bln USD against 5.6 bln USD generated by
PayPal (2012), the forecasted relationship by 2015 is 52% to 48% (11.5 bln USD
against 10.5 bln USD).47
In 2010 eBay was turning around the internal structure of businesses and as-
sessing possible strategic directions. Therefore, it is an important milestone in
turnaround strategy implementation.
Current incentive plans. CEO compensation structure in eBay is skewed
toward performance-based components since the Compensation Committee believes
in rewarding executives’ efforts that lead to successful strategy implementation. In
2010 non-equity incentive plan and performance-based stock units accounted for
15% and 21% respectively whereas in 2013 the same components amounted to 12%
and 40% respectively. This evolution of compensation structure within the company
44Refer to DEF 14A Proxy statement (2012) retrieved from the U.S. SEC EDGAR
database
45At the time when he started serving as CEO
46Refer to Forbes: http://www.forbes.com/profile/john-donahoe/; Refer to App. 7 to find
data on parameters evaluation
47Veverka M. (2013) Unplugged: Ebay’s impressive run un-
der CEO John Donahoe. USA Today. Retrieved from:
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/veverka/2013/04/01/ebay-amazon-
att-meg-whitman-john-donahoe/1995211/
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shows stronger belief and focus on equity-based remuneration for performance. Total
performance-dependent part of compensation exceeds 75% (including time-based
stock units and options). Tab. 12 provides an overview of executive compensation
throughout the period of 2008-2013.
Non-equity incentive plan. For eBay this part of compensation program reflects
achievement of short-terms objectives, in other words, it aligns CEO remuneration
with annual operational goals (however, the Compensation Committee can review
and change the length of the performance period). Foreign-exchange neutral rev-
enue (calculated on a fixed foreign exchange basis; FX-neutral), net income, net
promoter score improvement, employee engagement improvement and individual
performance are metrics against which yearly performance is assessed. Net pro-
moter score improvement is a proxy for customer satisfaction; in such a customer
oriented business it is important that it is properly measured and improved on year-
by-year basis. Weights for evaluation are the following: 65% for the financial metrics
in total (equally divided for two parameters), 25% is for individual performance,
5% is devoted to customer satisfaction metric and 5% is devoted to employee en-
gagement. Since evaluation in 2013 slightly changed and employee engagement seem
not to be taken into account, moreover, proxy statement doesn’t reflect individual
performance metric for the CEO, we recalculated weights of the above mentioned
metrics.48 Moreover, all metrics have a minimum threshold; if performance is be-
low this threshold the CEO is not paid anything; otherwise he is paid according to
a scale of multiples (in regard to target incentive plan that is linked to the base
salary).
Table 12: CEO compensation at eBay. Source: rendering from DEF 14A proxy statements
Compensation, ths
USD
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Salary 879,808 934,615 920,673 945,577 970,353 993,269
Bonus 500 522,917 736,538 0 0 0
Stock awards 5167,156 4450,388 5586,045 8854,607 23729,96 8855,064
Option awards 6364,098 2483,682 3735 3799,993 2000 2199,263
Non-equity incentive
plan
0 1568,752 1158,575 2688,984 2844,346 1620,27
All other compensation 279,108 172,394 245,655 167,367 160,42 165,508
Total compensation 13190,17 10132,75 12382,49 16456,53 29705,08 13833,37
Performance-based restricted stock units (PBRSUs). The Compensation Com-
mittee offers two-year performance-based restricted stock units for the CEO based
on attainment of several performance metrics, namely FX-neutral revenue, non-
GAAP operating margin and return on invested capital (ROIC). PBRSUs are
granted one or two years prior and vested to the CEO based on the performance.
Thereby for example at the end of year 2010 the CEO was allocated (provided the
goals are achieved) PBRSUs granted in year 2009 (performance period 2009-2010)
and at the beginning of year 2010 (performance period 2010-2011).49 Revenue and
48New weights are: 46.43% for financial metrics and 7.14% for customer satisfaction.
49Yet the portion of performance period 2010-2011 PBRSUs is not to be granted until
after the end the performance period even though one-year targets are achieved.
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operating margin metrics are weighted equally, then a resulting normalized measure
is modified by a coefficient related to ROIC.
Performance share units. Another component that is paid out at some perfor-
mance periods based on Total Shareholder Return (TSR). However, in 2013 he
target value was not reached and in 2010 performance shares were not paid out,
therefore, we do not analyze this component in detail. However, we hypothesize the
same methodology as with non-equity incentive plan or performance-stock units can
be applied to this compensation element.
Tab 13 demonstrates performance target metrics against the actual performance
in two periods for case study analysis.
Table 13: Target and actual performance at eBay.Source: rendering from DEF 14A proxy
statements and 10-K annual reports
For ST50 2010 2013 Weights For LT51 2010 2013
incentive
plan
T A T A incentive
plan
T A T A
Revenue,
bln USD
8,337 9,16 15,16 16,15 46,43% Revenue,
bln USD
8,96 9,16 29,5* 29,85*
Net In-
come, bln
USD
2,25 2,299 3,61 3,56 46,43% Operating
income
2,76 2,7 7,72* 8,25*
Customer
satis-
faction,
points
7 Achieved N/A Achieved 7,14% ROIC, % 23,90% 25% 23,1%* 23,5%*
TSR, % N/A N/A 72,90% 73,20%
* Figures for the long-term incentive plan are calculated on two-year basis;
therefore, for all financial metrics should take into account results of the year 2012
and 2013.
Model illustration and reality check. The case is broken down into two
periods: first period is years 2008-2010 and the second period falls into years 2011-
2013. App. 7 provides details on CEO’s history and evaluated variables. While
assessing the modeled short-term incentive plan compensation, we calculate the
resulting figures in accordance to their weights in eBay methodology. First period
was rather successful for the company (the normalized result is 100052) and the
second period also exceeded expectations (the normalized result is 115). The model
results are presented in Tab. 3.12. According to the model results the Board does
not need to change the strategy. The incentive plan in the first period is equal to
4.981 mln USD whereas in the second period it amounts to 1.875 mln USD. In
actual case the amount that was paid to the CEO in the first period was 1.159 mln
USD and 1.62 mln USD for the second period.
50ST = short-term
51LT = long-term
52Calculated multiple corresponding to overperformance against the target metrics (met-
rics weighted in accordance to short-term and long-term incentive plan weights)
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After recalculation of results for the long-term incentive plan (using another
weighting scale) the model evaluation for the compensation was still the same.
The possible reason for that is similar composition of both plans – short-term and
long-term plans. Due to the similar assessment of performance in the short and
long term, the model is insensitive to changes in financial performance variable.
Therefore, resulted model numbers can be assessed as integral value of incentive
plan. The actual figures for short- and long-term incentive plan is 4.496 mln USD
for year 2010 and 7.175 mln USD for year 2013.
Based on this test we can derive the following insights. Firstly, it is arguable
whether performance metrics for short- and long-term incentives should be the
same. Certainly strategic goals (e.g. growth in the next 3 years) correlate with
operational objectives (e.g. revenue growth per annum); however, it creates instru-
ments for additional rent extraction. Once a strategic goal is broken down into series
of operational objectives, remuneration mechanism should take into account over-
lapping of two metrics and compensation components. Secondly, once there is such
an overlap in performance metrics, the model can be used for evaluation of integral
incentive plan (short- and long-term incentive plans).
Table 14: Model results for eBay case. Source: own rendering
q0 e1 e1 e2 e2 pG c R
0,91 0,75 0,4 0,83333 0,56667 0,81818 500 1000
△e1 △e2 p
0 p1 q
l,l
0
f(ql,l
0
) ql,l
1
f(ql,l
1
)
0,35 0,26667 0,3125 0,5625 0,07042 2,11268 0,58824 17,6471
wh,h w
l,h
S1=S0
w
l,h
S1 6=S0,new
whS1=S0 w
l,h
S1=sG=S0
△f Change?
1875 5972,11 3333,33 4981,04 1847,11 27,8873 No
Other cases
After the applied procedure was tested on 4 cases of U.S. public companies
fromm retail and IT-industry, additional 10 cases of U.S. public companies from
those industries were considered. The following result were presented in Table 15.
As can be seen from the Table 15, our model showed good results for the sun
of two periods for five of the considered companies (Fred’s, Dollar Tree, Barnes
& Noble, Lowe’s Corporation, Blackbaud), but is has some deviations in certain
periods and, on the whole, is working better for the retail industry.
More than that, it worth mentioning that the model is working better in case
of changing both strategy and CEO after the first period. It could be explained by
the fact that the model suppose new CEO has no reputational risks and historical
effects almost do not influence the incentive plan.
Also there is a practice of a partial payout of incentive packages in IT-companies
even in case of failure to achieve the target performance goal set by the board of
directors, but the model itself supposes for this case there is no incentive payout
possible for a manager.
Moreover, there is a common tendency across 8 of 10 examined companies to
overpay their CEO based on the results of theoretical modeling. Of course, some
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Table 15: Summary results
Company q0
Change of
strategy
Compensation
after 1st pe-
riod, million
$
Compensation
after 2st pe-
riod, million
$
Sum of com-
pensation for
two periods,
million $
Fact Model Fact Model Fact Model Fact Model
Fred’s, Inc. 0,75 No No 1,345 1,300 0,000 0,000 1,345 1,300
Dollar Tree, Inc. 0,545 No No 1,800 3,000 1,900 0,450 3,700 3,450
Kohl’s Corporation 0,75 No No 2,145 1,750 0,535 0,000 2,680 1,750
Barnes & Noble, Inc. 0,625 Yes Yes 0,000 0,000 2,604 2,848 2,604 2,848
Lowe’s Companies, Inc. 0,6 No Yes 2,225 2,181 1,500 0,525 3,725 2,706
Yahoo, Inc. 0,67 Yes Yes 1,500 0,000 1,120 1,250 2,620 1,250
Blackbaud, Inc. 0,72 Yes Yes 0,437 0,000 0,870 1,370 1,307 1,370
Blucora, Inc. 0,5 No No 0,540 0,000 0,450 0,216 0,990 0,216
Linkedin Corporation 0,875 No No 0,570 0,000 0,636 0,450 1,143 0,450
CA Technologies, Inc. 0,8 Yes Yes 1,500 0,000 1,764 1,790 3,264 1,790
companies can save money and fire their CEO, but what happens in real practice
is that this step would hurt the reputation of the company on the labor market of
top-management. Also, companies do not limit their operation by one strategy only
as considered in the model, but their business is rather diversified, so the board
of directors often enough set a compensation package based on broader range of
factors than those considered in the paper.
Besides, the model considers a game for two periods that sets huge reputational
risks for those periods. In real business practice strategies are implementing for
longer periods and it is possibly worth considering more periods in theoretical mod-
eling as well to get more precise results, probabilities of outcomes and more smooth
risks for players.
So, for the model to be more precise in cases of low business results it was sug-
gested to introduce new coefficients ε E. Those parameters set the percentage of the
maximum incentive package in case of either failure to achieve a target performance
goal or achieving better result than that expected. And it worth mentioning that
those coefficients are subject for individual setting for each company and should be
determined by each board of directors.
7. Conclusion
The research paper represents total amount of 10 case studies of modeling of incen-
tive packages for CEO of U.S. public companies in retail and IT-industries. It was
demonstrated in the paper that the theoretical instrument could be applied as an
instrument of valuation of incentive compensation for the better motivation of high
level of efforts from CEO for corporate strategies implementation.
Furthermore, the chosen mechanism introduced reputation as an important fac-
tor of influence on manager’s efforts application. Therefore, the CEO cares not only
for monetary reward but also considers reputational risks in case of low performance,
which is in line with current executive compensation research and corresponding
concepts of talent.
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We have also addressed the issue of setting performance objectives and goals and
concluded that compensation composition can have adverse impact on efforts ap-
plication (in the form of opportunistic behavior) by the CEO if similar performance
metrics are used for design of short- and long-term incentive plans.
The novelty of the given research paper is formulation of methodology how to
evaluate parameters in the chosen model, so it can be applied on actual company
cases.
We realize that incentive methods are sensitive to international corporate gov-
ernance regulations and current practices. Since European corporate governance
differs with the U.S. practices, results of the methodology cannot be applied di-
rectly but taking into account European specificity methodology can be adapted
and tested in different environments.
Since development of Russian public companies was following the U.S. example,
we can assume that managerial implication for the Russian public companies is
more structural and relevant for management control. In order to allow the board
monitoring the CEO’s efforts (hereby strengthening corporate governance), boards
of directors should be composed of the majority of independent directors who rep-
resent shareholders’ interest, not having other agenda in mind. There is lower op-
portunity to capture or collude with the board once composition is skewed toward
independent directors.
Proven its applicability on example of the U.S. public companies in retail and
technology industries, the model still has limitations and can be further improved.
First of all, the game implies rationality of players, which is not always the case
in reality. Even though we introduce the concept of reputation that implies non-
monetary stimulation, rationality in the model still remains an issue.
The applied procedure with minor amendments can be used as a secondary
instrument in the U.S. public companies to evaluate incentive plans of CEO. Except
for companies, some other researches like us could be interested in that methodology.
Consulting companies could enrich their portfolio of instruments by introducing the
considered model.
Appendix 1. The base model solution
This model is a base game theoretical interpretation of the principal-agent phe-
nomenon whose objective is to model the incentive plan of CEO compensation
(performance-based pay component). The principal (owner, shareholder or investor)
hires an agent (CEO) to implement a company strategy (strategic decision) in the
subsequent time, followed by the principal’s decision to replace or leave the agent.
This model is a non-cooperative dynamic game; a modification of this base model is
analyzed with scrutiny in Chapter 1. In this game the company CEO is incentivized
not only materially but also non-materially (he cares for his/her reputation).
The underlying assumption of the model is that the company strategy cannot
be amended in the 2nd period after it has been chosen in the 1st period.
All variables and assumptions are similar to the game described in the text.
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Interaction between the principal and the agent is represented in the form of
a decision tree in Fig. 3. Dotted lines incorporate the same information sets, in
other words the player with the move cannot differentiate between nodes within the
information set. Several branches are not depicted in detail due to the fact that the
outcome will never occur. Branches where CEO exerts low efforts are analogous to
branches where s/he exerts high efforts; the only difference is in probabilities.
The following changes should be considered.
Based on Bayes’ formula, reputation after the 1st period is calculated differently:
qi =
[
1 if R1 = Rh,
ql if R1 = Rl,
(23)
where reputation of the manager after the 1st period with low performance Rl = 0
(probability that the manager is good) is:
ql =
q0(1− e1)
q0 (1− e1) + 1− q0 . (24)
Reputation after the 2nd period is the following:
qi,j =
[
1 if R1 = Rh and/or R2 = Rh,
ql,l if R1 = Rl and R2 = Rl,
(25)
where reputation of the manager after the 2nd period in the light of two periods
with low performance Rl = 0 (probability that the manager is good) is:
ql,l =
q0(1− e1)(1 − e2)
q0 (1− e1) (1− e2) + 1− q0 . (26)
Payoffs of each player are described the same as in the modified game in section
3.
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Fig. 3: Game tree
Solution of the model. Compensation contract is accounted for the solution
of the model. Equilibrium strategies for the agent and the principal constitute the
overall Nash equilibrium; the model is solved by backward induction.
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Let us consider the last move of the game where the agent makes a decision
about the level of efforts. In each sub-game the manager has 2 alternatives: exert
high level of efforts e2 or shirk and exert low level of efforts e2. High efforts mean
higher payoff for the principal and thus is more desirable.
Let us denote conditional probability that the chosen strategy is successful (ac-
counted for the Company performance in the 1st period) as pi:
pi =
[
1 if R1 =Rh,
pl if R1 =Rl,
(27)
where
P l =
q0(1 − e1)
q0 (1− e1) + 1− q0 . (28)
In order to find compensation value we are required to solve linear programming
problem: the principal maximizes his expected payoff by minimizing the agent’s
expected compensation. The objective function looks as follows:
min
[
pi
(
e2 w
i,h + (1− e2 )wi,l
)
+ (1− pi)wi,l]
subject to the following constraints:
Constraint on incentives compatibility (the agent must exert high efforts):
wi,h − wi,l ≥ c
pi△e2 −△f. (29)
In case of a new manager (no reputational risk):
wi,h − wi,l ≥ c
pi△e2 . (30)
Constraint (the agent’s expected payoff should exceed costs under high efforts):
pi(e2w
i,h − (1− e2)wi,l + (1 − pi)wi,l ≥ c. (31)
Constraint on limited liability: wi,h ≥ 0, wi,l ≥ 0.
Let us consider possible outcomes:
1. R1 =Rh, then i = h. Hereby p
i = 1, △f = f (qh,h) − f (qh,l) = 0. Then the
linear programming problem is the following: min
[
e2 w
h,h + (1− e2 )wh,l
]
subject to:
wh,h − wh,l ≥ c△e2 ,
e2w
h,h − (1− e2)wh,l ≥ c,
wh,h ≥ 0, wh,l ≥ 0.
The first and fourth constraint are satisfied as equalities, therefore:
wh,h =
c
△e2 , (32)
wh,l = 0. (33)
Compensation is the same for the old and new CEOs.
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1. R1 = Rl, i = l, then p
i=pl, so it can be calculated according to the formula
(28). If the agent is not fired, then △f = f (1)− f (ql,l). Condition (29) looks
as follows:
wl,h − wl,l ≥ c
pl△e2 −△f. (34)
Condition (31) looks as follows:
pl(e2w
l,h − (1− e2)wl,l + (1− pl)wl,l ≥ c. (35)
We need to choose the lowest compensation that satisfies these conditions, then
wl,l = 0. If (34) becomes an equality, then
wl,h = max
[
0;
c
pl△e2 −△f
]
.
These values satisfy the condition (35), i.e. wl,h ≥ c
ple2
. If this condition is not
satisfied, then (35) becomes an equality. Hereby optimal compensation is as follows:
wl,h = max
[
c
pl△e2 −△f ;
c
ple2
]
, (36)
wl,l = 0. (37)
Under these compensation values for the 2nd period the CEO will always exert
high level of efforts since his expected payoff accounted for high efforts is higher
than in the case of low efforts.
Now let us consider the principal’s move. If after the 1st period the Company
performance is high Rh, then p
h = 1, i.e. the agent is good and the strategy is
successful. Therefore, it is unreasonable to replace the agent after high performance
in the 1st period, so in such a case the owner always prefers to leave the old top
manager in the Company.
If or the performance is low Rl, the principal has two alternatives: leave or
replace the agent. In order to find out the principal’s strategy, we need to compare
his/her payoffs in both cases. For the principal it is optimal to stimulate high efforts
of the agent if and only if the Company financial performance is significantly high:
R ≥ e2c
pi(△e2)2 .
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Let us consider the first move of the agent. He has 2 options again: exert high
or low level of efforts. In order to find optimal compensation incentivizing to exert
high efforts, the following linear programming problem should be solved:
min
[
q0
(
e1 w
h + (1− e1 )wl
)
+ (1− q0)wl
]
.
Subject to:
wh − wl ≥ c
q0△e1 − e2
(
wh,h − wl,hS1=S0
)
− (1− e2)△f,
wh ≥ 0, wl ≥ 0.
The problem solution is the following when the first and the third inequalities
become equalities:
wh = max
[
0;
c
q0△e1 − e2
(
wh,h − wl,hS1=S0
)
− (1− e2)△f
]
, (38)
wl = 0. (39)
Considering these results it is transparent that the manager will exert high efforts
in every sub-game in the 1st period in order to maximize his expected compensation.
Therefore Nash equilibrium strategies for both players are as follows:
1. For the agent: in both periods he should exert high efforts e1 and e2.
2. For the owner: regardless of the Company result after the 1st period he should
leave the agent.
Expected compensation of the agent for 2 periods is the following:
E (w) = q0
[
e1
(
wh + e2w
h,h
)
+ (1− e1)e2wl,h
]
. (40)
The game solution is demonstrated in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4: Game solution
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Abstract The purpose of the research is to investigate the motives of coop-
eration in the movie production and to improve the methodology of incentive
income imputation formation on the basis of appropriate game-theoretical
model construction. As a result a systematized methodology of the income
imputations definition generated by the product of cooperation (movie),
which can be used as a decision-making support tool in negotiations about
shares of the income allocation among the participants of the cooperation of
the movie creation, has been elaborated. It should be accentuated that it is
not assumed that the implementation of the methodology will give the rev-
enue imputations, which could be taken as per se, however, it can become a
substantial help during negotiations of the parties involved about their par-
ticipation in revenue. The applicability of the methodology has been tested
on the cases from Hollywood practice.
Keywords: motion picture, members of motion picture industry, box-office,
revenue-sharing contracts, cooperative game, imputation, nondominant rev-
enue imputation, optimal imputation.
1. Introduction
Movie business is an extremely complex business, which involves a lot of people, a
lot of interactions among various legal entities, high level of uncertainty about the
outcomes of each single project, and thus leaves a lot of loopholes for unfair behavior
and possibilities for manipulations. By analyzing the process of movie production,
distribution and exhibition, we can trace a very important problem existent in the
industry – the issue of optimal incentives for the participants of movie value chain.
This issue can actually be broken down into two problems, which constitute two
parts of the incentives alignment problem in the movie industry.
The first problem concerns the contract design among the participants of the
movie value chain. The demand for the movie is very difficult to assess beforehand,
and it can never be forecasted with 100% precision. At the same time the prevailing
part of the investments is made at the initial stage, when the final result is com-
pletely unknown. The thing is that in the course of project realization some factors
appear, which influence the revenue allocation, but which impede its division pro-
portionally the financing of the budget. New groups of participants appear, such
as leading actors and directors, which have the ability to substantially increase the
⋆ This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Fundamental Researches under
grants No.16-01-00805.
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box-office by their participation in the project. This gives them the advantage dur-
ing negotiations concerning the level and the form of their compensation. Having a
significant bargaining power, they can claim not only for the flat fee, but also for
the percentage of revenue or profit (depending on the contract terms) of the project
realization. At the same time actors and directors do not finance the budget, and
rather on the contrary consume a part of it. According to Epstein (Epstein, 2011)
sometimes, although the agreement on the shares is set, the parties may not be fully
satisfied with it due to different reasons. For instance, in the case of the produc-
tion of the movie “Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines” Arnold Schwarzenegger was
given the unprecedentedly large share of revenue as a part of compensation without
a reasonable basis from the perspective of producers, but they had to undertake
this step due to the requirements of the investors. If the producers could underpin
their decision with some tool, maybe the situation could have been different, and
they would not have had to pay such a large compensation to Schwarzenegger. If a
question of inclusion of certain agent of movie making into the allocation of the com-
mon revenue is left without attention, different internal problems may arise, such as
conflicts between producers from one side and actors and directors – from another,
which might activate the problem of lost opportunities and, consequently, smaller
amounts of box-office. So here the central question is how to form the cooperative
contract, i.e. which percentage of the revenues to assign to each participant.
The second problem concerns the contracts realization in the movie value chain.
When the contracts are formed, and the shares of the chain participants are agreed
on, they need to be implemented. The agreements among companies, which con-
stitute the main links of the value chain, are in a form of participation contracts,
meaning that everybody’s income is dependent on the final revenues, generated by
the movie. However, currently the value chain has such a form, which allows differ-
ent parties to behave opportunistically. This issue is thoroughly elaborated by Vogel
(Vogel, 2015), who explains how parties tend to cut themselves a larger lump of the
pie by artificially increasing their costs on the books, thus leaving a smaller amount
for next participants to share. Wasko (Wasko,2003) and Eliashberg (Eliashberg,
2005) support this idea explaining that the weights of the chain participants are
different, and some of them may deprive others from the part of the revenue they
can obtain by manipulations with numbers or by exertion extra pressure on weaker
players. In other words, the profit is allocated unfairly. For instance, producers can
very often find themselves in an instable position, since the distributors, being the
part of huge media conglomerates, have all the conditions to play with numbers on
the books by artificially bloating costs, and at the same time the producers have
to set agreements with the talent, who can also manipulate their remuneration by
imposing special terms on their participation in the project. Therefore, the gap for
the research appears: how to incentivize the participants to act fairly, and conse-
quently to minimize the losses of the weakest players of the chain. Basically, the
opportunistic behavior can be eliminated with the mechanisms of the contract im-
plementation in the value chain. Special terms should be introduced, which would
mitigate the risk of cheating, and motivate every participant in the chain not no
overestimate the costs. Coordination contracts principles can help with the solution
of this problem.
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1.1. Movie making process
Movie production is a process which consists of a lengthy consequence of the unique
creative decisions leading to creation of a product from the initial story till the re-
lease and the exhibition in the movie theaters, on television or in the Internet. Movie
making process consists of several major stages: Development, Pre-production, Pro-
duction, Post-production and Distribution.
Development. At this stage a producer selects a story, which may be based on
a book, play, game, true story, be an original idea, which can vary from a general
idea to a finished script (Vogel, 2010, Squire, 2004). In some cases a producer (or a
studio) asks a scriptwriter to write a new (or to adapt an existing) script. However,
usually the scriptwriter with the help of a literary agent gives the first draft to
several independent or affiliated with the studio producers. If a producer is inter-
ested, both parties sign the option-type contract, which gives a producer a right to
buy the finished script and a scriptwriter gets an up-front fee (a share of which is
taken by the literary agent). From this point on substantial funding resources are
required in order to start the project. The financing is not that problematic, if the
producer is affiliated with the studio. When signing the contract with the studio,
the producer usually gives up the studio a significant portion of rights, which are
connected with the sequels, new episodes of the series, distribution. Funding is much
more challenging, if a producer doesn’t have an agreement with the studio, he needs
to find the initial funds from other sources, which is a very difficult task, especially
if there are no guarantees concerning the distribution (Eliashberg, 2005). The final
version is submitted to investors, studios and other interested parties. For the as-
sessment of the potential success of the movie even at the early stage a distributor
can be attracted, who analyze the genre, the target audience, the success of the sim-
ilar movies in the past, the actors and potential directors. All these factors imply
some attractiveness for the spectators. Not every movie can be profitable only from
theatrical exhibition, thus the production companies also take into consideration
box-office in the world and the DVD sales. Producers and scriptwriters prepare the
movie pitch, or treatment, and present it to potential investors. The parties involved
negotiate the terms of the deal and sign the contract. As soon as the parties have
met and the deal has been set, the movie may proceed to the pre-production stage.
Pre-production. Pre-production is the longest and definitely very important pe-
riod. Producers hire the director, the actors and the crew, search for shooting lo-
cations, think of the design of the production set and the costumes, calculate the
budget, based on such factors as script, expenditures for post-production (for in-
stance, for special effects), starting salaries and funding potential. The production
budget is compounded and the production expenditures are calculated. In case of
massive projects, apart from anything else, the insurance is acquired for the protec-
tion of unforeseen circumstances. Then the producer hires the crew, which will be
working on a movie production during several months. In many Hollywood block-
busters there are hundreds of people involved, while low-budget independent movies
are sometimes created with only eight-nine people (Eliashberg, 2005).
Production. At this stage the crew is enlarged. The production period may last
several months, but due to the high cost of this stage, producers try to minimize it
by thorough planning and rational organization of the shooting process.
Post-production. At this stage the movie is assembled by the movie editor. The
shot material and the sound are edited, and then all the sound elements are married
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to the picture and the work on the movie is finished (Weis & Belton, 1985). Usually
post-production period lasts longer than the production stage, up to several months
in duration. Editing process is often called the second director’s production, because
with its help it is possible to change the concept of the picture.
Distribution. At this stage the motion picture is released to the big screens. The
massive marketing campaign starts. Upon the release distributors usually launch
press-releases, interviews with press, preview screenings and film festival screen-
ings. Movies are shown in predetermined cinemas and several months later they
are released on DVD. The box-office is then allocated among the exhibitors, the
distributors and the production company.
1.2. Producer-studio relationships
There exist different schemes of the relationships between the producers and the
studios, which determine the income distribution among them. There are five basic
financing-production and distribution options, described by Cones (Cones, 1997).
Those are:
1. In-house production/distribution. Under this contract the studio (the distribu-
tor) finances all phases of the project. In this case a producer, who is responsible
for a movie acts as an employee of the studio.
2. PFD (production-financing-distribution) agreements. In this case an indepen-
dent producer comes to the studio/ distributor with a project, where all core
elements are already defined, and the studio provides financing of production
and distribution.
3. Negative pickup agreements. Under this agreement the distributor acquires the
original negative with the distribution rights. In other words, it is responsible
for distribution and pays the production costs.
4. Acquisition deals. The distributor is in charge of the distribution only, and the
funds for production is given by other parties.
5. Rent-a-distributor deals. In this case practically all financing for the production
and distribution has been provided by other parties, and the finished movie is
ready for the distribution.
The difference in producer-studio relationship results in different value chains,
and thus different problems, arousing on each of the links. This paper concentrates
on movie production by an independent producer. First of all, the process is more
complicated in this case, and the income distribution is not as obvious as in the case
of studio-affiliated production, where a studio, being an extremely powerful player,
imposes its own rules of the game, and no other party has enough power to command
its own terms. Moreover, in case of studio-affiliated production, both the production
and the distribution are under control of the studio, meaning that no contracts exist
between the producer and the distributor, thus there is no problem of coordination of
contracts. Basically, no contract disputes can occur in this situation. This situation
is very advantageous for the studio, however, it is extremely disadvantageous for all
other participants, who signed the agreement for sharing contract, because studios
very often blow up the expenditures, and profitable movies in reality show no profit
at all on the books. What is more, in the case when producer is affiliated with
studio, he loses the rights for the movie, including the rights for the last word in
the creative part of the production.
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There are a lot of participants of this chain. Those are: the producer, the dis-
tributor, the exhibitors, the talent (actors, director, etc.), the scriptwriter, agents
(of the scriptwriter, actors, etc.), the investors, the banks, the insurance company.
Rodnyansky (Rodnyansky, 2013) identifies following steps of the movie value
chain from the idea creation till the delivery of the movie to the spectators:
1. The scriptwriter creates a script.
2. The scriptwriter finds an agent. If the agent considers the script promising, he
starts offering it to the production companies.
3. The producer buys the script and develops it and simultaneously taking care of
the search for actors and director.
4. When the script is ready, and the leading actors expressed their confirmation of
the participation in the project, the work on the budget and calendar schedule
starts.
5. The producer starts negotiations with American distributors.
6. The producer signs the contract with the distributor. If the potential of the
movie is high, the contract may imply the payment of the minimum guarantee
(MG). For the movie with a budget from $15 mln. to $60 mln. MG may con-
stitute around $5 mln., but such term is quite rare in the contracts. Usually,
another guarantee is stipulated: the minimum number of copies, on which the
movie will be released, and the minimum budget for the release (P&A).
7. With the mastered support of the American distributor, the producer starts
negotiations with sales companies, which take care of the presales of the rights
to the international distributors.
8. The location is defined.
9. The next very important step is the getting a completion bond, guaranteeing
that even in the case of acts of God, the movie will be finished in accordance
with the approved script, budget and calendar schedule. Without the completion
bond the producer cannot approach investors or banks. The issuing company
reads the script, questions experts on the financial success potential, checks the
budget, meets the director and sometimes the leading actors. The amount of
the insurance is the budget of the movie + 10% for the unbudgeted expenses.
The cost of the completion bond is usually not over 6-7%. The representative
of the insurance company is always present on the set of the movie.
10. In order to get the money on security of presales, agreements with the authorities
of the state about the reliefs and, if necessary, in order to get the missing amount
in the budget, the producer can approach the bank, private or institutional
investors.
11. The production and post-production phases are carried out.
12. The work with the US distributor about the positioning of the movie, marketing
campaign, etc. is carried out.
13. Realization of other rights. (if any are left after the agreement with the local
distributor): VOD, DVD, television.
14. Release of the movie.
15. From the proceeds made by the movie, movie theaters take 50% and the rest of
the receipts are given to the distributor. The distributor subtracts expenses for
the release (P&A), the amount of the minimum guarantee, if it was paid, and
its share of the gross. Money left after the payments on a full scale is passed to
the producer.
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16. Usually, the first to get the money are banks, which gave loans secured on
rights, the next are private investors. Often share of the profit is also given to
the director and the main stars of the movie. The last one to get the money is
the producer.
2. Cooperation in movie value chain
2.1. Bargaining and negotiations
In the motion picture industry the question of box-office revenues allocation among
its creators is always a topical one. The investors have to get the profit, since it is
their return on investments. The producers get all the residual income, which is left
after the exhibitors and the distributors take their shares. The producers pay back
the borrowed money to the investors. However, there are a lot of reasons, why shar-
ing contracts may be arranged with those participants of the movie making process,
the contribution of who is intangible. In other words, the producers, who by the
principles of motion picture industry get the rest of the money after all deductions,
start sharing income from the movie with those participants, the contribution of
who is very difficult to assess financially. In this paper we are considering predom-
inantly the case of an independent movie production and consider the following
players: producers, actors and directors. The model, where the producer is affiliated
with the studio works with completely same logic, the difference is only in the names
of the cooperation participants: instead of the producer, the distributor will share
revenue with actors and director. Going back to our schematic representation of the
movie value chain, now we consider the relationship among the players of the first
link of the chain.
The question arises: what exact percentage from the income it is needed to set in
order for all the parties to be satisfied and not to have objective reasons to decline
the solution. It is quite obvious that the larger power is in the hands of producers,
since they are the owners of the rights of the movie, and thus they want to arrange
a deal in the most favorable way for themselves. At the same time the stars do not
want to agree for the terms, which will not satisfy them sufficiently. The conflict
situation appears. Instruments of game theoretical modeling come to the aid, and
with their help it becomes possible to define the income imputations in different
forms. These imputations can be used as a basis of negotiations. Certainly, a huge
role play the skills of the producer, studio representative, agents or lawyers of actors
and directors to negotiate more favorable for their own side terms and conditions,
but the method, which will be described later in the chapter, is suggested to be used
only as a base for negotiations of this type. It serves as a tool for decision-making
support.
2.2. Cooperative contract as cooperative game
Imputation in cooperative game. Let’s consider game in characteristic function
form - game Γ =< N, v >. Here N = {1, 2, . . . , n} - set of players (in our case those
are producers, a director and actors, which can claim for a share of movie proceeds).
The real-valued function v with the set of players N defined on coalitions S ⊂ N
is called a characteristic function of the n-person game. Here the inequality v (T )+
v (S) ≤ v (T ⋃S) , v (∅) = 0 holds for any nonintersecting coalitions T, S (T ⊂
N, S ⊂ N) (Petrosyan, Zenkevich, 2016, p. 168). This is called a superadditivity
property, which means that the payoff of the united coalitions is no less than that of
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the two nonintersecting coalitions, when they act independently. If this inequality
is not fulfilled (which means that the united coalition does not bring additional
payoffs), then the unifying into coalition is senseless, and it will be more rational
for the players to act independently. Let’s consider that the issue of imputation
choice is modeled by a cooperative game.
Value v(S) is a gain of the coalition S, i.e. that payoff, which the partici-
pants can get when working together. In game theory it is supposed that func-
tion v (S) , S ⊂ N has a superadditivity property (Petrosyan, Zenkevich, 2016,
p. 168), meaning, how has already beed described earlier, the payoff of the par-
ticipants, if they work together, should be bigger than the sum of their payoffs in
case they work independently. In case of the movie industry this property is al-
ways fulfilled, since only in cooperation participants can create the final product (a
different matter is that the composition of the participants may vary), and all to-
gether they achieve a synergetic effect. From the superadditivity property it follows
the inequality
∑k
i=1 v(Si) ≤ v(N). This implies that the maximum payoff may be
achieved only upon participation of all players in the maximal coalition, and there
is no such decomposition of the set N that the guaranteed payoff to these coalitions
would exceed the payoff of all players acting together v(N). Thus, all participants
have a motive to cooperate in confines of the maximal coalition. Let’s discuss, what
happens in terms of motion picture industry. No participant (producer, director
and actor) can create a movie by himself only or in a tandem with another partic-
ipant. The project will be realized only upon the participation of all three parties.
Consequently, we can say that there is an obvious synergetic effect.
Now let’s bring in the notion of the payoff imputation. The vector
α = (α1, . . . , αn), which satisfies the conditions
αi ≥ v (i) , i ∈ N, (1)
n∑
i=1
αi = v(N) (2)
where v (i) is the value of the characteristic function for a single-element coalition
S = {i}, and αi is the payoff of the same coalition, is called an imputation (Pet-
rosyan, Zenkevich, 2016, p. 171).
Condition (1) of the imputation is called an individual rationality condition, and
it implies that in order for a member to decide to participate in a coalition he should
receive at least the same amount he could receive if acting alone without support of
other players. Condition (2) is called a collective (or group) rationality condition. It
implies that there are no other imputations of the payoff of v(N), which would bring
each player a larger payoff than the considered imputation. Consequently, only if the
condition of collective rationality is fulfilled, vector α = (α1, . . . , αn) can be taken as
admissible. Therefore, in order for the vector α = (α1, . . . , αn) to be an imputation
in a cooperative game Γ =< N, v >, it is necessary and sufficient that it could be
represented as αi = v (i) + γi, i ∈ N , where γi ≥ 0 payoffs from cooperation of the
player i ∈ N. Meaning that each player should gain more in cooperation, than he
would gain by acting alone. If the condition
∑
i∈N v(i) < v(N) is fulfilled, the game
is called essential. This means that cooperation brings a positive payoff.
Cooperative contract in movie production. In motion picture industry,
when the movie is under production the main participants of the process face the
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problem of income allocation, which they earn from the movie release. As a payoff
v(N) we will consider the revenue of the movie excluding the share of the exhibitors
(usually 50% of the total box-office), because as it has been discussed in the first
chapter of the paper, the exhibitors get their share before the proceeds are dis-
tributed among those who actually produced the movie. However, it is important
to note that the decision about the receipts allocation is made at the initial stage,
when neither the final result nor the success of the movie is known. Thus, the fore-
casted box-office is considered as payoff. Consequently, the issue of the characteristic
function construction arises. It is needed to calculate the value of the characteristi
function for the contribution of each participant. At this point we need to look more
precisely at the principles of the expected box-office calculations. Analysts look at
the movies of the same genre, with the cast of the similar class, and then basing on
that data they make their forecasts about the box-office for the new movie. More-
over, they look at the box-offices of the movies with the participation of the certain
leading actor and compare them to the movies of the same genre with less renowed
actors. Moreover, movies of the director, which pertain to the same genre, as the
one under production, are analyzed. All those estimations are taken into considera-
tion, and on their base the forecast of a specific movie is made. In Hollywood there
exist various advanced box-office forecasting models, which allow to obtain quite
accurate estimates.
In order to demonstrate the mechanisms of the imputation calculations mech-
anisms we would like to show them on numerical examples. First, let’s consider a
fabricated example, and later in the paper examine real cases from Hollywood prac-
tice. So let’s assume that a certain movie “Z” is produced. As we remember, the
producer is a person with ultimate responsibility for a movie, meaning that he owns
all the rights (if we consider an independent movie production). He is responsible
for finding the funding for movie creation, which can come from different sources,
including his own assest. Those mechanisms were discussed in the first chapter of
the paper. So basically, he either spends his own money, or he has an obligation
to the investors to pay back the borrowed money. Thus, we will consider that his
contribution will be estimated proportionally to the financing assets he brings to
the project, since for the purposes of this model we assume that the producer is in
possession of the sum of money, which is enough to make a movie. What is more,
the producer later deals with the investors with the money, which he receives as
a part of revenue distribution deals, that is why it is also important to make sure
that the producer makes enough money to pay back. Moreover, money as a hard
asset stresses the high bargaining power of the producer. Now let’s move back to
the example. The movie’s “Z” budget equals to $20 mln., however, due to high risks
of the project, two producers: producer A and producer B, decide to cooperate in
order to share risks, and each of them commits $10 mln. For the leading role a star
actor X with worldwide recognition is invited. It is forecasted that his participation
may significantly increase the movie’s box-office. It is expected that on condition
of this actor’s participation, the box-office will equal $200 mln. At the same time
without this actor the movie will also be able to become profitable, although not to
such an extent: the box-office is forecated to be $160 mln. So it is possible to say
that by his participation actor X is increasing the box-office by $40 mln. Since the
participation of this actor significantly augments the profit-earning capacity of the
movie, it will be more advantageous to all of the project participants, if he stays in
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the project. In other words, this actor obtains a large power to influence his remu-
neration. He may set a deal for movie earnings participation. Since in our case we
consider an A-list star, let’s consider that he is able to sign a contract for revenue
(and not profit) participation. Here the issue arouses: what share exactly to offer
an actor in order for him to have enough motivation to work on the movie, but at
the same time not give him a share, which would be too large, in order to guarantee
the return on investments to producers. It is also needed to take in account the
uncertainty of the box-office, because the forecasts do not have 100% accuracy and
in reality they may be far from estimations.
The revenue, which will be divided among the considered participants after the
deduction of the exhibitors share (50%) will equal to $100 mln. or v ({1, 2, 3}) = 100.
Now let’s find out, how much the players will be able to earn, if they do not operate
in maximal coalition. Not a single player will be able to create a movie alone, and
consequently to gain additional gains. So v ({1}) = v ({2}) = 10 (each producer has
his $10 mln.); v({3})= 0 (the actor does not earn anything). If producers A and B
try to make a movie without this actor, they will manage to do it, because they
can hire another less famous actor, which will not claim for revenue share. However,
the expected box-office of such movie will be smaller and will equal to $80 mln. or
v ({1, 2}) = 80. If any of the producers tries to create a movie on his own, none of
them will succeed due to insufficiency of the budget. Thus, the producers will only
have their $10 mln. in hand: v ({1, 3}) = 10; v ({2, 3}) = 10.
The imputation of this cooperative game is an allocation of revenue, gained
under cooperation. It is worth stating that the superadditivity property is fulfilled,
which assumes that each player in coalition should add some value to this coalition.
Now let’s move to the definition of income imputation.
2.3. Optimal imputations in cooperative game
Nash bargaining solution. Obviously, for each player the notion of optimality
means the maximization of his share of cooperation payoff. However, not a single
player can guarantee the maximization of the payoff, since the matter is the division
of the common payoffs.
First of all, let’s consider bargaining problem (Petrosyan, Zenkevich, 2016, p.
160). It will allow us to define the upper border of pretentions of the weakest par-
ticipant of cooperation, in our case an actor (or a director), since their contribution
to cooperation is intangible and therefore difficult to assess. The thing is that ne-
gotiations about the way, how to allocate the proceeds, may last infinitely long,
and then end up with no result, if systematical approach is not applied. Thus, the
reasonable solution to a dispute would be to invite some independent arbiter, who
has an equal attitude towards all the parties, and who would act fairly. If the arbiter
is in fact unbiased and fair, then he will probably make a decision, which would suit
all players. Nash bargaining solution serves as such arbiter.
To find Nash bargaining solution (NBS) we need to apply Nash function:
H (α1, . . . , αn) =
n∏
i=1
(αi − vi) . (3)
NBS is the solution to the following optimization problem (Petrosyan, Zenkevich,
2016, p. 164):
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maxH (α1, . . . , αn) = max{αi}
n∏
i=1
(αi − vi) (4)
under conditions:
αi ≥ v (i) , i ∈ N,
n∑
i=1
αi = v(N).
In other words, the payoff of every coalition from cooperation should be no less
than they could earn when working alone. The sum of those payoffs should be equal
to the total payoff of the coalition.
It is clear that the result achieved in such a way is Pareto optimal. This means
that there is no other division of the game v(N), under which each each player gets
more than his share in a specific imputation.
Nash bargaining solution arouses interest, because it has a number of important
properties (Mazalov, 2010): efficiency (or Pareto optimality); linearity (under linear
transformations optimality remains) and symmetry. The latter property implies the
equal status of the players, i.e. if players have the same market (bargaining) power,
then the Nash bargaining solution is symmetrical.
In case of the motion picture industry NBS can be applied for calculation of
the participation shares in proceeds allocation as a kind of a reference for further
negotiations, because it can always be calculated, under any values of the character-
istic function. This imputation can be considered as an upper border of the share,
to which an actor or a director may claim. The thing is that as has already been
said before, the NBS is considered fair, just because it allocates the total payoff
from cooperation among players (the income with the exclusion of costs) in equal
shares. It does not take into consideration probable inequality of the players. Thus
the calculated shares may not satisfy the producers, which would not want to share
with the participants that much, since he or she does not contribute to the common
affair tangibly, and consequently, it is very hard to estimate the degree of his input
contribution to the overall performance of the project. Consequently, it is needed
to find such imputations, under which not a single coalition would have objective
reasons to decline them.
However, let’s first go back to our reference example and calculate a Nash bar-
gaining solution. NBS will be a solution to the following problem:
max(α1 − 10) ∗ (α2 − 10) ∗ α3
under constraints:
α1 + α2 + α3 = 100 (5)
α1 ≥ 10,
α2 ≥ 10,
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α3 ≥ 0.
In order to calculate Nash bargaining solution we need to maximize the product
of the gains of each player. In addition, both of the considered producers expect to
get no less than what they have contributed, i.e. not less than $10 mln., actor X
also expects to het some reward for his participation in the project. All together
they will not be able to get more than the box-office revenue of $100, which we have
forecasted.
By solving (5) problem, we get the following imputation:
α1 = 36, 67, α2 = 36, 67, α3 = 26, 67. (6)
We can see that the shares are divided in a way, if all the participants were equal.
We cannot forget that the producers have invested $10 mln. each, thus, if we deduct
their expenditures from the total payoff, we get the absolutely equal distribution
of profit among the producers and the actor, a situation, which certainly cannot
happen in real life, because producers, having a higher bargaining power, than actor,
will simply not allow him to receive such a large share. However, Nash bargaining
solution let us make a conclusion about the maximum of all possible shares, which
could theoretically get the weakest player.
Nondominant bargaining solution. Now we need to find such imputations,
which would be nondominant, meaning that no coalition would have objective rea-
sons to disagree with these imputations. In other words, the gain of each coalition
(both single-element and two-element) of players would be no less than that if they
worked independently. Since each participant in any situation gets benefits from
the joint activity with other players, they do not have objective reasons to disagree
with such imputation. Basically, such distribution is stable in a way that it is disad-
vantageous for any coalition to separate from other players and distribute a payoff
of this smaller separated coalition among its members. There can be many such
imputations, and the participants may have different subjective reasons to disagree
with a certain earnings imputation. Thus, it is needed to find an solution, which
would satisfy all the players. Such impulation may become nondominant bargain-
ing solution. For its definition we need to consider only the set of nondominant
imputations.
Mathematically the problem of finding nondominant bargaining solution would
look as following:
maxαi
n∏
i=1
(αi − vi)
under constraints:
n∑
i=1
αi = v(N), (7)
α(S) ≥ v(S), S ⊂ N,
where α (S) =
∑
i∈S αi.
This method will again give us the fair division, as in the case of Nash bargain-
ing solution, however, it will take into consideration the inequality of the initial
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contributions of the players. Nondomination of the imputation means that no coali-
tion has objective reasons to decline such imputation. This gives another reference
during negotiations about the final earnings division. Despite the clear advantage of
such method over the previous one, its disadvantage resides in the fact that it does
not consider the inequality of the bargaining power of players, and the difference is
in their abilities to impose their own rules of the game.
Let’s move to our example and calculate the nondominant bargaining solution
in respect to the producers A and B and the actor X. We need to solve the following
problem:
max(α1 − 10) ∗ (α2 − 10) ∗ α3
under constraints:
α1 + α2 + α3 = 100, (8)
α1 ≥ 10,
α2 ≥ 10,
α3 ≥ 0,
α1 + α2 ≥ 80,
α1 + α3 ≥ 10 ,
α2 + α3 ≥ 10.
We again maximize the product of the players’ payoffs, and at the same time
not only each participant expects to get not less than he has contributed, but each
pair of players also expects to get from cooperation not less than they could earn
if working in pair. Since producers A and B can manage to create a movie without
the participation of this certain actor, and it will have a drawing capacity of $80
mln., they assume that if they hire the actor X for the leading role, their income
will also increase, as otherwise the decision to share proceeds with him would be
senseless. At the same time if producers work alone, they will not be able to finance
the budget, thus, the movie will not be produced, and they will remain only with
their $10 mln. at hand.
After solving the (8) problem we get the following result:
α1 = 40, α2 = 40, α3 = 20. (9)
Therefore the nondominant bargaining solution of the payoffs shares under co-
operation gets the following form: (40%, 40%, 20%). We can see that the revenue
again has been divided quite evenly, however, now the inequality of the initial con-
tribution is taken into account, and the producers receive $10 mln. more than in
the case of NBS. Nevetherless, such solution would hardly suit the producers, as
20% of the movie box-office is a way too large percentage for investors to give to
340 Ekaterina Zaytseva, Margarita Gladkova
an actor. Therefore, although this solution is not optimal for solving the considered
problem, it allows an actor to roughly estimate, what he can generally claim his pre-
tentions for when cooperating on the movie creation. From this provision the next
idea appears, which could serve as a support for defining the payoff imputations.
Maximum and minimum nondominant imputations.With the help of the
nondominant imputations calculation (those imputations, under which no coalition
of players would have objective reasons to decline them) we can calculate maximum
and minimum value of the actor’s or director’s share from cooperation. Thus, we
will get a corridor of the values on the set of nondominant imputations, in which
there will be located the share of the weakest of the players. In other words, we will
get the pretentions’ range of a player with intangible input. In the general case such
corridor of feasible changes of the income share can be calculated for any player.
In general case the set of equations for minimum nondominant imputation (MIN
solution) for player i will look as follows:
minαi(αi − vi)
under constraints:
n∑
i∈S
αi = v(N), (10)
α(S) ≥ v(S), S ⊂ N.
We minimize the payoff of player i, for which we want to find a corridor of the
possible income percentage values. Income of the other players is divided among
them proportionally to their contribution to the result of cooperation.
The problem of the search of maximum nondominant imputation (MAN solu-
tion) for player i will be as follows:
maxαi(αi − vi)
under constraints:
n∑
i∈S
αi = v(N), (11)
α(Si) ≥ v(Si), S ⊂ N.
The problem is absolutely similar with the first one with the only difference that
now the payoff of the considered player is not minimized, but maximized.
Now let’s go back to our example of the movie “Z” production and calculate
minimum and maximum nondominant solutions for it.
For calculation of the MIN solution for player 3 (actor X) let’s solve the following
problem:
minα3
under constraints:
α1 + α2 + α3 = 100, (12)
α1 ≥ 10,
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α2 ≥ 10,
α3 ≥ 0,
α1 + α2 ≥ 80,
α1 + α3 ≥ 10 ,
α2 + α3 ≥ 10.
As a result we get the MIN solution:
α1 = 50, α2 = 50, α3 = 0. (13)
Obviously the minimum value of the actor’s X share is 0%, i.e. he does not
participate in the revenue distribution and gets only fixed payment from the movie
budget. The shares of the producers are equal, as they have financed the budget in
equal proportions.
Now let’s find the maximum nondominant solution, which would show the shares
of the box-office allocation, if the actor was offered the maximum possible percent-
age.
maxα3
under constraints:
α1 + α2 + α3 = 100 (14)
α1 ≥ 10,
α2 ≥ 10,
α3 ≥ 0,
α1 + α2 ≥ 80,
α1 + α3 ≥ 10,
α2 + α3 ≥ 10.
As a result we get the MAN solution:
α1 = 40, α2 = 40, α3 = 20. (15)
The computed solution shows that the maximum share, which an actor can claim
for, equals 20%. So we have set the borders, within which actor X can negotiate
about his percentage. However, they give us only a range of actor’s pretentions.
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It is quite obvious that 20% is too high, and the producers will not accept such
imputation. Generally speaking, one needs to take into account that the participants
of our cooperation are unequal in their power of influence on negotiations’ result.
Generally speaking, producers have a higher bargaining power, than actors, because
they are owners the rights for the picture and they possess the unambiguous and
easily measurable resource – finances. Creative participants of cooperation, having
an intangible input in cooperation, have a lesser extent of influence on the final
decision concerning their remuneration, since their contribution is hard to assess
numerically. All the methods of revenue distribution, which were considered before,
did not take into account the inequality of players’ power of influence on their
payoff share. Consequently, there is a need of introducing the weights for each of
the players, which would allow removing the problem of inequality of the players.
Weighted nondominant bargaining solution. If every player would be as-
signed with some weight, then is seems that the problem of bargaining power in-
equality of different players would be offset, and the game would be normalized. So
in general case weighted nondominant bargaining solution (WNB solution) is the
solution to the following problem:
maxHw (α1, .., αn) =max{αi}
n∏
i=1
(αi−νi)wi .
under constraints: ∑
i∈S
αi = v (S) , S ⊂ N, (16)
where wi ≥ 0; ;w1+ ..+wn = 1. The vector w = (w1, .., wn) is a set of weights wi of
players, where parameter wi characterizes the power of player i, i ∈ N in the game.
Shapley index. For the producer the weight is defined by the amount of com-
mited financing sources. With those participants, the contribution of who is intan-
gible, everything is not so obvious. For the definition of the weights of those players
two methods can be introduced. First of them is the use of Shapley index. Shapley
index is calculated on the basis of Shapley value, which actually can be considered
as as a tool for solution of the problem, considered in the paper. The advantage of
optimal imputation’s definition with the use of Shapley value resides in the fact that
such imputation exists in each game and it is unique. Shapley value is calculated as
follows:
φi [v] =
∑
S\i∈S⊂N
(s− 1)! (n− s)!
n!
[v (S)− v (S\i)] , i ∈ N, (17)
where s = |S|.
Shapley value has several properties (Petrosyan, Zenkevich, 2016, p. 182): in-
dependence from irrelevant alternatives; independence from repositioning of the
numbers of the players and linearity.
On the basis of Shapley value it is possible to calculate Shapley index, which is
often used as a measure of the player’s power in a certain game:
sh [v] = [sh1 (v) , ..., shn(v)] ,
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where
shi =
φi[v]
v(N)
, i = 1, n. (18)
Going back to our example, let’s calculate the Shapley value according to the
above stated formula. We get the imputation: (46,67%, 46,67%, 6,67%). By devid-
ing the obtained shares by the expected value of the movie revenue, we get Shapley
index, which we will use as a power of influence of this or that player. Generally,
Shapley index is widely used in politics in evaluation of parties influence in parlia-
ment. In our case the index will calculate the influence of certain participants of
moviemaking with the help of relationships among coalitions, in which a partici-
pant is essential towards all winning coalitions. Weights of the participants can be
also shown in vector form (0,47; 0,47; 0,07). Using these weights let’s calculate the
revenue imputation with the formula of weighted nondominant bargaining solution.
By solving the problem with Excel functions, we get the solution (47,33%; 47,33%;
5,33%). The revenue is divided in the other way than was obtained with the usage
of Nash bargaining solution and nondominant bargaining solution. Now it is taken
into account that the producers have more opportunities for exerting pressure on
an actor. This is an approximation of what happens in real life. The thing is, no
matter how talented and famous an actor is, producers will not allow him to claim
for unlimited amount of money. Even in the cases when the role is written specially
for a certain actor, and the director does not want to consider anyone else for this
role, it is needed to accept that in motion picture industry, just as in any other
business, those who possess rights and money, are the ones to dictate the termes.
Expert weighted solution. However, weights of the players can be calculated
not only by the method of Shapley index. In fact, with all its advantages, it has one
serious disadvantage when applied to movie industry: it is impersonal and does not
consider the details of each specific project. In motion picture business there are
never two absolutely identical projects, although the main principles of the movie
production are always the same. Moreover, when the weights of an actor or a direc-
tor are estimated, a very important role is played by individual properties of each
single person. That is why in this work for defining weights of actors and directors
it is suggested to use the questionnaire, questions of which are aimed at estimation
of factors, which influence the bargaining power of actors, i.e. their weight. It is
supposed that the questionnaire is intended for the movie experts, those people,
who are to a large extent aware of the mechanisms of the movie industry, who know
this business from the inside and sometimes possess the insider information. The
questions are not abstract, but always concern certain movies, certain actors and
directors. The answers intend subjective opinions of experts towards the influence
on the box-office of such factors as Oscars awards or nominations, the number of
those, the experience of an actor at the moment of the movie production, number
of financially successful movies with his participation. Moreover, the experts are
invited to give a subjective estimation of influence on the bargaining power and
consequently on the probability of signing a sharing contract of such factors, as the
fact that the movie is a sequel, the established reputation of an actor/ director in
terms of the behavior and tendency towards shrinking, the length of the contract
with this or that studio/ producer (in case of the franchise, when initially a serie
of movies is planned to be created), the diversity of the actor’s/ director’s areas of
activity, for instance, his musical activity, participation in TV series, advertising of
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famous brands, in other words, everything, which allows to increase the visibility
of a person. The most important factor, which is suggested for the experts to esti-
mate in the questionnaire, is the level of participant’s ability to increase the final
movie’s box-office. It is possible to examine the questionnaire more thoroughly in
the appendix.
The criteria, in their turn, are devided into groups in order of importance. There-
fore, to the most important the following ones were assigned: the ownership of the
Oscar award, Oscar’s nominations, the length of the career and consequently the
experience, the variety of activities, and the fact that the movie is a sequel. To the
next in descending order of importance group of factors were assigned: the number
of Oscar awards, the number of Oscar’s nominations, the fact (or the absence) of
previous joint projects of an actor and a director. To the less least important cri-
teria were assigned: the reputation of an actor in terms of his behavioral patterns.
Consequently, to each group an importance value was assigned on the scale from
1 to 3. The answers of the experts on each question are converted to the 5-point
scale. Then the average values are calculated on each question. At the same time
the weight of the each criteria is calculated by division of the importance value of
each criteria by the sum of all importance values. In other words, if, for example,
the importance value of the question is 3, and the sum of importance values for all
questions for the estimation of this actor is 14, then the weight of the criterion will
equal 0,21. Then finally the weight of the actor is found by the sum of the products
of average values of each question and the corresponding weight of the criterion.
However, due to the fact that the weight is calculated irrespective to other
participants of cooperation, it arrives too big for obtaining relevant results. Thus,
to calculate the weighted nondominant bargaining solution, we normalize the weight
of an actor or a director by multiplying the calculated weight by the largest in history
percentage, which has ever been obtained by a participant with a similar degree of
involvement to a project. Under the similar degree of involvement to a project it is
implied the quantity of the obligations taken by a participant: whether he fulfills
only an acting job, or also a producing one; whether the director is only fulfilling his
direct job or he also possesses the rights for the script and in addition produces the
project. By multiplying the weight, which was obtained in the course of the expert
evaluations, by the largest in the history participation share, we can get the final
weight, which would be used for actually imputation calculations.
The general form of the set of equations for defining the expert weighted solution
have the following form:
max Hw (α1, .., αn) = max{αi}
n∏
i=1
(αi − vi)wi .
α (S) ≥ v (S) , S ⊂ N, (19)
where: α (S) =
∑
i∈S αi; w = (w1, .., wn); wi ≥ 0; ;w1 + ..+ wn = 1.
Let’s move to the reference example. Let’s suppose that according to the expert
questionnaire, the weight of an actor amounted to 0,8. Consequently, by multiplying
this coefficient by the maximum revenue share in history, which amounts to 0,2 (the
remuneration of Arnold Schwarzenegger for the movie “Terminator 3: Rise of the
Machines”) we get that the final weight of an actor X equals to 0,16. Let’s remind,
that weights of the producers are difined proportionally the invested resources. Since
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in our case both producers provided equal amount of funding, their weight is also
equal, and it amounts to 0,42. It is needed to specify, why the value is exactly 0,42.
In order for the game to be normalized, the sum of participants’ weights should
equal 1. Consequently, when we first found the weight of the weakest player, we
deducted it from 1, and the remaining sum of weights we divided between the
producers proportionally their financial contribution to the project.
Now we need to solve the following problem of non-linear programming:
max (α1 − 10)0,42} ∗ (α2 − 10)0,42 ∗ α30,16 (20)
under constraints:
α1 + α2 + α3 = 100,
α1 ≥ 10,
α2 ≥ 10,
α3 ≥ 0,
α1 + α2 ≥ 80,
α1 + α3 ≥ 10 ,
α2 + α3 ≥ 10.
By solving this problem in Excel, we get the expert weighted solution:
α1 = 43, 6, α2 = 43, 6, α3 = 12, 8. (21)
In the percentage format the imputation will look as following: (43,6%; 43,6%;
12,8%). We see that this solution is more fair than all of the considered earlier. From
the one hand, it takes into account the contribution of an actor, but not overesti-
mates it, what Nash bargaining solution and nondominant bargaining solution did.
From the other hand, it does not give the large overbalance in favor of producers,
what showed Shapley value imputation and Shapley index weighted solution. The
thing is that the two latter methods substantially underestimated the contribution
of an actor, since they did not consider the specificity of projects, and were cal-
culated only on the basis of mathematical repositionings and that utility addition,
which actor X could bring to each coalition under condition that his initial input
equals zero in money terms. Thus, we can draw a conclusion that the method of
revenue imputation finding using the weighted nondominant bargaining solution,
when weights are found by expert estimations, gives the most unbiased results from
all methods. It should be stressed that the results obtained are not postulated as
reference ones. The offered tool set is suggested to be used as a mathematically jus-
tified system of support to solution of strategically important ptoblem of revenue
distribution among the participants of cooperation.
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Let’s look at the method of the income imputation finding in a more concise
way. We proceed from the assumption that in the receipts allocation may take part
following parties: a producer, leading actors and a director. All other participants
of the movie making are included in the budget part of the movie, and their pay-
ments are fixed. The first step is the definition of the expected box-office and the
quantitative forecasts concerning the ability of each of the participant, whose input
is intangible, to increase the expected box-office by his participation. This is carried
out on the basis on their previous works analysis and the box-office results of the
similar genre or storyline movies. Then on the basis of the achieved data the char-
acteristic function is built. After that the imputations are calculated by different
methods.
Firstly, it is suggested to calculate the Nash bargaining solution, which shows the
absolute maximum of the share, which an actor can claim for. Then the maximum
and the minimum nondominant imputations are calculated, which denote the range
of pretentions of an actor or a director, which might be accepted by a producer due
to the fact that they will not have the objective reasons to decline the imputation.
Inside this corridor of values the nondominant bargaining solution is situated, which
tries to solve the problem of the as even income imputation among the participants
as possible. In order to solve the problem of inequality of power of influence of the
participants, it is suggested to bring in the notion of the weighted bargaining solu-
tions, which would consider the bargaining power of an actor and would give more
realistic results. Upon that weights are suggested to be calculated by two methods:
by calculating Shapley index or by expert questionary. Since for calculating Shapley
index the Shapley value itself is needed, it makes sense to check this imputation
with respect to relevancy for finding the optimal solution. The imputation, found
with the help of Shapley value, and weighted nondominant bargaining solution with
the weights-Shapley index, both give realistic results, however, the shares of actors
nevetherless remain too big in relation to the shares of producers. This situation
can never happen in real life. Therefore, it is suggested to bring in another approach
to income imputation definition, namely, expert weighted nondominant bargaining
solution. In this case the weights of the producers would be defined proportionally
the funding of the project, and the weights of actors and directors would be defined
on the basis of expert evaluations. At the same time the value, which was found
by consolidation of the expert evaluations, is suggested to be taken as a share of
the maximim percentage, which has ever been received by a participant of a movie
project with the same level of involvement. This is exactly what will be taken as
the weights of actors and directors. Weighted nondominant imputation has an ad-
vantage over the other imputations in the sense that it takes into consideration the
main characteristic of actors and directors for the motion picture business: their
ability to bring in the added value to a movie, which results in increased cash flow
generation. However, this method gives a realistic proceeds division, since it con-
siders the larger bargaining power of producers in comparison to creative talent.
Thus, a whole spectrum of mathematically justified imputations is presented, and
the reliance on them may facilitate negotiations. Although the final decision will
anyway to a high extent depend on the skills of layers and the representatives of
actors and directors, as well as on the ability of producers to negotiate favorable
deals, the author of this work suggests to use the method of weighted nondominant
bargaining solution as a base of negotiations, since this solution seems the most
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relevant in application to the sphere of movie making due to the specific context of
the motion picture industry.
2.4. Case studies of producer’s and talent revenue-sharing imputation.
In this part of the paper the author would like to show the realization of the method-
ology and test its applicability of specific examples. Let’s consider the creation of
three movies: “Inception” (2010), “Alice in Wonderland”(2010) and “Terminator 3:
Rise of the Machines” (2003) and try to calculate the income imputations for each
of them.
Movie Inception. Let’s start with Christopher Nolan’s movie “Inception”,
the main role in which was performed by Leonardo DiCaprio. This movie initially
had a very large budget of $160 mln (IMDb) due to the star cast and massive
special effects, consequently, quite a massive payoff was also expected. It is necessary
to state here that although the main trajectory of this paper is devoted to the
independent movie production, the case of “Inception” is actually the situation,
when the producer is affiliated with the studio (i.e. distributor). The thing here is
that financing of “Inception” was quite a complicated deal, since the budget was
quite large. The The rights for the movie were in the possession of Christopher
Nolan, because he wrote the original script, thus, he decided to co-produce this
movie with another producer Emma Thomas. The deal with Warner Bros. was
arranged, and all the financing was provided by the studio. Later Warner Bros.
distributed the movie for the US theatrical release. Now let’s try to model the game
situation, as if we were in the shoes of people making decisions on the revenue
distribution. In the situation considered the following participants claim for the
revenue share: the studio (who was the investor of the project), the leading actor,
A-lister Leonardo DiCaprio and the director (and at the same time the scriptwriter
and the co-producer of the project) Christopher Nolan. Let’s call them Player 1,
Player 2 and Player 3 correspondingly. All them due to their high power of influence
claim for the revenue and not profit participation share.
Let’s first build characteristic function, and for that task we need box-office
forecast. In order to do that, we need to analyze the movies of the same genre, the
same scale and intensity of special effects usage and the same degree of star cast
involved, and then we will be able to get the idea of the approximate box-office
amount. Let’s take an average box-office amount and assume that “Inception” will
earn around $800 mln. However, we should remember that not the entire box-office
is distributed, but the revenue after deduction of the exhibitors’ share, which is
according to the established practice, constitutes 50%. Therefore, the value of the
characteristic function of the maximal coalition is $400 mln., i.e. v (N) = 400. No
one from the participants will be able to create a movie working independently.
Christopher Nolan will not have funding for such a large scale project, the producer
does not have the rights for the script, as it is in Nolan’s possession, and obviously
that DiCaprio will not be able to create a movie on his own. Therefore, the payoffs
of Nolan and DiCaprio will be zero (v (2) = v (3) = 0). As we have decided earlier in
the paper, the producer’s power will be estimated proportionally to the investments,
he has been able to obtain, since he has obligations to investors. So the producer will
only have the money in the amount of $160 mln. (v (1) = 160). If the participants
started to team up into different paired coalitions, only a coalition of Nolan and the
studio would be able to make a movie. They could assign another actor, who would
have a fixed fee and not a sharing contract. Let’s assume that without DiCaprio’s
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participation the expected box-office of the movie would be of a smaller amount. For
getting a sense of this possible amount let’s analyze the filmography of Christopher
Nolan, then look at the coefficient of return on investments of these movies and
after that let’s multiply the budget of “Inception” on average return on investments
coefficient. (Actually there are a lot of different means of forecasting the box-office,
however, this is not the goal of this paper, thus in this work only simplified versions
are represented, moreover, all the forecasts are approximations). So we get that the
forecast on “Inception” box-office without DiCaprio’s participation in it equals to
$500 mln., and consequently, the considered for the reasons of imputation allocation
amount will constitute a half of it and will equal to $250 mln., v (1, 3) = 250,
v (1, 2) = 160, v (2, 3) = 0.
Therefore, after definition of characteristic function we can start calculating the
imputations by different methods. With the help of Excel program, we get the
following imputations:
1. Nondominant bargaining solution: (240; 80; 80) or in percent format: (60%;
20%; 20%).
2. Minimum nondominant imputation: (400; 0; 0) or in percent format: (100%;
0%; 0%).
3. Maximum nondominant imputation: (160; 0; 240) or in percent format: (40%;
0%; 60%).
4. Shapley value: (255; 50; 95) or in percent format: (64%; 12%; 24%).
5. Shapley index weighted solution (weights of the participants are defined by
Shapley index): (313; 30; 57) or in percent format: (78%; 8%; 14%).
6. Expert weighted solution (weights are defined by expert questionary): (306; 38;
55) or in percent format: (76%; 10%; 14%).
However, the calculation of the last imputation is needed to be examined in more
detail, as at this moment it makes sense to show the method of weights calculation
of a participant on a specific example. In order to find out the power of influence of
Leonardo DiCaprio and Christopher Nolan, expert questionary were conducted. In
my case they were 40 people, who are somehow connected with the movie industry:
current and former managers of the production companies and students of movie
universities in Russia and the USA. The questionnaire can be examined in the
appendix. After converting the answers to a 5-point scale and their normalization
relatively to the significance of these of those factors the following results were
obtained: DiCaprio’s “weight” constituted 0,8 and Nolan’s – 0,77. However, these
weights were calculated relative to 1, and we need to normalize them for our game.
Consequently, in order to find out the power of influence of Leonardo DiCaprio on
the final box-office we calculate his share from the maximum percentage, which has
ever been received by an actor in history. Maximum percentage was received by
Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2003 for his role of Terminator in the third part of the
Terminator franchise, and it constituted 20% (Epstein, 2011) of the movie’s gross.
Thus, the weight of DiCaprio, which defines his influence on the final box-office is:
0,8*0,2=0,16. For Christopher Nolan the base for the weight computation will be
different. The maximum percentage for a director, who is also a scriptwriter and
a co-producer, in history was received by James Cameron for the movie “Avatar”
(2009) and constituted 30% (deadline.com). Therefore, the final weight of Nolan is:
0,77*0,3=0,23. After calculating the weights of the perticipants, we can compute
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the weighted nondominant bargaining solution, which is described earlier in the
paragraph.
Then we can compare the obtained results with the revenue distribution in real
life. The total box-office amounted to $823 mln., consequently, after deduction of
the exhibitor’s part, the amount entitled to distribution among the main players
was $411,5 mln., from which Leonardo DiCaprio has taken $59 mln. and Christo-
pher Nolan – $69 mln., which is in percentage form was 14% and 17% correspond-
ingly. The distribution, calculated by the weighted nondominant bargaining solution
method is close to the real numbers, which gives us a notion that the methodology
can be applied to real life cases. Even more than that, we can even say that actu-
ally Nolan and DiCaprio could have claimed for a larger percentage than the one,
whey have received in reality. It only proves the fact, that producers (especially, if
they cooperate with studios for finding the financing, and thus they are binded to
their obligations to those huge and powerful parts of media conglomerates, like we
have seen in case of “Inception”) due to their lagre level of influence can impose
their own termes by making weaker participants of the cooperation agree on less
favorable conditions.
Movie Alice in Wonderland. Now I would like to move to the approbation
of the methodology on another example, namely on Tim Burton’s movie, which was
released in 2010, “Alice in Wonderland”. One if the leading roles in the movie was
performed by Johnny Depp. The budget of this movie was even larger than the one
in the previous example: $200 mln (IMDb). All the investments were found in one
source - Walt Disney Pictures, meaning that the producer Richard D. Zanuck was
binded with an obligation to Walt Disney Pictures and thus, in negotiation model
he incorporates the bargaining power of the studio. Let’s model this game situation,
by solving which we will get the revenue distribution of the motion picture. Just
as in our previous example three participants claim for the share of revenues: the
producer (and in our model we assume that he incorporates the bargaining power
of a studio as an investor), the leading actor Johnny Depp and the director of the
movie Tim Burton. For the purpose of our game construction they will be denoted
as Player 1, Player 2 and Player 3. All of them claim for a share of revenue, not
of net profits. On basis of the previous mutual works of Burton and Depp, as well
as on the basis of movies of the similar genre, let’s assume that the forecasted
amount of revenues after the deduction of exhibitor’s share will amount to $600
mln., i.e. v (N) = 600. Now let’s find the characteristic function value for each
coalition. We assume that players will not be able to make the movie under any
circumstances except for the situation of the maximal coalition of three players. The
producer will only have the money, but will not be able to shoot the movie, Burton
and Depp will not manage without financing as well. Moreover, this game has a
peculiarity: Burton and Depp will form a coalition, meaning that their actions will
be coordinated, and they will act as a single player. This situation happens, because
when Tim Burton was invited to direct the cinematization of Lewis Carroll’s novel,
as one of his terms he claimed the mandatory participation of Depp in this motion
picture. Otherwise, Burton refused to direct “Alice in the Wonderland”. Burton
and Depp have constituted a great tandem for many years now, which attracts a
huge crowd to movie theaters, and a rare Burton’s movie does not have Depp in
it. The producer had to accept this term, since, firstly, it was only Burton, who
they wanted to see as a director, and, secondly, as has been stated earlier, this
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tandem attracts a lot of people. Therefore, taking into consideration this condition,
it is clear that the coalition of Player1 and Player 2 or a coalition of Player 1 and
Player 3 is impossible. Thus, the characteristic value for each coalition will look as
following:
v (1) = 200,
v (2) = v (3) = 0,
v (1, 2) = 200,
v (1, 3) = 200,
v (2, 3) = 0.
Now we can calculate the revenue imputations. With the help of Excel program
we obtain the following results:
1. Nondominant bargaining solution: (333; 133; 133) or in percent format: (56%;
22%; 22%).
2. Minimum nondominant imputation: (600; 0; 0) or in percent format: (100%;
0%; 0%).
3. Maximum nondominant imputation: (326; 147; 126) or in percent format: (54%;
25%; 21%).
4. Shapley value: : (333; 133; 133) or in percent format: (56%; 22%; 22%).
5. Shapley index weighted solution (weights of the participants are defined by
Shapley index): (422; 89; 89) or in percent format: (70%; 15%; 15%).
6. Expert weighted solution (weights are defined by expert questionary): (444; 72;
84) or in percent format: (72%; 12%; 14%).
In order to calculate the expert weighted solution the weights were calculated
by expert questionary. 62 industry insiders answered questions about Tim Burton’s
and Johnny Depp’s powers of influence. According to the evaluations, weight of
Johnny Depp (in absolute terms) equaled to 0,9, and weight of Tim Burton – 0,82.
In order to normalize these coefficients, we again take the obtained share from the
maximum percentage, which was received by the movimaking process participant
of the same category. If for Depp the basis remains 20%, the basis for Burton differs
from the previous example, since during the production of Alice in Wonderland
Burton accomplished functions only of a director. Consequently, his share will now
be calculated on the basis of 25%, the largest revenue share obtained by Michael
Bay for the movie “Transformers”, and it will constitute 0,21. Under these weights
we get the imputation (72%; 12%; 14%).
Now let’s check, what has happened in reality. The total box-office amounted to
$1,02 bln., consequently, $510 mln. were distributed among the participants. Johnny
Depp received $40 mln. and Tim Burton - $50 mln. In order to offset the difference in
scale, let’s look at the percentages. The share of Depp was 8% and Burton got 10%.
We can trace that despite the smaller size of the participants’ shares of remuneration
(than in previous example), the proportion between the shares of actor and director
Incentive Plans Improvement in Movie Value Chain 351
in both cases is the same: the director’s share is 1,2 times larger than the actor’s
one. Moreover, the calculated remuneration share is of the approximately same
order, which happened in reality. Therefore, it is again proved that it is possible to
effectively calculate participation shares of the participants of cooperation on the
basis of the methodology elaborated in this paper.
Movie Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines. The last example, which will
demonstrate the suggested methodology of the income allocation, is the third part
of the Terminator series “Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines”, which has already
been mentioned earlier in the paper. The budget of the “Terminator 3” equaled to
$150 mln., which constituted an unbelievably large sum of money for the motion
picture budgets of the early 2000s. However, the task of finding such a big sum for
financing the movie was not an easy task for the producers. Not a single investor
wanted to invest so much money into one project, because the risks were very high.
The producer Mario Kassar came up with a solution and decided to raise money
from several studios. Three studios agreed to participate in the deal: Warner Bros.,
which invested $51,6 mln., Tokio-based company Toho-Towa with $20 mln. invest-
ment and Sony Pictures Entertainment, the share of which in co-financing was the
largest - $77,4 mln. However, all the companies had a mandatory requirement to
the producers: Arnold Schwarzenegger should participate in the project. They con-
sidered that only the face of Schwarzenegger could draw significant box-office to the
movie. Otherwise they refused to provide the funding. This is exactly the reason,
why this movie project is of such an interest to us. This term gives Schwarzeneg-
ger a huge bargaining power, because he, having a support of the investors, could
make almost any claims, concerning his remuneration. Since forecasted box-office
promised to be quite big, and also due to the fact that the acquisition of the rights
for the franchise and the script development cost the producer a couple douzens
million dollars, they did not want to abandon the project and continued the movie
production.
So let’s proceed to the modeling of the game situation. Since the producer has
arranged the deal with three studios for the funding of the movie, and thus he has
obligations to all of them, and consequently according to our model, he incorporates
the bargaining power of all three, but since their investments were different, for the
purposes of more explicit demonstration of the model and more precise results, the
author decided to consider 4 players, instead of 2. So instead of saying that the
producer acts on behalf of each of the studios, for simplification of labelling we will
be naming studios by their names. So 4 players claim for the revenue share: studios
Warner Bros., Toho-Towa and Sony Pictures Entertainment, as well as the leading
actor Arnold Schwarzenegger. For the purpose of convenience let’s denote them as
Player 1, Player 2, Player 3 and Players 4. In our case we have an assumption
that they will be able to create a movie only in maximal coalition, which consists
of all four players, and the characteristic function value in this case will be the
expected box-office of the movie with the deduction of the exhibitors’ share. On
the basis of available data on two previous Terminator movies, let’s assume that
the expected box-office will constitute $520 mln., consequently, the revenue of the
maximal coalition will constitute $260 mln. (v (N) = 260). It is needed to specify
that as a forecasted revenue the amount, larger than actual box-office, which was
achieved in reality, was chosen on purpose. Usually, each new movie which is a sequel,
is able to draw a larger box-office than the previous serie. “Terminator 2” was an
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exceptionally successful motion picture, which managed to achieve $519 mln. in the
box-office. So it is logical to presume that the expected revenue of “Terminator 3”
was supposed to be at least equal to that of the previous serie of the franchise.
In all other cases of different coalitions combinations, characteristic function
value will equal the sum of the disposed funds of the participants of the coalition.
Thus, v (1) = 52, v (2) = 20, v (3) = 78, v (4) = 0, v (1, 2) = 72, v (1, 3) = 130,
v (1, 4) = 52, v (2, 3) = 98, v (2, 4) = 20, v (3, 4) = 78, v (1, 2, 3) = 150, v (1, 2, 4) =
72, v (1, 3, 4) = 130, v (2, 3, 4) = 98.
When characteristic function is defined, we can proceed to imputations calcula-
tion. With the help of Excel, we get the following results:
1. Nondominant bargaining solution: (84; 25; 151; 0) or in percent format: (32%;
10%; 58%; 0%).
2. Minimum nondominant imputation: (84; 25; 151; 0) or in percent format: (32%;
10%; 58%; 0%).
3. Maximum nondominant imputation: (52; 20; 78; 110) or in percent format:
(20%; 8%; 30%; 42%).
4. Shapley value: (79; 48; 106; 28) or in percent format: (31%; 18%; 41%; 11%)
5. Shapley index weighted solution (weights of the participants are defined by
Shapley index): (86; 40; 123; 12) or in percent format: (33%; 15%; 47%; 4%).
6. Expert weighted solution (weights are defined by expert questionary): (77; 30;
115; 38) or in percent format: (30%; 11%; 44%, 15%).
Let’s look at the expert weighted solution. Interest here raises the basis of the
weight. In all other cases, which were considered earlier in the paragraph, we have
taken the share (calculated on the basis of expert questionary) from the maximum
percentage, which an actor ever received for his work. As that percentage appeared
the share of Schwarzenegger for his work in “Terminator 3” movie. Therefore, an
approach, based on historic data is not applicable in current example. We know the
maximum share, which Schwarzenegger can get for his participation in this movie
(this share was calculated on the basis of maximum nondominant imputation). It
equals $110 mln. or 42% of the revenue. These 42% we will take as a basis for
Schwarzenegger’s weight calculation in this project, which will define his degree of
influence on the final outcome of negotiations. Subsequent to the results of expert
questionary (62 experts) Schwarzenegger’s weight equals to 0,82, consequently, his
normalized weight equals to 0,11. The weights of investors are defined proportionally
to the share of their funding of the budget. Thus, the weights of the companies were
as following: Warner Bros. – 0,31; Toho-Towa – 0,18; Sony Pictures Entertainment
– 0,41. In accordance with such power of influence distribution of the cooperation
participants we get expert weighted solution: (30%; 11%; 44%, 15%).
In reality Schwarzenegger for his role in “Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines”
received 20% of the movie receipts, which constitutes a much larger amount than
practically any other share of income distribution, which are considered in this
paper. Generally speaking, the contract, obtained by Schwarzenegger, is still con-
sidered one of the best examples of deals ever made by actors in Hollywood. This
result was achieved, firstly, due to paramount importance of Schwarzenegger partic-
ipation in the movie production for investors. Secondly, a significant role is played
the high level of professionalism of actor’s layers, because only thanks to their ne-
gotiation skills Schwarzenegger was able to emerge the winner from the unequal
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battle with studios and producers. What is more, an effect may be exerted by the
poor performance of the movie in the box-oofice: it earned almost $100 mln. less,
than expected. If the assumption, that the expected revenues of the subsequent part
of the franchise should be larger than those for the previous one, is right, and the
same was presumed by the producers during calculations of different scenarios, it
is possible to say that Schwarzenegger did not realized expectations of the produc-
ers and investors. In this case his contribution, which was estimated at 20% of the
movie’s revenues is overestimated. If the methodology, which is suggested by the
author, was used, such situation may have been avoided, since mathematically jus-
tified recommendations would have clearly showed the overestimation of the actor’s
contribution.
From studying Table 1, where the consolidated results of methodology approba-
tion on Hollywood cases is presented, it is easily traceable that the Expert weighted
solution gives the best results in terms of feasibility and applicability to real life.
The fact that it takes into account the considerations of the experts of the industry,
and, thus, the bargaining power of the participants is incorporated into the calcu-
lations, allows for the most accurate results from all of the methods considered in
the paper. Therefore, the expert weighted solution is the solution, recommened to
usage by the author.
Table 1: Methodology approbation results
Inception Alice in Wonder-
land
Terminator 3
Nondominant
BS
(60%; 20%; 20%) (56%; 22%; 22% (32%; 10%; 58%; 0%)
MIN solution (100%; 0%; 0%) (100%; 0%; 0%) (32%; 10%; 58%; 0%)
MAN solution (40%; 0%; 60%) (54%; 25%; 21%) (20%; 8%; 30%; 42%)
Shapley value (64%; 12%; 24%) (56%; 22%; 22%) (31%; 18%; 41%;
11%)
Shapley index
WS
(78%; 8%; 14%) (70%; 15%; 15%) (33%; 15%; 47%; 4%)
Expert WS (76%; 10%; 14%) (72%; 12%; 14%) (30%; 11%; 44%,
15%)
Reality (69%; 14%; 17%) (82%; 9%; 10%) (28%; 11%; 41%;
20%)
Source: Compiled by the author
3. Coordination in movie value chain
3.1. The concept of coordination
When the value chain of a movie exists, a question of how to incentivize all the
crucial links to act fairly and avoid opportunistic behavior arouses. As has been
discussed in the first chapter, there is quite a substantial amount of cheating in-
volved in the value chain. Exhibitors distort the amount of revenue in order to
retain a larger lump of it; the distributors creatively increase the amount of their
expenses on the books in order to eliminate the net profit, which is to be distributed
among the producer and the creative talent. Actually, the weakest party here is the
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producer, since it is he, who receives all the residuals from the proceeds, therefore,
it is in the producer’s primary interests to have the contracts in the value chain
coordinated. The contracts in such value chains are participation ones. Generally
(without the relation to the motion picture industry), such contracts are organized
in the following way. A supplier sells a product to a retailer for a specific price
and the latter shares a part of the revenue with the supplier. Upon the offer of
the purchase price of the supplier, the retailer sets the quantity of the product to
order before the demand is actually realized. Depending on the business situation,
it is also in the power of a retailer to set the retail price for the product when the
order is placed to the supplier, or it can determine the price on the basis of the
market price. In these settings, a typical revenue sharing agreement determines a
fraction of the supply chain revenue to be kept by the retailer. The proportion, in
which the contractors share their revenue in the case of a typical revenue sharing
contract, is independent of the amount of the revenue realized (Pasule-Desai, 2012).
Under a revenue-sharing contract, a retailer pays a supplier a wholesale price for
each unit purchased, plus a percentage of the revenue the retailer generates (Cachon
and Lariviere, 2005).
However, movie industry has its own peculiarities. The exhibitor does not pay a
distributor a wholesale price for getting the motion picture for exhibition, and the
income of both is only the shared revenues from the movie exhibition. In their turn,
the distributor and the producer also usually do not have monetary relationships
before the final income is actually distributed. The producer usually transferres the
rights for movie distribution, and only then receives the income as a share of the
final box-office. However, there still are cases (although rare), when the minimum
guarantee is paid by the distributor to the producer for obtaining the rights for
movie distribution. So basically, there is a kind of a wholesale price, but at the
same time they also share revenues from the movie release. Moreover, in case of
movie industry there is no supply chain; it is rather a value chain: each link of the
chain adds some value on the way of a product from initiation till the end consumer.
Thus, in this chapter we will try to adapt the existing coordination models of supply
chain sphere to the value chain of motion picture industry environment, and then
we will approbate those on numerical examples.
Supply chain coordination. First of all, let’s study the supply chain coordi-
nation to derive some conclusions for the purpose of our paper: coordination in the
movie value chain. However, in order to be more consistent, it makes sense to first
look at the bigger picture of supply chain inter-organizational stages.
This framework – C3: cooperation, coordination, collaboration – is very popular
for classifying the nature of the relationships inside the chain. Cooperative relation-
ship is defined by motivating one of the partners to invest resources or increase
profitability of the other partner in the chain. These partnerships usually are more
advantageous towards that partner of the chain, who enjoys a greater bargaining
power (Munson et al., 1999). Usually, this incentive takes a form of a long-term con-
tract. In this kind of relations the structure and control originates from one partner,
but actually both partners experience advantages from the relationships, since they
secure business and behavior. Moreover, as contract and financial investments in-
volved have a long-term nature, a particular level of trust is required (Ketchen et
al., 2006). By coordinative relationships, supply chain tries to gain alignment and
fluidity across the chain by informing each chain member of the preferred behavior
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for each transaction (Arshinder, 2007). Coordination contracts benefited both par-
ties downstream and upstream, although the company with the larger bargaining
power enjoyed more advantages. By these contracts downstream party secured the
price and the quality level, whereas the upstream party decreased the risk connected
with the errors of the downstream partner (Park et al., 2006). Collaborative rela-
tionships require the established cooperative and coordinative relationships. Thus,
a collaborative supply chain is defined as “integration and management of chain or-
ganizations and activities through cooperative organizational relationships, effective
business processes and high levels of information sharing to create high perform-
ing value systems that provide member organizations a sustainable competitive
advantage” (Handfield and Nichols, 2002). Collaborative relationships concentrate
on constructive disagreement and part from the idea of bargaining power in the
intention to create the strongest supply chain. Generally, collaborative chains are
defined by the voluntary investment of resources by one chain participant to another
chain participant or joint venture in order to reinforce the partnership overall. Such
type of relations is considered rather as a long-term investment than a short-term
tactic (Ketchen et al., 2008). However, collaborative type of relationship is out of
the scope of our paper, and is considered as a possible direction of further research
in application to the motion picture industry.
Since the topic of this part of the paper is coordination, a more detailed look
should be focused on it. If a company wants to effectively transform the compet-
itive advantage into profitability, it should develop efficient coordination within
its boundaries and beyond them (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Basically, coordination
between independent companies is crucial in order to achieve flexibility, which is
needed to constantly improve logistic processes in response to ever changing exter-
nal environment. The main problem resides in the method to attain the consistency
towards the mutual goal of the partners, since the effectiveness of the chain is depen-
dent on how well the members perform together, and not on how well each member
works independently. There are different coordination modes distinguished. The
classification is constructed on the concepts of mutuality and focus. The concept
of mutuality pertains to unifying efforts of the independent companies (MacNeil,
1980). Mutuality is comprised of complementarity and coherency of actions of the
chain links. In its turn, focus refers to putting emphasis on operational and organi-
zational relations. The classification distinguishes four coordination modes: logistics
synchronization, information sharing, incentives alignment and collective learning
(Simatupang, Wright, Sridharan, 2002). In order to achieve the common goal by
integration the actions of various players, the knowledge of coordination is needed.
It consists of notion about key drivers of coordination modes, which influence the
chain’s performance. Let’s move to the taxonomy of coordination modes. Reciprocal
relations become important in order to make networking within the members of the
chain easier. The main issue of supply chain management becomes how to coordinate
the members in order to perform all together as a whole to achieve the common goal
of chain profitability in unstable market environment (Simatupang, Wright, Srid-
haran, 2002). Malone and Crowston (1994) identify coordination as management
of interrelatedness between performed operations, which air to achieve a goal. In
terms of supply chain, coordination may be regarded as a proper combination of a
number of objects in order to attain a goal.
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Let’s consider the concepts, on which the taxonomy is built on. Simatupang,
Wright and Sridharan (2002) identify mutuality of coordination as “the underlying
values of responsibility among partners with a strong emphasis on sustaining rela-
tionship in order to build effective goal attainment”. Milgrom and Roberts (1990)
state that modern supply chain does not accept incremental adjustments made
independently, but rather requires significant and coordinated changes in the com-
prehensive perspective of business. Complementarity of the stages of the chain will
lead to augmentation of the total gains, such as, for example, higher level of sales
and lower costs, which may be shared by all the participants of the chain. “When
the links of the chain synchronize the decision-making about value creation to co-
ordinate the sharing of the benefits associated with logistics improvement, they are
likely to shape complementarity” (Simatupang, Wright, Sridharan, 2002).
The other important dimension of coordination is focus. It can be on either op-
erational or organizational linkages. Linkages exist when the operations, performed
by one of the participant of the chain may somehow influence the work or the re-
sults of work of another chain participant. Thus, linkages are the liaisons among
companies, where joint decisions between chain participants have to be coordinated.
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) identify four coordination modes:
1. Logistics synchronization;
2. Information sharing;
3. Incentive alignment;
4. Collective learning.
Every mode exists in different context and stresses different cognitive processes.
In our case, case of producer’s incentives plan improvement, clearly, from the modes
mentioned above, we need to consider the incentive alignment one.
Incentives define how those in charge of decision-making will be rewarded or
penalized for the taken actions. Current incentives affect both types of behavior
of a chain participant: individual and communication with partners. A conflict of
interests may arouse, when the incentives lead to actions, which maximize per-
sonal benefits, but at the same time decrease total gain (Clemons and Row, 1993).
Simatupang and Sridharan (Simatupang and Sridharan,2002) consider that one of
the methods to deal with this conflict of interests is to introduce the incentive
schemes that are based on the all-embracing performance, and which include both
value creation with regard to the customers and profitability. This coordination
mode is known as incentive alignment, and it encourages the behavior of the part-
ners, which would be consistent with customer focus and total profit (Lee, 2000).
Companies, which partake the complementarity of business process, will try to solve
the issue of incongruity of incentives in reciprocally satisfying ways, drawing on re-
lational contracts, especially is the customer demand is uncertain. These contracts
determine such parameters as price, quantity, time and quality (Simchi-Levi et al.,
1999).
One of the features of the incentive scheme is that it is offered before the mutual
benefits are realized. It is intended to motivate the chain participants to relate their
decisions with the profitability of the entire supply chain. A number (or even all)
of the reciprocal benefits that follow from better coordination of the chain can be
allocated in more incentives. Larger gains from incentives will affect the behavior of
decision-makers and make them improve chain performance (Simatupang, Wright,
Sridharan, 2002).
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Coordination problem in movie value chain. This principle of increasing
the motivation of the chain members by means of coordination, which was studied
in the sphere of supply chain, perfectly fits the task of incentives alignment in the
movie industry, where the value chain is considered. As has been studied in the first
chapter of the paper, there are a number of problems, which appear between the
links of the value chain, due to possibility of opportunistic behavior. However, it
has been noticed by the author of the paper that the situations of the opportunistic
behavior may be avoided, if all the chain members were motivated to think in the
terms of the benefits of the entire chain and not in terms of their own benefits
individually. Let’s first formalize the stages of movie creation and delivery to the
end consumer in terms of the value chain.
Producer is considered as a manufacturer or a supplier, since he produces the
product and initially it is he, who has the rights for the product. Then he transferres
(and sometimes sells) the rights for movie distribution to the distributor. If the sale
occurs, those usually are presales, which are carried out before the movie is actually
ready, and the price (minimum guarantee) is used by a distributor to cover a part of
the incurred costs, and basically can be considered as a part of the budget funding.
Rights are transferred for a specific time period (usually, between 5 and 15 years),
and the distributor has to squeeze everything possible from the movie. Then the
distributor makes prints (copies of the movie), which will be then distributed to
the movie theaters. He also is responsible for marketing campaign. Those activities
are quite costly ones. The distributor arranges contracts with exhibitors – retailers
– where the movie will be released. At this point there is no prices. Usually, the
distributor works with exhibitors for a long period of time, the relations are already
well established, and there is no need for extra insurance. Exhibitors order a specific
quantity of copies (they can be adjusted later depending on the demand of the
movie), and they get those copies for a specific period of time (which can also be
adjusted upon necessity). Then after the movie is released, there is a movement
backwards the chain. Firstly, there is revenue split between the exhibitors and the
distributors (the percentages have been discussed in the first chapter of the paper),
then the rest of the proceeds are split between the distributor and the producer.
It can be traced that this chain has some similarities with the supply chain, thus
we assume that some of the supply chain principles may be transferred to the topic
of our research. As has already been discussed earlier, there are possibilities for
cheating and opportunistic behavior to appear in the relationships of the links.
This problem can be solved by the tools of mathematic modeling, which will be
considered further.
Revenue sharing base model. Firstly, let’s study the revenue-sharing con-
tracts coordination, suggested by Cachon and Lariviere (2005), which will explain
the principles of the model in general supply chain environment.
The revenue sharing base model has a supplier, who is interacting with a single
retailer.
There are two decisions to be made by the retailer in order to forecast the total
revenue generated over a single selling period. Those are: the number of units to
purchase from a supplier and the retail price. There are two points of view on the
method to determine the revenue function. From marketing standpoint (Lilien et
al, 1992) the revenue function is derived on the basis of a deterministic demand
curve, while the operations point of view (Tsay et al, 1998) reflects the idea that
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it is derived from stochastic demand with a fixed retail price, i.e. a newsvendor
model. The formulation, proposed by Cachon and Lariviere (2005) embraces both of
these revenue functions. It illustrates that the revenue sharing contracts coordinate
the supply chain, meaning, that the retailer makes decisions concerning quantity
and price (supply chain optimal actions) and the total profit of the chain may be
arbitrary divided between the firms. Moreover, a single revenue sharing contract can
coordinate a supply chain with several noncompeting retailers even if the retailers
have different revenue functions.
According to Cachon and Lariviere (2005), revenue-sharing contracts are very
effective in a broad variety of supply chains. However, there, of course, are some
limitations. Firstly, revenue sharing does not coordinate competing retailers, if each
retailer’s revenue is dependent on its quantity, its price and the actions of other
retailers. Secondly, revenue sharing lays down the administrative burden on the
firms. In order to ensure that the revenues are split appropriately, the supplier
must control retailer’s revenues. These costs are sometimes that significant that
gains from coordination might not always cover them. Thirdly, the chain is not
coordinated, if the demand is influenced by noncontractable and costly retailer
effort.
Now let’s move to the supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts.
Let {q0, p0} be a quantity-price pair that maximizes (q, p). We assume that (q, p)
is upper semicontinuous in q and p, so {q0, p0} exists, but it need to be unique.
Revenue-sharing contracts achieve supply chain coordination by making the re-
tailer’s profit function an affine transformation of the supply chain’s profit function;
hence, {q0, p0} maximizes πr(q, p).
Let’s consider the set of revenue-sharing contracts with
w = ψc− cr (22)
and ψ ∈ (0, 1]. With those contracts, the firms’ profit functions are:
Πr (q, p) = ψΠ(q, p). (23)
Furthermore, {q0, p0} is the retailer’s optimal quantity and price; i.e., those
contracts coordinate the supply chain (Cachon, Lariviere, 2005).
Given the profit function (23), it follows that {q0, p0} maximizes the retailer’s
profit when ψ > 0. To obtain (23), substitute w = ψc−cr into (1) and simplify. The
supplier’s profit function follows from (23) and πs (q, p) = πr (q, p)−Π (q, p) ; ; ψ ≤ 1
ensures and πs (q, p) ≥ 0.
The theorem indicates that ψ is the retailer’s share of the supply chain’s profit in
addition to its share of revenue. Therefore, revenue-sharing contracts coordinate the
supply chain and arbitrarily allocate profit. The certain profit split chosen probably
depends on the firms’ relative bargaining power. With the strengthening of the
retailer’s bargaining position, one would anticipate ψ increases. As a proxy for
bargaining power, each firm may have an outside opportunity profit, πi > 0, that
the firm requires to include in the relationship; i.e., πi(q, p) ≥ πi is required to
gain firm i’s participation. It is possible to satisfy both firms’ requirements when
πr + πs < (q
0, p0) , but the feasible range for ψ will be more limited.
Extreme ψ values raise two other issues. First, the retailer’s profit function
becomes quite flat as ψ > 0; while q0 remains optimal for the retailer, a deviation
from q0 imposes little penalty on the retailer. Second, from (22), the coordinating
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wholesale price is actually negative when ψ < cr/c. In other words, if the retailer’s
share of the channel’s cost is high, the retailer is already in a low-margin business
before the supplier cuts its part of revenue. If the supplier wants to claim a large
portion of revenue, he must subsidize the retailer’s purchase of product. If one wishes
to rule out negative wholesale price, then a positive retailer cost establishes a floor
on retailer profit under coordinating contracts.
A prerequisite for coordination is a wholesale price below the supplier’s cost
of production cs. The supplier loses money in selling the product and only makes
money by participating in the retailer’s revenue. Selling below cost is necessary be-
cause revenue sharing systematically drops the retailer’s marginal revenue curve be-
low the integrated supply chain’s. In order to have marginal revenue equal marginal
cost at the desired point, the retailer’s marginal cost must also be less than the
integrated system’s.
Given that the set of coordinating contracts is independent of the revenue func-
tion, it follows that a single revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the actions of
multiple retailers with different revenue functions as long as each retailer’s revenue
is independent of the other retailer’s actions (i.e., they do not compete) and they
have the same marginal cost, cr.
3.2. Coordinating contracts in movie value chain
After studying the general concepts of coordination and examining the principles
of coordinating contracts functioning we can conclude that they are applicable to
the motion picture industry. There are three players: producer, distributor and
exhibitor. The producer gives to the distributor the good (q), which are the rights
for the movie (q = 1, since they are not quantifiable). There is no price for the
movie rights, which the distributor pays to the producer, because their income is
the share of the revenue generated by the movie after release: wd = 0. In this model
we take the sales period as exogenously specified. Both parties have their costs
with cpr being the costs of the producer and cd - the costs of the distributor. The
distributor expects to generate some income for the movie (P ), and he needs to
estimate it. Then the distributor makes the copies in some predetermined by the
arrangement with the exhibitor quantity (q ≥ 0) and transfers them to the exhibitor.
There is again no wholesale price (we = 0), which the exhibitor could have paid to
the distributor for each copy. They only share the total income generated by the
exhibitor after releasing this movie. This income is R (p, q), where q is the quantity
of copies, ordered by the exhibitor and p is the income generated by each single
copy. The exhibitor has costs ce.
Coordination is possible, when there is cooperation. Basically, the decisions
are made on two stages, and two different cooperation relationships can be dis-
tinguished. So it is suggested to introduce sharing contracts on two stages. We will
consider them step-by-step. Let’s start with the producer-distributor relationships.
Producer and distributor divide the income generated by the movie in some
shares with ϕ being the share of the distributor and (1 − ϕ) being the share of
the producer. Basically, they cooperate, since only working together they maximize
their income, which they later share. However, it is possible to say that they do
not coordinate, because there is no sharing contract between them, since wd = 0.
Meaning, they only split the final income in some shares, but there is still room for
cheating of the parties (in our case distributor cheats on producer, since he has larger
power and more mechanisms to do so), since there is no contract coordination. So the
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author suggests introducing the price for the movie rights wd, which would allow to
avoid opportunistic behavior, because all the parties are interested in minimization
of the costs in order to maximize the total gain, thus they are motivated to act
fairly. The price wd is calculated according to the formula: wd = ψcpr − cd.
The second step is the second level of cooperation. We have already coordinated
the first stage, but it is possible to move further and coordinate the whole chain.
The thing here is that we will consider the producer and the distributor as a single
player now, which cooperates with the exhibitors for the realization of the movie.
This is done due to the fact that to the time when the distributor makes deals
for a certain movie with the exhibitors he already cooperates with the producer.
When selling the movie for exhibition the distributor is obliged to later share the
revenue with the producer, thus, it is logical to consider them as a single entity at
this level of coordination. The costs of the compounded player are cprd = cpr + cd
and the costs of the exhibitor are ce, which are the costs incurred by the exhibitor
in consideration each single copy. Since the costs of the exhibitor are considered per
copy, we need to normalize the costs of the producer and the distributor in order to
account them per copy as well. Thus, we need to divide the costs of the producer and
the distributors by number of copies (q): cprd = (cpr+ cd)/q. Since in the US all the
major movie theater chains have already switched to the digital equipment, meaning
that there is no more need for buying several copies of the movie per theater, if the
movie is to be shown on more than one screen. One copy is ordered by the exhibitor
per theater, and then it is uploaded to the data server and transmitted to as many
screens of the specific theater, as needed. Thus, for calculating the number of copies
in our research we take the number of the theaters in a chain, assuming that it
will be shown in all of them, since only the huge blockbusters are considered in the
paper.
Another major difference with the first stage is that we already know the revenue
allocation between the parties: as has been discussed in the first chapter, according
to the accepted principles of the industry, the exhibitor retains 50% of the box-
office. Thus, ϕ = 1/2. Since there is again no price we, there is no sharing contract,
meaning that there are only share of the revenue allocation, which do not elimi-
nate the possibilities for the parties to cheat. For instance, exhibitor can behave
opportunistically towards distributor, thus, depriving him of a part of income. If
we introduce the wholesale price for copies we, we will coordinate the chain, so this
is exactly what is suggested to be done by the author. It is calculated as following:
we = ψcprd − ce.
We have considered a basic case of the movie value chain. However, it should
be specified that in reality in the vast majority of cases there are several exhibitors
involved, since the movie needs to be shown in as many locations, as possible, in
order to get the maximum possible revenue.
The calculations of the transfer prices remain the same with the only difference
that there augments the number of copies considered in the model, since the num-
ber of theaters increases. Thus, the costs of the distributor and the producer are
dispersed over a larger number of copies. This scheme is the one, which is widely
spread in the US, but even more broadly it is used in Europe, where there are almost
no such powerful studios as Hollywood ones.
Another case should be considered as well. This is the case, when the producer
is affiliated with the studio. In this case the studio (which is also a distribution
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company) finances the movie and the producer acts as a manager and has a flat fee
instead of participation in the revenues. Basically, what happens is that at some
point the rights are transferred to the studio, if the latter finances the whole budget
of the movie. This means that the distributor also bears the budget costs. So our
chain reduces. This case is to a high extent spread in the US due to such factors
as huge movie budgets and the industry domination by majors (six largest movie
studios in Hollywood, which have astounding financial capabilities, since they are
parts of huge media conglomerates).
So by introducing the sharing contracts in the chain, we achieve the task of
coordination. The main result of this is the elimination of the costs of control,
because every player is interested in maximizing the revenue of the chain. Otherwise
there exist loopholes for opportunistic behavior. Currently, in the situation of the
absence of the wholesale price, participants of the movie value chain frequently
bloat their costs in order to retain a larger lump of the proceeds, thus diminishing
the percentage base for the next players. Coordination is feasible to resolve this
problem, and it is applicable to the situation, since the necessary precondition is
cooperation, and cooperation does exist in the considered case.
It is needed to be mentioned that in the paper we consider the model, which is
centralized in a sense that under exhibitor we consider some specific chain of movie
theaters. However, in reality usually distributors work with many exhibitors, mean-
ing, that the chain is decentralized. Such types of chains can also be coordinated,
but the calculations are more complicated and larger amounts of data are needed
in order to fulfill the task, thus, this is out of the scope of this research paper.
3.3. Case studies
In this part of the research paper the application of the elaborated method will
be shown on specific examples. Cases will include movies “Inception” and “Alice
in Wonderland” , both of which have already been considered earlier in the paper
during the discussion of the cooperation problem.
Movie Alice in Wonderland. Let’s start with the movie “Alice in Wonder-
land”. On this example due to the availability of the data the author would like to
demonstrate all possible situations of the relationships inside the chain, which will
lead to different outcomes. For the purposes of the paper from all the participants
involved in this movie creation we will consider the producer Richard D. Zanuk, the
distributor Walt Disney Pictures and as an exhibitor we will consider the largest
movie theater chain in the USA – Regal Entertainment Group. So basically, what
process do we have now: the producer gives the rights for the movie release to Walt
Disney Pictures, and it does not get anything in return for giving away the rights.
They only agree on some percentage from the final proceeds of the movie. In our
model we consider the budget of the movie as producer’s costs. Then the distributor
creates copies, elaborates and conducts marketing campaign (P&A) and then sets
agreement on some number of copies with the exhibitor (Regal in our case). Regal
estimates the demand and orders a specific number of copies from the distributor.
The distributor does not get any transfer price immediately from the exhibitor.
They will later share the revenue of the movie in a predetermined by the industry
proportion of 50:50. Since the access to the data about the costs of each theater is
limited, we will take industry averages. The average weekly expense of a theater is
around $5000 per week. Regal Entertainment Group owns around 558 locations in
the US, and they all have adopted the digital technology, which means that they
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do not use the hard copy prints of the movie, they have it in digital form. Those
copies are usually distributed either on hard drive or via Internet and satellite. In
either way only one copy per theatre is needed no matter how many screens in a
single theatre will show the picture. So the number of copies in our calculations
will equal the number of screens of the theatre chain. We assume that every theatre
of the chain will order this movie, because this is a loud blockbuster with huge
budget and star cast, as well as massive marketing campaign, thus, it is expected
that it will be popular with public. Currently there is only a contract stipulating
the proportion, in which the revenue will be divided, but there is no coordination of
the contracts, meaning that the participants still have the motives to increase their
costs on the books, because in this way they will be able to retain a larger lump
of the proceeds. So the author suggests to introduce the transfer prices, which will
mitigate the adverse effects of working in cooperation.
The costs of the producer equal $200 mln. (cpr = 200000000). The costs of the
distributor are the P&A costs. Walt Disney Pictures conducted a huge marketing
campaign, which cost $75 mln. (cd = 75000000). The share of the distributor was in
line with industry averages and constituted 80% (ϕ = 0, 8). With this data at hand
we can calculate the possible transfer price wd, which the distributor could pay
the producer for the rights of the movie. With the introduction of this parameter,
the contract would be transferred from simply participation contract to sharing
contract. According to the formula wd = ψcpr − cd we get wd = 0, 8 ∗ 200000000−
75000000 = 85000000. So it is suggested that the distributor pay $85 mln. to the
producer as a fee for having the opportunity to distribute the movie. Those $85
mln. could serve as a recoupment of the incurred costs for getting the movie done
for the producer.
Now we can move to the second level of coordination, where we will find the
transfer price we, which is a price per copy, which the distributor can receive from the
exhibitor. Importantly, at this point the producer and the distributor are considered
as a single entity, because it is essential that they already have contract and work
together. Since we are calculating a price per copy, we need to adjust all the costs.
It has been stated that the average weekly costs per theatre are $5000. It is assumed
that such blockbuster as “Alice in Wonderland” can be shown by the movie theatre
chain in the period of up to 17 weeks, thus the costs per theatre for the whole period
of movie screening will equal to $85000 (ce = 85000). The costs of the distributor
and the producer have to also be adjusted, since all the calculations are made
per copy. So cprd =
cpr+cd
N
, where N – number of copies. In our case it looks as
following: cprd =
275000000
558 . Using the coordinating formula we = ϕcprd − ce we get
we = 0, 5 ∗ 275000000558 − 85000 = 161416. Thus, the suggested price per copy for the
movie theatre to pay is $161416.
We have considered the case in the situation, where there is only one theater
chain involved. In this situation the price per copy would be $161416. However, in
reality we have multiple theatre chains, which the distributor is working with, thus,
the model should be slightly modified. Let’s consider a situation, when the distrib-
utor has made agreements with several US theatre chains. For the purposes of the
example let’s say that the distributor have made deals with 5 largest theatre chains
in the US. So, apart from Regal Entertainment Group with 558 locations, we will
consider AMC Theatres with 346 locations, Cinemark Theatres with 334 locations,
Carmike Cinemas with 278 locations and Bow Tie Cinemas with 55 locations.
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In this situation although the first step will be exactly the same as in the first
case, the second step will be different. The idea now is that the unified costs of the
distributor and the producer will be spread over a larger number of copies. Since
we consider that each theater chain order the number of copies, which equal the
number of the locations, we get that there are 1571 copies in total (q = 1571). The
theater expenses are different in each chain and in the majority of locations, and
they are not publicly available, so for the purposes of the example we will consider
the industry averages. The period for which the copy is expected to be on screens
is 17 weeks. Then we have:
q = 1571,
ce1 = ce2 = · · · = ce5 = 5000,
cprd = 275000000,
ϕ = 0, 5.
Then
we = 0, 5 ∗ 275000000
1571
− 85000 = 2524.
In the other words, the transfer price per copy is $2524. This means that in
case the theatres will be purchasing copies, the agreement between the distributor
and the exhibitors will be sharing, i.e. no party will have objective reasons to ma-
nipulate their costs, because if they increase the costs on the books, they diminish
the revenue, from which they have a share. So all the participants are motivated to
maximize the possible revenue.
Basically, by introducing this methodology we do not only state that the trans-
fer price should be implemented, but we also explain the way, how it should be
calculated.
Movie Inception. Another example, which will demonstrate the methodology,
is the movie “Inception”, which has also been considered. This example is inter-
esting, because in this case the producer and the distributor Warner Bros. act like
a single entity from the first stage and the problem is a one-step problem. This
happens, because the producer is affiliated with the studio (which is also the dis-
tributor), meaning that the producer gets the financing of the motion picture in
return for the rights for the movie. So basically, in affiliation with the studio he
ceases to be the ultimate claimant for all proceeds, generated by the movie. There-
fore, the chain is as follows. The producer affiliates with the distributor and the
rights are in the possession of the distributor from a certain point. The distributor
in return fully finances the production of the picture. So, basically, all the deci-
sions concerning movie (including some creative part corrections) are made by the
distributor and the producer works for a flat fee and does not participate in the
profit. Then the distributor sets deals with theater chains for the screening of the
movie. When they share revenues from the box-office, the exhibitor takes 50% and
then the distributor deals with talent, who participated in proceeds, from its 50%.
So we have that the costs for production were at the level of $160 mln. The costs
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of the distributor for P&A equaled $100 mln. Thus, the compounded costs equal
$260 mln. Let’s assume that the deal for distribution was set with 5 largest movie
theatre chains, and the total number of locations equals 1571 theatres. Thus, the
number of copies released also equals 1571. The house expense per theatre is taken
the same as in previous examples - $5000 per week per location. The movie was on
screens for 16 weeks. Thus, we have the following solution.
q = 1571,
ce1 = ce2 = · · · = ce5 = 5000,
cprd = 260000000,
ϕ = 0, 5.
Then
we = 0, 5 ∗ 260000000
1571
− 80000 = 2750.
So the transfer price per copy is $2750 per copy, meaning that the each theatre
chain, cooperating with the distributor, has to pay $2750 per each copy of the movie
for the rights to show this movie in their movie theaters. In this case, again, the
opportunistic behavior of the parties is eliminated. With the introduction of price
per copy, there appears the dependence on the costs, because their value is used
for calculation of transfer price. Thus, if a theater starts increasing its costs, then
the transfer price will also enlarge, and this is certainly not favorable situation for
exhibitors. So all parties are motivated to act fairly.
Peculiarities of the methodology. In this chapter the methodology has been
developed, which incentivizes all of the participants of the value chain to maximize
the gain of the chain, because unlike in the case of simply participation contracts,
under which they share revenue, with the suggested methodology they share profit
of the chain. This mitigates the opportunistic behavior in the chain, since the par-
ticipnats do not have the incentives to increase their costs on the books anymore.
With the introduction of transfer price, participants get the goods for a certain
amount of money, which is in the direct dependence of the costs: the higher the
costs, the higher will the price to pay be. There are no incentives to artificially di-
minish the costs as well, because the smaller the costs on the books are, the larger
will be the sum of money to pay in accordance to the sharing contracts. Therefore,
all the participants of the chain are motivated to, firstly, act fairly, and, secondly, to
operate efficiently in order to have the costs at the optimal level to stay profitable.
The interesting thing here is that in the international context different schemes
of the participants’ relationship in the value chain are in practice. All of them have
been discussed in the chapter. In the USA due to the large share of the blockbusters
in production, which require extremely large investments, the case of the producer
affiliation with the studio is more spread. This case was considered on the exam-
ple of the movie “Inception”. In Europe, especially in France and Italy, movies are
predominantly independently financed, when the producer usually works with sev-
eral institutional and private investors in order to finance the budget, therefore, the
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case, where the producer and the distributor are separate legal entities, is applicable
here. This case was considered on the example of the movie “Alice in Wonderland”.
Basically, most widely spread cases have been considered and the methodology has
been adjusted for each of them.
4. Conclusion
The problem of cooperation in the movie value chain has been studied, and the
methodology of box-office income allocation has been improved with the adapta-
tion to the motion picture industry environment. Known to the literature methods
of optimal revenue imputation have been investigated, which are Nash bargaining
solution, the core (set of nondominant imputations), Shapley value and Shapley
index. Due to drawbacks of those methods in application to motion picture in-
dustry, because of high specificity of the relationship among the parties involved,
new approaches to the shares of movie revenue allocation computation have been
introduced.
Coordination concept of supply chain has been studied and the possibility to
apply it with some modifications to the motion picture industry has been elicited.
Several types of value chains in movie industry have been considered for develop-
ment of the methodology, which are in use in various countries. The peculiarity of
the elaborated methodology is the introduction of transfer prices between the links
of the chain, which allow transforming the participation contracts between the coun-
teragents to sharing contracts. This innovation would motivate them to work for
profit maximization and eliminate incentives for opportunistic behavior, since the
transfer price is constructed on the basis of the costs of the participants and their
shares in the final allocation of revenues. Therefore, with the introduction of the
suggested methodology, the only optimal behavior for the participants becomes the
fair one, since with the artificial increase of the costs the transfer price they need to
pay will augment, and with the artificial decrease of the costs the amount of money
they need to pay according to the sharing contracts will get bigger. Introduction of
the transfer prices allows the producer reimburse a part of the costs connected with
movie production almost immediately after setting the deal with the distributor,
and avoid waiting long time till the theatrical release of the movie. The same logic
applies to the distributor, since he is able to recoup a part of his costs with the
transfer of copies to the exhibitors without waiting till the movie makes money in
the theaters.
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